Crash of a Rockwell Gulfstream 690C Jetprop 840 near Fort Simpson: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 24, 2026 at 1930 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FNRP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
11627
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
Bird Dog 104
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Engaged in a firefighting mission out from Hay River Airport, the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in the Martin Hills, some 50 km west southwest of Fort Simpson. All three occupants were killed.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Makepeace Lake: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 13, 2025 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FDPW
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint Theresa Point - Makepeace Lake
MSN:
1339
YOM:
1959
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane was approaching Makepeace Lake when it crashed in unknown circumstances near the north shore and was destroyed. The pilot was injured while all four passengers, natives from Saint Theresa Point First Nation were killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo C Panther in Deer Lake: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 26, 2025 at 1732 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GYYP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Deer Lake - Deer Lake
MSN:
31-7812026
YOM:
1978
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot departed Deer Lake Airport Runway 25 at 1727LT on a local solo flight. Following a circuit, the airplane made an apparent touch and go then the pilot initiated a new departure. While climbing out, the airplane entered a left turn then descended to the ground and crashed near the airport, bursting into flames. The pilot was killed.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver off Saint-Mathias-sur-Richelieu: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 2, 2025 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FYNT
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint-Mathias-sur-Richelieu - Saint-Mathias-sur-Richelieu
MSN:
1054
YOM:
1956
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
11000
Circumstances:
On the morning of 02 May 2025, the pilot of the float-equipped De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited DHC-2 Mk. I aircraft (registration C-FYNT, serial number 1054) operated by ETA Aviation & César Camp du Nord Inc. arrived at the facilities of the approved maintenance organization Aviation B.L. Inc. at the St‑Mathias Water Aerodrome (CSV9), Quebec. The pilot and the person responsible for maintenance (PRM) discussed the maintenance work that had been done on the 3 aircraft operated by ETA Aviation & César Camp du Nord Inc., which had been stored at Aviation B.L. Inc. over the winter. The weather conditions forecast for that day were suitable for conducting a flight. The aircraft was refueled so that there were approximately 79 imperial gallons of fuel on board. The occurrence aircraft was placed in the water by the pilot, with the help of a passenger (who was also a pilot), and the pilot conducted a preflight inspection. The pilot and the passenger boarded the aircraft and taxied down the river in a northeasterly direction, buckling their safety belts and performing pre-takeoff checks, including the run-up. At approximately 1100, the aircraft began its take-off run in a southwesterly direction to conduct a local private flight under visual flight rules. The pilot attempted to raise the right wing by rotating the control wheel to the left. The left wing began to lift, contrary to the pilot’s expectations. The pilot reacted by rotating the control wheel completely to the left, which only accentuated the lifting of the left wing. The aircraft then rolled to the right, the right wing touched the surface of the water, and the aircraft overturned. The passenger unbuckled his safety belt and tried, in vain, to open the door on his side. He then managed to open the window and was able to egress through it. He received serious injuries to his right arm. After catching his breath at the surface, the passenger went back under the water to try to help the pilot, but the water was very opaque and he had difficulty swimming due to his injury and wet clothing. Eyewitnesses called 911. Emergency services went to the west shore. Given that no boats were immediately available, emergency services tried throwing ropes to the passenger to help him reach the shore. The passenger ultimately had to swim to the west shore on his own, where emergency services assessed him and drove him to the hospital for treatment of his injuries. The pilot was found dead in the aircraft, with his safety belt unbuckled, when the aircraft was brought to shore later that day.
Probable cause:
On 20 October 2024, the occurrence aircraft was brought to the approved maintenance organization’s facilities. The aircraft was then stored for the winter, during which time the annual and 300-hour routine inspections were to be performed. The maintenance work began in February 2025, and while the work was being carried out, a crack that needed to be repaired was noticed in the control column. To perform the repair, the chain linking the control wheel to the aileron system cables had to be removed. After the repair was completed, the chain was reinstalled in mid-March 2025 by the apprentice who had worked on the aircraft and had removed the chain before performing the repair. When the chain was reinstalled, the ends did not match the aileron system cables, so the apprentice asked for assistance from another apprentice to fix the problem. The manufacturer’s procedures were not consulted for reinstalling the chain, and the work was not directly supervised by an aircraft maintenance engineer (AME). After the control column and chain were reinstalled, the apprentice did not check the directional movement of the ailerons. When maintenance work is completed on a flight control system, in addition to AME certification, an independent inspection must also be completed by another qualified person. The certification process and independent inspection both include verifying the assembly and its locking mechanism, as well as verifying the directional movement of the ailerons. In this case, the work was not certified before the independent inspection. Knowing that an independent inspection had to be conducted, the apprentice who performed the maintenance work asked an AME to conduct this independent inspection. During the independent inspection, the AME was reportedly interrupted, and directional movement of the ailerons was not verified. When the PRM certified all the work on 01 and 02 May 2025, the AME who had conducted the independent inspection signed the independent inspection of the flight control system with the same dates.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-900LR in Toronto

Date & Time: Feb 17, 2025 at 1412 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N932XJ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Minneapolis – Toronto
MSN:
15194
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
DL4819
Country:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
76
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Minneapolis-Saint Paul Airport Runway 30R at 1147LT on a schedule service (flight DL4819) to Toronto, carrying 76 passengers and a crew of four. After departure, the airplane continued to the southeast and reached this assigned altitude of 29,000 feet before starting the descent to Toronto. The approach was performed in marginal weather conditions with wind from 270 at 28 knots, gusting 35 knots, a 6 miles surface visibility and blowing snow. Upon touchdown, the airplane went out of control, lost its empennage, both wings and both main landing gear before coming to rest upside down. All 80 occupants were rescued, among them 8 were injured, 3 seriously. First CRJ-900 destroyed in an accident.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo B in Calgary

Date & Time: Aug 16, 2024 at 1244 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FZHG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jasper – Calgary
MSN:
31-753
YOM:
1971
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
A Piper PA-31 Navajo operated by Airborne Energy Solutions Inc. was conducting a round robin instrument flight rules flight from Calgary International Airport (CYYC), AB, to Hinton/Entrance Aerodrome (CEE4), AB, and back to CYYC with only the pilot on board. The plan was to conduct the flight without refueling in CEE4. Prior to departure from CEE4, the pilot determined there was sufficient fuel for the return flight to CYYC. While in cruise, with the left engine being supplied by the left outboard tank, the pilot observed the left engine fuel pressure start to fluctuate, and the engine operation became erratic. The pilot then selected the left engine to run on the left inboard fuel tank. Concerned about the fuel quantity in the left-wing fuel tanks, the pilot elected to cross feed the left engine from the right-side fuel system. During the final approach into CYYC the right engine stopped running. The pilot secured the right engine, feathered the propeller, declared a Mayday with ATS and elected to continue the approach. Two to three minutes later, the left engine stopped operating, and the pilot proceeded to perform a forced approach onto a golf course located directly south of the approach end for Runway 35R. The aircraft came to a rest approximately 1/2 nm south of the threshold for Runway 35R. The pilot received minor injuries; however, the aircraft was substantially damaged. There was no post-accident fire. On site post-accident examination of the aircraft found the left-hand fuel selector in the outboard position, the right-hand fuel selector in the off position and the cross-feed valve in the off (normal) position. The aircraft was subsequently removed from the golf course and transported to a secure location for further investigation. The investigation found that there was no fuel remaining in the left inboard, left outboard and left nacelle fuel tanks. The right nacelle tank was empty, however approximately 24 USG were recovered from the right inboard, and approximately 29 USG were recovered from the right outboard fuel tanks.

Crash of a Beechcraft B100 King Air in Lake Simcoe

Date & Time: Aug 13, 2024 at 1225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FTFT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Toronto - Lake Simcoe
MSN:
BE-49
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
TOR804
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew departed Toronto-Lester Bowles Pearson Airport in the morning to perform training at Lake Simcoe Regional Airport under flight number TOR804. After performing several approaches and touch-and-go, the crew was completing an approach to runway 28 when the airplane belly landed. It slid for few dozen metres before coming to a halt, bursting into flames. All three crew members evacuated safely but the airplane was totally destroyed by fire.

Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III in Tofino: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 18, 2024 at 1243 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N264DC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tofino - Portland
MSN:
421C-1248
YOM:
1982
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
828
Captain / Total hours on type:
113.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2795
Circumstances:
The privately registered Cessna 421C aircraft was conducting a recreational instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Tofino-Long Beach Airport (CYAZ), British Columbia (BC), to Portland International Airport (KPDX), Oregon, United States, carrying one pilot and two passengers. The aircraft departed runway 16 at approximately 1242LT. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft occupants observed flames coming from the top of the right engine cowling. The aircraft turned east, joined the left downwind leg for runway 25, and levelled off at approximately 320 feet above ground level (AGL). The aircraft subsequently performed a descending steep turn toward the threshold of runway 25 but overshot the runway centreline to the north. During this turn, the aircraft’s rate of descent increased significantly. At 1243LT, approximately one minute after takeoff, the aircraft impacted the ground north of runway 25 in a wings-level attitude with the landing gear extended and the flaps partially extended. The initial point of impact was approximately 206 feet past the runway threshold and 157 feet north of the paved surface of runway 25. Post impact, the main landing gear separated from the aircraft while the aircraft travelled approximately 450 feet along the ground before coming to rest. When the aircraft was at approximately the mid-point of the distance travelled on the ground, it caught fire. One passenger received serious injuries but was able to exit the aircraft. The pilot and the 2nd passenger were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by the post-impact fire. The Canadian Mission Control Centre did not receive an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal from the aircraft.
Probable cause:
An in-flight fire, located in the right engine nacelle, occurred just after takeoff. The fire characteristics were consistent with a turbocharger exhaust fire resulting from a disconnected turbocharger exhaust pipe. It is unknown if the aircraft fire warning system activated.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Red Lake: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 16, 2024 at 0655 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GBZH
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chukuni River - Thicketwood Lake
MSN:
1518
YOM:
1963
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1773
Captain / Total hours on type:
816.00
Aircraft flight hours:
13590
Circumstances:
The float-equipped aircraft operated by Canadian Fly-in Fishing was preparing to depart from the Chukuni River, approximately 2.2 nautical miles (NM) southeast of the Red Lake (Howey Bay) Water Aerodrome (CKS4), on a visual flight rules flight to Thicketwood Lake. At approximately 0653LT the aircraft departed with the pilot, 4 passengers, and cargo on board. Winds were observed by the pilot to be from the south. A normal takeoff was conducted with the flaps in the TAKEOFF setting, and with the heading approximately 120° magnetic. The aircraft accelerated and lifted off as planned about halfway down the waterway (approximately 2,500 feet downriver). As the aircraft gained airspeed to 80 mph, the pilot initiated a climb. Once the climb was established at approximately 100 feet above water, the pilot reduced the engine power to 30 inches of manifold pressure at 2,000 rpm. Along with this power change, the wing flaps were raised from the TAKEOFF position to the CLIMB position. Shortly thereafter, the pilot noticed the aircraft descending, accompanied by a decrease in airspeed to 60 mph. The pilot pushed forward on the control wheel and simultaneously added full power in an attempt to regain airspeed. The aircraft’s airspeed did not increase, and the pilot made a turn to the right, into the wind. At a height of approximately 80 feet above the water, the aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall, with a roll to the right. Aircraft control was lost and, at 0655LT, the aircraft collided with the shoreline in a nose-down, banked attitude. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There was no post-impact fire. The emergency locator transmitter activated. The aircraft occupants were all partially submerged in water when the aircraft came to rest. The pilot egressed through the right-side door and assisted the front-seat passenger out of the aircraft while the other 3 passengers were assisted from the aircraft by local residents. Two of the passengers, who had been seated in the left and right back seats, were seriously injured and were airlifted to hospital in Thunder Bay. One of these passengers subsequently died while in hospital. The pilot and the 2 other passengers were medically evaluated at a local hospital and released.
Probable cause:
Based on the aircraft’s configuration and the most accurate weight information available to the investigation, it was determined that, at the time of takeoff, the estimated weight of the aircraft was 334 pounds over the maximum gross take-off weight of 5,090 pounds, but within the correct centre of gravity range. The operator’s take-off weight calculation prior to the flight was 5,359 pounds as the passenger weights were averaged from a group weigh-in as per the company operations manual approved by TC. The eight passengers weighed a total of 1,812 pounds. The group was then split between two aircraft, four passengers in each. One of the passengers weighed significantly more than the average for the group and was positioned in the occurrence aircraft, resulting in a gross weight increase that was not accounted for.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAe 3212 Jetstream 32 in Fort Smith: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jan 23, 2024 at 0642 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FNAA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fort Smith – Diavik
MSN:
929
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
PLR738
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
8277
Captain / Total hours on type:
627.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
717
Copilot / Total hours on type:
467
Aircraft flight hours:
24405
Circumstances:
At 0641LT, during the hours of darkness, the takeoff run on Runway 30 commenced. Eight seconds after liftoff, at a height of approximately 100 feet above ground level (AGL), the copilot (FO) observed an abnormal landing gear indication and notified the captain. Two seconds later, the FO called for the captain to reduce the speed; the captain acknowledged, and two brief changes in propeller rpm occurred within six seconds. During the initial climb, the captain maintained a shallow climb angle and attitude, the aircraft’s speed increased to approximately 165 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and the aircraft reached a maximum height of approximately 140 feet AGL. At this point, the aircraft began a shallow descent. Six seconds later, the FO observed that the aircraft was losing altitude and called “Descending”. One second later, the terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) began to produce an aural alert and, simultaneously, the aircraft impacted trees 0.5 nautical miles (NM) past the end of Runway 30. During this impact, the left-wing structure was compromised, resulting in a fireball. Approximately three seconds after the aircraft’s initial collision, the aircraft impacted additional trees and then terrain 0.6 NM from the end of Runway 30 and 0.1 NM left of the extended runway centreline. During the final portion of the accident sequence, one passenger was ejected from the aircraft (the seat and safety belt remained in the aircraft) and received minor injuries. All six other occupants were killed and the airplane was destroyed.
Probable cause:
These are the factors that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence:
- During departure, the captain intentionally kept a low pitch attitude and a high airspeed to remove possible snow accumulation on the aircraft. As a result, the aircraft’s departure profile was closer to the ground than it would be on a standard departure.
- When the captain and first officer attempted to raise the landing gear, the combination of an outside air temperature colder than approximately −20 °C and the air load on the landing gear from the increased speed resulted in one of the main landing gear units, likely the left unit, not fully retracting.
- Following the first officer’s call to reduce airspeed, the captain reduced engine power to reduce the aircraft’s speed and allow the main landing gear to fully retract. As a result of the decreased power, the aircraft entered an inadvertent descent at 140 feet above ground level.
- The captain and first officer were likely preoccupied with the abnormal main landing gear indication and the aircraft’s airspeed and did not notice the aircraft’s loss of altitude until immediately before impact. As a result, the aircraft impacted trees and terrain 10 seconds after the descent began.
Final Report: