Ground accident of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Fresno

Date & Time: Dec 18, 2019 at 0730 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N72MM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
BB-497
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
9838
Circumstances:
Parked at Fresno-Yosemite Airport, the twin engine airplane was stolen by a teenager aged 17. She lost control of the airplane that collided witht a fence and a building. The only occupant was uninjured and arrested. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Ground collision with an ATR72-500 in Medan

Date & Time: Aug 3, 2017 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-WFF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Medan – Meulaboh
MSN:
869
YOM:
2009
Flight number:
IW1252
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
67
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13006
Captain / Total hours on type:
624.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
263
Copilot / Total hours on type:
109
Aircraft flight hours:
14321
Aircraft flight cycles:
16132
Circumstances:
On 3 August 2017, a Boeing 737-900 ER aircraft, operated by PT. Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air) as a scheduled passenger flight from Sultan Iskandar Muda International Airport, Banda Aceh (WITT) to Kualanamu International Airport, Medan (WIMM) as flight number JT 197. JT197 departed at 1010 LT (0310 UTC) in daylight condition, with 151 persons on board. Meanwhile, an ATR 72-500 aircraft, operated by PT. Wings Abadi Airlines (Wings Air) as scheduled passenger flight from Medan with intended destination to Cut Nyak Dien Airport, Meulaboh (WITC) as flight number IW1252. On board IW1252 were two pilots, one observer pilot, two flight attendants and 67 passengers. At 0356 UTC, the IW1252 pilot requested taxi clearance to runway 23 from the Medan Ground controller and was instructed to follow U2 taxi route, the IW1252 pilot requested to depart via intersection taxiway D which was approved by Medan Tower controller. At 0357 UTC, JT197 was on landing approach and received landing clearance. At 04:00:01 UTC, the Medan Tower controller issued conditional clearance to the IW1252 pilot, to enter the runway after the JT197 had landed. This conditional clearance was combined with the air traffic control route clearance. IW1252 continued to taxi and entered the runway. At 04:00:50 UTC, JT197 touched down on runway 23 and a few second later impacted with the IW1252. There were no injuries during this occurrence, but both aircraft were substantially damaged. After impact, debris from the impact aircraft remained on the runway. Prior to the runway inspection, one aircraft departed and one aircraft landed.
Probable cause:
The communication misunderstanding of the conditional clearance to enter runway while the IW1252 pilots did not aware of JT197 had received landing clearance and the unobserved IW1252 aircraft movement made the IW1252 aircraft entered the runway.
Final Report:

Ground collision with an ATR42-600 in Jakarta

Date & Time: Apr 4, 2016 at 1957 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-TNJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1015
YOM:
2014
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
2073
Aircraft flight cycles:
1038
Circumstances:
On 4 April 2016, Boeing 737-800 registration PK-LBS was being operated by Batik Air as scheduled passenger flight with flight number ID 7703 from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport with intended destination Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport, Makassar. An ATR 42-600 aircraft, registration PK-TNJ operated by TransNusa Aviation Mandiri was being repositioned from north to south apron of Halim Perdanakusuma Airport by a ground handling agent PT. Jasa Angkasa Semesta (PT. JAS). The aircraft was towed without aircraft electrical power fed to the system including the radio communication and aircraft lighting system. At the time of occurrence, the ID7703 pilot communicated to Halim Tower controller on frequency 118.6 MHz while the towing car driver communicated using handheld radio on frequency 152.73 KHz and was handled by assistant controller. At 1948 LT (1248 UTC), ID7703 pilot received taxi clearance from Halim Tower controller and after the ID7703 taxi, the towing car driver received clearance for towing and to report when on taxiway C. Afterward the towing car driver was instructed to expedite and to follow ID7703. While the ID7703 backtracking runway 24, the towed aircraft entered the runway intended to cross and to enter taxiway G. At 1256 UTC, ID7703 pilot received takeoff clearance and initiated the takeoff while the towed aircraft was still on the runway. The towing car driver and the pilots took action to avoid the collision. The decision of the pilot and the towing car driver to move away from the centerline runway had made the aircraft collision on the centerline runway (head to head) avoided, however the wings collision was unavoidable. At 1257 UTC, the ID7703 collided with the towed aircraft. The ID7703 pilot rejected the takeoff and stopped approximately 400 meters from the collision point while the towed aircraft stopped on the right of the centerline runway 24. No one injured at this occurrence and both aircraft severely damaged.
Probable cause:
The collision was the result of a poor coordination by ATC staff at Jakarta Airport. The following factors were reported:
- Handling of two movements in the same area with different controllers on separate frequencies without proper coordination resulted in the lack of awareness to the controllers, pilots and towing car driver,
- The communication misunderstanding of the instruction to follow ID 7703 most likely contributed the towed aircraft enter the runway,
- The lighting environments in the tower cab and turning pad area of runway 24 might have diminished the capability to the controllers and pilots to recognize the towed aircraft that was installed with insufficient lightings.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Boeing 737-3H4 in Nashville

Date & Time: Dec 15, 2015 at 1730 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N649SW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Houston – Nashville
MSN:
27719/2894
YOM:
1997
Flight number:
WN031
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
133
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
19186
Captain / Total hours on type:
14186.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
15500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5473
Aircraft flight hours:
58630
Circumstances:
On December 15, 2015, at 5:23pm central standard time (CST), Southwest Airlines flight 31, a Boeing 737-300, N649SW, exited the taxiway while taxing to the gate and came to rest in a ditch at the Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee. Nine of the 138 passengers and crew onboard received minor injuries during the evacuation and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from William P. Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas. Weather was not a factor, light conditions were dark just after sunset. The airplane landed normally on runway 20R and exited at taxiway B2. The flight crew received and understood the taxi instructions to their assigned gate. As the crew proceeded along taxiway T3, the flight crew had difficulty locating taxiway T4 as the area was dark, and there was glare from the terminal lights ahead. The crew maneuvered the airplane along T3 and onto T4, and then turned back to the right on a general heading consistent with heading across the ramp toward the assigned gate. The flight crew could not see T4 or the grassy area because the taxiway lights were off and the glare from the terminal lights. As a result, the airplane left the pavement and came to rest in a drainage ditch resulting in substantial damage to airplane. The cabin crew initially attempted to keep the passengers seated, but after being unable to contact the flight crew due to the loud alarm on the flight deck, the cabin crew properly initiated and conducted an evacuation. As a result of past complaints regarding the brightness of the green taxiway centerline lights on taxiways H, J, L and T-6, BNA tower controllers routinely turned off the taxiway centerline lighting. Although the facility had not received any requests on the day of the accident, about 30 minutes prior to the event the tower controller in charge (CIC) turned off the centerline lights as a matter of routine. In doing so, the CIC inadvertently turned off the "TWY J & Apron 2" selector, which included the taxiway lights in the vicinity of the excursion. The airfield lighting panel screensaver feature prevented the tower controllers from having an immediate visual reference to the status of the airfield lighting.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's early turn towards the assigned gate because taxiway lighting had been inadvertently turned off by the controller-in-charge which resulted in the airplane leaving the paved surface. Contributing to the accident was the operation of the screen-saver function on the lighting control panel that prevented the tower controllers from having an immediate visual reference
to the status of the airfield lighting.
Final Report:

Ground fire of a Boeing 767-269ER in Fort Lauderdale

Date & Time: Oct 29, 2015 at 1233 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N251MY
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fort Lauderdale - Caracas
MSN:
23280/131
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
DYA405
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
90
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15700
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4140
Aircraft flight hours:
30108
Aircraft flight cycles:
9986
Circumstances:
On October 29, 2015, about 12:33 pm eastern daylight time (EDT), Dynamic International Airways flight 405, a Boeing 767-200ER, N251MY, experienced a fuel leak and subsequent fire while taxiing for departure at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Florida (FLL). Of the 101 passengers and crew onboard, one passenger received serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage from the fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 supplemental as a scheduled charter from FLL to Maiquetía Simón Bolívar International Airport (CCS), Caracas, Venezuela. A significant fuel leak and subsequent fire occurred in the left engine strut and nacelle during taxi, resulting in substantial damage to the airplane. The fuel leak was the result of a fuel line flexible coupling (Wiggins fitting) loosening and becoming disengaged due to the lack of a safety lockwire on the coupling as required by the maintenance manual. The leaking fuel contacted hot engine case surfaces which ignited the fire. Records indicate that maintenance was conducted on this fitting in October of 2012 at the 4C check prior to the airplane being prepared for storage. The area would also have been subject to a visual inspection when the airplane was brought out of storage in 2015. The same maintenance facility conducted both of these activities. About 240 flight hours were logged between the aircraft returning to service and the accident. The leak occurred after the coupling loosened due to the missing safety wire which was the result of an error by the third-party maintenance provider. The flight crew promptly shut down the left engine using the fire handle, and requested fire equipment. As the airplane stopped on the taxiway, passengers saw the fire and insisted that the cabin crew initiate an evacuation. One passenger opened an overwing exit on his own, and the slide did not deploy. The cabin crew initiated the evacuation without coordination with the flight crew. After the evacuation had already begun, the flight crew advised over the PA to evacuate out the right side of the airplane. The flight crew did not immediately shut down the right engine and an evacuating passenger ran behind the engine and was blown to the pavement resulting in serious injuries. The lack of coordination between the flight crew and cabin crew resulted in the evacuation initiating while the right engine was still running.
Probable cause:
The separation of the flexible fuel line coupling and subsequent fuel leak due to the failure of maintenance personnel to install the required safety lockwire. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the initiation of the evacuation before the right engine was shut down which led to the passenger's injury.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Boeing 747-436 in Johannesburg

Date & Time: Dec 22, 2013 at 2243 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BNLL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Johannesburg – London
MSN:
24054/794
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
BA034
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
17
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
185
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
20050
Captain / Total hours on type:
12500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5700
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1400
Aircraft flight hours:
110578
Aircraft flight cycles:
12832
Circumstances:
The British Airways aircraft B747-400, flight number BA034 with registration G-BNLL, was going to embark on a commercial international air transportation long haul flight from FAOR to EGLL. The ATC gave the crew instructions to push back, start and face south, then taxi using taxiway Bravo to the Category 2 holding point for Runway 03L. During the taxi, instead of turning to the left to follow Bravo, the crew continued straight ahead, crossing the intersection of taxiway Bravo and aircraft stand taxilane Mike. After crossing the intersection, still being on Mike, the aircraft collided with a building. An investigation was conducted and several causal factors were determined. Amongst others, it was determined that the crew erred in thinking they were still taxiing on Bravo while in fact they were taxiing on Mike. This mistake, coupled with other contributory factors such as the briefing information, taxi information, ground movement visual aids, confusion and loss of situational awareness led to the collision. All 202 occupants evacuated safely while four people in the building were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The loss of situational awareness caused the crew to taxi straight ahead on the wrong path, crossing the intersection/junction of Bravo and Mike instead of following Bravo where it turns off to the right and leads to the Category 2 holding point. Following aircraft stand taxilane Mike; they collided with a building on the right-hand side of Mike.
Contributory Factors:
- Failure of the crew to carry out a briefing after they had received instruction from ATC that the taxi route would be taxiway Bravo.
- The lack of appropriate knowledge about the taxiway Bravo layout and relevant information (caution notes) on threats or risks to look out for while taxiing on taxiway Bravo en route to the Cat 2 holding point.
- The aerodrome infrastructure problems (i.e. ground movement navigation aids anomalies), which created a sense of confusion during the taxi.
- Loss of situation awareness inside the cockpit causing the crew not to detect critical cues of events as they were gradually unfolding in front of them.
- Failure of the other crew members to respond adequately when the Co-pilot was commenting on the cues (i.e. narrowness and proximity to the building).
- The intersection/junction of Bravo and Mike not being identified as a hotspot area on the charts.
Final Report:

Crash of a Saab 340B in Udon Thani

Date & Time: Oct 6, 2013 at 0845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HS-GBG
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chiang Mai - Udon Thani
MSN:
453
YOM:
1998
Flight number:
DD8610
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
25
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Chiang Mai, the crew completed the landing on runway 30 at Udon Thani Airport. The aircraft vacated runway and was taxiing when control was lost. The airplane veered to the right, entered a soft grassy area, lost its nose gear and came to rest. All 28 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of the hydraulic system, causing the malfunction of the nosewheel steering system and the brakes.

Ground accident of a Saab 340A in Mendoza

Date & Time: Jan 2, 2013 at 1011 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LV-BMD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mendoza - Neuquén
MSN:
123
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
OLS5420
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
30
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7000
Captain / Total hours on type:
600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1818
Copilot / Total hours on type:
110
Aircraft flight hours:
47798
Circumstances:
While taxiing to runway 18 for a departure to Neuquén, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off taxiway to the left and rolled onto a soft ground four about 40 metres before coming to rest. The nose gear sank in soft ground, causing both propeller blades to struck the ground and to be partially torn off. The fuselage was hit by debris. All 33 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The loss of control during taxiing was the consequence of the combination of the following factors:
- The electric pump which controls fluid pressure in the hydraulic system was not operational, generating a deficit of fluid pressure in the hydraulic system.
- The low fluid pressure warning in the hydraulic system was not recognized by the crew.
- The crew could not control the path of the aircraft due to the unavailability of nose wheel steering.
- The persistence of an informal practice among the crews of the operator on the operation of the hydraulic system, contrary to the concept of operation of the hydraulic system established by the manufacturer.
- The lack of detection of the informal practice on the operation of the hydraulic system by the operator's safety monitoring mechanisms.
Final Report:

Ground fire of a Boeing 737-8KN in Antalya

Date & Time: Oct 14, 2012 at 0400 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-TJK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Antalya - Trondheim
MSN:
35794/2794
YOM:
2009
Flight number:
CAI773
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
189
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the push back process, the pilots noticed smoke spreading in the cockpit and in the cabin and stopped the aircraft. All 196 occupants were evacuated but some were standing on wings and jumped down to the tarmac. 27 passengers were injured, some of them seriously. The aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair due to smoke.
Probable cause:
It is believed that a short circuit occurred in the cockpit panel, on the captain side, most probably in the vicinity of the oxygen system.

Crash of a Canadair CRJ-200ER in Saint George: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 17, 2012 at 0100 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N865AS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
7507
YOM:
2001
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Registered N865AS, the landed at Saint George Airport, Utah, at 2236LT after completing flight DL7772 from Salt Lake City. All occupants deplaned and the aircraft was parked on the ramp for the night. Shortly after midnight, a commercial pilot climbed over the barbed wire fence, open the door of the aircraft (which was not closed by key) and managed to start the engines. The aircraft rolled for several metres before then impacted the terminal building, went through the fence and came to rest in a parking lot. The pilot shot himself in the cockpit. Polices forces confirmed later that he wanted to stole the aircraft after his girlfriend was killed that day in Colorado Springs.
Probable cause:
Aircraft stolen by a commercial pilot who shot himself in the cockpit after trying to take off without any clearance (illegal flight). No investigations were conducted by the NTSB on this event.