Ferry

The twin engine aircraft departed South Africa on a flight to Tanzania with intermediate stops in Tete and Lilongwe, carrying one passenger and one pilot. The aircraft was en route to Dar es-Salaam to perform a Lidar (Laser Imaging Detection And Ranging) mission. En route, the pilot encountered engine problems and elected to make an emergency landing. Upon landing in an open field, the aircraft lost its tail and crashed landed about 45 km southwest of Lilongwe. Both occupants were rescued and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft was planned to fly from Lanseria airport (FALA) in Republic of South Africa to Bamako airport (GABS) in Mali with a stopover in Ondangwa airport (FYOA) in Namibia, São Tomé International airport (FPST) in São Tomé and Príncipe and Accra airport (DGAA) in Ghana, with a rough estimating time of approximately 15hrs flying, not including the ground time at airports of stopover. The aircraft had been in Lanseria airport (FALA) in Republic of South Africa (RSA) for maintenance check (including but not limited to engine work and interior refurbishing). Prior to the planned flight, the aircraft underwent flight check for 45 minutes after completed planned maintenance on Saturday, April 6th, flown by the Captain and another SAS company pilot. The aircraft departed FALA to FYOA for its first stop over whose flight time was 03:35h. The planned departure from FYOA was delayed due to trouble in starting the right engine. The aircraft took off at 1021hrs contrary to planned 0830hrs. For the second leg of the flight, the aircraft departed FYOA to FPST with filed flight plan of 05 hours and 20 minutes (flight time) having FYOA as alternate. Leaving the Namibian airspace the pilot only contacted Luanda ATC and São Tomé Tower as destination, and at no time did he contact Brazzaville or Libreville for any further clearance within Brazzaville FIR: It is important to emphasize that on that day, the west coast of Africa in the vicinity of Gulf of Guinea had widespread moderate to severe thunderstorm activity with lighting and heavy rain. When initiating descent to São Tomé from FL 200 to 4000 feet as instructed by São Tomé ATC, the pilot was advised that weather was gradually deteriorating at airport vicinity. At 1610hrs the pilot had last transmission with Control Tower informing them about his position which was 9 nm inbound to São Tomé VOR at 4000 feet and also informed the ATC that he was encountering heavy rain. Having lost contact with aircraft at 1613hrs, the São Tomé ATC tried several times to contact the airplane by VHF118.9, 127.5, 121.5 and HF 8903 without success. Facing this situation the ATC sent messages to FIRs of Brazzaville and Accra and Libreville Control as well, some airlines flying within São Tomean an adjacent airspace were contacted for any information but all responses were negative. A Search and Rescue operation started on 7 April 2013 the same day the accident occurred and was conducted on the sea and on the island; no trace of aircraft or its debris, pilot or any cargo were found. The search was terminated on 20 April at 1730hrs.

Last March 12, the aircraft sustained damages upon landing at Djolu Airport. Repairs were carried on and the aircraft was ready for its back trip to Kinshasa on March 22, carrying three crew members, two pilots and one mechanic. After the brakes were released, while accelerating on a dirt runway, the aircraft veered off runway, contacted trees and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. All three crew members evacuated the burned wreckage and only the mechanic was injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

Approach was carried out on the runway 19 at Vnukovo Airport with length of 3060m. Pilot was performed by pilot in command (PIC). Before entering the glide path the aircraft was in landing configuration: with flaps deployed at 37°, slats - at 23 °, and the landing gear down. Decision height was calculated to be 60 m. Landing weight of the aircraft was approximately 67.5 tons, alignment ~26.5%, which did not exceed the limits specified by the flight operation manual (FOM). During flight preparation PIC determined the landing glide path speed as 210 km/h, and specified that the speed at least 230 km/h has to be maintained. Glideslope descent was made in director mode with automatic throttle disabled with an average instrument speed about 255 km/h vertical speed -3…-5 m/s. Descent was performed without significant deviations from the glide path. Flyby of the of the neighboring (to the runway) homing radio beacon was performed at the altitude 65…70 m. Runway threshold was passed at the altitude about 15 m and airspeed of 260 km/h. 5 seconds after the throttle control lever had been switched to the idle mode the aircraft landed at the speed about 230 km/h, distance from the runway threshold of 900-1000 m and left bank of 1... 1.5°, provided that the signal of the signal of left gear strut compression was produced. During aircraft landing the right side wind gust reached up to ~11.5 m/s. The maximum value of the vertical acceleration during touch down was recorded as 1.12g according to flight recorders (hereinafter - magnetic tape recorder). About 10 seconds had passed from the moment of passing 4 m height above ground and touchdown. 3 seconds after landing nose gear strut was compressed. At this stage the right gear strut compression signal had not yet been formed. Almost simultaneously with nose landing gear touchdown the crew moved thrust reverser lever in one motion to the "maximum reverse" position and applied mechanical brakes. Actuation of the reverse valves didn't occur. Air brakes and spoilers were not also activated automatically and the crew didn't make attempt to activate them manually. After thrust levers were moved to the "maximum reverse" position an increase of forward thrust (up to ~90% Nvd) was recorded with both engines. The pressure in the hydraulic system of wheel brakes of the left (compressed) landing gear was up to 50 kgf/сm², whereas there were no pressure in the wheel brakes of the right (not compressed) landing gear. The minimum airspeed to to which the aircraft slowed 7-8 seconds after landing was 200-205 km/h at ~0° pitch and roll of 1° to the left, after that the speed began to increase. 2 seconds after thrust levers were moved to the "maximum reverse" position the flight engineer reported that reversers had not been deployed. Thrust lever had been maintained in the "maximum reverse" position for about 8 seconds and was switched off after that. During this time the airspeed increased to 240 km/h. The increase in airspeed led to further unloading of the main landing gear. With fluctuations in roll (from 4.5° to the left to 2.6° to the right) compression was produced alternately on the left and right landing gear struts. Almost simultaneously sith the reversers being switched off the brake pedal was pushed by left-hand-seat pilot to 60°. As before the breaking was inefficient - hydraulic pressure in the wheel brake in only applied after sufficient compression of the gear strut. 5 seconds after reversers were deactivated, after words of the flight engineer "Turn on reverse! Reverse!" the control was moved to the "maximum reverse" position again. As in the first attempt the deployment of reversers didn't occur, both engines started to produce direct thrust (at Nvd ~ 84%). Aircraft braking didn't occur, airspeed was 230…240 km/h. In 4 seconds the reverse was switched off. At the moment of reverser reactivation the aircraft was at the distance of about 900...1000 m from the exit threshold. 6 seconds after reversers switch off the crew attempted to supply automatic braking as evidenced by the crew conversation and transient appearance of commands: "Automatic braking on" for the primary and backup subsystems. When the aircraft passed the exit threshold thrust levers were in the "small-reverse" position. The aircraft overrun occurred 32 seconds after landing, being almost on the axis of the runway, with an airspeed of about 215 km/h. In the process of overrun flight engineer by PIC command turned off the engines by means of emergency brakes. The aircraft continued to roll outside the runway slowly due to road bumps and snow cover. The compression on both landing gear struts occurred which led to activation of air brakes and spoilers. The aircraft collided with the slope of a ravine at the ground speed of about 190 km/h. Four stewardess were seriously injured while four other crew members were killed. The following day, one of the survivor died from her injuries.

Shortly after takeoff from Rome-Ciampino Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in a car demolition, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post impact fire as well as more than 30 cars. Both crew were killed.

Based on the information available, at 20:40 the ONT (National Transplant Organization) informed the Santiago Airport (LEST) that they were going to make a “hospital flight”. The aircraft was refueled at the Santiago Airport with 1062 liters of fuel. According to communications, the crew of aircraft EC-IBA contacted the Santiago tower at 21:46 to request permission to start up and information on the weather and the runway in use at Asturias. At 21:54 they were cleared to take off. According to the airport operations office, the aircraft landed in Asturias (LEAS) at 22:27. The hospital flight service commenced at 22:15. The RFFS accompanied the ambulance to the aircraft at 22:30 and at 22:44 the aircraft took off en route to Porto. The aircraft was transferred from Madrid control to Santiago approach at 22:52 at flight level 200 and cleared straight to Porto (LPPR). Based on the information provided by Porto Airport, the aircraft landed at 23:40. While waiting for the medical team to return, the crew remained in the airport’s facilities. According to some of the personnel there, the crew made some comments regarding the bad weather. There was fog, especially on the arrival route. At 01:34 and again at 02:01 the crew was supplied with the flight plan information, information from the ARO-LPPR office and updated weather data. The aircraft was refueled at the Porto Airport with 1,000 l of fuel and took off at 02:34. At 02:44 the aircraft contacted approach control at Santiago to report its position. Four minutes later the crew contacted the Santiago tower directly to ask about the weather conditions at the field (see Appendix C). The aircraft landed once more in Asturias at 03:28. At 03:26 the RFFS was again activated to escort the ambulance to the aircraft. The service was deactivated at 04:00. The crew requested updated weather information from the tower, which provided the information from the 03:00 METAR. According to the flight plan filed, the estimated off-block time (EOBT) for departing from the Asturias Airport was 03:45, with an estimated flight time to Santiago of 40 minutes. The alternate destination airport was Vitoria (LEVT). The aircraft took off from Asturias at 03:38. At 03:56 the crew established contact with Santiago approach control, which provided the crew with the latest METAR from 03:30, which informed that the runway in use was 17, winds were calm, visibility was 4,000 m with mist, few clouds at 600 ft, temperature and dew point of 13° and QNH of 1,019. The aircraft was then cleared to conduct an ILS approach to runway 17 at the Santiago Airport. At 04:15 the crew contacted the tower controller, who reported calm winds and cleared them to land on runway 17. At 04:18 the COSPAS-SARSAT system detected the activation of an ELT. The system estimated the position for the beacon as being in the vicinity of the LEST airport. At 04:38 the tower controller informed airport operations of a call he had received from SAR that a beacon was active in the vicinity of the airport, and requested that a marshaller go to the airport where the airplane normally parked to see if it was there. At 04:44 the marshaller confirmed that the aircraft was not in its hangar and the emergency procedure was activated, with the various parties involved in the search for the airplane being notified. At 05:10 the control tower called the airport to initiate the preliminary phase (Phase I) before activating the LVP. At 05:15 the RFFS reported that the aircraft had been found in the vicinity of the VOR. At 05:30 the LVP was initiated (Phase II). At 07:51 the LVP was terminated. The last flight to arrive at the Santiago Airport before the accident had landed at 23:33, and the next flight to arrive following the accident landed at 05:25.

The airplane, operated by Oz Gas Aviation LLC, was substantially damaged when it struck a communications tower near Morgantown, West Virginia. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. No flight plan had been filed for the positioning flight from Nemacolin Airport (PA88), Farmington, Pennsylvania, to Morgantown Municipal Airport (MGW), Morgantown, West Virginia conducted under Title14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. At 0924 on the morning of the accident, the airplane departed from Rigrtona Airport (13PA), Tidioute, Pennsylvania for PA88 with the pilot and three passengers onboard. The airplane landed on runway 23 at PA88 at 0944. The pilot then parked the airplane; shutdown both engines, and deplaned the three passengers. He advised them that he would be back on the following day to pick them up. After the passengers got on a shuttle bus for the Nemacolin Woodlands Resort, the pilot started the engines. He idled for approximately 2 minutes, and then back taxied on runway 23 for takeoff. At 0957, he departed from runway 23 for the approximately 19 nautical mile positioning flight to MGW, where he was going to refuel and spend the night. After departure from PA88, the airplane climbed to 3,100 feet above mean sea level (msl) on an approximately direct heading for MGW. The pilot then contacted Clarksburg Approach Control and was given a discrete code of 0130. When the airplane was approximately nine miles east of the Morgantown airport, the air traffic controller advised the pilot that he had "radar contact" with him. The airplane then descended to 3,000 feet, and approximately one minute later struck the communications tower on an approximate magnetic heading of 240 degrees. According to a witness who was cutting timber across the road from where the accident occurred; the weather was cloudy with lighting and thunder, and it had just started "sprinkling". He then heard a loud "bang", turned, and observed the airplane descending upside down, and then impact. About 20 minutes later it stopped "sprinkling". He advised that he could still see the top of the tower when it was "sprinkling".

The pilot, sole on board, departed Barra do Vento Airport on a ferry flight to Boa Vista-Atlas Brasil-Cantanhede Airport, Roraima. Shortly after rotation, he noticed abnormal vibrations. At the same time, the 'door warning' light came ON on the instrument panel. He decided to land back but lost control of the airplane that veered off runway to the right and collided with an earth mound, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and the pilot was seriously injured.

Following an uneventful flight from Bridgetown-Grantley Adams Airport, the pilot landed at Castries-George F. L. Charles (Vigie) Airport. Upon touchdown, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest against a fence. The pilot was uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was flown on a non-scheduled charter flight from O. R. Tambo International Airport to Hoedspruit military aerodrome, where it landed safely and all 97 passengers disembarked. The crew then prepared to return to O. R. Tambo International Airport with no passengers on board. Whilst taxiing to the cleared holding point for takeoff, the pilot switched off the landing lights to avoid blinding an approaching aircraft. As a result, he overshot the turning point in the darkness and found himself at the end of the taxiway with insufficient space to turn around. According to him, he decided to manoeuvre the aircraft out of the "dead end" by turning into the last taxiway, which led to military hangars, and then reversing the aircraft to carry out a 180° turn. This was to be done without external guidance. Whilst reversing the aircraft, the pilot failed to stop it in time, the main wheels rolled off the edge of the taxiway and the aircraft slipped down a steep embankment, coming to rest with the nose-wheel still on the taxiway. The aeroplane was substantially damaged, but no-one was injured.