Technical failure

On 14.11.2017, Khabarovsk Airlines' representative submitted the flight request for L-410UVP-E20 RA-67047 A/C flight to Joint ATM System Khabarovsk regional unit; the flight (NI 463) was planned along the route Khabarovsk – Nikolayevsk-on-Amur – Nelkan. On 14.11.2017 at 22:00 (local time: on 15.11.2017 at 08:00) at Khabarovsk airport, the preflight preparation was started including the medical examination. While the preflight preparation was being performed, new information was received that Nikolayevsk-on-Amur airport was closed due to the RWY snow removal. In coordination with ATC of Nikolayevsk-on-Amur airport, it was decided to change the route as follows: Khabarovsk – Chyumican – Nelkan. Before coming onboard the crew passed all mandatory preflight procedures as required by the normative documentation. On 15.11.2017, before the departure, Khabarovsk Airlines' technicians provided the line maintenance check in accordance with the F-A Form (Maintenance Job Card #687). No findings in relation to the aircraft and/or systems' operation were reported. The total amount of fuel on board was 1250 kg. The flight crew obtained all the necessary weather information (actual and forecast) during of the preflight weather briefing. The actual weather and the weather forecast for the departure aerodrome, on route weather, the weather forecast for the destination and alternate aerodromes – all met the FAP-128 (Russian FAR) requirements stated in items 5.30 and 5.38, and did not preclude the PIC's decision for departure. There were 2 crew members, 5 passengers and 410 kg of cargo (personal luggage and mail) onboard. The A/C takeoff mass was 6368 kg and the A/C center of gravity was at 25.5% MAC, which was within the AFM limits for the flight. The takeoff from Khabarovsk airport was performed at 23:33. 50 minutes before the approach to Chyumikan aerodrome, the flight crew checked the remaining fuel and requested the Khabarovsk ATC controller for the route change (AFIL): after passing of the OGUMI waypoint to follow the B226 airway to Nelkan destination airport without a stop at Chyumikan. According the initial flight plan, the stop at Chyumikan was intended only for refueling. On 15.11.2017 at 01:47 the Khabarovsk ATC approved the AFIL. At 02:35 the crew contacted the Nelkan Tower controller and received the approach conditions and the actual weather at the landing site. During the approach, at the true height of about 100 m and IAS of about 100 knots, developing the aggressive right roll and losing its altitude, the aircraft left the descending glidepath, collided with the ground and was destroyed. The crew and 4 passengers were killed. A 3-and-half year old child was taken to hospital with serious injuries. Nobody was killed on ground and there was no on-ground damage. The accident area is mountainous, marshy, with broad-leaved and needle-leaved trees. In winter, the area is covered with snow which is about 50-100 cm deep. The accident place ASL elevation is 304 m, the magnetic dip is minus 15°.

The single engine airplane depart Ekimchan Airport at 0834LT on a cargo flight to Udskoye, carrying two pilots and a load of 1,199 kilos of various goods. Six minutes after takeoff, while climbing to an altitude of 1,600 metres, the crew noticed a strong smell of fuel in the cockpit and decided to return. During the descent, flames came out from the engine that started to rough and eventually stopped on short final. The airplane stalled, impacted a birch tree and crashed in a wooded area located 132 metres short of runway 06, bursting into flames. The copilot was killed and the captain was seriously injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

On 02 November 2017, a Perimeter Aviation LP Fairchild SA227-AC Metro III (serial number AC-756B, registration C-FLRY) was operating as flight 959 (PAG959) from Gods River Airport, Manitoba, to Thompson Airport, Manitoba, with 2 flight crew members on board. When the aircraft was approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of Thompson Airport, the crew informed air traffic control that they had received a low oil pressure indication on the left engine that might require the engine to be shut down. The crew did not declare an emergency, but aircraft rescue and firefighting services were put on standby. After touchdown on Runway 24 with both engines operating, the aircraft suddenly veered to the right and exited the runway. The aircraft came to rest in snow north of the runway. The captain and first officer exited the aircraft through the left side over-wing emergency exit and were taken to hospital with minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The 406-MHz emergency locator transmitter did not activate. The occurrence took place during the hours of darkness, at 1920 Central Daylight Time.

The twin engine aircraft departed Dundo Airport at 1658LT on an ambulance flight to Luanda, carrying three doctors, one patient from South Africa and three crew members. About 15 minutes into the flight, the crew reported engine problems when one of them caught fire shortly later. The airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located near Cuilo, about 170 km southwest of Dundo. All seven occupants were killed.

