Crash of a Cessna 401 in Tapachula: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 19, 2021 at 0712 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XB-RQE
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tapachula – Ocosingo
MSN:
401-0268
YOM:
1969
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Tapachula Airport Runway 05, while in initial climb, the pilot reported engine problems when control was lost. The aircraft crashed in a mango plantation. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Crash of a Pilatus PC-12/47 in Mesquite

Date & Time: Apr 23, 2020 at 1600 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N477SS
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fort Worth - Mesquite
MSN:
813
YOM:
2007
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On April 23, 2020, about 1600 central daylight time, a Pilatus PC-12 airplane, N477SS, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Mesquite, Texas. The pilot received
serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91 cross-country flight. Preliminary reports indicate the pilot reported to air traffic control that he was losing engine power. The pilot then said he was going to divert to Rockwall (airport) and accepted vectors to the airport. The pilot then reported the loss of engine power had stabilized, so he wanted to return to DFW (Dallas-Fort Worth International airport). A few moments later the pilot reported that he was losing engine power and he needed to go back to Rockwall. The controller reported that the Mesquite airport (HQZ) was at the pilot's 11 o'clock position and about 3 miles and gave a heading. The pilot reported that he was going to perform a 360° turn to set-up for a left base for the Mesquite Airport. The airplane impacted terrain in a muddy field, short of the airport. The airplane's wings separated in the accident and a post-crash fire developed near the wings.

Crash of a Cessna 560XL Citation Excel in Aligarh

Date & Time: Aug 27, 2019 at 0840 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VT-AVV
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New Delhi - Aligarh
MSN:
560-5259
YOM:
2002
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5484
Captain / Total hours on type:
1064.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1365
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1060
Aircraft flight hours:
7688
Circumstances:
On 27 Aug 19, M/s Air Charter Services Pvt Ltd Cessna Citation 560 XL aircraft (VTAVV), while operating a flight from Delhi to Aligarh (Dhanipur Airstrip) was involved in an accident during landing on runway 11.The operator is having a maintenance facility at Aligarh Airport and aircraft was scheduled to undergo ADS-B modification. There were 02 cockpit crew and 04 SOD onboard the aircraft. The aircraft was under the command of a PIC, who was an ATPL holder duly qualified on type with a CPL holder co-pilot, duly qualified on type as Pilot Monitoring. This was the first flight of the day for both pilots. Both, PIC and Co-Pilot had prior experience of operating to Aligarh airport, which is an uncontrolled airport. As per the flight plan, ETD from Delhi was 0800 IST and ETA at Aligarh was 0820 IST. The crew had reported around 0630 IST at Delhi airport and underwent BA test. The MET report to operate the aircraft to Aligarh was well within the VFR conditions. The aircraft Take-off weight was within limits including 1900 Kgs of fuel on board. As per the statement of PIC, the Co-pilot was briefed about pre departure checklists including METAR before approaching the aircraft. Once at the aircraft, prefight checks were carried out by PIC before seeking clearance from Delhi delivery (121.95 MHz). Aircraft was accorded start up clearance by Delhi ground (121.75 Mhz) at 0800 IST.ATC cleared the aircraft to line up on runway 11 and was finally cleared for takeoff at 0821 IST. After takeoff, aircraft changed over to Delhi radar control from tower frequency for further departure instructions. Aircraft was initially cleared by Radar control to climb to FL090 and was given straight routing to Aligarh with final clearance to climb to FL130. Thereafter, aircraft changed to Delhi area control for further instructions. While at approximately 45 Nm from Aligarh, VT-AVV made contact with Aligarh (personnel of M/s Pioneer Flying Club manning radio) on 122.625 MHz. Ground R/T operator informed “wind 100/2-3 Kts, QNH 1005, Runway 11 in use” and that flying of Pioneer Flying Club is in progress. Further, he instructed crew to contact when at 10 Nm inbound. After obtaining initial information from ground R/T operator, VT-AVV requested Delhi area control for descent. The aircraft was cleared for initial descent to FL110 and then further to FL080. On reaching FL080, aircraft was instructed by Delhi area control to change over to Aligarh for further descent instruction in coordination with destination. At approx 10 Nm, VT-AVV contacted ground R/T operator on 122.625 MHz and requested for long finals for runway 11. In turn, ground R/T operator asked crew to report when at 5 Nm inbound. As per PIC, after reaching 5 Nm inbounds, Aligarh cleared VTAVV to descend to circuit altitude and land on runway 11. Aircraft had commenced approach at 5 Nm at an altitude of 2200 ft. Approach and landing checks briefing including wind, runway in use were carried out by PIC. During visual approach, Co-pilot called out to PIC “Slightly low on profile”. As per PIC, Co-pilot call out was duly acknowledged and ROD was corrected. Thereafter, PIC was visual with runway and took over controls on manual. Co-pilot was monitoring instruments and parameters. While PIC was focused on landing, a loud bang from left side of the aircraft was heard by PIC when the aircraft was below 100 feet AGL. Aircraft started pulling towards left and impacted the ground short of runway 11 threshold. After impact, aircraft veered off the runway and its left wing caught fire. The aircraft stopped short of airfield boundary wall. Crew carried out emergency evacuation. Co-pilot opened main exit door from inside of the aircraft for evacuation of passengers. Aircraft was destroyed due to post crash fire. The fire tender reached the crash site after 45 Minutes.
Probable cause:
While landing on runway 11, aircraft main landing gears got entangled in the powerline crossing extended portion of runway , due to which aircraft banked towards left and crash landed on extended portion of runway 11.
Contributory factors:
- It appears that there was a lack of proper pre-flight briefing, planning, preparation and assessment of risk factors.
- Non-Adherence to SOP.
- Sense of complacency seems to have prevailed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation Encore in the Atlantic Ocean: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 24, 2019 at 1755 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N832R
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Saint Louis - Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
560-0585
YOM:
2001
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
9016
Aircraft flight hours:
4744
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot departed on a repositioning flight in the jet airplane. The airplane was in level cruise flight at 39,000 ft mean sea level when the pilot became unresponsive to air traffic controllers. The airplane continued over 300 miles past the destination airport before it descended and impacted the Atlantic Ocean. Neither the pilot nor the airplane were recovered, and the reason for the airplane's impact with water could not be determined based on the available information.
Probable cause:
Impact with water for reasons that could not be determined based on the available information.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410UVP-E20 in Lukla: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 14, 2019 at 0907 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9N-AMH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lukla - Manthali
MSN:
13 29 14
YOM:
2013
Flight number:
GO802D
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
15652
Captain / Total hours on type:
3558.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
865
Copilot / Total hours on type:
636
Aircraft flight hours:
4426
Aircraft flight cycles:
5464
Circumstances:
On 14 April 2019, around 0322Hrs, Aircraft Industries' L410UPV-E20, registration 9NAMH, owned and operated by Summit Air Pvt. Ltd. met with an accident at Tenzing-Hillary Airport, Lukla when it veered right and excurred the runway during take-off roll from runway 24. The aircraft first collided with Manang Air's helicopter, AS350B3e, registration 9N-ALC, with its rotor blade running on idle power and then with Shree Airlines' helicopter, AS350B3e, registration 9N-ALK just outside the inner perimeter fence of the aerodrome into the helipad before coming to a stop. The PIC and Cabin Crew of 9N-AMH survived the accident, whereas the Co-pilot and one security personnel on ground were killed on the spot. One more security personnel succumbed to injury later in hospital during the course of treatment. 9N-AMH and 9N-ALC both were substantially damaged by impact forces. There was no post-crash fire. Prior to the accident the aircraft had completed 3 flights on Ramechhap-Lukla-Ramechhap sector. According to PIC, he was in the left seat as the pilot monitoring (PM) and the co-pilot, in the right seat was the pilot flying (PF). According to CCTV footages, the aircraft arrived at the apron from VNRC to VNLK at 0315Hrs and shut its LH engine. The PIC started the LH engine at about 0318 Hrs after unloading cargo and passengers. At 0322:30 Hrs, the PIC aligned the aircraft with the runway at the runway threshold 24 and then handed over the controls to the co-pilot for the take-off roll. The take-off roll commenced at 0322:50 Hrs. CCTV footage captured that within 3 seconds the aircraft veered right and made an excursion. The aircraft exited the runway and travelled about 42.8 ft across the grassy part on right side of runway 24, before striking the airport inner perimeter fence. It then continued to skid for about 43 ft, into the upper helipad, crashing into 9N-ALC. Eye witnesses statements, CCTV footages and initial examination of the wreckage showed that rotor blades of helicopter 9N-ALC were on idle when RH wing of the aircraft swept two security personnel (on ground) before slashing its rotor shaft. The moving rotors cut through the cockpit on the right side slaying the Co-pilot immediately. The helicopter toppled onto the lower helipad 6 ft below. The LH wing of the aircraft broke the skid of helicopter 9NALK and came to a halt with toppled 9N-ALC beneath its RH main wheel assembly. Due to 2impact, 9N-ALK shifted about 8 ft laterally and suffered minor damages. There was no post-crash fire. The PIC switched off the battery and came out of the aircraft through emergency exit along with the cabin crew. The captain of the helicopter 9N-ALC was rescued immediately. 9N-ALC's crew sustained a broken tail-bone whereas 9N-ALK's crew escaped without sustaining major injuries. All three deceased were Nepalese citizens. Aircraft 9N-AMH and helicopter 9N-ALC were substantially damaged while the helicopter 9N-ALK endured partial damages.
Probable cause:
The commission concluded that the probable cause of the accident was aircraft's veering towards right during initial take-off roll as a result of asymmetric power due to abrupt shifting of right power lever rearwards and failure to abort the takeoff by crew. There were not enough evidences to determine the exact reason for abrupt shifting of the power lever.
Contributing Factors:
1. Failure of the PF(being a less experienced co-pilot) to immediately assess and act upon the abrupt shifting of the right power lever resulted in aircraft veering to the right causing certain time lapse for PIC to take controls in order to initiate correction.
2. PIC's attempted corrections of adding power could not correct the veering. Subsequently, application of brakes resulted in asymmetric braking due to the position of the pedals, and further contributed veering towards right.
Final Report:

Crash of an AMI DC-3-65TP in Kidron: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 21, 2019 at 0912 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N467KS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kidron - Akron
MSN:
20175
YOM:
1944
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
15457
Captain / Total hours on type:
5612.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9969
Copilot / Total hours on type:
12
Aircraft flight hours:
37504
Circumstances:
The two pilots departed in a turbine powered DC-3C at maximum gross weight for a repositioning flight. The airplane was part of a test program for new, higher horsepower engine installation. Soon after liftoff and about 3 seconds after decision speed (V1), the left engine lost total power. The propeller began to auto-feather but stopped feathering about 3 seconds after the power loss. The airplane yawed and banked to the left, descended, and impacted terrain. Recorded engine data indicated the power loss was due to an engine flameout; however, examination of the engine did not determine a reason for the flameout or the auto-feather system interruption. While it is plausible that an air pocket developed in the fuel system during the refueling just before the flight, this scenario was not able to be tested or confirmed. It is possible that the auto-feather system interruption would have occurred if the left power lever was manually retarded during the auto-feather sequence. The power loss and auto-feather system interruption occurred during a critical, time-sensitive phase of flight since the airplane was at low altitude and below minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). The acutely transitional phase of flight would have challenged the pilots' ability to manually feather the propeller quickly and accurately. The time available for the crew to respond to the unexpected event was likely less than needed to recognize the problem and take this necessary action – even as an immediate action checklist/memory item.
Probable cause:
The loss of airplane control after an engine flameout and auto-feather system interruption during the takeoff climb, which resulted in an impact with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A-20 Islander in West Portal: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 8, 2018 at 0828 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-OBL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Cambridge – Bathurst Harbour
MSN:
2035
YOM:
1986
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
540
Captain / Total hours on type:
80.00
Aircraft flight hours:
12428
Circumstances:
On 8 December 2018, the pilot of a Pilatus Britten-Norman BN2A-20 Islander, registered VH-OBL and operated by Airlines of Tasmania, was conducting a positioning flight under the visual flight rules from Cambridge Airport to the Bathurst Harbour aeroplane landing area (ALA), Tasmania. The aircraft departed Cambridge at about 0748 Eastern Daylight-saving Time and was scheduled to arrive at Bathurst Harbour about 0830 to pick up five passengers for the return flight. The passengers were part of a conservation project that flew to south-west Tasmania regularly, and it was the pilot’s only flight for that day. Automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) position and altitude data (refer to the section titled Recorded information) showed the aircraft tracked to the south-west towards Bathurst Harbour (Figure 1). At about 0816, the aircraft approached a gap in the Arthur Range known as ‘the portals’. The portals are a saddle (lowest area) between the Eastern and Western Arthur Range, and was an optional route that Airlines of Tasmania used between Cambridge and Bathurst Harbour when the cloud base prevented flight over the mountain range. After passing through the portals, the aircraft proceeded to conduct a number of turns below the height of the surrounding highest terrain. The final data point recorded was at about At about 0829, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority received advice that an emergency locator transmitter allocated to VH-OBL had activated. They subsequently advised the Tasmanian Police and the aircraft operator of the activation, and initiated search and rescue efforts. The rescue efforts included two helicopters and a Challenger 604 search and rescue jet aircraft. The Challenger arrived over the emergency locator transmitter signal location at around 0925, however, due to cloud cover the crew were unable to visually identify the precise location of VH-OBL. A police rescue helicopter arrived at the search area at about 1030. The pilot of that helicopter reported observing cloud covering the eastern side of the Western Arthur Range, and described a wall of cloud with its base sitting on the bottom of the west portal. Multiple attempts were made throughout the day to locate the accident site, however, due to low-level cloud, and fluctuating weather conditions, the search and rescue operation was unable to confirm visual location of the aircraft until about 1900. The aircraft wreckage was found in mountainous terrain of the Western Arthur Range in the Southwest National Park (Figure 2) . The search and rescue crew assessed that the accident was unlikely to have been survivable. The helicopter crew considered winching personnel to the site, however, due to a number of risks, including potential for cloud reforming, the time of day and lighting, and other hazards associated with the mountainous location, the helicopter departed the area. The aircraft wreckage was accessed the following day, when it was confirmed that the pilot was fatally injured.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the controlled flight into terrain involving Pilatus Britten-Norman BN2A, VH-OBL, 101 km west-south-west of Hobart, Tasmania, on 8 December 2018.
Contributing factors:
• The pilot continued descending over the Arthur Range saddle to a lower altitude than previous flights, likely due to marginal weather. This limited the options for exiting the valley surrounded
by high terrain.
• While using a route through the Arthur Range due to low cloud conditions, the pilot likely encountered reduced visual cues in close proximity to the ground, as per the forecast conditions. This led to controlled flight into terrain while attempting to exit the range.
Final Report:

Crash of a Gulfstream 690C Jetprop 840 off Myrtle Beach

Date & Time: Nov 12, 2018 at 1415 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N840JC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Greater Cumberland - Myrtle Beach
MSN:
690-11676
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The airplane sustained substantial damage when it collided with terrain during an approach to landing at the Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The commercial pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was privately owned and operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Greater Cumberland Regional Airport (CBE), Cumberland, Maryland. According to the pilot, he was following radar vectors for the downwind leg of the traffic pattern to runway 36 at MYR. He turned for final approach and was inside the outer marker, when he encountered heavy turbulence. As he continued the approach, he described what he believed to be a microburst and the airplane started to descend rapidly. The pilot added full power in an attempt to climb, but the airplane continued to descend until it collided with the Atlantic Ocean 1 mile from the approach end of runway 36. A review of pictures of the wreckage provided by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed the cockpit section of the airplane was broken away from the fuselage during the impact sequence. At 1456, the weather recorded at MYR, included broken clouds at 6,000 ft, few clouds at 3,500 ft and wind from 010° at 8 knots. The temperature was 14°C, and the dew point was 9°C. The altimeter setting was 30.27 inches of mercury. The airplane was retained for further examination.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26B near El Alamein

Date & Time: Jul 20, 2018 at 0125 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UP-AN611
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Kiev - El Alamein - Khartoum
MSN:
114 04
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
KUY9554
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a positioning flight from Kiev to Khartoum with an intermediate stop in El Alamein, Egypt. While cruising by night, the crew informed ATC that he was short of fuel and attempted an emergency landing in a desert area located about 50 km east of El Alamein Airport. The aircraft belly landed, slid for few dozen metres and came to rest, broken in two. There was no fire. All six crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is reported that the crew was forced to make an emergency landing due to fuel shortage, probably caused by strong headwinds all along the flight.

Crash of a Cessna 525 CitationJet CJ2+ in Saint-Tropez

Date & Time: Jun 6, 2018 at 1310 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-IULI
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Figari - Saint-Tropez
MSN:
525A-0514
YOM:
2013
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2500
Captain / Total hours on type:
1234.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Figari-Sud-Corse Airport on a positioning flight to Saint-Tropez-La Môle, carrying one passenger and one pilot. Weather conditions at destination were poor with ceiling at 1,800 feet and rain. The pilot contacted Nice Approach and was cleared to descend to 6,000 feet and to report over EM for an approach to La Môle Airport Runway 24. On final approach, the pilot was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, he completed a second approach and landed the airplane 200 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 136 knots. Spoilers were deployed but the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It veered slightly to the left, departed the end of the runway, crossed a river and came to rest against an embankment located about 100 metres past the runway end. The pilot escaped unhurt while the passenger was slighlty injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The landing distance of the airplane on a wet runway as defined in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) performance tables are not compatible with the length of runway available at La Môle Aaerodrome. When preparing the flight, the pilot used the flight record provided by the operator ProAir to determine landing performance. Landing distance on a wet runway presented in the file increased that on a dry runway by 15%. The 15% increase on a wet runway can only be used in conjunction with the increase of 60% imposed in commercial operation, otherwise it may be inappropriate. The value resulting from the calculation was, in this case, wrong and less than the value indicated in the aircraft flight manual. The pilot probably did not use the EFB application for the calculation of performance or the flight manual to verify this value. The pilot thus undertook the flight on the basis of erroneous performance values, without realizing that he could not land at this aerodrome if the runway was wet. In addition, during the final approach, the speed of the aircraft was greater than the speed approach reference and the approach slope was also greater than the nominal slope, which resulted in an increase in the landing distance. During the landing roll, the aircraft exited the runway longitudinally at a speed of 41 kt. The pilot failed to stop the aircraft until it does not violently collide with obstacles at the end of the track.
Contributing factors:
- The operator's use of the same operations manual for two different types of operations;
- The absence in the operations manual of a calculation method, coefficient and safety margin for the calculation of performance in non-commercial transport;
- Lack of knowledge by the pilot and the operator of the method of calculation of landing performance in non-commercial transport;
- The lack of indication in the operations manual that the landing performances at La Môle aerodrome are limiting in case of a wet or contaminated runway.
Final Report: