South Carolina

The pilot was attempting to land on a wet, 5,000-ft-long asphalt runway in night conditions with calm wind. He stated that the airplane touched down before the 1,000 ft markers and that he immediately applied full brake pressure. The brakes began to cycle in anti-skid mode, but the pilot said the cycling felt slower than normal. The pilot considered a go-around, but the left brake “grabbed” suddenly, and the airplane yawed left and began a sequence of left and right skids before it continued off the end of the runway. The airplane traveled down an embankment onto a rocky berm and came to rest about 360 ft from the end of the runway. The pilot and the passengers egressed the airplane uninjured before a post-impact fire consumed the cockpit, center fuselage, and the right wing. The pilot stated that he used the airplane’s cockpit display unit (CDU) computer to calculate the airplane’s landing reference speed (Vref) of 120 knots (kts) and reported that the airplane touched down at this speed. Although recorded data for the flight was not available due to thermal damage to the avionics, ADS-B data last captured the airplane on final approach at a ground speed of 120 kts, about 200 ft above the runway, consistent with the pilot’s statement. However, when the conditions that existed at the time of the accident were entered into an exemplar CDU, the calculated Vref was 112 kts, and the required landing distance for a wet/contaminated runway was 4,829 ft. To determine the landing distance required at a Vref of 120 kts, a Vref increment of Vref+5 (117 kts) and Vref+10 (122 kts) were entered into the CDU; the results were 5,311 ft and 5,794 ft, respectively. When these landing distances were calculated, the CDU, which had already been programmed for a 5,000-ft-long runway, displayed a prominent caution below the Vref number that stated: “LANDING FIELD LENGTH INSUFFICIENT.” How the accident pilot achieved a Vref of 120 kts via the CDU based on the conditions that existed at the time of the accident could not be determined. Postaccident examination of the braking system revealed no evidence of any preimpact anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; however, a testing anomaly was observed when the power brake and antiskid valve were tested. An initial test on an exemplar bench stand produced hysteresis that could not be produced when it was tested on a certified bench at the manufacturer. According to the manufacturer, the anomaly observed would not prevent the application of brakes nor the removal of pressure during skidding events; however, significant hysteresis may lead to braking performance degradation due to a decreased pressure application for a given current input. The reason for the anomaly was unknown, and therefore, it could not be determined if it played a role in the loss of braking action reported by the pilot. Despite this anomaly, and based on all other available information, the pilot landed the airplane faster than the prescribed landing speed with insufficient runway length available given the wet runway condition, which resulted in a runway excursion.

The airplane departed Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, at 1812, with the intended destination of Grand Strand Airport (CRE), North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast and air traffic control (ATC) communications information, the pilot established contact with ATC and reported that he was ready for departure from runway 18. He was instructed to fly runway heading, climb to 1,700 ft mean sea level (msl), and was cleared for takeoff. Once airborne, the controller instructed the pilot to turn left; however, the pilot stated that he needed to return to runway 18. The controller instructed the pilot to enter a right closed traffic pattern at 1,500 ft msl. As the airplane continued to turn to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, it reached an altitude of about 1,000 ft mean sea level (msl). While on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, the airplane descended to 450 ft msl, climbed to 700 ft msl, and then again descended to 475 ft msl before radar contact was lost. About 1 minute after the pilot requested to return to the runway, the controller asked if any assistance was required, to which the pilot replied, “yes, we’re in trouble.” There were no further radio communications from the pilot. The airplane crashed in a field and was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot in command (PIC) and second-in-command (SIC) completed an uneventful positioning flight to pick up passengers and then continued to the destination airport. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information revealed that, while en route, the PIC expressed a desire to complete the flight as quickly as possible and arrive at the destination before another airplane that was also enroute to the destination airport, presumably to please the passengers. The PIC compared the flight with an automobile race, and the airplane’s overspeed warning annunciated multiple times during the descent. The flight crew elected to conduct a straight-in visual approach to land. Throughout the final approach, the airplane was high and fast, as evidenced by the SIC’s airspeed callouts. When the SIC asked whether s-turns should be made, and the PIC responded that such turns were not necessary. An electronic voice recorded by the CVR repeatedly provided “sink rate” and “pull up” warnings while the airplane was on final approach, providing indications to the crewmembers that the approach was unstable, but they continued the landing. The airplane touched down about 1,000 ft down the 4,200-ft-long runway. The PIC described that the airplane’s wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and ground air brakes did not function after touchdown, but witness and video evidence showed that the thrust reversers deployed shortly after touchdown. In addition, tire skid marks indicated that wheel braking occurred throughout the ground roll and increased heavily during the final 1,500 ft of the runway when the antiskid system activated. The ground air brakes did not deploy. The airplane overran the runway and came to rest about 400 ft past the departure end of the runway in marshy terrain. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage. The switch that controlled the automatic deployment of the ground air brake system was found in a position that should have allowed for their automatic deployment upon landing. There was no evidence to indicate a preaccident mechanical malfunction or failure with the hydraulic system, wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and weight-on-wheel switches, or electrical issues with either air brake switches. The airplane’s ground air brake deployment system logic required that both throttle levers be below 18° (throttle lever angle) in order to activate. The accident airplane’s throttle lever position microswitches were tested after the accident. The left throttle microswitch tested normal, but the right throttle microswitch produced an abnormal electrical current/resistance during initial testing. When the throttle was touched and then further manipulated by hand, the electrical resistance tested normal. The investigation was unable to determine whether the intermittent right throttle microswitch resistance prevented the ground air brakes from deploying because the testing was inconclusive. Landing performance calculations showed that, without ground air brakes, the landing ground roll exceeded the runway that was available from the airplane’s touchdown point about 1,000 ft down the runway. Mobile phone video evidence revealed that a quartering tailwind of about 10 to 15 knots persisted during the landing, which exceeded the manufacturer’s tailwind landing limitation of 10 knots for the airplane, and thus would have further increased the actual ground roll distance beyond that calculated. Throughout the final approach, the flight crew received several indications that the approach was unstable. The flight crew was aware that the airplane was approaching the runway high, fast, and at an abnormal sink rate. Both pilots had an opportunity to call for a go-around, which would have been the appropriate action. However, it is likely that the external pressures that the PIC and SIC accepted to complete the flight as quickly as possible influenced their decision-making in continuing the approach.

According to the pilot, he and the copilot were flying low-level mapping flights in the twin-engine airplane. Although the copilot was not multi-engine rated, he and the pilot regularly switched control of the airplane during the mapping flights. On the accident flight, the pilot was seated in the right seat; the copilot was seated in the left seat; and they were flying the airplane at an altitude of about 300 ft above ground level. According to the pilot, they flew for about 2 hours before he, who was the pilot flying at the time, switched fuel tanks from the inboard tanks to the outboard tanks. The pilot did not tell the copilot he had switched fuel tanks. About 1.5 hours later, while the copilot was the pilot flying, the left engine started to surge and lose power. The pilot began the steps of the emergency procedure for an engine failure in cruise flight starting with moving the fuel selectors to the inboard tanks. Power was not restored; the airplane immediately began losing altitude; and the pilot took over control of the airplane. The copilot stated that at the time the pilot took over control, he looked at the fuel tank quantity gauges, and they both displayed zero. The pilot reported that the airplane stalled just above the ground during the emergency landing in a field. The right wing struck first, and within a couple of seconds, the right outboard fuel tank exploded. The pilot and copilot egressed out the rear door. Examination of the wreckage revealed that neither engine exhibited evidence of power at impact. The left outboard fuel tank was found completely full of fuel, and the left inboard fuel tank was empty. Both right wing tanks were fire damaged, and the fuel quantity in the tanks at impact could not be determined. Further examination revealed that the fuel crossfeed valve was in the “crossfeed/open” position. No fuel was observed in the valve or attached fuel lines during disassembly. The left fuel selector valve was found in the “OFF” position, and no fuel was observed within the fuel line between the valve and gascolator. The right fuel selector valve was damaged by fire, and its position at impact could not be determined. No other anomalies were noted in the engines or airframe. According to the pilot, all fuel tanks were full before the flight. According to the pilot’s operating manual, the airplane likely consumed about 33.1 gallons of fuel per hour or a total of about 115 gallons of fuel during the 3.5-hour flight. Given that the inboard fuel cells held 56 gallons each (112 gallons total), that the left inboard tank was found empty, and that the copilot noticed that the fuel gauges were reading zero just before impact, it is likely that each engine was drawing fuel from its respective inboard tank throughout the flight until those tanks were empty. The left engine lost power first, and the right engine likely lost power just before impact. The postaccident positions of the crossfeed valve (on) and the left fuel selector (off) did not correspond to the pilot’s statements regarding his positioning of the fuel selector valves during the flight. The fuel panel was located between and behind the pilots’ seats and required the pilots to look down and back in order to see the panel when making changes to the panel; therefore, it is likely the pilot misconfigured the valves when he switched tanks 2 hours into the flight, when he switched tanks after the left engine lost power, or on both occasions. It is unlikely the copilot would have been able to see an incorrect switch selection on the fuel panel due to the location of the panel, and he would have been unlikely to look at the 2-hour point as the pilot did not verbalize that a change to the panel had been made.

The airplane sustained substantial damage when it collided with terrain during an approach to landing at the Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The commercial pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was privately owned and operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Greater Cumberland Regional Airport (CBE), Cumberland, Maryland. According to the pilot, he was following radar vectors for the downwind leg of the traffic pattern to runway 36 at MYR. He turned for final approach and was inside the outer marker, when he encountered heavy turbulence. As he continued the approach, he described what he believed to be a microburst and the airplane started to descend rapidly. The pilot added full power in an attempt to climb, but the airplane continued to descend until it collided with the Atlantic Ocean 1 mile from the approach end of runway 36. A review of pictures of the wreckage provided by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed the cockpit section of the airplane was broken away from the fuselage during the impact sequence. At 1456, the weather recorded at MYR, included broken clouds at 6,000 ft, few clouds at 3,500 ft and wind from 010° at 8 knots. The temperature was 14°C, and the dew point was 9°C. The altimeter setting was 30.27 inches of mercury. The airplane was retained for further examination.

The flight crew was operating the business jet on an on-demand air taxi flight with passengers onboard. During landing at the destination airport, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the sound of the airplane touching down followed by the pilot's and copilot's comments that the brakes were not operating. Air traffic controllers reported, and airport surveillance video confirmed, that the airplane touched down "normally" and the airplane's thrust reverser deployed but that the airplane continued down the runway without decelerating before overrunning the runway and impacting terrain. Postaccident examination of the airplane's brake system revealed discrepancies of the antiskid system that included a broken solder joint on the left-side inboard transducer and a reversal of the wiring on the right-side outboard transducer. It is likely that these discrepancies resulted in the normal braking system's failure to function during the landing. Before the accident flight, the airplane had been in long-term storage for several years and was in the process of undergoing maintenance to bring the airplane back to a serviceable condition, which in-part required the completion of several inspections, an overhaul of the landing gear, and the resolution of over 100 other unresolved discrepancies. The accident flight and four previous flights were all made with only a portion of this required maintenance having been completed and properly documented in the airplane's maintenance logs. A pilot, who had flown the airplane on four previous flights along with the accident pilot (who was acting as second-in-command during them), identified during those flights that the airplane's normal braking system was not operating when the airplane was traveling faster than 20 knots. He remedied the situation by configuring the airplane to use the emergency, rather than normal, braking system. That pilot reported this discrepancy to the operator's director of maintenance, and it is likely that maintenance personnel from the company subsequently added an "INOP" placard near the switch on the date of the accident. The label on the placard referenced the antiskid system, and the airplane's flight manual described that with the normal brake (or antiskid) system inoperative, the brake selector switch must be positioned to use the emergency braking system. Following the accident, the switch was found positioned with the normal braking system activated, and it is likely that the accident flight crew attempted to utilize the malfunctioning normal braking system during the landing. Additionally, the flight crew failed to properly recognize the failure and configure the airplane to utilize the emergency braking system, or utilize the parking brake, as described in the airplane's flight manual, in order to stop the airplane within the available runway.

The commercial pilot and passenger departed on a local flight in the twin-engine airplane. According to a witness, the pilot took off from the private grass runway and departed the area for about 10 minutes. The airplane then returned to the airport, where the pilot performed a low pass over the runway and entered a steep climb followed by a roll. The airplane entered a nose-low descent, then briefly leveled off in an upright attitude before disappearing behind trees and subsequently impacting terrain. The pilot's toxicology testing was positive for ethanol with 0.185 gm/dl and 0.210 gm/dl in urine and cavity blood samples, respectively. The effects of ethanol are generally well understood; it significantly impairs pilot performance, even at very low levels. Federal Aviation Administration regulations prohibit any person from acting or attempting to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft while having 0.040 gm/dl or more ethanol in the blood. While the identified ethanol may have come from sources other than ingestion, such as postmortem production, the possibility that the source of some of the ethanol was from ingestion and that pilot was impaired by the effects of ethanol during the accident flight could not be ruled out. Toxicology also identified a significant amount of diphenhydramine in cavity blood (0.122 µg/ml, which is within or above the therapeutic range of 0.0250 to 0.1120 µg/ml; diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, and central postmortem levels may be about two to three times higher than peripheral or antemortem levels.). Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine that causes more sedation than other antihistamines; this is the rationale for its use as a sleep aid. In a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.100%. The pilot had been diagnosed with memory loss about 8 months before the accident. It appears that he had some degree of mild cognitive impairment, but whether his cognitive impairment was severe enough to have contributed to the accident could not be determined from the available evidence. However, it is likely that the pilot's mild cognitive impairment combined with the psychoactive effects of diphenhydramine and possibly ethanol would have further decreased his cognitive functioning and contributed to his decision to attempt an aerobatic maneuver at low altitude in a non-aerobatic airplane.

The purpose of the flight was for the pilot to accomplish a flight review with a flight instructor. According to air traffic control records, after takeoff, the pilot handling radio communications requested maneuvering airspace for airwork in an altitude block of 13,000 to 15,000 feet mean sea level (msl). About 8 minutes later, the air traffic controller asked the pilot to state his heading, but he did not respond. A review of recorded radar data revealed that, about 14,000 msl and 3 miles southeast of the accident site, the airplane made two constant-altitude 360-degree turns and then proceeded on a north-northeasterly heading for about 2.5 miles. The airplane then abruptly turned right and lost altitude, which is consistent with a loss of airplane control. The airplane continued to rapidly descend until it impacted trees and terrain on a southerly heading. No discernible distress calls were noted. The wreckage was found generally fragmented, and all of the airplane’s structural components and flight control surfaces were accounted for within the wreckage debris path. Subsequent examination of the engines revealed evidence of rotation and operation at impact and no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The aircraft, registered to the United States Customs Service, and operated by Stevens Aviation, Inc., was substantially damaged during collision with a deer after landing on Runway 9 at Greenwood County Airport (GRD), Greenwood, South Carolina. The airplane was subsequently consumed by postcrash fire. The two certificated airline transport pilots were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the maintenance test flight, which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to the pilot, the purpose of the flight was to conduct a test of the autopilot and flight director systems on board the airplane, following a "cockpit modernization" their company had performed. The airplane completed the NDB/GPS RWY 27 instrument approach procedure and then circled to land on Runway 9. About 5 seconds into the landing rollout, a deer appeared from the wood line and ran into the path of the airplane. The deer struck the airplane at the leading edge of the left wing above the left main landing gear, and ruptured an adjacent fuel cell. The pilot was able to maintain directional control, and the airplane was stopped on the runway, spilling fuel and on fire. The crew performed an emergency shutdown of the airplane and egressed without injury.Greenwood County Airport did not have a fire station co-located on the airport facility. The fixed base operator called 911 at the time of the accident, and the fire trucks arrived approximately 10 minutes after notification.

The pilot was conducting the first leg of a positioning flight in an experimental, amateur built, tail-wheel turboprop airplane. During landing, the airplane touched down to the right of the runway centerline and departed the right side of the runway. The pilot then added engine power to attempt an aborted landing. The airplane lifted off the runway, pitched up at a steep angle, stalled, and impacted the ground. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions; however, a postcrash fire consumed the majority of the wreckage. The airplane's pitch trim actuator was observed in the landing position, which was the full nose-up position and would have resulted in a steep nose-up attitude during climb-out, if not corrected by the pilot. The pilot had accumulated about 1,930 hours of total flight experience; however, he only had 5 total hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane.