code

CO

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Denver

Date & Time: May 12, 2021 at 1023 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N280KL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Salida – Denver
MSN:
TC-280
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
LYM970
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a cargo flight (service LYM970) from Salida to Denver-Centennial. On approach to runway 17L, at a distance of 4,2 km from the threshold, the aircraft collided with a private Cirrus SR22 registered N416DJ. The pilot of the Cirrus was able to activate the CAPS rescue parachute and the aircraft crash landed in a prairie. The crew of the Metro was able to continue the approach and to land without further problem. There were no casualties and both aircraft were damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Piper PA-61 Aerostar (Ted Smith 601) in Powder Wash: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 23, 2020 at 2130 LT
Registration:
N601X
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
61-0393-117
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in an isolated area located near Powder Wash, about 176 miles northwest of its departure point, Fort Collins-Loveland-Northern Colorado Regional Airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation I in Gunnison

Date & Time: Dec 4, 2016 at 1853 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N332SE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
San Jose – Pueblo
MSN:
500-0332
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2267
Captain / Total hours on type:
142.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5218
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot of the jet reported that he initially requested that 100 lbs of fuel be added to both fuel tanks. During the subsequent preflight inspection, the pilot decided that more fuel was needed, so he requested that the airplane's fuel tanks be topped off with fuel. However, he did not confirm the fuel levels or check the fuel gauges before takeoff. He departed on the flight and did not check the fuel gauges until about 1 hour after takeoff. He stated that, at that time, the fuel gauges were showing about 900-1,000 lbs of fuel per side, and he realized that the fuel tanks had not been topped off as requested. He reduced engine power to conserve fuel and to increase the airplane's flight endurance while he continued to his destination. When the fuel gauges showed about 400-500 lbs of fuel per side, the low fuel lights for both wing fuel tanks illuminated. The pilot reported to air traffic control that the airplane was low on fuel and diverted the flight to the nearest airport. The pilot reported that the airplane was high and fast on the visual approach for landing. He misjudged the height above the ground and later stated that the airplane "landed very hard." The airplane's left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed and the airplane veered off the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to fly a stabilized approach and his inadequate landing flare, which resulted in a hard landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to ensure that the airplane was properly serviced with fuel before departing on the flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Travel Air 4000 in Palmer Lake: 2 killed

Date & Time: Mar 2, 2016 at 0800 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N6464
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Longmont – Casa Grande
MSN:
785
YOM:
1928
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were flying the biplane to a fly-in gathering in another state. Witnesses saw the airplane flying over a frozen lake at a low altitude and low airspeed. One witness saw the airplane "listing" left and right before it entered a left turn, and he lost sight of it. Other witnesses saw the airplane turn left and nose-dive into the ground. A postimpact fire consumed most of the airplane. Damage to the wreckage indicated that the airplane impacted the ground in a nose down attitude. The examination did not reveal evidence of any preimpact anomalies with the airframe, engine, or the control system of the airplane. A witness reported that, at the time of the accident, the wind was from the south about 30 miles per hour. However, a burnt area extending east from the airplane's impact point indicated the wind was from the west. Additionally, although wind information from nearby weather stations varied in direction and intensity. One station, about 14 miles west-northwest of the accident site reported calm wind., However, another station, located about 11 miles south of the accident site, recorded wind from the west at 11 knots with gusts to 27 knots about the time of the accident and wind from the west at 33 knots with gusts to 48 knots about an hour after the accident. Further, the forecast for the accident area called for wind gusts to 40 knots from the west-northwest. Therefore, it is likely that strong gusty west winds prevailed in the accident area at the time of the accident. Although some witnesses speculated that the pilot may have been attempting to land the airplane on the frozen lake, the airplane was not equipped to land on ice, and the reason the pilot was maneuvering at a low altitude in strong gusty winds could not be determined. Based on the witness observations and the damage to the wreckage, it is likely that the pilot allowed the airspeed to decrease to a point where the critical angle of attack was exceeded, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall/spin. Although the pilot was known to have heart disease, it is unlikely that his medical condition contributed to the accident. The witness observations indicate that the pilot was actively flying the airplane before the loss of control. Toxicology testing showed the presence of chlorpheniramine in the pilot's blood at a level that was likely in the therapeutic range. Chlorpheniramine is a sedating antihistamine available in a number of over the counter products, and it carries the warning, "May impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g., driving, operating heavy machinery)." Because of its sedating effect, chlorpheniramine may slow psychomotor functioning and cause drowsiness. It has also been shown in a driving simulator (after a single dose) to suppress visual-spatial cognition and visual-motor coordinating functions when compared to placebo. Such functions would have been necessary for the pilot to maintain control of the airplane while maneuvering close to the ground in the strong gusty wind conditions. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot's ability to safely operate the plane was impaired by the effects of chlorpheniramine.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain sufficient airspeed while maneuvering at low altitude in strong gusting winds, which resulted in exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall/spin. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment due to the effects of a sedating antihistamine.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft BeechJet 400A in Telluride

Date & Time: Dec 23, 2015 at 1415 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XA-MEX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Monterrey – El Paso – Telluride
MSN:
RK-396
YOM:
2004
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7113
Captain / Total hours on type:
1919.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8238
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1412
Aircraft flight hours:
5744
Circumstances:
The pilots were conducting an international chartered flight in the small, twin-engine jet with five passengers onboard. Since the weather at the destination was marginal, the flight crew had discussed an alternate airport in case weather conditions required a missed approach at their destination. As the airplane neared the non-towered destination airport, the flight crew received updated weather information, which indicated that conditions had improved. Upon contacting the center controller, the crew was asked if they had the weather and NOTAMS for the destination airport. The crew reported that they received the current weather information, but did not state if they had NOTAM information. The controller responded by giving the flight a heading for the descent and sequence into the airport. The controller did not provide NOTAM information to the pilots. About 2 minutes later, airport personnel entered a NOTAM via computer closing the runway, effective immediately, for snow removal. Although the NOTAM was electronically routed to the controller, the controller's system was not designed to automatically alert the controller of a new NOTAM; the controller needed to select a display screen on the equipment that contained the information. At the time of the accident, the controller's workload was considered heavy. About 8 minutes after the runway closure NOTAM was issued, the controller cleared the airplane for the approach. The flight crew then canceled their instrument flight plan with the airport in sight, but did not subsequently transmit on or monitor the airport's common traffic advisory frequency, which was reportedly being monitored by airport personnel and the snow removal equipment operator. The airplane landed on the runway and collided with a snow removal vehicle about halfway down the runway. The flight crew reported they did not see the snow removal equipment. The accident scenario is consistent with the controllers not recognizing new NOTAM information in a timely manner due to equipment limitations, and the pilots not transmitting or monitoring the common traffic advisory frequency. Additionally, the accident identifies a potential problem for flight crews when information critical to inflight decision-making changes while en route, and problems when controller workload interferes with information monitoring and dissemination.
Probable cause:
The limitations of the air traffic control equipment that prevented the controller's timely recognition of NOTAM information that was effective immediately and resulted in the issuance of an approach clearance to a closed runway. Also causal was the pilots' omission to monitor and transmit their intentions on the airport common frequency. Contributing to the accident was the controller's heavy workload and the limitations of the NOTAM system to distribute information in a timely manner.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 404 Titan II in Englewood: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 30, 2014 at 0429 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N404MG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Denver - Denver
MSN:
404-0813
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
LYM182
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2566
Captain / Total hours on type:
624.00
Aircraft flight hours:
16681
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting an early morning repositioning flight of the cargo airplane. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported to air traffic control that he had “lost an engine” and would return to the airport. Several witnesses reported that the engines were running rough and one witness reported that he did not hear any engine sounds just before the impact. The airplane impacted trees, a wooden enclosure, a chain-linked fence, and shrubs in a residential area and was damaged by the impact and postimpact fire. The airplane had been parked outside for 5 days before the accident flight and had been plugged in to engine heaters the night before the flight. It was dark and snowing lightly at the time of the accident. The operator reported that no deicing services were provided before the flight and that the pilot mechanically removed all of the snow and ice accumulation. The wreckage and witness statements were consistent with the airplane being in a right-winglow descent but the airplane did not appear to be out of control. Neither of the propellers were at or near the feathered position. The emergency procedures published by the manufacturer for a loss of engine power stated that pilots should first secure the engine and feather the propeller following a loss of engine power and then turn the fuel selector for that engine to “off.” The procedures also cautioned that continued flight might not be possible if the propeller was not feathered. The right fuel selector valve and panel were found in the off position. Investigators were not able to determine why an experienced pilot did not follow the emergency procedures and immediately secure the engine following the loss of engine power. It is not known how much snow and ice had accumulated on the airplane leading up to the accident flight or if the pilot was successful in removing all of the snow and ice with only mechanical means. The on-scene examination of the wreckage and the teardown of both engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. While possible, it could not be determined if water or ice ingestion lead to the loss of engine power at takeoff.
Probable cause:
The loss of power to the right engine for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examination and teardown and the pilot’s failure to properly configure the
airplane for single-engine flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage in Cortez

Date & Time: Sep 3, 2014 at 1238 LT
Registration:
N747TH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cortez - Cortez
MSN:
46-36200
YOM:
1999
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4000
Captain / Total hours on type:
2050.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4184
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1648
Aircraft flight hours:
2900
Circumstances:
The accident occurred during a local instructional flight to satisfy the commercial pilot's annual insurance currency requirements in the accident airplane. The flight instructor reported that the pilot was demonstrating a simulated loss of engine power during initial climb and return for a downwind landing. During initial climb, upon reaching 1,200 ft above ground level (agl), the flight instructor reduced engine power to flight idle and feathered the propeller. In response, the pilot reduced airplane pitch and entered a left, 45-degree-bank turn back toward the airport. The flight instructor stated that, upon rolling wings level, the airplane appeared to be lower than he had expected as it glided toward the runway; however, he believed there was sufficient altitude remaining to safely land on the runway and told the pilot to continue without increasing the engine power. The flight instructor ultimately decided to abort the maneuver as the airplane crossed over the runway threshold at 40 ft agl. The flight instructor advanced the engine power lever to the full-forward position and increased airplane pitch to arrest the descent; however, he did not perceive an increase in engine thrust. Without an increase in engine thrust and with the increased pitch, the airplane's airspeed decreased rapidly, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall about 30 ft above the runway. The airplane impacted the runway before sliding into a grassy area. The flight instructor reported that he did not recall advancing the propeller control when he decided to abort the maneuver, and, as such, the perceived lack of engine thrust was likely because the propeller remained feathered after he increased engine power. Additionally, the flight instructor postulated that the airplane's landing gear had not been retracted after takeoff, which resulted in a reduced climb gradient, and, as such, the airplane entered the maneuver farther away from the airport than anticipated. Further, with the landing gear extended, the airplane experienced a reduction in glide performance during the simulated forced landing. The flight instructor reported that the accident could have been prevented if he had maintained a safe flying airspeed after he took control of the airplane. Additionally, he believed that his delayed decision to abort the maneuver resulted in an insufficient margin of safety.
Probable cause:
The flight instructor's delayed decision to abort the simulated engine out maneuver, his failure to unfeather the propeller before restoring engine power, and his inadequate airspeed management, which led to an aerodynamic stall at low altitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage in Erie: 5 killed

Date & Time: Aug 31, 2014 at 1150 LT
Registration:
N228LL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Denver - Erie
MSN:
46-22164
YOM:
1994
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
1300
Aircraft flight hours:
2910
Circumstances:
The private pilot was inbound to the airport, attempting to conduct a straight-in approach to runway 33. Due to the prevailing wind, traffic flow at the time of the pilot's arrival was on runway 15. Another airplane was departing the airport in the opposite direction and crossed in close proximity to the accident airplane. The departing traffic altered his course to the right to avoid the accident airplane while the accident airplane stayed on his final approach course. The two aircraft were in radio communication on the airport common traffic advisory frequency and were exercising see-and-avoid rules as required. Witnesses reported that as the airplane continued down runway 33 for landing, they heard the power increase and observed the airplane make a left-hand turn to depart the runway in an attempted go-around. The airplane entered a left bank with a nose-high attitude, failed to gain altitude, and subsequently stalled and impacted terrain. It is likely the pilot did not maintain the necessary airspeed during the attempted go-around and exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack. The investigation did not reveal why the pilot chose to conduct the approach with opposing traffic or why he attempted a landing with a tailwind, but this likely increased the pilot's workload during a critical phase of flight.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed and exceedance of the critical angle of attack during a go-around with a tailwind condition, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. A contributing factor to the accident was the pilot's decision to continue the approach with opposing traffic.
Final Report:

Crash of a Socata TBM-700 in the Ridgway Reservoir: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 22, 2014 at 1400 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N702H
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bartlesville – Montrose
MSN:
112
YOM:
1996
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
908
Captain / Total hours on type:
9.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4848
Circumstances:
About 3 months before the accident, the pilot received about 9 hours of flight instruction, including completion of an instrument proficiency check, in the airplane. The accident flight was a personal cross-country flight operated under instrument flight rules (IFR). Radar track data depicted the flight proceeding on a west-southwest course at 15,800 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the destination airport. The flight was cleared by the air traffic controller for a GPS approach, passed the initial approach fix, and, shortly afterward, began a descent as permitted by the approach procedure. The track data indicated that the flight became established on the initial approach segment and remained above the designated minimum altitude of 12,000 ft msl. Average descent rates based on the available altitude data ranged from 500 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,000 fpm during this portion of the flight. At the intermediate navigation fix, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a north-northwest course toward the airport. The track data indicated that the flight entered a right turn about 1 mile before reaching the intermediate fix. As the airplane entered the right turn, its average descent rate reached 4,000 fpm. The flight subsequently tracked northbound for nearly 1-1/2 miles. During this portion of the flight, the airplane initially descended at an average rate of 3,500 fpm then climbed at a rate of 1,800 fpm. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn. The final three radar data points were each located within 505 ft laterally of each other and near the approximate accident site location. The average descent rate between the final two data points (altitudes of 10,100 ft msl and 8,700 ft msl) was 7,000 fpm. About the time that the final data point was recorded, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane was in a spin and that he was attempting to recover. No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted the surface of a reservoir at an elevation of about 6,780 ft and came to rest in 60 ft of water. A detailed postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The available meteorological data suggested that the airplane encountered clouds (tops about 16,000 ft msl or higher and bases about 10,000 ft msl) and was likely operating in IFR conditions during the final 15 minutes of the flight; however, no determination could be made regarding whether the clouds that the airplane descended through were solid or layered. In addition, the data suggested the possibility of both light icing and light turbulence between 12,000 ft msl and 16,000 ft msl along the flight path. Although the pilot appeared to be managing the flight appropriately during the initial descent, it could not be determined why he was unable to navigate to the approach fixes and maintain control of the airplane as he turned toward the airport and continued the descent.
Probable cause:
The pilot's loss of airplane control during an instrument approach procedure, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and entering an inadvertent aerodynamic stall and spin.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-61 Aerostar (Ted Smith 601) in Aurora: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 19, 2014 at 1650 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N90464
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Aurora - Aurora
MSN:
61-0261-051
YOM:
1976
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
26000
Aircraft flight hours:
1975
Circumstances:
The pilot's friend reported that the pilot planned to fly his recently purchased twin-engine airplane over his friend's home to show it to him and another friend. The pilot's friends and several other witnesses reported observing the pilot performing low-level, high-speed aerobatic maneuvers before the airplane collided with trees and then terrain. A 1.75-liter bottle of whiskey was found in the airplane wreckage. A review of the pilot's Federal Aviation Administration medical records revealed that he had a history of alcohol dependence but had reportedly been sober for almost 4 years. Toxicological testing revealed that the pilot had a blood alcohol content of 0.252 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood, which was over six times the limit (0.040) Federal Aviation Regulations allowed for pilots operating an aircraft.
Probable cause:
The pilot's operation of the airplane while intoxicated, which resulted in a loss of airplane control.
Final Report: