Cargo

Shortly after takeoff from Juba Airport runway 31, while climbing, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The airplane crash landed in an area located in the Hai Referendum district about 3 km northwest of the airport. All five occupants escaped with minor injuries while the airplane was severely damaged.

The flight crew reported that while on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach with the autopilot system engaged in approach mode, they noticed that the airplane flight director indicated a climbing right turn but the airplane was still tracking the localizer and glideslope. The airplane’s ice protection was on, and no visible ice had accumulated. They reported that they disconnected the autopilot, and the airplane suddenly rolled to the right. They attempted to regain control by increasing engine power and applying counteractive control inputs, but the airplane impacted the ground in a near-wings-level attitude. Examination of the airplane’s primary flight control system and engines after the accident did not reveal any defects. The rudder trim was neutral, and the pitch trim was airplane nose up. Aileron trim could not be determined. Examination of the airplane’s autopilot components revealed deficiencies in the yaw damper system that rendered it inoperative; however, on the accident airplane the yaw damper system was an optional component and was not necessary for airplane operation. Testing of the remaining autopilot components revealed some deficiencies that could have degraded performance but would not have resulted in a complete failure of the automatic flight control system. A performance study based on ADS-B data showed that the airplane intercepted the localizer and glideslope for the ILS approach and was descending in a level attitude. While maintaining the ILS approach guidance, the airplane slowed below the 130 knots (kts) airspeed that the crew stated was the desired approach speed. The airspeed continued to slow to about 102 kts when the ADS-B data indicated that the airplane rolled slightly to the right, likely corresponding to the flight crew’s description of events after they disconnected the autopilot. The airplane continued to slow below 100 kts and the airplane was at a bank angle of 27° right wing down. Subsequently, the descent rate increased to over 4,000 ft/min and airspeed increased while ground speed remained between 80 and 90 kts. The airplane rolled sharply to the left. The sudden roll and loss of altitude after reaching a low airspeed was consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Based on the available evidence, the airplane entered an inadvertent aerodynamic stall due to exceedance of the critical angle of attack after the flight crew allowed the airspeed to decay during the instrument approach. Although an unknown anomaly in the flight director system could have resulted in the crew becoming fixated on an errant flight director indication at the expense of airspeed control, the postaccident component examination was not able to explain the errant flight director indication that the flight crew described.

The airplane departed Kasese Airport at 1500LT on a cargo flight to Goma, carrying two pilots, one passenger and a load of various goods for a total weight of one ton. En route, weather conditions deteriorated with low clouds and heavy rain falls. As the airplane failed to arrive at destination, SAR operations were initiated and the wreckage was found two days later in a dense wooded area located in South Kivu, about 139 km southwest of Goma. The airplane was destroyed by a post impact fire and all three occupants were killed.
Crew:
Peter Sabo +1.

After takeoff from runway 35 at Saltillo-Plan de Guadalupe Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 800 feet, the crew encountered technical issues with the right engine that lost power and started to vibrate. The crew reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in bushes about 4,5 km northwest of the airport and came to rest. Both pilots were uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane departed Bukavu-Kavumu Airport at 1150LT on a cargo flight to Kasese with three crew members on board. As the airplane failed to arrive at destination, SAR operations were initiated and the wreckage was found two days later in a wooded and hilly terrain near Kasese. All three occupants were killed.

The four engine airplane departed Niš at 2036LT on a cargo flight to Amman, carrying eight crew members and a load of 12 tons of various goods. Bound to the southeast over the Aegean Sea, the crew was cruising at FL210 when they reported technical problems. Cleared to divert to Kavala Airport, the pilot made a 180 turn and started the descent. On approach to Kavala Airport at night with engine n°4 on fire, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 202 knots in an agricultural zone located just out of the village of Eleftheroupolis, bursting into flames. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all eight occupants were killed. The wreckage was found 12 km west of Kavala Airport. According to the Serbian Defense Minister Nebojsa Stefanovic, the plane was carrying a load of 11-12 tons of armaments, including flare mortar mines, bound for Bangladesh.

The twin engine airplane departed Yakutsk Airport on a cargo flight to Olenyok, carrying seven crew members and a load of 6,3 tons of food. En route, the airplane suffered a double engine failure. The crew reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing. The airplane crash landed in a wooded area located 70 km from Olenyok and came to rest. All seven crew members evacuated the cabin, among them three were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The single engine airplane departed Us-Khatyn on a cargo flight to Vertikal'nyy, carrying one passenger and two pilots. En route, weather conditions worsened and the visibility was reduced due to fog. The airplane impacted tree tops and crashed on the slope of a wooded terrain located about 46 km southeast of the village of Sebyan-Kyuyol. As the airplane failed to arrive at destination (the flight was supposed to be 2 hours and 30 minutes), SAR operations were initiated. The wreckage was found 10 days later, on July 1st, in an uninhabited area. Both pilots were killed and the passenger was found alive after he found refuge in a fishing house where he could find food.

The airplane departed Jundiaí on a cargo flight to Eldorado do Sul, carrying two pilots and a load of automotive parts. On final approach, the airplane crash landed in a rice paddy field and came to rest with its left wing detached. Both pilots were slightly injured.

The pilot flew two RNAV (GPS) runway 20 instrument approaches at the Burley Municipal Airport, Burley, Idaho in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The accident occurred during the second approach. For the first instrument approach, the pilot configured the airplane with flaps up and flew the final approach segment at speeds above the operator’s training standard of 120 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS).The pilot flew a low pass over the runway, most likely to assess the landing conditions in accordance with company policy, determined the conditions were acceptable, initiated the missed approach and requested to return flying the same approach. The pilot elected to not use flaps during the second approach but slowed the approach speed during the final approach leg. Reported weather had improved and visibility had increased to about 2.5 miles. During this approach, the airplane intercepted and remained on the glide path to the stepdown fix. The last automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) equipment plot recorded the airplane about a mile past this fix, or about 0.6 nautical miles (nm) from the displaced threshold, on the glide path, and at an estimated 85 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS), which was slower than the airplane’s 95-knot minimum speed for flaps up in icing conditions. Shortly afterward, the airplane descended about 130 ft below the glide path, striking an agglomerate stack atop a potato processing plant, fatally injuring the pilot and substantially damaging the airplane. A witness reported seeing the airplane come out of the clouds and immediately enter a steam cloud coming from six other stacks before striking the accident stack. A security camera at the processing plant captured the last moments of the airplane’s flight as it came into view in a wings-level, flaps-up, nose-high descent and just before it impacted the stack. While snow and visible moisture were present, the agglomerate stack was always in clear view during the Page 2 of 24 WPR22FA151 video, with only partial sections obscured. The witness’s account of hearing the engine noise increase and then the nose lift-up may have been the pilot’s attempt to avoid the obstacle. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Aeronautical Information Manual advises pilots to avoid overflight of exhaust stacks; however, the accident stack was directly underneath the instrument approach course and overflight would be expected. Postaccident examination of the airplane, conducted hours after the accident, revealed no structural icing on the wings and empennage. Examination of the airframe and powerplant revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The flaps were up, and a review of the manifest revealed the airplane was loaded within the specifications of the manifest and within the center of gravity limits. Between 2016 and 2017, the FAA conducted two aeronautical studies regarding the stack structures. In the first study, the FAA determined that many of the stack structures were a hazard to air navigation that required mitigation by the processing plant. As an interim measure, the FAA placed the runway 20 visual approach slope indicator (VASI) out of service because the stacks penetrated the obstruction clearance surface and were deemed hazardous to aviation. After determining that they needed to increase the height of the stacks, the plant then modified their proposal; the proposed height increase necessitated a second study. The second study determined the agglomerate stack and the row-of-six stacks exceeded the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) section 77 standards and provided mitigating actions that included painting the stacks with high visibility white and aviation orange paint and equipping the stacks with red flashing warning lights. The control measures also included the permanent removal of the VASI. On the day of the accident, the agglomerate stack and row-of-six stacks had not been painted to the standard required by the FAA. The warning lights had been installed, and five of the row-of-six stacks were equipped with flashing red lights. The agglomerate stack warning light was stolen following the accident, so an accurate determination of its operating status could not be made. The existing paint scheme and the visible moisture emitted by the stacks provided a low contrast to the environmental background. This low contrast and the lack of a visual glide slope indicator may have caused difficulty for the pilot in maintaining a safe altitude during the visual portion of the approach to the runway. A white and aviation orange paint scheme, as identified in the regulations, may have offered a higher contrast and thus an adequate warning once the pilot transitioned to visual conditions.