Tennessee

On May 29, 2021, about 1055 central daylight time, a Cessna 501 Citation, N66BK, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident shortly after takeoff from the Smyrna Airport (MQY), Smyrna, Tennessee. The pilot and six passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan with a destination of Palm Beach International (PBI) Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida. He purchased 414 gallons of Jet A fuel prior to the flight, which topped-off the fuel tanks (574 gallons total). The pilot then taxied to runway 32. Preliminary review of air traffic control (ATC) communications and radar data revealed the pilot was cleared for takeoff and instructed to turn to a heading of 090°, and to climb and maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The pilot initially read back the clearance as “at or above 3,000 ft”, and the controller corrected him. The airplane departed at 1053:06 and made a climbing right turn to the east and the pilot was instructed to contact Nashville departure control. At 1054:27, when the airplane was about 3 miles north of the airport, a departure controller contacted the airplane and asked if they were “on frequency.” The pilot responded with, “N66BK with you.” The controller then instructed the pilot to turn right to a heading 130°; however, the pilot did not acknowledge. At 1054:46, the controller asked the pilot if he “copied” the heading instruction. The pilot responded about 4 seconds later and said, “130…Bravo Kilo.” At 1055:11, the controller instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 15,000 ft msl, but there was no response. The controller then made multiple attempts to re-establish communications with the airplane; however, there were no further communications. A review of radar data revealed that after the pilot established contact with departure control the airplane made a series of heading changes along with several climbs and descents before it entered a steep, descending left turn. The last radar return, at 1055:05, indicated the airplane was at an altitude of about 700 ft msl, descending about 31,000 ft-per-minute, on a heading of 090°. A witness was fishing about 150 ft west of the Fate Sanders Recreation Area boat ramp located on Lake Percy Priest, about 2.7 miles northeast of MQY. He described the weather as a very low ceiling in mist. The witness heard what he thought was a low flying military jet before he saw the airplane impact the lake in a “straight down” nose first attitude. He did not see any evidence of fire or an explosion. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted a shallow section of the lake that was about 2 to 8-ft-deep. First responders and recovery personnel used underwater side sonar to identify larger pieces of wreckage, along with underwater rescue divers. The divers reported that the visibility in the water was poor due to the deep mud and silt that made up the lakebed. About two-thirds of the airplane were recovered from the lake, which included both engines, the main cabin door, portions of the main cabin windows, the left nose baggage door, all threelanding gear, most of the tail section, and sections of both wings, including portions of the flaps and ailerons. Several fractured seat frames and pieces of the interior were also recovered. There was no evidence of an in-flight fire observed on any of the recovered sections of airframe or engines. The airplane was not equipped; nor was it required to be equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). No other sources of non-volatile recorded data were identified as being installed on the airplane. The airplane wreckage was retained for further examination. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. He also held a private pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot held a type rating for the airplane with no restrictions. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate was issued on November 12, 2019, with the limitation that he “must wear corrective lenses.” Initial review of the plot’s logbook revealed he had accumulated about 1,680 total flight hours; of which 83 hours were in the accident airplane.

On February 7, 2021, about 1648 central standard time, a Cessna 441, N44776, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Belvidere, Tennessee. The airline transport pilot and a commercial pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to preliminary radar and communications information obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration, the pilot took off from Thomasville Regional Airport (TVI), Thomasville, Georgia about 1527 with a destination of Winchester Municipal Airport (BGF), Winchester, Tennessee. As the airplane was descending to 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot established contact with the Bowling Green, Kentucky radar controller. The flight was then cleared for the RNAV runway 36 approach. As the airplane descended through 2,300 ft, the radar target disappeared, which was normal due to the radar coverage in the area. About 3 minutes later, the controller attempted to contact the pilot with no response. There was no further communication with the pilot. Later that evening, the wreckage was found about 6 miles south of BGF. The wreckage path was about 500 ft in length, and oriented on a northerly heading. A large portion of the fuselage and both wings were consumed by a postimpact fire.

The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload. As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm. When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground. The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed. When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire. A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized. As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-toStop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.

According to the pilot, during the landing roll, the airplane "began to drift sharply to the left." The pilot reported that, although there were no wind gusts reported, he felt as though a wind gust was pushing the airplane to the left. He attempted to maintain directional control with rudder pedal application, and he applied full right aileron. The airplane continued to drift to the left, and the pilot attempted to abort the landing by applying full throttle and 25° of flaps. He reported that the airplane continued to drift to the left and that he was not able to achieve sufficient airspeed to rotate. The airplane exited the runway, the pilot pulled the throttle to idle, and he applied the brakes to avoid obstacles. However, the airplane impacted the runway and taxiway signage and came to rest in a drainage culvert. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The published METAR for the accident airport reported that the wind was from 290° at 15 knots, and wind gusts exceeded 22 knots 1 hour before and 1 hour after the accident. The pilot landed the airplane on runway 20. The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for the airplane was 17 knots. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The commercial pilot reported that he had completed several uneventful flights in the multiengine airplane earlier on the day of the accident. He subsequently took off for a return flight to his home airport. He reported that the en route portion of the flight was uneventful, and on final approach for the traffic pattern for landing, all instruments were indicating normal. He stated that the airplane landed "firmly," that the right wing dropped, and that the right engine propeller blades contacted the runway. He pulled back on the yoke, and the airplane became airborne again momentarily before settling back on the runway. The right main landing gear (MLG) collapsed, and the airplane then veered off the right side of the runway and struck a runway sign and weather antenna. Witness reports corroborated the pilot's report. Postaccident examination revealed that the right MLG actuator was fractured and that the landing gear was inside the wheel well, which likely resulted from the hard landing. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the pilot and witness statements and the wreckage examination, it is likely that the pilot improperly flared the airplane, which resulted in the hard landing and the collapse of the MLG.

On December 15, 2015, at 5:23pm central standard time (CST), Southwest Airlines flight 31, a Boeing 737-300, N649SW, exited the taxiway while taxing to the gate and came to rest in a ditch at the Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee. Nine of the 138 passengers and crew onboard received minor injuries during the evacuation and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from William P. Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas. Weather was not a factor, light conditions were dark just after sunset. The airplane landed normally on runway 20R and exited at taxiway B2. The flight crew received and understood the taxi instructions to their assigned gate. As the crew proceeded along taxiway T3, the flight crew had difficulty locating taxiway T4 as the area was dark, and there was glare from the terminal lights ahead. The crew maneuvered the airplane along T3 and onto T4, and then turned back to the right on a general heading consistent with heading across the ramp toward the assigned gate. The flight crew could not see T4 or the grassy area because the taxiway lights were off and the glare from the terminal lights. As a result, the airplane left the pavement and came to rest in a drainage ditch resulting in substantial damage to airplane. The cabin crew initially attempted to keep the passengers seated, but after being unable to contact the flight crew due to the loud alarm on the flight deck, the cabin crew properly initiated and conducted an evacuation. As a result of past complaints regarding the brightness of the green taxiway centerline lights on taxiways H, J, L and T-6, BNA tower controllers routinely turned off the taxiway centerline lighting. Although the facility had not received any requests on the day of the accident, about 30 minutes prior to the event the tower controller in charge (CIC) turned off the centerline lights as a matter of routine. In doing so, the CIC inadvertently turned off the "TWY J & Apron 2" selector, which included the taxiway lights in the vicinity of the excursion. The airfield lighting panel screensaver feature prevented the tower controllers from having an immediate visual reference to the status of the airfield lighting.

Shortly after takeoff in day visual meteorological conditions, when the airplane was climbing through 3,000 ft mean sea level, a complete electrical failure occurred that affected electrical instrumentation and additional airplane equipment, including the landing gear. The pilot reported that he performed the electrical failure checklists and could not restore power. After additional troubleshooting with no success, he chose to divert to and land at another airport. While in the traffic pattern at his diversion airport, he attempted to lower the landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedures but could not confirm the landing gear were down and locked. Without any capability to communicate or confirmation that the landing gear were down, he decided to leave the airport traffic pattern and land on a nearby field to avoid airport traffic; the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, landing gear doors, engines, and propellers during the off-airport landing. The reason for the loss of electrical power could not be determined. Examination of the cockpit revealed that the landing gear's emergency engage handle, also known as the "J" handle, was not pulled up and turned, which was one of the steps listed in the airplane flight manual for the manual landing gear extension procedure. The "J" handle engages the clutch and allows for the handle to operate the landing gear chain. Without engaging the "J" handle, the landing gear handle pumping action would not have worked, which resulted in the gear-up landing.

According to the pilot's written statement he departed runway 05 and the airplane veered "sharply" to the right. The pilot assumed a failure of the right engine and turned to initiate a landing on runway 23. Seconds after the airplane touched down it began to veer to the left. The pilot applied power to the left engine and right rudder, but the airplane departed the left side of the runway, the right main and nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that he had failed to configure the rudder trim prior to takeoff and that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane under instrument flight rules (IFR). As the flight neared its destination, the controller issued clearance for a GPS approach, and, shortly thereafter, the pilot informed the controller that he needed to review the approach procedure before continuing the approach. The controller acknowledged, and, after the pilot reported that he was ready to proceed with the approach, the controller again issued clearance for the GPS approach. Radar data showed that, during the approach, the airplane tracked a course that was offset about 0.5 miles right of the final approach course until it was about 1 mile from the runway threshold. The airplane then turned left towards the threshold and descended to an altitude of about 145 ft above ground level over the runway threshold before the pilot performed a missed approach. It is likely that the pilot performed the missed approach because he was unable to align the airplane with the runway before it crossed the threshold. The controller provided radar vectors for the airplane to return to the approach course and cleared the airplane a third time for the GPS approach to the runway. Radar data showed that the airplane was established on the final approach course as it passed the initial approach fix; however, before it reached the final approach fix, its airspeed slowed to about 111 knots, and it began a left turn with a 25 degree bank angle. About 18 seconds later, while still in the turn, the airplane slowed to 108 knots and began descending rapidly. The airplane's rate of descent exceeded 10,000 feet per minute, and it impacted the ground about 9 miles from the destination airport. Examination of the accident site showed that the airplane was severely fragmented and fire damaged with debris scattered for about 450 feet. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures; however, damage to the left engine indicated that it was not producing power at the time of the accident. The severity of impact and fire damage to the airplane and engine precluded determination of the reason for the loss of left engine power. Weather conditions present at the time of the accident were conducive to super cooled liquid water droplets, and the airplane likely encountered moderate or greater icing conditions. Several pilot reports (PIREPs) for moderate, light, trace, and negative icing were reported to air traffic control but were not distributed publicly into the national airspace system, and there was no airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) issued for icing. However, the pilot received standard and abbreviated weather briefings for the flight, and his most recent weather briefing included three PIREPs for icing conditions in the area of the accident site. Given the weather information provided, the pilot should have known icing conditions were possible. Even so, the public distribution of additional PIREPs would have likely increased the weather situational awareness by the pilot, weather forecasters, and air traffic controllers. The airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems that included wing and empennage deice boots and engine inlet heaters. Due to impact damage to the cockpit, the positions of the switches for the ice protection systems at the time of the accident could not be determined. Although the airplane's airspeed of 108 knots when the steep descent began was above its published stall speed of 77 knots, both bank angle and ice accretion would have increased the stall speed. In addition, the published minimum control airspeed was 93 knots. It is likely that, after the airplane passed the initial approach fix, the left engine lost power, the airplane's airspeed began to decay, and the asymmetric thrust resulted in a left turn. As the airspeed continued to decay, it decreased below either stall speed or minimum control airspeed, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent.

The twin engine aircraft departed Miami on a flight to Dickson, Tennessee. By night, the pilot decided to land at Cornelia Fort Airpak which is closed to traffic at this time. In unclear circumstances, the aircraft belly landed in a grassy area along the left side of runway 22 and came to rest. The pilot escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.