Florida

Approaching Key West-Intl Airport on a flight from Orlando, the airplane suffered an engine failure and was ditched about 25 km northeast of the destination. The pilot was rescued and was uninjured while the airplane sank and was lost.

Shortly after takeoff from Saint Augustine Airport, while in initial climb, the airplane contacted trees and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. Both occupants and their dog escaped with minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Shortly after takeoff from Port Orange-Spruce Creek Airport Runway 23, the single engine airplane encountered difficulties to gain height, impacted trees and crashed on a golf course located south of the airfield. Both occupants were rescued, among them one was slightly injured. The airplane was destroyed.

The single engine airplane landed last October at Dade-Collier Airport, in the center of the Everglades National Park, following a flight from Sancti Spíritus, Cuba. The pilot defected Cuba and landed safely in the US. On November 14, in unclear circumstances, maybe while being transferred to Opa Locka Airport, the airplane crashed in a marshy area located 25 km west of Opa Locka Airport. Both occupants were uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to Kissimmee-Gateway Airport in marginal weather conditions, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed in a marshy and wooded area located about 10 km short of runway 33. All three occupants were injured, one seriously.

Following an uneventful flight from Santo Domingo-Las Américas Airport, the crew was cleared to land on runway 09 at Miami-Intl Airport. According to a video, it is believed that both main landing gear were not properly extended upon touchdown. The airplane rolled for few hundred metres then deviated to the left and departed the runway to the left. It collided with obstacles, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a grassy area, bursting into flames. Fire was quickly extinguished. All 126 occupants evacuated safely, among them three passengers were taken to Jackson Hospital.

On December 29, 2021, at 1622 eastern standard time, a Cessna 207 airplane, N1596U, sustained minor damage when it was involved in an accident in the Florida Bay near Marathon, Florida. The pilot sustained serious injuries and the two passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated by ExecAir of Naples as an on-demand passenger flight under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. According to the operator, the pilot reported that the takeoff from The Florida Keys Marathon International Airport (MTH), Marathon, Florida was normal, and the flight progressed oncourse over water toward the destination of Naples Municipal Airport (APF), Naples, Florida. Once the airplane reached about 3,500 ft mean sea level, a “bang” from the engine was heard, which was immediately followed by a total loss of engine power and oil spraying onto the cowling. The pilot briefed the passengers that they would not be able to make it to land and to prepare for a water landing. Subsequently, the ditching was accomplished in open water, the airplane remained upright, and everyone evacuated the airplane. About 10-15 minutes later, a passing pleasure vessel rescued the occupants and a United States Coast Guard helicopter also arrived shortly thereafter. Review of photographs of the airplane after it was recovered to land revealed that it sustained minor damage to areas of the cowling, fuselage, and wings. Photos of the engine (Continental Motors, IO-520-F) revealed that a large fracture hole was sustained to the crankcase near the No. 2 cylinder, with several internal engine components protruding from the area. The magnetos were also observed to have fractured from their attach points and were resting on top of the engine. The propeller was intact and showed minimal damage.

The flight crew, which consisted of the pilot- and second-in-command (PIC and SIC), and a non-type-rated observer pilot, reported that during takeoff near 100 knots a violent shimmy developed at the nose landing gear (NLG). The PIC aborted the takeoff and during the abort procedure, the NLG separated. The airplane veered off the runway, and the right wing and right main landing gear struck approach lights, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The passengers and flight crew evacuated the airplane without incident through the main cabin door. Postaccident interviews revealed that following towing operations prior to the flight crew’s arrival, ground personnel were unable to get the plunger button and locking balls of the NLG’s removable pip pin to release normally. Following a brief troubleshooting effort by the ground crew, the pip pin’s plunger button remained stuck fully inward, and the locking balls remained retracted. The ground crew re-installed the pip pin through the steering collar with the upper torque link arm connected. However, with the locking balls in the retracted position, the pin was not secured in position as it should have been. Further, the ground personnel could not install the safety pin through the pip pin because the pin’s design prevented the safety pin from being inserted if the locking balls and plunger were not released. The ground personnel left the safety pin hanging from its lanyard on the right side of the NLG. The ground personnel subsequently informed their ramp supervisor of the anomaly. The supervisor reported that he informed the first arriving crewmember at the airplane (the observer pilot) that the nose pin needed to be checked. However, all three pilots reported that no ground crewmember told them about any issues with the NLG or pins. Examination of the runway environment revealed that the first item of debris located on the runway was the pip pin. Shortly after this location, tire swivel marks were located near the runway centerline, which were followed by large scrape and tire marks, leading to the separated NLG. The safety pin remained attached to the NLG via its lanyard and was undamaged. Postaccident examination and testing of the NLG and its pins revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The sticking of the pip pin plunger button that the ground crew reported experiencing could not be duplicated during postaccident testing. When installed on the NLG, the locking ball mechanism worked as intended, and the pip pin could not be removed by hand. Although the airplane’s preflight checklist called for a visual check of the NLG’s torque link to ensure that it was connected to the steering collar by the pip pin and that the safety pin was installed, it is likely that none of the pilots noticed that the pip pin did not have its safety pin installed during preflight. Subsequently, during the takeoff roll, without the locking balls extended, the pip pin likely moved outward and fell from its position holding the upper torque link arm. This allowed the upper torque link arm to move freely, which resulted in the violent shimmy and NLG separation. The location of the debris on the runway, tire marks, and postaccident examination and testing support this likely chain of events. Contributing to the PIC and SIC’s omission during preflight was the ground crew’s failure to directly inform the PIC or SIC that there was a problem with the NLG pip pin. The ground crew also failed to discard the malfunctioning pip pin per the airplane’s ground handling procedures and instead re-installed the pip pin. Although the observer pilot was reportedly informed of an issue with a nose gear pin, he was not qualified to act as a required flight crewmember for the airplane and was on his cell phone when he was reportedly informed of the issue by the ramp supervisor. These factors likely contributed to the miscommunication and the PIC’s and SIC’s subsequent lack of awareness of the NLG issue.

Few minutes after takeoff from LaBelle Airport, the twin engine airplane crashed into trees located in a church garden located less than 2 km east of the airport. Apparently, the passenger survived while the pilot was killed. Engine failure was reported by the survivor.

After takeoff from his home airport with about 50 gallons of fuel in each fuel tank, the pilot climbed to 7,000 ft and proceeded to his destination. When he was about halfway there, he switched from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. Immediately after switching fuel tanks, the engine started to sputter and lost power. The pilot switched back to the right fuel tank but there was no change. He then tried different power settings, adjusted the mixture to full rich and switched tanks again without regaining engine power. The pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he was having an engine problem and needed to land at the nearest airport. ATC instructed him contact the control tower at the nearest airport and cleared him to land. The pilot advised the controller that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport and that he was going to land in the water. During the water landing, the airplane came to a sudden stop. The pilot and his passenger then egressed, and the airplane sank. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed about 2 months prior to the accident and test flights associated with the annual inspection had all been done with the fuel selector selected to the right fuel tank, and this was the first time he had selected the left fuel tank since before the annual inspection. The airplane was equipped with an engine monitor that was capable of recording engine parameters. Examination of the data revealed that around the time of the loss of engine power, exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature experienced a rapid decrease on all cylinders along with a rapid decrease of turbine inlet temperature, which was indicative of the engine being starved of fuel. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. During examination of the fuel system, the fuel selector was observed in the RIGHT fuel tank position and was confirmed to be in the right fuel tank position with low pressure air. However, when the fuel selector was positioned to the LEFT fuel tank position, continuity could not be established with low pressure air. Further examination revealed that a fuel selector valve labeled FERRY TANK was installed in the left fuel line between the factory-installed fuel selector and the left fuel tank. The ferry tank fuel selector was observed to be in the ON position, which blocked continuity from the left fuel tank to the engine. Continuity could only be established when the ferry tank fuel selector was positioned to the OFF position. With low pressure air, no continuity could be established from the ferry tank fuel line that attached to the ferry tank’s fuel selector. The ferry tank fuel selector valve was mounted between the pilot and copilot seats on the forward side of the main wing spar in the area where the pilot and copilot would normally enter and exit the cockpit. This location was such that the selector handle could easily be inadvertently kicked or moved by a person or object. A guard was not installed over the ferry tank fuel selector valve nor was the selector valve handle safety wired in the OFF position to deactivate the valve even though a ferry tank was not installed. Review of the airplane’s history revealed that about 3 years before the accident, the airplane had been used for an around-the-world flight by the pilot and that prior to the flight, a ferry tank had been installed. A review of maintenance records did not reveal any logbook entries or associated paperwork for the ferry tank installation and/or removal, except for a copy of the one-page fuel system schematic from the maintenance manual with a handwritten annotation (“Tank”), and hand drawn lines, both added to it in blue ink. A review of Federal Aviation Administration records did not reveal any record of a FAA Form 337 (Major Repair or Alteration) or a supplemental type certificate for installation of the ferry tank or the modification to the fuel system.