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Crash of an IAI 1124 Westwind in Sundance: 2 killed

Date & Time: Mar 18, 2019 at 1531 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N4MH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Panama City - Sundance
MSN:
232
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5872
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5259
Aircraft flight hours:
11030
Circumstances:
The two commercial pilots were conducting a personal, cross-country flight. A video surveillance camera at the airport captured their airplane’s approach. Review of the video revealed that, as the airplane approached the approach end of the landing runway, it began to climb, rolled left, became inverted, and then impacted terrain. The left thrust reverser (T/R) was found open and unlatched at the accident site. An asymmetric deployment of the left T/R would have resulted in a left roll/yaw. The lack of an airworthy and operable cockpit voice recorder, which was required for the flight, precluded identifying which pilot was performing pilot flying duties, as well as other crew actions and background noises, that would have facilitated the investigation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that it was not equipped, nor was required to be equipped, with a nose landing gear (NLG) ground contact switch intended to preclude inflight operation of the thrust reverser (T/R). The left T/R door was found unlatched and open, and the right T/R door was found closed and latched. Further, electrical testing of the T/R left and right stow microswitches within the cockpit throttle quadrant revealed that the left stow microswitch did not operate within design specifications. Disassembly of the left and right stow microswitches revealed evidence of arc wear due to aging. Based on this information, it is likely that the airplane’s lack of an NLG ground contact switch and the age-related failure of the stow microswitches resulted in an asymmetric T/R deployment while on approach and a subsequent loss of airplane control. Also, there were additional T/R system components that were found to unairworthy that would have affected the control of the T/R system. Operational testing of the T/R system could not be performed due to the damage the airplane incurred during the accident. Toxicology testing results of the pilot’s specimens indicated that the pilot had taken diazepam, which is considered impairing at certain levels. However, the detected amounts of both diazepam and its metabolite nordiazepam were at subtherapeutic levels, and given the long half-life of these compounds, it appears that the medication was taken several days before the accident; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident and thus that his use of diazepam was a not factor in the accident.
Probable cause:
The airplane’s unairworthy thrust reverser (T/R) system due to inadequate maintenance that resulted in an asymmetric T/R deployment during an approach to the airport and the subsequent loss of airplane control.
Final Report:

Crash of an Extra EA-400 in Ponca City: 5 killed

Date & Time: Aug 4, 2018 at 1045 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N13EP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ponca City - Independence
MSN:
10
YOM:
2000
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
4200
Captain / Total hours on type:
200.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1198
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting a personal flight with four passengers. A witness observed the airplane take off and climb slowly from the airport. A pilot flying in the vicinity observed the airplane maneuver erratically before the airplane impacted terrain in a near-vertical attitude. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire. The wreckage was contained to a confined area in the field and the remains of the major airplane components were all accounted for. Extensive thermal damage to the airframe and engine limited the scope of the postaccident examination. The impact energy needed to drive the engine into the ground suggested that the engine was producing power at the time of the accident. A postaccident examination of the remaining airframe and engine components did not reveal any anomalies which would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Depending on the amount of fuel, baggage and equipment on board, and the location of the adult passenger, the center of gravity (CG) could have been within or aft of the recommended CG. Since fuel load and location of the passengers could not be determined or may have shifted during flight, it is not known if loading contributed to the accident. The pilot was not operating with valid medical certification. His second-class medical certificate had expired several years prior to the accident and Federal Aviation Administration records did not indicate that he had obtained BasicMed medical certification. A pilot-rated passenger was seated in the rightfront seat. Investigators were unable to determine who was manipulating the flight controls of the airplane at the time of the accident. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot’s loss of control. However, the reason for the loss of control could not be determined with the available evidence.
Probable cause:
The pilot's loss of control for reasons that could not be determined with the available evidence.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90B King Air in Rattan

Date & Time: Feb 14, 2017 at 1145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1551C
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
McAlester – Idabel
MSN:
LJ-1365
YOM:
1994
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
22000
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7862
Circumstances:
The pilot stated that the engine start and airplane power-up were normal for the air medical flight with two medical crewmembers. The engine ice vanes were lowered (as required for ground operations) and then were subsequently raised before takeoff. Takeoff and climbout were routine, and the pilot leveled off the airplane at the assigned cruise altitude. The air traffic controller informed the pilot of heavy showers near the destination airport, and the pilot "put the ice vanes down." The pilot indicated that, shortly afterward, the airplane experienced two "quick" electrical power fluctuations in which "everything went away and then came back," and "[s]econds later the entire [electrical] system failed." Due to the associated loss of navigation capability while operating in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the pilot set a general course for better weather conditions based on information from his preflight weather briefing. While the pilot attempted to find a suitable hole in the clouds to descend through under visual conditions, the left engine lost power. The pilot ultimately located a field through the cloud cover and executed a single-engine off-airport landing, which resulted in substantial damage to the right engine mount and firewall. A postaccident examination of the airplane and systems did not reveal any anomalies consistent with an in-flight electrical system malfunction. The three-position ignition and engine start/starter-only switches were in the ON position, and the engine anti-ice switches were in the ON position. When the airplane battery was initially checked during the examination, the voltmeter indicated 10.7 volts (normal voltage is 12 volts); the battery was charged and appeared to function normally thereafter. The loss of electrical power was likely initiated by the pilot inadvertently selecting the engine start switches instead of the engine anti-ice (ice vane) switches. This resulted in the starter/generators changing to starter operation and taking the generator function offline. Airplane electrical power was then being supplied solely by the battery, which caused it to deplete and led to a subsequent loss of electrical power to the airplane. A postaccident examination revealed that neither wing fuel tank contained any visible fuel. The left nacelle fuel tank did not contain any visible fuel, and the right nacelle fuel tank appeared to contain about 1 quart of fuel. The lack of fuel onboard at the time of the accident is consistent with a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. This was a result of the extended flight time as the pilot attempted to exit instrument conditions after the loss of electrical power to locate a suitable airport. Further, the operator reported that 253 gallons (1,720 lbs) of fuel were on board at takeoff, and the accident flight duration was 3.65 hours. At maximum range power, the expected fuel consumption was about 406 lbs/hour, resulting in an endurance of about 4.2 hours. Thus, the pilot did not have the adequate fuel reserves required for flying in IMC. Both the pilot and medical crewmembers described a lack of communication and coordination among crewmembers as the emergency transpired. This resulted in multiple course adjustments that hindered the pilot's ability to locate visual meteorological conditions before the left engine fuel supply was exhausted.
Probable cause:
The loss of electrical power due to the pilot's inadvertent selection of the engine start switches and the subsequent fuel exhaustion to the left engine as the pilot attempted to locate visual meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's failure to ensure adequate fuel reserves on board for the flight in instrument meteorological conditions and the miscommunication between the pilot and medical crewmembers.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Verdigris

Date & Time: Mar 24, 2015 at 1507 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N106BZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tulsa - Tulsa
MSN:
208B-0106
YOM:
1988
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
970.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11443
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that, during the postmaintenance test flight, the turboprop engine lost power. The airplane was unable to maintain altitude, and the pilot conducted a forced landing, during which the airplane was substantially damaged. The engine had about 9 total flight hours at the time of the accident. A teardown of the fuel pump revealed that the high-pressure drive gear teeth exhibited wear and that material was missing from them, whereas the driven gear exhibited little to no visible wear. A metallurgical examination of the gears revealed that the damaged drive gear was made of a material similar to 300-series stainless steel instead of the harder specified M50 steel, whereas the driven gear was made of a material similar to the specified M50 steel. Subsequent to these findings, the airplane manufacturer determined that the gear manufacturer allowed three set-up gears made from 300-series stainless steel to become part of the production inventory during the manufacturing process. One of those gears was installed in the fuel pump on the accident airplane, and the location of the two other gears could not be determined. Based on the evidence, it is likely that the nonconforming gear installed in the fuel pump failed because it was manufactured from a softer material than specified, which resulted in a loss of fuel flow to the engine and the subsequent loss of engine power. The manufacturer subsequently inspected its stock of gears and issued notices to customers that had engines with fuel pumps installed with the same part number gear set as the one installed on the accident airplane. The manufacturer also issued a service information letter and service bulletins regarding the fuel pump gear set for engines used in civilian and military applications. As of the date of this report, the two remaining gears have not been located.
Probable cause:
The fuel pump gear manufacturer’s allowance of set-up gears made from a nonconforming material to be put in the production inventory system, the installation of a nonconforming gear in the accident airplane’s production fuel pump, and the gear’s failure, which resulted in a loss of fuel flow to the engine and the subsequent loss of engine power.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 525 CitationJet CJ1 in Elk City

Date & Time: Feb 3, 2014 at 2300 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N61YP
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Rapid City – Elk City
MSN:
525-0237
YOM:
1998
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
21550
Captain / Total hours on type:
592.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4798
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot was conducting a business flight with six passengers on board. Radar data showed that, after crossing the final approach fix for an instrument approach at the destination airport, the airplane descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 2,480 ft mean sea level (msl); dark night, instrument meteorological conditions existed at that time. Subsequently, when the airplane was about 2 miles from the airport and about 2,070 ft msl, the airplane impacted a utility pole, which was 10 ft above ground level (agl). After impacting the pole, the pilot executed a missed approach, and about 40 minutes later, he landed the airplane without further incident at another airport. On-scene examination showed that the impact had scattered debris from the separated utility pole for about 200 ft into a snow-covered field. Examination of the airplane revealed that the impact resulted in substantial damage to the nose structure, lower and upper fuselage, and horizontal stabilizer. Further examinations of the airplane, including its static system, both altimeters, both vertical speed indicators, and the radar altimeter system revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he thought he had leveled the airplane at an altitude above the MDA and that at no time during the descent and approach did the airplane's radar altimeter sound an alert indicating that the airplane was below 400 ft agl radar altitude. He also reported that he never saw the terrain, any obstructions, nor the runway lights or airport environment. Despite the pilot's statement, given the radar data and the impact evidence, it is apparent that he descended the airplane below the MDA, which resulted in the subsequent impact with the utility pole. It could not be determined why the radar altimeter did not alert the pilot that the airplane was only 10 ft above the ground. The pilot's second-class medical certificate, which had been issued more than 20 months before the accident, had expired. The medical certificate limitation section in the expired certificate stated, "Not valid for night flying or by color signal control." There is no evidence that these restrictions contributed to the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's descent below the published minimum descent altitude for the instrument approach procedure, which resulted in impact with a utility pole.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 Marquise in Owasso: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 10, 2013 at 1546 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N856JT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Salina - Tulsa
MSN:
306
YOM:
1974
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2874
Captain / Total hours on type:
12.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6581
Circumstances:
Radar and air traffic control communications indicated that the Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 was operating normally and flew a nominal flightpath from takeoff through the beginning of the approach until the airplane overshot the extended centerline of the landing runway, tracking to the east and left of course by about 0.2 nautical mile then briefly tracking back toward the centerline. The airplane then entered a 360-degree turn to the left, east of the centerline and at an altitude far below what would be expected for a nominal flightpath and intentional maneuvering flight given the airplane's distance from the airport, which was about 5 miles. As the airplane was in its sustained left turn tracking away from the airport, the controller queried the pilot, who stated that he had a "control problem" and subsequently stated he had a "left engine shutdown." This was the last communication received from the pilot. Witnesses saw the airplane spiral toward the ground and disappear from view. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was in the extended position, the flaps were extended 20 degrees, and the left engine propeller blades were in the feathered position. Examination of the left engine showed the fuel shutoff valve was in the closed position, consistent with the engine being in an inoperative condition. As examined, the airplane was not configured in accordance with the airplane flight manual engine shutdown and single-engine landing procedures, which state that the airplane should remain in a clean configuration with flaps set to 5 degrees at the beginning of the final approach descent and the landing gear retracted until landing is assured. Thermal damage to the cockpit instrumentation precluded determining the preimpact position of fuel control and engine switches. The investigation found that the airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with federal regulations and that the recovered airplane components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures. The investigation also determined that the pilot was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable federal regulations, including Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 108, which is required for MU-2B pilots and adequate for the operation of MU-2B series airplanes. The pilot had recently completed the SFAR No. 108 training in Kansas and was returning to Tulsa. At the time of the accident, he had about 12 hours total time in the airplane make and model, and the flight was the first time he operated the airplane as a solo pilot. The investigation found no evidence indicating any preexisting medical or behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the pilot's performance on the day of the accident. Based on aircraft performance calculations, the airplane should have been flyable in a one engine-inoperative condition; the day visual meteorological conditions at the time of the accident do not support a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Therefore, the available evidence indicates that the pilot did not appropriately manage a one-engine-inoperative condition, leading to a loss of control from which he did not recover. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crash resistant recorder. Although radar data and air traffic control voice communications were available during the investigation to determine the airplane's altitude and flight path and estimate its motions (pitch, bank, yaw attitudes), the exact movements and trim state of the airplane are unknown, and other details of the airplane's performance (such as power settings) can only be estimated. In addition, because the airplane was not equipped with any type of recording device, the pilot's control and system inputs and other actions are unknown. The lack of available data significantly increased the difficulty of determining the specific causes that led to this accident, and it was not possible to determine the reasons for the left engine shutdown or evaluate the pilot's recognition of and response to an engine problem. Recorded video images from the accident flight would possibly have shown where the pilot's attention was directed during the reported problems, his interaction with the airplane controls and systems, and the status of many cockpit switches and instruments. Recorded flight data would have provided information about the engines' operating parameters and the airplane's motions. Previous NTSB recommendations have addressed the need for recording information on airplane types such as the one involved in this accident. Recorders can help investigators identify safety issues that might otherwise be undetectable, which is critical to the prevention of future accidents.
Probable cause:
The pilot's loss of airplane control during a known one-engine-inoperative condition. The reasons for the loss of control and engine shutdown could not be determined because the airplane was not equipped with a crash-resistant recorder and postaccident examination and testing did not reveal evidence of any malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 550 Citation II in Oklahoma City

Date & Time: Dec 21, 2012 at 1000 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N753CC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oklahoma City - Oklahoma City
MSN:
550-0109
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5097
Captain / Total hours on type:
420.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
357
Copilot / Total hours on type:
357
Aircraft flight hours:
13506
Circumstances:
While on the right downwind leg, the flight crew advised the air traffic control tower controller that they would make a full stop landing. The tower controller acknowledged, told them to extend their downwind, and stated that he would call their base turn. The controller then called out the landing traffic on final, which was an Airbus A300-600 heavy airplane. The flight crew replied that they had the traffic in sight, and the controller cleared the flight to land behind the Airbus, and to be cautious of wake turbulence. The flight crew observed the Airbus abeam their current position and estimated that they made their base turn about 3 miles from the runway. Before turning onto final approach, the flight crew discussed wake turbulence avoidance procedures and planned to make a steeper approach and land beyond the Airbus's touchdown point. They also added 10 to 15 knots to the Vref speed as an additional precaution against a wake turbulence encounter. The reported wind provided by the tower controller was 180 degrees at 4 knots. The flight crew observed tire smoke from the Airbus as it touched down and discussed touching down beyond that touchdown point. The tower controller advised the flight crew to be prepared for a go-around if the Airbus did not clear the runway in time, which the flight crew acknowledged. The flight crew estimated that the Airbus had turned off the runway when their airplane was about 1,000 feet from the threshold and about 200 feet above ground level (agl). The flight crew reported having a stabilized approach to their planned landing point. When the airplane was about 150 feet agl and established on the runway centerline, the airplane experienced an uncommanded left roll. The heading swung to the left and the nose dropped. The crew reported that the airplane was buffeting heavily. Immediately, they set full power, and the flying pilot used both hands on the control wheel in an attempt to roll the airplane level and recover the pitch. He managed to get the airplane nearly back to level when the right main gear struck the ground short of the threshold and left of the runway. The airplane collided with a small drainage ditch and a dirt service road, causing the right main gear and the nose gear to collapse. Videos from cameras at the airport recorded the accident sequence, and the accident airplane was about 51 seconds behind the Airbus. A wake vortex study indicated that the accident airplane encountered the Airbus's right vortex, and the airplane's direction of left roll was consistent with the counter-clockwise rotation of the right vortex.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's decision to fly close behind a heavy airplane, which did not ensure there was adequate distance and time in order to avoid a wake turbulence encounter with the preceding heavy airplane's wake vortex, which resulted in a loss of airplane control during final approach.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500B in Bartlesville

Date & Time: Jan 13, 2012 at 1930 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N524HW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kansas City - Cushing
MSN:
500-1533-191
YOM:
1965
Flight number:
CTL327
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8487
Captain / Total hours on type:
3477.00
Circumstances:
The pilot was en route on a positioning flight when the airplane’s right engine surged and experienced a partial loss of power. He adjusted the power and fuel mixture controls; however, a few seconds later, the engine surged again. The pilot noted that the fuel flow gauge was below 90 pounds, so he turned the right fuel pump on. The pilot then felt a surge on the left engine, so he performed the same actions he as did for the right engine. He believed that he had some sort of fuel starvation problem. The pilot then turned to an alternate airport, at which time both engines lost total power. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 1.5 miles from the airport. The left side fuel tank was breached during the accident; however, there was no indication of a fuel leak, and about a gallon of fuel was recovered from the airplane during the wreckage retrieval. The company’s route coordinator reported that prior to the accident flight, the pilot checked the fuel gauge and said the airplane had 120 gallons of fuel. A review of the airplane’s flight history revealed that, following the flight immediately before the accident flight, the airplane was left with approximately 50 gallons of fuel on board; there was no record of the airplane having been refueled after that flight. Another company pilot reported the airplane fuel gauge had a unique trait in that, after the airplane’s electrical power has been turned off, the gauge will rise 40 to 60 gallons before returning to zero. When the master switch was turned to the battery position during an examination of another airplane belonging to the operator, the fuel gauge indicated approximately 100 gallons of fuel; however, when the master switch was turned to the off position, the fuel quantity on the gauge rose to 120 gallons, before dropping off scale, past empty. Additionally, the fuel cap was removed and fuel could be seen in the tank, but there was no way to visually verify the quantity of fuel in the tank.
Probable cause:
The total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion and the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection, which did not correctly identify the airplane’s fuel quantity before departure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421A Golden I Eagle in Tulsa: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 10, 2010 at 2205 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N88DF
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Pontiac – Tulsa
MSN:
421A-0084
YOM:
1968
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
592
Captain / Total hours on type:
67.00
Aircraft flight hours:
640
Circumstances:
During the 3.5-hour flight preceding the accident flight, the airplane used about 156 gallons of the 196 gallons of usable fuel. After landing, the airplane was topped off with 156 gallons of fuel for the return flight. During the preflight inspection, a line serviceman at the fixed based operator observed the right main fuel tank sump become stuck in the open position. He estimated 5 to 6 gallons of fuel were lost before the sump seal was regained, but the exact amount of fuel lost could not be determined. The lost fuel was not replaced before the airplane departed. Data from an on board GPS unit indicate that the airplane flew the return leg at an altitude of about 4,500 feet mean sea level for about 4 hours. About 4 minutes after beginning the descent to the destination airport, the pilot requested to divert to a closer airport. The pilot was cleared for an approach to runway 18R at the new destination. While on approach to land, the pilot reported to the air traffic control tower controller, “we exhausted fuel.” The airplane descended and crashed into a forested area about 1/2 mile from the airport. Post accident examination of the right and left propellers noted no leading edge impact damage or signatures indicative of rotation at the time of impact. Examination of the airplane wreckage and engines found no malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot did not report any problems with the airplane or its fuel state before announcing the fuel was exhausted. His acceptance of the approach to runway 18R resulted in the airplane flying at least 1 mile further than if he had requested to land on runway 18L instead. If the pilot had declared an emergency and made an immediate approach to the closest runway when he realized the exhausted fuel state, he likely would have reached the airport. Toxicological testing revealed cyclobenzaprine and diphenhydramine in the pilot’s system at or above therapeutic levels. Both medications carry warnings that use may impair mental and/or physical abilities required for activities such as driving or operating heavy machinery. The airplane would have used about 186 gallons of fuel on the 4-hour return flight if the engines burned fuel at the same rate as the previous flight. The fuel lost during the preflight inspection and the additional 30 minutes of flight time on the return leg reduced the airplane’s usable fuel available to complete the planned flight, and the pilot likely did not recognize the low fuel state before the fuel was exhausted due to impairment by the medications he was taking.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s inadequate preflight fuel planning and management in-flight, which resulted in total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s use of performance-impairing medications.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation I in Oklahoma City: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2008 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N113SH
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Oklahoma City - Mankato
MSN:
500-0285
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
6100
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1378
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2
Aircraft flight hours:
6487
Circumstances:
On March 4, 2008, about 1515 central standard time, a Cessna 500, N113SH, registered to Southwest Orthopedic & Sports Medicine Clinic PC of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, entered a steep descent and crashed about 2 minutes after takeoff from Wiley Post Airport (PWA) in Oklahoma City. None of the entities associated with the flight claimed to be its operator. The pilot, the second pilot, and the three passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The flight was operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 with an instrument flight rules flight plan filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated from the ramp of Interstate Helicopters (a 14 CFR Part 135 on demand helicopter operator at PWA) and was en route to Mankato Regional Airport, Mankato, Minnesota, carrying company executives who worked for United Engines and United Holdings, LLC.
Probable cause:
Airplane wing-structure damage sustained during impact with one or more large birds (American white pelicans), which resulted in a loss of control of the airplane.
Final Report: