N - USA

The airplane departed under daytime visual meteorological conditions on a cross-country flight from an airport on the east side of a mountain range to a destination on the west side of the mountains. The airplane, which had been receiving flight following, then collided with upsloping mountainous terrain in a mountain pass while in controlled flight after encountering instrument meteorological conditions. The controller terminated radar services due to anticipation of losing radar coverage within the mountainous pass area, and notified the pilot to contact the next sector once through the pass while staying northwest of an interstate highway due to opposing traffic on the south side of the highway. The pilot later contacted the controller asking if he still needed to remain on a northwesterly heading. The controller replied that he never assigned a northwesterly heading. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. Radar data revealed that while proceeding on a northeasterly course, the airplane climbed to an altitude of 6,400 feet mean sea level (msl). A few minutes later, the radar data showed the airplane turning to an easterly heading and initiating a climb to an altitude of 6,900 feet msl. The airplane then started descending in a right turn from 6,900 feet to 5,800 feet msl prior to it being lost from radar contact about 0.65 miles southeast of the accident site. A weather observation station located at the departure airport reported a scattered cloud layer at 10,000 feet above ground level (agl). A weather observation system located about 29 miles southwest of the accident site reported a broken cloud layer at 4,000 feet agl. A pilot, who was flying west bound at 8,500 feet through the same pass around the time of the accident, reported overcast cloud coverage in the area of the accident site that extended west of the mountains. The pilot stated that the ceiling was around 4,000 feet msl and the tops of the clouds were 7,000 feet msl or higher throughout the area. Postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

Shortly after take off from Lomé international Airport, while on a cargo flight to Amsterdam, the crew declared an emergency and was cleared for an immediate return. The approach and landing were considered as normal and the aircraft returned safely to the apron. While all three crew members were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to bulkhead destruction.

The instrument-rated private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight plan in near-zero visibility with mist, light freezing rain, and moderate mixed and clear icing. After departure, and as the airplane entered a climbing right turn to a track of about 260 degrees, the pilot reported to air traffic control that she was at 1,000 feet, climbing to 10,000 feet. The flight remained on a track of about 260 degrees and continued to accelerate and climb for 38 seconds. The pilot then declared an emergency, stating that she had an attitude indicator failure. At that moment, radar data depicted the airplane at 3,500 feet and 267 knots. Thirteen seconds later, the pilot radioed she wasn't sure which way she was turning. The transmission ended abruptly. Radar data indicated that at the time the transmission ended the airplane was in a steep, rapidly descending left turn. The fragmented airplane wreckage, due to impact and subsequent explosive forces, was located in a wooded area about 6 miles south-southwest of the departure airport. Examination of the accident site revealed a near vertical high-speed impact consistent with an in-flight loss of control. The on-site examination of the airframe remnants did not show evidence of preimpact malfunction. Examination of recovered engine remnants revealed evidence that both engines were producing power at the time of impact and no preimpact malfunctions with the engines were noted. The failure, single or dual, of the attitude indicator is listed as an abnormal event in the manufacturer's Pilot's Abbreviated Emergency/Abnormal Procedures. The airplane was equipped with three different sources of attitude information: one incorporated in the primary flight display unit on the pilot's side, another single instrument on the copilot's side, and the standby attitude indicator. In the event of a dual failure, on both the pilot and copilot sides, aircraft control could be maintained by referencing to the standby attitude indicator, which is in plain view of the pilot. The indicators are powered by separate sources and, during the course of the investigation, no evidence was identified that indicated any systems, including those needed to maintain aircraft control, failed. The pilot called for a weather briefing while en route to the airport 30 minutes prior to departure and acknowledged the deteriorating weather during the briefing. Additionally, the pilot was eager to depart, as indicated by comments that she made before her departure that she was glad to be leaving and that she had to go. Witnesses indicated that as she was departing the airport she failed to activate taxi and runway lights, taxied on grass areas off taxiways, and announced incorrect taxi instructions and runways. Additionally, no Federal Aviation Administration authorization for the pilot to operate an aircraft between 29,000 feet and 41,000 feet could be found; the IFR flight plan was filed with an en route altitude of 38,000 feet. The fact that the airplane was operating at night in instrument meteorological conditions and the departure was an accelerating climbing turn, along with the pilot's demonstrated complacency, created an environment conducive to spatial disorientation. Given the altitude and speed of the airplane, the pilot would have only had seconds to identify, overcome, and respond to the effects of spatial disorientation.

The Rockwell International Sabreliner had just been released from the repair station following several months of maintenance, primarily for structural corrosion control and repair. According to the pilots, they began to taxi away from the repair station. Initially, the brakes and steering were satisfactory, but then failed. The airplane then contacted several other airplanes and a tug with an airplane in tow, before coming to a stop. The airplane incurred substantial damage as a result of the multiple collisions. Neither crewmember heard or saw any annunciations to alert them to a hydraulic system problem. Postaccident examination revealed that there was no pressure in the normal hydraulic system, as expected, and that the auxiliary system pressure was adequate to facilitate emergency braking. Additional examination and testing revealed that the aural warning for low hydraulic system pressure was inoperative, but all other hydraulic, steering, and braking systems functioned properly. Both the pilot and copilot were type-rated in the Sabreliner, and each had approximately 350 hours of flight time in type. Neither crewmember had any time in Sabreliners in the 90 days prior to the accident. Operation of the emergency braking system in the airplane required switching the system on, waiting for system pressure to decrease to 1,700 pounds per square inch (psi), pulling the "T" handle, and then pumping the brake pedals 3 to 5 times. In addition, the system will not function if both the pilot's and copilot's brake pedals are depressed simultaneously. The investigation did not uncover any evidence to suggest the crew turned on the auxiliary hydraulic system, or waited for the system pressure to decrease to 1,700 psi in their attempt to use the emergency braking system.

While flying a non precision approach, the pilot deliberately descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and attempted to execute a circle to land below the published circling minimums instead of executing the published missed approach procedure. During the circle to land, visual contact with the airport environment was lost and engine power was never increased after the airplane had leveled off. The airplane decelerated and entered an aerodynamic stall, followed by an uncontrolled descent which continued until ground impact. Weather at the time consisted of rain, with ceilings ranging from 300 to 600 feet, and visibility remaining relatively constant at 2.5 miles in fog. Review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) audio revealed that the pilot had displayed some non professional behavior prior to initiating the approach. Also contained on the CVR were comments by the pilot indicating he planned to descend below the MDA prior to acquiring the airport visually, and would have to execute a circling approach. Moments after stating a circling approach would be needed, the pilot received a sink rate aural warning from the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). After several seconds, a series of stall warnings was recorded prior to the airplane impacting terrain. EGPWS data revealed, the airplane had decelerated approximately 75 knots in the last 20 seconds of the flight. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions with the airplane or any of its systems. Toxicology testing detected sertraline in the pilot’s kidney and liver. Sertraline is a prescription antidepressant medication used for anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and social phobia. The pilot’s personal medical records indicated that he had been treated previously with two other antidepressant medications for “anxiety and depression” and a history of “impatience” and “compulsiveness.” The records also documented a diagnosis of diabetes without any indication of medications for the condition, and further noted three episodes of kidney stones, most recently experiencing “severe and profound discomfort” from a kidney stone while flying in 2005. None of these conditions or medications had been noted by the pilot on prior applications for an airman medical certificate. It is not clear whether any of the pilot’s medical conditions could account for his behavior or may have contributed to the accident.

On January 29, 2008, about 1723 eastern standard time, a Grumman G-21A, amphibian airplane N21A, impacted the ocean during landing near Marathon, Florida. The certificated airline transport pilot and passenger received serious injuries and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight was operated as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and no flight plan was filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight departed from the Florida Keys Marathon Airport (MTH) in Marathon, Florida, on January 29, 2008, about 1615. According to the pilot he departed MTH and after take off and the checklist accomplished he proceeded in a westerly direction to inspect a water-work area. The pilot stated that other then that, he had no further recollection of the flight. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the passenger stated that the pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings. During a water landing, the left wing contacted the water and the airplane water looped. A Good Samaritan rescued them from the water in his boat and brought them ashore where rescue personal were waiting. Examination of the airplane by the FAA revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane or engine, and none were reported by the pilot or passenger.

The pilot attempted to intercept an instrument landing system localizer three times without success. The pilot told Air Traffic Approach Control that he was having trouble performing a "coupled" approach and that he was trying to "get control" of the airplane. The airplane disappeared from radar, subsequently impacting a field and then a barn. The airplane came to rest in an upright position and a post crash fire ensued. A review of radar and voice data for the flight revealed that during the three approach attempts the pilot was able to turn to headings and climb to altitudes when assigned by air traffic control. Postmortem toxicology results were consistent with the regular use of a prescription antidepressant, and the recent use of a larger-than-maximal dose of an over-the-counter antihistamine known to cause impairment. There were no preimpact anomalies observed during the airframe and engine examinations that would have prevented normal operation.

The commercial pilot departed on a night instrument flight rules flight in actual instrument meteorological in-flight conditions. Less than 2 minutes after the airplane departed the airport, the controller observed the airplane in a right turn and instructed the pilot to report his altitude. The pilot responded he thought he was at 3,500 feet and he thought he had lost the gyros. The pilot said he was trying to level out, and when the controller informed the pilot he observed the airplane on radar making a 360-degree right turn , the pilot said "roger." Three minutes and 23 seconds after departure the pilot said "yeah, I'm having some trouble right now" and there were no further radio communications from the flight. The on scene investigation disclosed that both wings and the tail section had separated from the airframe. All fractures of the wing and wing skin were typical of ductile overload with no evidence of preexisting failures such as fatigue or stress-corrosion. The deformation of the wings indicated an upward failure due to positive loading. No anomalies were noted with the gyro instruments, engine assembly or accessories

The commercial certificated pilot was returning from a remote village after a round robin flight of about 130 miles over a frozen and snow-covered river. He was in cruise flight about 500 feet agl, but then circled while holding between 6 or 7 miles east of his destination airport, awaiting a special VFR (SVFR) clearance. The weather condition in that area was about 1 mile visibility, with a ceiling of about 1,000 feet agl. After receiving his SVFR clearance, the pilot flew toward the airport, but the engine fuel pressure began fluctuating. The engine rpm began decreasing, along with the airplane's altitude. The pilot switched fuel tanks, selected full flaps, and prepared for a forced landing. He said the weather was near white-out conditions, but he could see the bank of the river. After switching fuel tanks from the left to the right tank, the engine power suddenly returned to full power. He applied forward flight control pressure to prevent the airplane from climbing too fast, but the airplane collided with the surface of the river. The airplane sustained structural damage to the wings and fuselage. At the time of the accident, the ceiling at the airport was 600 feet obscured, with a visibility of 1/2 mile in snow. Neither the fuel status of the accident airplane, nor the mechanical condition of the engine, were verified by either the NTSB or FAA.