Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain

During an international cross country flight the private pilot, certificated single engine land, experienced a dual engine power loss as he was being vectored to the Brownsville Airport. Following the accident the aircraft was examined by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector who found that there was fuel in the left fuel tank and that the fuel selector was in the right tank position. The pilot had reported, prior to loss of engine power, that he had low fuel indications in the right tank and that he needed a vector to Brownsville. The aircraft was landed in rough and uneven terrain, resulting in damage to the structure and wings, approximately 1/2 mile short of the runway.

Fifteen minutes after takeoff from Nairobi-Wilson Airport, while flying in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located in the Ngong Hills, about 21 km southwest of Wilson Airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all five occupants were killed.

The crew departed Jayapura-Sentani Airport on a cargo flight to Oksibil. En route, the twin engine aircraft disappeared, maybe in a mountainous area located north of Oksibil. The wreckage was never found.

After landing at Siwandu Airfield, the twin engine airplane collided with a giraffe. The animal was killed and the aircraft was destroyed. The pilot escaped uninjured.

The captain had ILS glideslope data available during the approach but did not fly the ILS glideslope. The partial obscuration of the airport environment, due to ground fog, contributed to the captain's failure to recognize that the airplane was high on both his approach and landing. The destruction of the airplane and the resulting occupant injuries were a direct result of the collision with the blast fence. FAA interaction and communication with local communities, although persistent, were unsuccessful in gaining support for runway safety area improvements and for the installation of approach lighting for runway 6. The passenger seats had been improperly assembled using unapproved parts, and seat belts had been installed incorrectly.

The ATP and his passenger were en route to pick up a patient for transport to a VA hospital. The destination airport was uncontrolled, and VFR only. The pilot cancelled with ATC and reported the field in sight. The airport was reporting VFR conditions, but rising, mountainous terrain existed to the northeast, and local authorities reported that the top third of the mountain was obscured in clouds during the morning of the accident. After cancelling IFR, no subsequent radio calls were received from the flight, and the flight did not arrive at its destination. The wreckage was found several hours later near the crest of holston mountain, 1/2 mile east of the Holston mountain VOR. An examination of the wreckage indicated the aircraft impacted upsloping, wooded terrain, while at a climb angle of 8°. Disintegration of the wreckage was indicative of a high speed impact. No evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure was found during the examination of the wreckage. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot elected not to use the stored instrument flight plan, and he departed with a special VFR clearance. The flight was being followed by radar. After reaching visual flight conditions, the pilot proceeded toward his intended destination and climbed to 8,500 feet. Minimum safe altitude warning service was available, but not requested by the pilot. A review of radar data indicates that the airplane's track remained almost constant at 300° with a 160-knot ground speed. The last radar hit on the airplane occurred about 0.3 miles from where the airplane cruised into 8,500 foot msl terrain while still tracking along a northwesterly course. The accident occurred in dark, night time conditions.

At 1805 Atlantic standard time (AST), C-GNPG, a Piper Navajo Chieftain operating as Empress 204, departed Moncton, New Brunswick, on a scheduled courier flight to Bathurst. The aircraft carried a two-pilot crew, and there was no cargo on board. The aircraft proceeded direct to Bathurst at 8,000 feet above sea level (asl) and at 1820 AST was cleared by Moncton Area Control Centre (ACC) for an approach at Bathurst. The co-pilot contacted the Bathurst UNICOM and advised the operator that the crew would be flying the non-directional beacon/distance measuring equipment (NDB/DME) runway 10 approach. During the non-precision instrument approach to runway 10, the aircraft struck trees .75 nautical miles (nm) inside the Bathurst beacon and 3.75 nm from the airport. The accident occurred at approximately 1845 AST, during the hours of darkness in instrument meteorological conditions, at an elevation of 450 feet asl. Both pilots were killed.

Cargo was not weighed and weight and balance calculations were not performed. The airplane was about 321 pounds over gross. While taxiing, a witness reported seeing black smoke trailing the left engine which had been worked on the night before the accident. Two cylinders were worked on and a fuel injector nozzle was cleaned. The climb after takeoff was 'low and slow' during which the airplane rolled left, pitched nose down, and impacted the ground coming to rest adjacent to a house. Examination of each engine revealed no evidence of internal mechanical failure or malfunction. Heat damage precluded testing of the magnetos, turbocharger components, and fuel servos of each engine. Examination of each propeller revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The fuel nozzles from the left engine were examined which revealed that they were blocked in various places due to contaminants. After the accident the faa performed a focused inspection of the operator revealing that the cargo was not being weighed, the chief pilot of the company was in name only, and load manifests were not being kept by the company. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Members of a football club had planned to visit Launceston, travelling by light aircraft. Three aircraft were needed to carry the group, with all passengers and pilots contributing to the cost of the aircraft hire. One of the club members, who was a pilot, organised the required aircraft and additional pilots for departure from Moorabbin Airport on the afternoon of 17 September 1993. The operator from whom the aircraft were hired, who also employed the organising pilot as an instructor, arranged for one Piper PA-23 (VH-PAC), a Piper PA-31-310 (VH-NOS) and a Piper PA-31-350 (VH-WGI) to be available for the trip, with the organising pilot to fly VH-WGI. On the day of the flight the pilot of VH-WGI carried out pre-flight inspections, obtained the weather forecasts and submitted flight plans for all three aircraft. The flight plans for the two PA-31 aircraft were for flights operated in accordance with IFR procedures. The PA-23 was to operate in accordance with VFR procedures. The TAF for Launceston predicted 2 octas of stratocumulus cloud, base 2,000 ft and 3 octas of stratocumulus cloud, base 3,500 ft. The flight plan for VH-WGI (see fig. 2) indicated that the aircraft would track Moorabbin Wonthaggi-Bass-Launceston and cruise at an altitude of 9,000 ft. A cruise TAS of 160 kts, total plan flight time of 90 minutes, endurance 155 minutes and Type of Operation 'G' (private category flight) were specified. No alternate aerodrome was nominated and none was required. The estimated time of departure was 1730. The flight plan was submitted to the CAA by facsimile at 1529. Last light at Launceston was 1919. VH-WGI departed Moorabbin at 1817 and climbed to an en-route cruise altitude of 9,000 ft. The pilot was required to report at Wonthaggi but passed this position at 1832 without reporting. Melbourne ATC tried unsuccessfully to contact the pilot because of this missed report. Later, the Melbourne radar controller noticed the aircraft deviating left of track but was unable to make contact. Communications were re-established at 1858 when the pilot called Melbourne FS saying he had experienced a radio problem. By this time the aircraft heading had been corrected to regain track. At 1927 the pilot called Launceston Tower and was cleared for a DME arrival along the inbound track of the Launceston VOR 325 radial. The Launceston ATIS indicated 2 octas of cloud at 800 ft, QNH 1,012 hPa, wind 320° at 5-10 kts, temperature +10° and runway 32 in use. At 1930 the ADC advised the pilot that the 2 octas of cloud were clear of the inbound track, but that there was some lower cloud forming just north of the field, possibly on track. He informed the pilot that there was a chance he might not be visual by the VOR, in which case he would need to perform an ILS approach via the Nile locator beacon. The ADC contacted the airport meteorological observer at 1933, inquiring as to what the 1930 searchlight check of cloud height had revealed. He was told the observation indicated 7 octas of cloud at about 800 ft. At 1935.52 (time in hours, minutes and seconds) the ADC asked the pilot for his DME (distance) and level. The pilot responded that he was at 12 DME and 3,300 ft. The ADC told the pilot that conditions were deteriorating with probably 4 octas at 800 ft at the field. He then told the pilot he would hopefully get a break in the cloud, but then restated that if he was not visual by the VOR to make a missed approach, track to Nile and climb to 3,000 ft. At 1939.45 the pilot was again asked for his DME and level. He indicated that he was at 1,450 ft and 2-3 DME. He then also confirmed that he was still in IMC. There were three other aircraft inbound for Launceston and the ADC made an all-stations broadcast that conditions were deteriorating at Launceston, with 4 octas at 800 ft, and to expect an ILS approach. At 1940.56 the pilot stated that he was overhead the field, but did not have it sighted and was going around. At 1941.07 the pilot reported that he had the airfield in sight and at 1941.16 that he was positioned above the final approach for runway 32. Fifteen seconds later the pilot reported that he was opposite the tower and was advised by the ADC that he was cleared for a visual approach, or a missed approach to Nile as preferred. The pilot indicated he would take the visual approach and was then told to manoeuvre as preferred for runway 32. This was acknowledged at 1941.48. No further communications were received from the pilot. The ADC made a broadcast to two other inbound aircraft at 1942.32, advising that VH-WGI was in the circuit ahead of them, that it had become visual about half a mile south of the VOR, that it was manoeuvring for a visual approach and was just in and out of the base of the cloud. After the pilot of VH-WGI reported over the field, and the aircraft first appeared out of cloud, witnesses observed it track to about the south-east end of the aerodrome at a height of about 500-800 ft. It then turned left to track north-west on the north-east side of the main runway and approximately over the grass runway. The aircraft was seen to be travelling at high speed, and passing through small areas of cloud. North of the main terminal building a left turn was initiated onto a close downwind leg for runway 32. The aircraft appeared to descend while on this leg. As the base turn was started, at a height estimated as 300-500 ft, the aircraft briefly went through cloud. Some of the witnesses reported that the engine noise from the aircraft during the approach was fairly loud, suggestive of a high power setting. Late on a left base leg the aircraft was observed to be in a steep left bank, probably in the order of 60°, at a height of about 200 ft. It then descended rapidly and struck a powerline with the right wing, approximately 28 ft AGL, resulting in an airport electrical power failure at 1943.02. Almost simultaneously the left wing struck bushes. A short distance beyond the powerlines the aircraft struck the ground and slid to a stop. A fierce fire broke out immediately. Airport fire services responded to the accident and the fire was quickly extinguished. Six of the occupants received fatal injuries and the others, including the pilot, were seriously injured.