The four engine aircraft departed Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport on a flight to Bukavu, carrying ammunition and two vehicles. Few minutes after takeoff, the crew reported technical problems and was cleared for an immediate return. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a prairie located in Nsele, about 20 km northeast of the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all 12 occupants were killed.

The twin engine airplane departed Příbram Airport Runway 06 at 0705LT on a charter flight to Gdansk, carrying one passenger and one pilot. About 30 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 14,100 feet, the pilot was cleared to climb to FL180 when he declared an emergency and reported the failure of both engines. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a wooded area located 1,5 km northeast of Noviny pod Ralskem, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed Atatürk Airport in Istanbul at 2105LT bound for Ercan with a crew of three and one passenger on board. Shortly after takeoff, an unexpected situation forced the crew to return for an emergency landing. After touchdown on runway 35L, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway, struck a concrete drainage ditch and came to rest, broken in two and bursting into flames. All four occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The commercial pilot stated that, shortly after taking off for a cross-country, personal flight and while accelerating, he noticed high airplane nose-down control forces and that the airplane became increasingly difficult to control. He used manual trim to attempt to trim out the control forces and verified that the autopilot was not engaged; however, the nose-down tendency continued, and the pilot had trouble maintaining altitude. During the subsequent emergency landing, the airframe sustained substantial damage. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the elevator trim push rod assembly was separated from the elevator trim tab actuator, and the end of the elevator trim push rod assembly was found wedged against the elevator's main spar. The elevator trim indicator in the cockpit was found in the nose-up stop position; however, the elevator trim tab was deflected 24° trailing edge up/airplane nose down (the maximum airplane nose-down setting is 6°). A drilled bolt was recovered from inside the right elevator; however, the associated washer, castellated nut, and cotter pin were not found. Examination of the bolt revealed that the threads were damaged and that the bolt hole on one of the clevis yoke halves exhibited deformation, consistent with the bolt separating. About 2 weeks before the accident, the pilot flew the airplane to a maintenance facility for an annual inspection. At that time, Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-07-24, which required installation of new hardware at both ends of the pushrod for the elevator trim tab, was overdue. While the airplane was in for the annual inspection, AD 2016-07-24 was superseded by AD 2016-17-08, which also required the installation of new hardware. The ADs were issued to prevent jamming of the elevator trim tab in a position outside the normal limits of travel due to the loss of the attachment hardware connecting the elevator trim tab actuator to the elevator trim tab push-pull rod, which could result in loss of airplane control. While in for the annual inspection, the airplane was stripped and painted, which would have required removal of the right elevator. Although the repair station personnel indicated that they did not disconnect the elevator trim pushrod from the elevator trim tab actuator when they painted the airplane, photographs taken of the airplane while it was undergoing inspection and painting revealed that the pushrod likely had been disconnected. The repair station owner reported that he reinstalled the right elevator and the elevator trim pushrod after the airplane was painted; however, he did not replace the hardware at either end of the pushrod as required by the ADs. Subsequently, the airplane was approved for return to service. After the annual inspection, no work, repairs, or adjustments were made to the elevator trim system. The airplane had accrued about 58 hours since the annual inspection at the time of the accident. Although reusing the self-locking nut might have resulted in it coming off by itself, the cotter pin should have prevented this from happening. Therefore, although the castellated self-locking nut, washer, and cotter pin normally used to secure the elevator trim pushrod at the elevator trim tab actuator were not found, given the evidence it is likely that the hardware, which was not the required hardware, was not properly secured at installation, which allowed it to separate in flight. It is also likely that the pushrod assembly then moved aft and jammed in a position well past the maximum nose-down trim setting, which rendered controlled flight impossible.

Shortly after takeoff from Goma Airport, while on a cargo flight to Bunia, the crew reported technical problems with the right engine and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. The crew landed long (about half way down the runway) and after touchdown, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and while contacting lava ground, the right main gear and the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest with its right wing bent and all four crew members evacuated safely.

Approximately 20 minutes after takeoff from a private airstrip in Cheshire the pilot reported pitch control problems and stated his intention to divert to Caernarfon Airport. Approximately 5 minutes later, the aircraft struck Runway 25 at Caernarfon Airport, with landing gear and flaps retracted, at high speed, and with no noticeable flare manoeuvre. The aircraft was destroyed. The elevator trim was found in a significantly nose-down position, and whilst the reason for this could not be determined, it is likely it would have caused the pilot considerable difficulty in maintaining control of the aircraft. The extensive fire damage to the wreckage and the limited recorded information made it difficult to determine the cause of this accident with a high level of confidence. A possible scenario is a trim runaway, and both the CAA and the EASA are taking safety action to promote awareness for trim runaways as a result of this accident.