code

AL

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500B near Sylacauga

Date & Time: Jan 28, 2023 at 1740 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N107DF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tampa - Birmingham
MSN:
500B-1191-97
YOM:
1962
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The pilot departed Tampa Executive Airport at 1550LT on a cargo flight to Birmingham, Alabama. About two hours and a half into the flight, while approaching Birmingham-Shuttlesworth Airport from the southeast at an altitude of 5,800 feet, the pilot initiated a 180 turn in an apparent attempt to divert to Sylacauga Airport. Shortly later, the twin engine airplane impacted the ground and crashed into trees some 5 km north of Sylacauga Airport which is located 60 km southeast of Birmingham-Shuttlesworth Airport. The pilot was transported to local hospital but seems to be uninjured.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-325 Navajo C/R in Tuscaloosa: 6 killed

Date & Time: Aug 14, 2016 at 1115 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N447SA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kissimmee – Oxford
MSN:
31-8312016
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
749
Captain / Total hours on type:
48.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3447
Circumstances:
The private pilot and five passengers departed on a day instrument flight rules cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane. Before departure, the airplane was serviced to capacity with fuel, which corresponded to an endurance of about 5 hours. About 1 hour 45 minutes after reaching the flight's cruise altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level, the pilot reported a failure of the right engine fuel pump and requested to divert to the nearest airport. About 7 minutes later, the pilot reported that he "lost both fuel pumps" and stated that the airplane had no engine power. The pilot continued toward the diversion airport and the airplane descended until it impacted trees about 1,650 ft short of the approach end of the runway; a postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The propellers of both engines were found in the unfeathered position. All six of the fuel pumps on the airplane were functionally tested or disassembled, and none exhibited any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. Corrosion was noted in the right fuel boost pump, which was likely the result of water contamination during firefighting efforts by first responders. The airplane was equipped with 4 fuel tanks, comprising an outboard and an inboard fuel tank in each wing. The left and right engine fuel selector valves and corresponding fuel selector handles were found in the outboard tank positions. Given the airplane's fuel state upon departure and review of fuel consumption notes in the flight log from the day of the accident, the airplane's outboard tanks contained sufficient fuel for about 1 hour 45 minutes of flight, which corresponds to when the pilot first reported a fuel pump anomaly to air traffic control. The data downloaded from the engine data monitor was consistent with both engines losing fuel pressure due to fuel starvation. According to the pilot's operating handbook, after reaching cruise flight, fuel should be consumed from the outboard tanks before switching to the inboard tanks. Two fuel quantity gauges were located in the cockpit overhead switch panel to help identify when the pilot should return the fuel selectors from the outboard fuel tanks to the inboard fuel tanks. A flight instructor who previously flew with the pilot stated that this was their normal practice. He also stated that the pilot had not received any training in the accident airplane to include single engine operations and emergency procedures. It is likely that the pilot failed to return the fuel selectors from the outboard to the inboard tank positions once the outboard tanks were exhausted of fuel; however, the pilot misdiagnosed the situation as a fuel pump anomaly.
Probable cause:
A total loss of power in both engines due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot's fuel mismanagement, and his subsequent failure to follow the emergency checklist. Contributing to the pilot's failure to follow the emergency checklist was his lack of emergency procedures training in the accident airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Foley

Date & Time: Apr 26, 2016 at 1424 LT
Registration:
N3372Q
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Foley - Carrollton
MSN:
421B-0256
YOM:
1972
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5450
Circumstances:
The private pilot of the twin-engine airplane departed on the personal flight. During the takeoff roll, all indications were normal. When the airplane accelerated to between 75 and 80 knots, the pilot pulled back on the yoke slowly, and the airplane began to climb. After he raised the landing gear, the pilot noticed that the airplane was not continuing to climb and that the airspeed was 80 knots; he then heard the stall warning horn. The airplane impacted trees about 1/4 mile from the runway, caught fire, and was destroyed; the pilot egressed with minor injuries. The airplane's published minimum control speed was 86 knots and the break ground and climb speed was 106 knots. Given that information, it is likely that the pilot's attempt to rotate and climb the airplane below 80 knots resulted in the airplane being unable to gain altitude and climb above trees at the end of the runway.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to obtain proper takeoff speed before breaking ground, which resulted in the airplane's failure to gain altitude and a collision with trees and terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI 1124A Westwind II in Huntsville: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 18, 2014 at 1424 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N793BG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Huntsville - Huntsville
MSN:
392
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
20200
Captain / Total hours on type:
850.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
28421
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1816
Aircraft flight hours:
7571
Circumstances:
A pilot proficiency examiner (PPE) was using the airplane to conduct a pilot-in-command (PIC) proficiency check for two company pilots. Before the accident flight, one of the two company pilots on board received a PIC proficiency check, which terminated with a full-stop landing and reverse thrust application; no discrepancies with either thrust reverser were discussed by either flight crewmember. The pilot being examined then left the cockpit, and the accident pilot positioned himself in the left front seat while the PPE remained in the right front seat. The flight crew then taxied to the approach end of the runway to begin another flight. Data from the enhanced ground proximity system (EGPWS) revealed that, the flight began the takeoff roll with the flaps retracted, the thrust reversers armed, and both engines stabilized at 96 percent N2. About 2 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the "V1" call while on the airplane was on the runway; acoustic analysis indicated that the N2 speed of one engine, likely the right, decreased; the N2 speed of the other engine remained constant. This decrease in N2 speed was consistent with the PPE retarding right engine thrust to flight idle with the intent of simulating an engine failure. The takeoff continued, and, while the airplane was in a wings-level climb at an airspeed of 148 knots about 18 ft radar altitude, the CVR recorded the pilot command that the landing gear be retracted. The landing gear remained extended, and, about 1 second after the command to retract the landing gear, or about 3 seconds after becoming airborne, while about 33 ft above the runway and at the highest recorded airspeed of 149 knots, the CVR recorded the beginning of a rattling sound, which was consistent with the deployment of the right thrust reverser, and it continued to the end of the recording. About 1.5 seconds after the rattling sound began, the CVR recorded the PPE asking, "…what happened," which indicates that the deployment was likely not annunciated in the cockpit. The right engine N2 speed continued to gradually decrease, and the airplane rolled slightly left, back to a wings-level position. The airplane continued climbing with the landing gear extended as pitch changes continued to occur. During this time, the flight crew exchanged comments about their lack of understanding about what was occurring. While flying 10 knots above V2 speed with the left engine N2 speed remaining steady and the right engine N2 speed decreasing at a slightly greater rate than previously, the airplane began a right roll with a corresponding steady decrease in airspeed from about 144 knots. About 9 seconds after the original call to retract the landing gear, the CVR recorded the PPE requesting that the landing gear be retracted, which occurred 1 second later. The airplane then continued in the right turn with the airspeed steadily decreasing, and about 11 seconds after the PPE asked "…what happened", the EGPWS sounded a bank angle alert. At that time, the airplane was in a right roll of about 30 degrees, and the airspeed was about 132 knots. The right roll continued to a maximum value of about 39 degrees, which was the last valid bank angle value recorded. The airplane impacted the ground off the right side of the runway in a nose- and right-winglow attitude. The landing gear and flaps were retracted, and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw; nor was there any evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of either engine. A definitive reason for the deployment of the right thrust reverser could not be determined. No previous instances of inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment were documented by the operator of the accident airplane or by the airframe manufacturer for the accident airplane make and model. Certification flight testing of an airplane with the same thrust reverser system determined that the airplane remained controllable with the right thrust reverser deployed and throttle retarder system functioning. The flight testing also included application of a momentary, peak burst of right engine thrust, again with no controllability issues noted. It was also noted that with the installed throttle retarder system, in the event of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, that the engine's thrust should have been reduced to idle within 4 to 8 seconds. Acoustic analysis of the accident flight indicated that the lowest recorded N2 rpm value was about 84 percent and that the reduction in rpm occurred over a period of about 8.5 seconds, after the right thrust reverser deployed. No determination could be made as to why the throttle retarder system did not reduce the right engine thrust to flight idle as designed. Additionally, no determination could be made as to why the flight crew was not able to maintain directional control of the airplane following deployment of the right thrust reverser. Although the PPE had severe coronary artery disease, which placed him at risk for an acute coronary event that would cause symptoms like chest pain, shortness of breath, or sudden unconsciousness, the CVR recorded no evidence of impairment. Neither the heart disease nor the medications he was taking to treat it would have impaired his judgement or physical functioning. Therefore, it is unlikely any medical condition or substance contributed to the PPE's actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that any medical condition would have impaired judgement or physical functioning of the pilot being examined.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's inability to maintain airplane control during initial climb following deployment of the right thrust reverser for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination of the airframe and engine thrust reverser system did not reveal any anomalies. Contributing to the accident was the excessive thrust from the right engine with the thrust reverser deployed for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examinations and testing.
Final Report:

Crash of an Airbus A300-622R in Birmingham: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 14, 2013 at 0447 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N155UP
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Louisville - Birmingham
MSN:
841
YOM:
2003
Flight number:
UPS1354
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
6406
Captain / Total hours on type:
3265.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4721
Copilot / Total hours on type:
403
Aircraft flight hours:
11000
Aircraft flight cycles:
6800
Circumstances:
On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), UPS flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer non precision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time. A notice to airmen in effect at the time of the accident indicated that runway 06/24, the longest runway available at the airport and the one with a precision approach, would be closed from 0400 to 0500 CDT. Because the flight's scheduled arrival time was 0451, only the shorter runway 18 with a non precision approach was available to the crew. Forecasted weather at BHM indicated that the low ceilings upon arrival required an alternate airport, but the dispatcher did not discuss the low ceilings, the single-approach option to the airport, or the reopening of runway 06/24 about 0500 with the flight crew. Further, during the flight, information about variable ceilings at the airport was not provided to the flight crew.
Probable cause:
The NTSB determined that the probable causes of the crash were:
- The crew continued an unstabilized approach into Birmingham Airport,
- The crew failed to monitor the altitude and inadvertently descended below the minimum descent altitude when the runway was not yet in sight.
Contributing factors were:
- The flight crew's failure to properly configure the on-board flight management computer,
- The first officer's failure to make required call-outs,
- The captain's decision to change the approach strategy without communicating his change to the first officer,
- Flight crew fatigue.
Final Report: