Cargo

The airplane departed San José-Juan Santamaría Airport runway 07 at 0940LT on a cargo service (flight JOS7216) to Guatemala City, carrying two pilots and a load of various goods. When the crew reached FL210, he declared an emergency and reported technical problems with the hydraulic system. The crew encountered a 'HYDRAULIC QUANTITY indication then a HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE (L ONLY) second indication. At this time, the left autopilot and yaw damper disengaged. After being cleared to return, the crew followed a holding pattern and the airplane landed at a speed of 137 knots (Vref 130 kts) on runway 07. Following a normal touchdown, the crew initiated the braking procedure when the airplane started to veer to the right. It skidded to the right, made an almost 90° turn, descended a bank, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a grassy area located about five metres below the runway elevation, broken in two. Both pilots evacuated with minor injuries.

The twin engine airplane departed Bukavu-Kavumu Airport on a cargo flight to Lulingu Tschionka, carrying two pilots and a load of 1,600 kilos of various goods. Few minutes after takeoff, a fire erupted in the cargo compartment and the crew elected to return for an emergency landing. The crew landed normally and was able to stop the airplane and the runway and to evacuate safely. The aircraft was completely destroyed by fire.

The single engine airplane departed Koryaki on a cargo flight to Tymlat, carrying two pilots and a load of potatoes and roof tiles. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the airplane reached a critical angle of attack then entered a stall and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about one km from the village. The airplane was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.

The airplane was ready for a cargo flight from Hangzhou to Novosibirsk-Tolmachevo Airport (flight 4B6534). On board were eight crew members (2 captains, 2 copilots, 2 flight engineers and 2 maintenance technicians) and a load of 20 tons of various goods. After the push back was completed from stand 204, the copilot was processing with a test of his oxygen mask when a leak occurred, later followed by three flashes coming from the right side of the cockpit. As black smoke was spreading in the cockpit and while taxiing, the captain stopped the airplane and all eight crew members evacuated from the left front door. Almost five hours were needed for the fire bombers to extinguish the fire and the airplane was almost destroyed. All eight crew members escaped uninjured.

The aircraft departed Goma on a cargo flight to Shabunda, carrying two conveyors and three crew members. On approach to Shabunda Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions when the arcraft crashed 15 km from the airport. All five occupants were killed.

A Cessna 208B airplane collided with a powered paraglider during cruise flight at 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl) in Class E airspace. Based on video evidence, the powered paraglider operator impacted the Cessna’s right wing leading edge, outboard of the lift strut attachment point. The outboard 10 ft of the Cessna’s right wing separated during the collision. The Cessna impacted terrain at high vertical speed in a steep nose-down and inverted attitude. The powered paraglider operator was found separated from his seat style harness. The paraglider wing, harness, and emergency parachute were located about 3.9 miles south of the Cessna’s main wreckage site. Based on video evidence and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, the Cessna and the powered paraglider converged with a 90° collision angle and a closing speed of about 164 knots. About 8 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider operator suddenly turned his head to the right and about 6 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider maneuvered in a manner consistent with an attempt to avoid a collision with the converging Cessna. Research indicates that about 12.5 seconds can be expected to elapse between the time that a pilot sees a conflicting aircraft and the time an avoidance maneuver begins. Additionally, research suggests that general aviation pilots may only spend 30-50% of their time scanning outside the cockpit. About 8 seconds before the collision (when the powered paraglider operator’s head suddenly turned to the right), the Cessna would have appeared in the powered paraglider operator’s peripheral view, where research has demonstrated visual acuity is very poor. Additionally, there would have been little apparent motion because the Cessna and the powered paraglider were on a collision course. Under optimal viewing conditions, the powered paraglider may have been recognizable to the Cessna pilot about 17.5 seconds before the collision. However, despite the powered paraglider’s position near the center of his field of view, the Cessna pilot did not attempt to maneuver his airplane to avoid a collision. Further review of the video evidence revealed that the powered paraglider was superimposed on a horizon containing terrain features creating a complex background. Research suggests that the powered paraglider in a complex background may have been recognizable about 7.4 seconds before the collision. However, the limited visual contrast of the powered paraglider and its occupant against the background may have further reduced visual detection to 2-3 seconds before the collision. Thus, after considering all the known variables, it is likely that the Cessna pilot did not see the powered paraglider with sufficient time to avoid the collision. The Cessna was equipped with a transponder and an ADS-B OUT transmitter, which made the airplane visible to the air traffic control system. The operation of the powered paraglider in Class E airspace did not require two-way radio communication with air traffic control, the use of a transponder, or an ADS-B OUT transmitter and therefore was not visible to air traffic control. Neither the Cessna nor the powered paraglider were equipped with ADS-B IN technology, cockpit display of traffic information, or a traffic alerting system. Postmortem toxicological testing detected the prescription antipsychotic medication quetiapine, which is not approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen but the test results did not provide sufficient basis for determining whether he was drowsy or otherwise impaired at the time of the collision (especially in the absence of any supporting details to suggest quetiapine use). Testing also detected ethanol at a low level (0.022 g/dL) in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen, but ethanol was not detected (less than 0.01 g/dL) in another muscle specimen. Based on the available results, some, or all of the small amount of detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and it is unlikely that ethanol effects contributed to the accident. The Cessna pilot likely did not have sufficient time to see and avoid the powered paraglider (regardless of whether he was impaired by the quetiapine) and, thus, it is unlikely the effects of quetiapine or an associated medical condition contributed to the accident.

During an instrument approach at night in a twin-engine turboprop airplane, the pilot reported an engine failure, but did not specify which engine. About 9 seconds later, the airplane impacted terrain about ¼-mile short of the runway and a postcrash fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. During that last 9-second period of the flight, the airplane’s groundspeed slowed from 99 kts to 88 kts, as it descended about 400 ft in a slight left turn to impact (the airplane’s minimum controllable airspeed was 92 kts). The slowing left turn, in conjunction with left wing low impact signatures observed at the accident site were consistent with a loss of control just prior to impact. Postaccident teardown examination of the left engine revealed that the 1st stage turbine rotor had one blade separated at the midspan. The blade fracture surface had varying levels of oxidation and the investigation could not determine if the 1st stage turbine blade separation occurred during the accident flight or a prior flight. The 2nd stage turbine was operating at temperatures higher than the 1st stage turbine, which was consistent with engine degradation over a period of time. Additionally, the 2nd stage turbine stator assembly was missing vane material from the 6 to 12 o’clock positions, consistent with thermal damage. All of these findings would have resulted in reduced performance of the left engine, but not a total loss of left engine power. The teardown examination of the right engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of both propellers revealed that all blade angles were mid-range and exhibited evidence of little to no powered rotation. Neither propeller was in a feathered position, as instructed by the pilot operating handbook for an engine failure. If the pilot had perceived that the left engine had failed, and had he secured the engine and feathered its propeller (both being accomplished by pulling the red Engine Stop and Feather Control handle) and increased power on the right engine, the airplane’s performance should have been sufficient for the pilot to complete the landing on the runway.

Following an uneventful flight from Yakutsk, the crew started a night descent to Irkutsk-Intl Airport. The airplane was carrying four passengers, five crew members and a load of consisting of foods. On approach, the crew was instructed to contact tower and one minute later, was cleared to land on runway 30. At that time, the visibility was limited due the night and snow falls. Unable to establish a visual contact with the ground, the captain decided to initiate a go around procedure. Shortly later, the airplane contacted trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located 3 km short of runway, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all nine occupants were killed.

The crew was completing a cargo flight from Mogadishu to Dolow. After landing, the crew stopped the aircraft on the runway and was able to evacuate the cabin before the aircraft would be partially destroyed by fire.

The airplane departed Juba Airport Runway 13 at 1233LT on a cargo flight to Maban, carrying five crew members and a load consisting of 28 drums of diesel. Three minutes after takeoff, while climbing, the crew declared an emergency. One minute later, the entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed less than 2 km past the runway end, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed. Registration and MSN to be confirmed. It is believed that the aircraft was operated on behalf of Euro Airlines.