Human factor

The airplane was engaged in a crop spraying mission, carrying a load of herbicides, one passenger and one pilot. In the early morning, while completing a seventh low pass, at a height of about 20-40 metres, the pilot initiated a left turn when the aircraft descended to the ground and crashed at a speed of 140 km/h in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.

According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist.

On June 19, 2016, Mahan Air flight IRM 4525 was a scheduled passenger flight which took off from Ahwaz Airport at 1257 LMT (0827 UTC) to destination and landed at Khark Island Airport at 1335 LMT (0905 UTC). After delivery of the flight from BUZ approach to Khark tower, the flight was cleared to land on RWY 31 via visual approach. At 10 NM on final the pilot has asked weather information of the destination so, the captain requested to perform a visual approach for RWY 13. Finally the pilot in command accomplished an un-stabilized approach and landed on the runway after passing long distance of the Runway. Regarding to the length of the runway (7,657 feet) the aircraft overran the end of runway and made runway excursion on runway 13 and came to rest on the unpaved surface after 54 meters past the runway end. The nose landing gear strut has broken and collapsed. The captain instructed the cabin crew to evacuate the aircraft. No unusual occurrences were noticed during departure, en-route and descent.

During cruise flight through an area of mountainous terrain, the commercial pilot became geographically disoriented and selected the incorrect route through the mountains. Upon realizing it was the incorrect route, he initiated a steep climb while executing a 180° turn. During the steep climbing turn, the airplane inadvertently entered instrument meteorological conditions, and the airplane subsequently impacted an area of rocky, rising terrain. The pilot reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

The commercial pilot was completing an instrument flight rules air taxi flight on a route that he had flown numerous times for the customer on board. Radar and voice communication data revealed that the airplane was vectored to the final approach course for the precision approach and was given a radio frequency change to the destination airport control tower frequency. The tower controller issued a landing clearance, which the pilot acknowledged; there were no further communications with the pilot. Weather conditions at the airport at the time of the accident included an overcast ceiling at 300 ft with 1 mile visibility in mist. The wreckage was located in densely-wooded terrain. Postaccident examination revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The wreckage path and evidence of engine power displayed by numerous cut tree branches was consistent with a controlled, wings-level descent with power. A radar performance study revealed that, as the airplane crossed the precision final approach fix 6.7 nautical miles (nm) from the runway threshold, the airplane was 800 ft above the glideslope. At the outer marker, 5.5 nm from the runway threshold, the airplane was 500 ft above the glideslope. When radar contact was lost 3.2 nm from the threshold, the airplane was about 250 ft above the glideslope. Although the airplane remained within the lateral limits of the approach localizer, its last two recorded radar returns would have correlated with a full downward deflection of the glideslope indicator in the cockpit, and therefore, an unstabilized approach. Further interpolation of radar data revealed that, during the last 2 minutes of the accident flight, the airplane's rate of descent increased from 400 ft per minute (fpm) to greater than 1,700 fpm, likely as a result of pilot inputs. During the final minute of the flight, the rate decreased briefly to 1,000 fpm before radar contact was lost. The company's standard operating procedures stated that, if a rate of descent greater than 1,000 fpm was encountered during an instrument approach, a missed approach should be performed. The airplane's relative position to the glideslope and its rapid changes in descent rate after crossing the outer marker suggest that the airplane never met the operator's stabilized approach criteria. Rather than executing a missed approach procedure as outlined in the company's operating procedures, the pilot chose to continue the unstabilized approach, which resulted in a descent into trees and terrain. It is unlikely that the pilot's well-controlled diabetes and effectively treated sleep apnea contributed to the circumstances of this accident. However, whether or not the pilot's multiple sclerosis contributed to this accident could not be determined.

The aircraft, operated by Skydive Kalifornia (aka Skydive Toscana) was involved in a local skydiving flight from Cecina Airfield. When the aircraft reached the assigned altitude, six of the seven skydivers bailed out. When the seventh skydiver elected to jump, his auxiliary parachute accidentally opened while the skydiver was still in the cabin. He was sucked outside and collided with the right horizontal stabilizer that later detached. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and both pilots were killed. There was no fire. All seven skydivers were uninjured.

On 3 June 2016, a Cessna 208B of registration 5Y-JLL and serial number 2158 was conducting a charter passenger flight from Akobo Airstrip to Juba with 4 passengers and one flight crew member on board. According to the operator, during takeoff from Akobo Airstrip at approximately 10 a.m. Local Time, the pilot executed a premature takeoff due to animal incursion on the runway. The airplane's right main landing gear clipped the Airstrip perimeter fence and the aircraft crash-landed onto grass-thatched houses and trees near the end of the runway. Damage was substantial with no reported injuries. The runway was reported to have been wet at the time of occurrence.

Following en uneventful flight from Quito, the crew initiated the descent to Cuenca-Mariscal La Mar Airport Runway 23. Weather conditions at destination were poor with rain falls and a contaminated runway. The pilot-in-command continued the approach below the glide and the aircraft passed over the runway threshold at a height of 37 feet instead the recommended 50 feet. The airplane landed 277 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 127 knots and the crew activated the spoilers and the reverse thrust systems. Due to poor braking action, the captain activated the autobrake system, without success. As the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining distance, the captain intentionally turn to the right when the aircraft ground looped, overran and came to rest in a grassy area. All 93 occupants were rescued, among them two passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The private pilot of the twin-engine airplane departed on the personal flight. During the takeoff roll, all indications were normal. When the airplane accelerated to between 75 and 80 knots, the pilot pulled back on the yoke slowly, and the airplane began to climb. After he raised the landing gear, the pilot noticed that the airplane was not continuing to climb and that the airspeed was 80 knots; he then heard the stall warning horn. The airplane impacted trees about 1/4 mile from the runway, caught fire, and was destroyed; the pilot egressed with minor injuries. The airplane's published minimum control speed was 86 knots and the break ground and climb speed was 106 knots. Given that information, it is likely that the pilot's attempt to rotate and climb the airplane below 80 knots resulted in the airplane being unable to gain altitude and climb above trees at the end of the runway.

The crew (one pilot under supervision and one instructor) departed Girona-Costa Brava on a local training flight. Following two successful landings and touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew initiated a new approach to complete a full stop landing. The aircraft belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.