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Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation V near Staunton: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jun 4, 2023 at 1525 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N611VG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Elizabethton - Ronkonkoma
MSN:
560-0091
YOM:
1990
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Elizabethton Airport in Tennessee on a private flight to Ronkonkoma-Long Island-McArthur Field (Islip), New York. Approaching the destination, the airplane did not initiate a descent but an almost 180 turn and continued to the southwest. As there was no radio contact with the pilot anymore and as it was approaching the Washington DC area, ATC informed the authorities about the situation and two F-16 fighters were dispatched. The military pilots were unable to establish any contact with the crew. Flying at an altitude of 34,000 feet, the Cessna entered a right turn then an uncontrolled descent and spiraled to the ground before crashing in a wooded and hilly terrain located near Staunton, Virginia, some 600 km southwest from the destination airport. All four occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Failure of the cabin pressurization system suspected.

Crash of a Cessna 680A Citation Latitude in Elizabethton

Date & Time: Aug 15, 2019 at 1537 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N8JR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Statesville - Elizabethton
MSN:
680A-0010
YOM:
2015
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5800
Captain / Total hours on type:
765.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
11000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1165
Aircraft flight hours:
1165
Circumstances:
The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload. As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm. When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground. The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed. When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire. A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized. As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-toStop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.
Probable cause:
The pilot's continuation of an unstabilized approach despite recognizing associated cues and the flight crew's decision not to initiate a go-around before touchdown, which resulted in a bounced landing, a loss of airplane control, a landing gear collapse, and a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to deploy the speedbrakes during the initial touchdown, which may have prevented the runway excursion, and the pilot's attempt to go around after deployment of the thrust reversers.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Elizabethton: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 7, 1994 at 0810 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N64LB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Augusta - Elizabethton
MSN:
31-7852127
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
7800
Aircraft flight hours:
2910
Circumstances:
The ATP and his passenger were en route to pick up a patient for transport to a VA hospital. The destination airport was uncontrolled, and VFR only. The pilot cancelled with ATC and reported the field in sight. The airport was reporting VFR conditions, but rising, mountainous terrain existed to the northeast, and local authorities reported that the top third of the mountain was obscured in clouds during the morning of the accident. After cancelling IFR, no subsequent radio calls were received from the flight, and the flight did not arrive at its destination. The wreckage was found several hours later near the crest of holston mountain, 1/2 mile east of the Holston mountain VOR. An examination of the wreckage indicated the aircraft impacted upsloping, wooded terrain, while at a climb angle of 8°. Disintegration of the wreckage was indicative of a high speed impact. No evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure was found during the examination of the wreckage. Both occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The pilot's attempted VFR flight into imc conditions, and his failure to maintain a proper altitude over mountainous terrain. Factors were the clouds and obscuration at the accident site.
Final Report: