Swearingen SA226T Merlin III

On April 23, 2021, about 1530 mountain standard time, a Swearingen SA226-T(B) twin-engine airplane, N59EZ, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Winslow, Arizona. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The airplane departed from Scottsdale Airport (SDL), Scottsdale, Arizona, about 1412 and was destined for Winslow-Lindbergh Regional Airport (INW), Winslow, Arizona. No flight plan was filed and there was no contact with air traffic control during the flight. Radar tracking depicted the airplane accomplishing several turning maneuvers in the vicinity of the Winslow airport and general accident area at elevations ranging from 7,100 ft mean sea level (msl) to 4,850 ft msl for about two minutes before the radar track ends. The airplane came to rest in a rock quarry adjacent to Arizona State Route 87 about 4 miles east of the Winslow Airport. The entire airplane was contained within a flat portion of the quarry; the sides of the rock quarry were about 40 ft in elevation and surrounded the accident site. A postcrash fire consumed the wreckage. The first identified point of impact was a disturbance to the ground about 10 ft from a barb-wire fence; the wood posts were fractured, and the barbwire was pulled out, the two metal posts about 12 ft apart were not damaged or disturbed. The debris path was on a 028° heading that led to the main wreckage. The main wreckage was about 410 ft from the first identified point of impact and came to rest inverted. Both wings separated from the fuselage, and both engines separated from their respective wings. The two four-bladed propellers were found at the accident site, both propeller assemblies had separated from their respective engines and were found in the debris field.

The twin engine airplane departed North Bay on an ambulance flight to Arnprior, carrying two pilots and a doctor. Following an uneventful flight, the crew was cleared for a VOR/DME approach to runway 28 under VFR conditions. On short final, the aircraft descended too low and impacted ground 50 metres short of runway. Upon impact, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane slid for about 600 metres before coming to rest. All three occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist.

The twin engine airplane departed Alicante-Mutxamel Airport at 1221LT on a private flight to Andorra, carrying four passengers and one pilot. Following an uneventful flight at an altitude of 12,500 feet, the pilot informed ATC about electrical problems then initiated the descent to Andorra. About two minutes later, the electrical system totally failed. The pilot continued the approach to Andorra-La Seu d'Urgell Airport. After touchdown on runway 21, the undercarriage collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the right and came to rest in a grassy area. All five occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During takeoff from the departure airport, as the pilot advanced the throttles, the aircraft made a "sudden turn to the right." The pilot successfully aborted the takeoff, performed an engine run-up, and then took off without incident. The pilot experienced no anomalies during the second takeoff or the flight to the destination airport. As he reduced the power while in the traffic pattern, at the destination airport, the left engine accelerated to 60 percent power. The pilot reported to the tower that he had "one engine surging and another engine that seems like I lost control or speed." The pilot advanced and retarded the throttles and the engines responded appropriately, so he continued the approach. As the pilot flared the airplane for landing, the left engine surged to 65 percent power with the throttle lever in the "idle" position. The airplane immediately turned to the right; the right wing dropped and impacted the ground. Disassembly of the engines revealed no anomalies to account for surging, or for an uncommanded increase in power or lack of throttle response. Functional testing of the fuel control units and fuel pumps revealed the flight idle fuel flow rate was 237 and 312 pounds per hour (pph), for the left and right engines, respectively. These figures were higher than the new production specification of 214 pph. According to the manufacturer, flight idle fuel flow impacts thrust produced when the power levers are set to the flight idle position and differences in fuel flow can result in an asymmetrical thrust condition.

The pilot departed Front Range Airport (elevation 5512 feet) at approximately 2008, climbed to 7,000 feet msl, accelerated to 270 knots, and requested his IFR clearance. Weather at the time of N950TT's departure was 500 feet overcast; witnesses reported the tops of the thin cloud condition were 8,500 feet msl and it was very dark on top (no stars or moon). The pilot made several changes in airspeed and climb rate until radar indicated that he had entered an 8,500 fpm decent. The pilot reported to ATC that he had 'stalled' the airplane. Radar indicated that he then climbed at 7,500 fpm until his estimated airspeed was 10 knots, and then subsequently descended again at 8,400 fpm until he impacted the frozen ground. The pilot had flown 4 times for 7 hours in the previous 40 days. Five airline pilots, each of who had 3,000 to 5,000 hours in Swearingens, stated individually that even though the airplane is single pilot certified, they believed that 'its a two pilot airplane--because the work load is too high.'

On final approach to Ushuaia Airport, following an uneventful cargo flight from Río Grande, the twin engine aircraft collided with a flock of birds. The windshield was broken and the left engine lost power. The crew was able to continue the approach and landing. After touchdown, the aircraft went out of control and collided with a snow wall. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During arrival at dawn, the pilot contacted Approach Control about 22 miles from the airport at 8,500 feet and requested an ILS runway 26 approach. The ATIS was reporting 1/8 mile visibility with fog; the minimum published visibility for the ILS landing was 3/4 mile. The controller vectored the aircraft so that it intercepted the ILS localizer at the outer marker at an intercept angle that was 5 degrees greater than the maximum allowable intercept of 30 degrees. The intercept point should have been at least 3 miles further away from the airport. The aircraft was 650 feet above the ILS glideslope at the outer marker (which was outside the ILS glideslope parameter). Instead of making a missed approach, the pilot elected to continue the ILS. As he attempted to intercept the glideslope from above, the airplane entered a high rate of descent and passed through the glideslope. The pilot was arresting the descent, when the airplane collided with level terrain about 1,000 feet short of the runway. After the accident, at 0646 edt, the visibility was 1/16 mile with fog.