United States of America

The airplane touched down at night about 1,400 feet down the 3,864-foot runway and overran the runway surface, coming to rest about 851 feet beyond the departure end. The pilot was operating the airplane using a single-pilot waiver that he obtained two months prior to the accident. The airplane was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration with a flight crew of two. The pilot was returning from a personal event with his family, and landing at his home airport when the accident occurred. Witnesses stated that the pilot’s approach into the airport was not consistent with previous approaches in which the airplane would touch down directly on the runway numbers. They also stated that they heard the thrust reversers deploy, and then return to the stowed position. The airplane flight manual states that once the thrust reversers have been deployed, a pilot should not attempt to restow the thrust reversers and take off. Two sink rate warnings were issued during the approach to landing which should have alerted the pilot of the unstabilized approach. Performance calculations showed that the airplane would have required an additional 765 to 2,217 feet of runway for a full stop landing.

The private pilot receiving instruction and his flight instructor departed on runway 06 with a headwind of 17 knots gusting to 23 knots. Witnesses said that the pilot had transmitted on Common Traffic Advisor Frequency the intention of practicing a loss of engine power after takeoff, and turning 180 degrees to return to the airport. Another witness said that the airplane pitched up 30 degrees while simultaneously banking hard to the right in an uncoordinated manner. He said that as the airplane rolled to the right, the nose of the airplane yawed down to nearly 45 degrees below the horizon. Subsequently, the airplane's wings rolled level, but the aircraft was still pitched nose down. He said the airplane appeared to be recovering from its dive. A witness said that the airplane appeared to be in a landing flare when he observed dirt and grass flying up behind the aircraft. He said the airplane's right wing tip and engine impacted terrain, and a fire ensued that consumed the airplane. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane's right wingtip hit a 10 inch in diameter rock and immediately impacted a wire fence 10 inches above the ground. Approximately 120 feet of triple wire fence continued with the airplane to the point of rest. No preimpact engine or airframe anomalies which might have affected the airplane's performance were identified. The weight and balance was computed for the accident airplane at the time of the accident and the center of gravity was determined to be approximately one inch forward of the forward limit.

According to the pilot, passenger, and several witnesses, during takeoff the light jet became airborne momentarily, and then banked aggressively to the left. It impacted the runway in a left wing low attitude and cartwheeled down the runway. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies. Approximately 1.5 minutes before the airplane was cleared for takeoff, a De Havilland Dash 8 (DH-8) airplane departed. A wake turbulence study conducted by an NTSB aircraft performance engineer concluded that even slight movement in the atmosphere would have caused the circulation of the vortices near the accident site to decay to zero within two minutes, that is, before the time accident jet would have encountered the wake from the DH-8. The study states, in part: "Given the time of day of the accident, consistent reports of easterly surface wind speeds on the order of 6 to 7 knots, higher wind speeds aloft, and the mountainous terrain near Colorado Springs, it is unlikely that the atmosphere was quiescent enough to allow the wake vortices near the Sport-Jet to retain any significant circulation after two minutes. Furthermore, easterly surface winds would have blown the wake vortices well to the west of the runway by the time of the accident. Consequently, while in smooth air the wake vortices from the DH-8 that preceded Sport-Jet off of the runway may have retained enough circulation after two minutes to produce rolling moments on Sport-Jet on the order of the rolling moment available from the Sport-Jet's ailerons, it is most likely that the wake vortices were neither strong enough nor close enough to the Sport-Jet to cause the violent roll to the left reported by the pilot and witnesses to the accident."

The first officer reported that during cruise flight, both propeller secondary low pitch stop (SLPS) lights illuminated, indicating the SLPS system prevented both propellers from going below the low pitch hydraulic mechanical stop. The right occurred first, then the left approximately 1 minute later. Emergency procedures to correct the condition were ineffective. The right propeller feathered at some point during the flight, and the first officer reported that while operating single engine, they experienced a problem with the propeller governor. The flight proceeded direct to an airport with short runways approximately 3.2 nautical miles (nm) northwest of their present position, rather than to an air carrier airport located 8.5 nm away. The captain entered a close-in right base to runway 35 (2,688 feet long runway), while flying at 155 knots (51 knots above single engine reference speed). He turned onto final approach with the landing gear and flaps retracted, but overshot the runway. The airplane contacted a taxiway near the departure end of intended runway, and then collided with several obstacles before coming to rest at a house located past the departure end of runway 35. A post crash fire consumed the cockpit, cabin, and sections of both wings. Post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No determination was made as to the reason for the annunciation of both SLPS lights.

Prior to departure on the maintenance repositioning flight, the captain discussed with the first officer an uneven fuel balance that they could "fix" once airborne, and a 25,000 feet msl restriction because of an inoperative air conditioning/pressurization pack. The captain also commented about the right pack "misbehaving", and a bleed valve failure warning. The captain also commented about aborting below 80 knots for everything, except for the bleed shutoff valve. During the takeoff roll, a single chime was heard, and the first officer reported a bleed valve fail message. The captain responded, "ignore it." Another chime was heard, and the first officer reported "lateral mode fail, pusher fail." The captain asked about airspeed and was advised of an "indicated airspeed miscompare." The captain initiated the aborted takeoff approximately 13 seconds after the second chime was heard. The crew was unable to stop the airplane, and it went off the end of the runway, and impacted obstructions and terrain. According to the flight data recorder, peak groundspeed was 152 knots and the time the aborted takeoff was initiated, and indicated airspeed was 78.5 knots. The captain and the airplane owner's director of maintenance were aware of several mechanical discrepancies prior to the flight, and the captain had advised the first officer that the flight was for "routine maintenance," but that the airplane was airworthy. Prior to the flight the first officer found "reddish clay" in one of the pitot tubes and removed it. A mechanic and the captain examined the pitot tube, and determined the tube was not obstructed. The captain's pitot tube was later found to be partially blocked with an insect nest. A postaccident examination of the airplane and aircraft maintenance log revealed that no discrepancies were entered in the log, and no placards or "inoperative" decals were affixed in the cockpit.

The crew briefed the Instrument Landing System approach, including the missed approach procedures. Weather at the time included a 100-foot broken cloud layer, and at the airport, 2 miles visibility. The approach was flown over water, and at the accident location, there was dense fog. Two smaller airplanes had successfully completed the approach prior to the accident airplane. The captain flew the approach and the first officer made 100-foot callouts during the final descent, until 200 feet above the decision height. At that point, the captain asked the first officer if he saw anything. The first officer reported "ground contact," then noted "decision height." The captain immediately reported "I got the lights" which the first officer confirmed. The captain reduced the power to flight idle. Approximately 4 seconds later, the captain attempted to increase power. However, the engines did not have time to respond before the airplane descended into the water and impacted a series of approach light stanchions, commencing about 2,000 feet from the runway. Neither crew member continued to call out altitudes after seeing the approach lights, and the captain descended the airplane below the decision height before having the requisite descent criteria. The absence of ground references could have been conducive to a featureless terrain illusion in which the captain would have believed that the airplane was at a higher altitude than it actually was. There were
no mechanical anomalies which would have precluded normal airplane operation.

The commercial certificated pilot was departing a remote bay with five passengers in an amphibious float-equipped airplane on the return portion of a Title 14, CFR Part 135 sightseeing flight. The pilot began the takeoff run toward the north, with the wind from the north between 15 to 20 knots, and 4 to 6 foot sea swells. When the airplane had climbed to about 10 to 15 feet, the pilot said a windshear was encountered, which pushed the airplane down. The airplane's floats struck a wave, missed about 4 to 5 swells, and then struck another wave, which produced a loud "bang." The company guide, seated in the right front seat, told the pilot that the right float assembly was broken and displaced upward. The airplane cleared a few additional swells, and then collided with the water. Both float assemblies were crushed upward, and the left float began flooding. The guide exited the airplane onto the right float, and made a distress call via a satellite telephone. All occupants donned a life preserver as the airplane began sinking. The pilot said that after about 15 minutes, the rising water level in the airplane necessitated an evacuation, and all occupants exited into the water, and held onto the right float as the airplane rolled left. The airplane remained floating from the right float, and was being moved away from shore by wind and wave action. The pilot said that one passenger was washed away from the float within about 5 minutes, and two more passengers followed shortly thereafter. Within about 5 minutes after entering the water, the pilot said he lost his grip on the float, and does not remember anything further until regaining consciousness in a hospital. He was told by medical staff that he had been severely hypothermic. U.S. Coast Guard aircraft were already airborne on a training mission, and diverted to rescue the occupants. About 1320, a C-130 flew overhead, and began dropping inflatable rafts. The company guide was the only one able to climb into a raft. When the helicopters arrived, they completed the rescue using a hoist and a rescue swimmer. The passengers reported that they also were unable to hold onto the airplane after entering the water, became unconscious, and were severely hypothermic upon reaching a hospital. The airplane was not equipped with a life raft, and was not required to be so equipped.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Greensboro, NC, the aircraft made a wheels-up landing on runway 18 at Myrtle Beach Airport, SC. The aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the main runway. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot obtained a weather briefing from an Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) and filed an IFR flight plan before departing on an IFR flight from Cornelia, Georgia, to Pensacola, Florida, on May 10, 2006.The flight service specialist provided information on a line of embedded thunderstorm activity along the route from Atlanta to Mobile including SIGMETs and advised that tops were forecasted to be at 41,000 to 50,000 feet. The specialist suggested that the pilot not depart immediately because of the weather, but said that it might be possible to land at an intermediate stop ahead of the weather, possibly in Pensacola or further north in the Crestview area. The pilot filed an IFR flight plan from Cornelia to Pensacola at 16,000 feet. The pilot called the AFSS again and requested an IFR clearance. The specialist responded that the clearance was on request, and that he would work on the void time and placed the pilot on hold. The specialist obtained the clearance from Atlanta Center and returned back to provide the clearance to the pilot. The pilot was not on the telephone line. The pilot departed Cornelia without an IFR clearance and contacted Atlanta Center. The controller informed the pilot on initial contact that he was not on his assigned heading, altitude, correct transponder code, and subsequently handed the pilot off to another controller. The flight was subsequently cleared direct to Panama City, Florida, and the pilot was instructed to climb to 16,000 feet. Atlanta Center broadcasted weather alerts over the radio frequency the pilot was on for Center Weather Advisory 101, SIGMETS 73C, 74C,and AIRMET Sierra between 0903 to 0913 CDT. The National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center, issued Severe Thunderstorm Watch 329 valid from 0635 CDT until 1300 CDT. The National Weather Service Aviation Weather Center issued Convective SIGMET 73C valid from 0855 CDT until 1055 CDT. The SIGMET was for a line of thunderstorms 40 nautical miles wide, and moving from 280 degrees at 35 knots. The tops of the thunderstorms were at 44,000 feet, with 2-inch hail, and possible wind gusts up to 60 knots. These weather alerts included the route of flight for the accident airplane. The controllers did not issue the pilot with severe radar-depicted weather information that was displayed on the controller's radar display. The airplane was observed on radar level at 16,000 feet at 09:19:48 CDT heading southwest. The airplane was observed to began a continuous left turn northwest bound at 15,700 feet at 09:20:38. The pilot called Atlanta center at 09:20:48 CDT and stated, "Aero Star six eight triple nine we're going to make a reverse." and there was no further radio contact with the pilot. The last radar return was at 09:20:59. The airplane was at 15, 600 feet. The wreckage was located on May 11, 2006. Examination of the wreckage revealed the right wing separated 9 feet 2 inches outboard of the wing root. The separated outboard section of the right wing was not recovered. The components were forwarded to the NTSB Laboratory for further examination. Examination of the components revealed the deformation patterns found on the fracture surfaces were consistent with upward bending overstress of the right wing.

The commercial certificated pilot was positioning the multi-engine, retractable landing gear airplane for a corporate passenger flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. Upon landing at the destination, the pilot aborted the landing, and after climbing to about 100 feet agl descended, impacting in a canal. A witness who was not looking towards the runway, reported hearing the sound of a twin engine airplane approaching with the engines at reduced power, and then heard a scraping noise similar to the recent gear-up landing he had witnessed. Looking toward the runway, he said the airplane was midfield, left of the runway centerline, about 20 feet in the air with the landing gear retracted, and that he saw a cloud of dust, and heard what he thought was full engine power being applied. He said the airplane climbed to about 100 feet agl, and disappeared from view. Another witness with a portable VHF radio tuned to the unicom frequency, reported hearing the pilot say he was "doing an emergency go-around." The airplane descended striking utility poles, and impacted in a saltwater canal. An examination of the airport runway revealed a set of parallel propeller strike marks. The left and right sets of marks were 109 and 113 feet long, and the mark's center-to-center measurement is consistent with the engine centerline-to-centerline measurement for the accident airplane. No landing gear marks were observed. The airplane's six propeller blades had extensive torsional twisting and bending, as-well-as extensive chord wise scratching and abrasion. Several of the blades had fractured or missing tips. An examination of the cockpit showed the landing gear retraction/extension handle was in the up/retracted position, and the landing gear extension warning horn circuit breaker was in the pulled/tripped position. The landing gear emergency extension handle was in the stowed position. The nose landing gear was damaged during final impact, and was not functional. During the postimpact examination, both the left and right main landing gear were stowed in the up and locked/retracted position. The landing gear were released/unlocked and operated appropriately using the emergency extension handle. An examination of the left and right main landing gear showed no damage to the wheel doors, leg doors, wheels, or tires. All linkages and locking devices were undamaged, and appeared to function normally.