Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Farmingdale

Date & Time: Jan 10, 2021 at 1300 LT
Registration:
N421DP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
421B-0353
YOM:
1973
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Farmingdale-Republic Airport, en route for Connecticut, the pilot reported an engine failure and elected to return. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed in the Old Bethpage industrial park about 3 km north of the airport. The pilot was injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a Hawker 800XP in Farmingdale

Date & Time: Dec 20, 2020 at 2035 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N412JA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Miami - Farmingdale
MSN:
258516
YOM:
2001
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight flight from Miami-Opa Locka Airport, the crew started the descent to Farmingdale-Republic Airport, NY. At 2032LT, he was cleared to land on runway 14 and was briefed about the latest weather conditions at destination that were close to minimums with low clouds, vertical visibility of 200 feet, horizontal visibility 1/4 of a mile and indefinite ceiling. Upon landing on runway 14, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and skidded on runway for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries.

Crash of a Cessna T303 Crusader in Sky Acres: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 17, 2019 at 1613 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N303TL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Sky Acres - Farmingdale
MSN:
303-00286
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
On August 17, 2019, about 1613 eastern daylight time, a Cessna T303, N303TL, was destroyed after impacting a house shortly after takeoff from Sky Acres airport (44N) in Lagrangeville, New York. The private pilot and one person in the house were fatally injured. Two passengers and one person in the house sustained serious injuries, one person in the house sustained minor injuries. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the business flight, which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight departed 44N at 1612 and was destined for Republic Airport (FRG), Farmingdale, New York. According to the passenger seated in the copilot's seat, on the morning of the accident the pilot and two passengers departed FRG and flew to Orange County Airport (MGJ), Montgomery, New York where the pilot had a business meeting. After the meeting, they departed MGM with a final destination of FRG, which included a stop at 44N to purchase fuel. The passenger reported that those flights were uneventful. The pilot fueled the airplane at 44N, where fuel records indicate he purchased 100 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel, which was the only type of fuel available at 44N. After the fueling, surveillance video at the airport showed several unsuccessful attempts to start the left engine for about 30 seconds. Next, the pilot attempted to start the right engine several times over period of about 30 seconds, and on the last attempt, the engine started. The left engine was then started after about 10 seconds of engine cranking. The airplane remained in position with the engines idling for about 2 minutes before it taxied around to the opposite side of the fuel pump and stopped for about 45 seconds with the engines at or near idle. The airplane then taxied from the fuel pump to the beginning of runway 17 (3,830 x 60 ft) without stopping for an engine run-up and performed a rolling takeoff. The airplane lifted off the runway in the vicinity of the windsock, which is located on the left side of the runway about 2,100 feet from the threshold. According to the passenger in the copilot's seat, shortly after liftoff at an altitude of less than 50-100 ft, both engines lost partial power. They did not stop completely, they sounded as though they were "not getting full RPM" and they began "studdering", which continued until impact with the house. As the airplane proceeded down the runway, it began to drift toward the left until they were over the grass next to the runway. The pilot corrected the drift and the airplane then tracked straight and remained over the grass. As the airplane continued beyond the end of the runway, it was not climbing, and he noticed obstacles that he described as trees and a structure or building. The pilot pitched the airplane up to clear those obstacles. The airplane then began a left banked turn and as it reached the house the left wing struck the ground and the right wing struck a tree and the house. The airplane had "very little forward motion" after the initial impact. He estimated that the airplane remained below 100 ft of altitude for the entire flight.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226T Merlin IIIB in Farmingdale

Date & Time: Jun 20, 2016 at 1758 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N127WD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
White Plains - Farmingdale
MSN:
T-297
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11450
Captain / Total hours on type:
410.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
4500
Circumstances:
According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command's failure to extend the landing gear before landing and his failure to use the Before Landing checklist. Contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to maintain a sterile cockpit during landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in Sheffield

Date & Time: Sep 15, 2009 at 1435 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N336DN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Farmingdale - Saratoga Springs
MSN:
208-0001
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3100
Captain / Total hours on type:
25.00
Aircraft flight hours:
10182
Circumstances:
The pilot and the five passengers, who were employees of an industrial services company, were returning from a job site with hazardous materials used for blasting operations. The airplane was in a climb, at an altitude of 8,500 feet, when it experienced a catastrophic engine failure. The pilot declared an emergency and subsequently performed a forced landing to a field. During the landing, the airplane's right wing struck a tree and separated. All occupants exited the airplane without injury; however, the airplane became fully engulfed in fire, which consumed the majority of the airplane. The airplane was equipped with a turbine engine that, at the time of the accident, had been operated for about 7,620 hours since new and 65 hours since it was overhauled about 19 months prior to the accident. Impact damage was observed to the interior of the engine exhaust duct. In addition, the exhaust duct contained portions of a fractured power turbine blade. Additional examination of the engine revealed damage consistent with a distressed 1st stage sun gear, and associated compressor turbine and power turbine damage. Examination of the sun gear teeth output splines revealed that they were too damaged to determine the cause of their deterioration. It was noted that the sun gear found on the accident engine was previously removed from another engine due to "spalled gear teeth" about 7 years prior to the accident. The condition of the sun gear when installed on the accident engine could not be determined.
Probable cause:
A total loss of engine power due to a failure of the 1st stage sun gear output splines for unknown reasons, which resulted in a power turbine overspeed condition, with subsequent blade distress/release.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 650 Citation III in Atlantic City

Date & Time: Oct 27, 2007 at 1110 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N697MC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Farmingdale – Atlantic City
MSN:
650-0097
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9472
Captain / Total hours on type:
199.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2535
Copilot / Total hours on type:
120
Aircraft flight hours:
7052
Circumstances:
The first officer was flying the Area Navigation, Global Positioning System, approach to runway 22. During the approach, the airplane was initially fast as the first officer had increased engine power to compensate for wind conditions. Descending below the minimum descent altitude (MDA), the first officer momentarily deployed the speed brakes, but stowed them about 200 feet above ground level (agl), and reduced the engine power to flight idle. The airplane became low and slow, and developed an excessive sink rate. The airplane subsequently landed hard on runway 22, which drove the right main landing gear into the right wing, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing spar. The first officer reported intermittent airspeed fluctuations between his airspeed indicator and the captain's airspeed indicator; however, a subsequent check of the pitot-static system did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airspeed indicators. About the time of the accident, the recorded wind was from 190 degrees at 11 knots, gusting to 24 knots; and the captain believed that the airplane had encountered windshear near the MDA, with the flaps fully extended. Review of air traffic control data revealed that no windshear advisories were contained in the automated terminal information system broadcasts. Although the local controller provided windshear advisories to prior landing aircraft, he did not provide one to the accident aircraft. Review of the airplane flight manual (AFM) revealed that deploying the speed brakes below 500 feet agl, with the flaps in any position other than the retracted position, was prohibited.
Probable cause:
The first officer's failure to maintain airspeed during approach, and the captain's inadequate remedial action. Contributing to the accident was the first officer's failure to comply with procedures, windshear, and the lack of windshear warning from air traffic control.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 35A in Groton: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 4, 2003 at 0639 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N135PT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Farmingdale - Groton
MSN:
35-509
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4300
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9000
Aircraft flight hours:
9287
Circumstances:
About 5 miles west of the airport, the flightcrew advised the approach controller that they had visual contact with the airport, canceled their IFR clearance, and proceeded under visual flight rules. A witness heard the airplane approach from the east, and observed the airplane at a height consistent with the approach minimums for the VOR approach. The airplane continued over the runway, and entered a "tight" downwind. The witness lost visual contact with the airplane due to it "skimming" into or behind clouds. The airplane reappeared from the clouds at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground on a base leg. As it overshot the extended centerline for the runway, the bank angle increased to about 90-degrees. The airplane then descended out of view. The witness described the weather to the north and northeast of the airport, as poor visibility with "scuddy" clouds. According to CVR and FDR data, about 1.5 miles from the runway with the first officer at the controls, and south of the extended runway centerline, the airplane turned left, and then back toward the right. During that portion of the flight, the first officer stated, "what happens if we break out, pray tell." The captain replied, "uh, I don't see it on the left side it's gonna be a problem." When the airplane was about 1/8- mile south of the runway threshold, the first officer relinquished the controls to the captain. The captain then made an approximate 60-degree heading change to the right back toward the runway. The airplane crossed over the runway at an altitude of 200 feet, and began a left turn towards the center of the airport. During the turn, the first officer set the flaps to 20 degrees. The airplane reentered a left downwind, about 1,100 feet south of the runway, at an altitude of 400 feet. As the airplane turned onto the base leg, the captain called for "flaps twenty," and the first officer replied, "flaps twenty coming in." The CVR recorded the sound of a click, followed by the sound of a trim-in-motion clicker. The trim-in-motion audio clicker system would not sound if the flaps were positioned beyond 3 degrees. About 31 seconds later, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stick pusher stall warning tone. The airplane impacted a rooftop of a residential home about 1/4-mile northeast of the approach end of the runway, struck trees, a second residential home, a second line of trees, a third residential home, and came to rest in a river. Examination of the wreckage revealed the captain's airspeed indicator reference bug was set to 144 knots, and the first officer's was set to 124 knots. The flap selector switch was observed in the "UP" position. A review of the Airplane Flight Manual revealed the stall speeds for flap positions of 0 and 8 degrees, and a bank angle of 60 degrees, were 164 and 148 knots respectfully. There were no charts available to calculate stall speeds for level coordinated turns in excess of 60 degrees. The flightcrew was trained to apply procedures set forth by the airplane's Technical Manual, which stated, "…The PF (Pilot Flying) will call for flap and gear extension and retraction. The PNF (Pilot not flying) will normally actuate the landing gear. The PNF will respond by checking appropriate airspeed, repeating the flap or gear setting called for, and placing the lever in the requested position... The PNF should always verify that the requested setting is reasonable and appropriate for the phase of flighty and speed/weight combination."
Probable cause:
The first officer's inadvertent retraction of the flaps during the low altitude maneuvering, which resulted in the inadvertent stall and subsequent in-flight collision with a residential home. Factors in the accident were the captain's decision to perform a low altitude maneuver using excessive bank angle, the flight crews inadequate coordination, and low clouds surrounding the airport.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain off New York: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 18, 1995 at 2055 LT
Registration:
N711EX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Atlantic City – Farmingdale
MSN:
31-7952075
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6950
Captain / Total hours on type:
425.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7335
Circumstances:
While descending from 5,000 feet to 3,000 feet, the pilot informed ATC that the left engine had failed and the engine cowling was open. The crew said that after feathering the left propeller, and with the right engine at full power, they could not arrest a 300-500 fpm rate of descent. The crew informed ATC that they would be landing in the water. All the occupants exited the airplane from the left front pilot's emergency door. The victims were in the water for approximately 30 minutes before being rescued. One of the passengers was in cardiac arrest when he was retrieved from the water. Examination of the left engine revealed that the #2 cylinder had separated from the engine in flight as a result of high stress fatigue cracking of the cylinder hold down studs and the #3 main bearing thru-studs. The fatigue in the studs occurred as a result of the cylinder fastener preload forces either initially inadequate or lost during service. Maintenance records indicated that the thru-stud was replaced 80 service hours prior to the accident. Examination of the cylinder hold down studs and the #3 main bearing thru-studs revealed that they were improperly torqued, resulting in low initial preload on the fasteners. Incorrect installation of the oversize thru-studs, per existing service information, could have also been a factor in the improper torquing of the studs. The locations of the fatigue origins and the edge worn into the deck indicate that the upper studs were probably the first to fail, allowing the cylinder to rock on the lower rear corner of the cylinder flange.
Probable cause:
A total loss of left engine power as a result of an in-flight separation of the #2 cylinder. The cylinder separated due to high stress fatigue cracking of the cylinder hold down studs and the #3 main bearing thru-studs. Factors in this accident were: improper torquing of the studs and failure of maintenance personnel to properly comply with service information.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AC Metro II in Hartford: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 17, 1993 at 0225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N220KC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Farmingdale - Hartford
MSN:
AC-231
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4200
Captain / Total hours on type:
600.00
Aircraft flight hours:
16710
Circumstances:
On an approach to land at the destination, the second-in-command (sic) was flying the airplane. The plane touched down with the landing gear retracted, and the propeller blades contacted the runway. The sic initiated a go-around (aborted landing). Witnesses saw the airplane in a steep left bank just before impact in a river next to the airport. Propeller strikes on the runway extended 380 feet, indicating a touchdown speed of 96 knots. The last propeller strikes on the right side indicated a speed of 86 knots. The last strikes on the left side indicated a slowing propeller. Published VMC for the airplane was 94 knots. The CVR tape revealed the crew completed a descent arrival check, performed an incomplete approach briefing, and did not perform a before landing check. The CVR revealed no sound of a gear warning horn. Company personnel stated that the circuit breaker for the warning horn had been found pulled at the completion of previous flights by other crew; this was to prevent a warning horn from sounding during a high rate of descent. Both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
Failure of the copilot (second-in-command) to follow the checklist, assure the gear was extended for landing and attain or maintain adequate airspeed (VMC); and failure of the pilot-in-command (pic) to properly supervise the flight and take sufficient remedial action.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421A Golden Eagle I in Norfolk

Date & Time: Aug 5, 1979 at 1630 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N3126K
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Myrtle Beach - Farmingdale
MSN:
421A-0107
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8000
Circumstances:
En route from Myrtle Beach to Farmingdale, the pilot encountered engine problems, informed ATC about his situation and was vectored to Norfolk for an emergency landing. The aircraft descended from 8,000 to 3,000 feet when the pilot realized he could not reach Norfolk Airport. He attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in an open field. Both occupants were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Engine failure during normal cruise due to piston rings failure. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Material failure,
- Failed to maintain flying speed,
- Improper in-flight decisions,
- Complete engine failure,
- Forced landing off airport on land,
- N° two cylinder piston failed,
- Pilot descended from 8,000 to 3,000 feet 12 miles from field with right engine shut down.
Final Report: