Oceania

At 0906 Eastern Standard Time on 28 July 2004, a Piper Aircraft Corporation PA31T Cheyenne aircraft, registered VH-TNP, with one pilot and five passengers, departed Bankstown, New South Wales on a private, instrument flight rules (IFR) flight to Benalla, Victoria. Instrument meteorological conditions at the destination necessitated an instrument approach and the pilot reported commencing a Global Positioning System (GPS) non-precision approach (NPA) to Benalla. When the pilot had not reported landing at Benalla as expected, a search for the aircraft was commenced. Late that afternoon the crew of a search helicopter located the burning wreckage on the eastern slope of a tree covered ridge, approximately 34 km southeast of Benalla. All occupants were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-impact fire.

The aircraft departed Papeete-Faaa on a local post maintenance flight with one engineer and one pilot on board. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the pilot informed ATC about control problems and elected to return. Unable to maintain control, he decided to ditch the aircraft few hundred metres offshore. The aircraft sank by a depth of 21 metres and both occupants were able to swim to shore.

The aircraft commenced taxying at Hobart for a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) ferry flight to Devonport. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, reported a departure time of 1643 to air traffic control, with an intention to climb to 8,500 ft and to fly a track of 319 degrees magnetic. Due to following traffic, the pilot was required to report leaving specific altitudes. At 1646, the pilot reported leaving 4,500 ft, and was advised that air traffic services were terminated. The acknowledgement of that call was the last communication heard from the pilot. At about 1800, the operator’s staff at Devonport advised the Hobart base that the aircraft had not arrived. The operator advised AusSAR and the Hobart air traffic control tower, and organised company search aircraft from both Hobart and Devonport. The non-flying occupant of the Hobart search aircraft sighted the wreckage at about 1930. Shortly after, a search and rescue helicopter arrived at the accident site. The pilot of the aircraft was found fatally injured in the wreckage. The wreckage was located 58 km from Hobart airport on a bearing of 320 degrees magnetic. Based on predictions of aircraft performance and the distance of the accident site from Hobart, the estimated time of the accident was 1656. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. Aircraft flight profile The aircraft was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder, nor was it required to be. As such, and given that the aircraft was operating outside of radar coverage, there was no recorded flight profile information available. The pilot was not required to report cruising at 8,500 ft and there was no evidence to confirm that the aircraft had reached that altitude. However, based on the normal climb and cruise performance, forecast winds and the radio broadcasts made by the pilot, the aircraft should have reached an altitude of 8,500 ft approximately 35 km from Hobart at about 1651, which was 5 minutes prior to the estimated time of the accident at 1656.

The aircraft, with two pilots on board, was being operated for pilot type endorsement training. Air Traffic Control (ATC) had cleared the pilots to conduct upper level air work between 4,000 and 5,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) within a 5 NM radius of Green Island, Queensland. Following the upper level air work, the crew requested, and were granted a clearance for, a simulated engine failure and descent to 2,000 ft. The pilot in command (PIC) reported that while completing the simulated engine failure training, he had retarded the power lever to the FLIGHT IDLE stop and the fuel condition lever to the LOW IDLE range, setting a value of 55% engine gas generator speed (Ng). The pilot under training then set the glide attitude at the best glide speed (for the operating weight) of about 79 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The PIC then instructed the pilot under training to place the propeller into the feathered position, and maintain best glide speed. The PIC reported that he instructed the pilot under training to advance the emergency power lever (EPL) to simulate manual introduction of fuel to the engine. According to the PIC, he then noticed that there was no engine torque increase, with the engine inter-turbine temperature (ITT or T5) and Ng rapidly decreasing, and a strong smell of fuel in the cockpit. While the pilot under training flew the aircraft, the PIC placed the ignition switch to the ON position and also selected START on the engine starter switch. He then reportedly placed the EPL to the CLOSED position, the propeller to the UNFEATHERED position and the fuel condition lever to the IDLE CUTOFF position to clear the excess fuel from the engine. The PIC reported that they then increased the aircraft airspeed to 120 KIAS, at which point he reintroduced fuel into the engine by advancing the fuel condition lever. He reported that following these actions, the strong fuel smell persisted. As the aircraft approached 1,500 ft, the PIC broadcast a MAYDAY, informing ATC that they had a 'flameout' of the engine and that they were going to complete a forced landing water ditching near Green Island. While the pilot under training flew the aircraft, the PIC placed the propeller into the feathered position, closed the fuel condition lever to the IDLE CUTOFF position and turned off the starter and ignition switches. They then completed a successful landing in a depth of about 2 m of water near Green Island. The pilots evacuated the aircraft without injury. The aircraft, which sustained minor damage during the ditching, but subsequent substantial damage due to salt water immersion, was recovered to the mainland. Following examination of all connections and control linkages, the engine was removed for examination under the supervision of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) at the engine manufacturer's overhaul facility. The engine trend monitoring (ETM) data logger was also removed from the aircraft for examination.

The Ted Smith Aerostar 601 aircraft, registered VH-WRF, departed Coolangatta at 1301 ESuT with a flight instructor and a commercial pilot on board. The aircraft was being operated on a dual training flight in the Byron Bay area, approximately 55 km south-south-east of Coolangatta. The aircraft was operating outside controlled airspace and was not being monitored by air traffic control. The weather in the area was fine with a south-easterly wind at 10 - 12 kts, with scattered cloud in the area with a base of between 2,000 and 2,500 ft. The purpose of the flight was to introduce the commercial pilot, who was undertaking initial multi-engine training, to asymmetric flight. At approximately 1445, the operator advised Australian Search and Rescue that the aircraft had not returned to Coolangatta, and that it was overdue. Recorded radar information by Airservices Australia revealed that the aircraft had disappeared from radar coverage at 1335. Its position at that time was approximately 18 km east-south-east of Cape Byron. Search vessels later recovered items that were identified as being from the aircraft in the vicinity of the last recorded position of the aircraft. Those items included aircraft checklist pages, a blanket, a seat cushion from the cabin, as well as a number of small pieces of cabin insulation material. No item showed any evidence of heat or fire damage. No further trace of the aircraft was found.

During the takeoff roll from a grassy runway (780 metres long), the pilot noted standing water on the ground. He attempted to take off prematurely to avoid these puddles but the aircraft stalled and crash landed. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On the morning of 19 December 2003, the pilot began work about 0630 hours, flying from Te Kuiti aerodrome to an agricultural airstrip about eight nautical miles to the west. At that strip he completed a 150 tonne lime contract that had been started by two other aircraft the day before. Refuelling of the aircraft was completed approximately every hour, and the pilot stopped for a break with about four loads remaining. At 1400 hours, with the job completed, he flew to the strip from which he operated until the time of the accident. On arrival at this strip, the pilot completed a reconnaissance flight with the pilot of ZK-EMW, discussed their sowing plan, and agreed on a 1.1 tonne load with the loader driver. Take-offs were made to the south-west, landings in the opposite direction. The loader driver reported that the job was going smoothly, and that the pilot seemed in good spirits, at one stage miming wiping his brow, which the loader driver took to be a comment on the heat of the day. During this time, a third company aircraft, ZK-JAL, arrived at the strip and shut down, as the loader driver was able to handle only two aircraft at a time. The pilot of ZK-JAL flew a briefing sortie with the pilot of ZK-BXZ prior to the planned departure of ZK-BXZ. After each take-off, ZK-BXZ would turn left on to a downwind leg and then cross over the top (loading) end of the strip on the way to the sowing area. ZK-BXZ was working inward from the eastern boundary of the property, and ZK-EMW from the western boundary. While topdressing was in progress, fresh lime was being trucked to the strip and placed in the large fertilizer bin from which the loader was replenishing the aircraft. The lime was received directly from the processing plant, and was dry and free-flowing. As each load arrived, the farmer would mix a cobalt supplement with it in the bin. One of the truck drivers, who himself held a Commercial Pilot Licence (Aeroplane), took several photographs of the aircraft landing and taking off. One photograph showed ZK-BXZ leaving the end of the strip on probably its penultimate take-off, with ZK-EMW on final approach on the reciprocal heading. On this occasion ZK-EMW passed over ZK-BXZ just after the latter became airborne. The next photograph showed ZK-BXZ approximately two thirds of the way down the strip, with 20° of flap set on its final take-off, with dirt being thrown up by the wheels as it hit the soft spots in the strip. The driver did not watch the take-off beyond this point. The pilot of ZK-EMW initially reported that on his landing approach, he flew over ZK-BXZ while it was still on its take-off run. He later disputed this and claimed that ZK-BXZ had just become airborne when it disappeared from view under his right wing. In any event, ZK-BXZ only flew approximately 170 metres, so the proximity of these two aircraft was very close if ZK-BXZ was already airborne at this point in time. The close proximity of the two aircraft is significant as it is possible that ZKBXZ, being the lower of the two aircraft, may have encountered wake turbulence from ZK-EMW. All aircraft produce wake turbulence as a by-product of generating lift from their wings, the intensity varying with the aircraft’s speed, weight and configuration. The weather conditions, as discussed in the article appended to this report, were favourable for ZK-BXZ to encounter the wake vortices from the aircraft passing above. The first indication of the accident was a loud bang heard by the farmer – he was in the bin mixing in the cobalt supplement, and initially thought he had heard a truck tailgate slamming. Looking towards the end of the strip, he saw a plume of smoke and immediately went by motorcycle to investigate. On arrival at the scene, he found the aeroplane well ablaze, and was unable to get close because of the heat. As the accident occurred, a fourth company aircraft, ZK-EGV, arrived at the strip. The pilot did not see the actual impact, but flew over the burning wreckage on approach. As soon as he landed he went by foot to the accident site, as he had arrived too late to join those that had gone on board the loading vehicle. The loader driver used his fire extinguisher to quell the flames, but could do nothing to assist the pilot. After the extinguisher ran out, the fire flared up again, and all those present could do was to await the arrival of the Fire Service. The accident occurred in daylight, at approximately 1500 hours NZDT, at Mairoa, 10 nm south-west of Te Kuiti aerodrome, at an elevation of 1150 ft. Latitude: S 38° 22.9', longitude: E 174° 57.0'; grid reference: 260-R16-806117.

On Friday 3 October 2003, Convair 580 ZK-KFU was scheduled for 2 regular return night freight flights from Christchurch to Palmerston North. The 2-pilot crew arrived at the operatorís base on Christchurch Aerodrome at about 1915 and together they checked load details, weather and notices for the flight. The flight, using the call sign Air Freight 642 (AF642), was to follow a standard route from Christchurch to Palmerston North via Cape Campbell non-directional beacon (NDB), Titahi Bay NDB, Paraparaumu NDB and Foxton reporting point. The pilots completed a pre-flight inspection of ZK-KFU and at 2017 the co-pilot (refer paragraph 1.10.4) called Christchurch Ground requesting a start clearance. The ground controller approved engine start and cleared AF 642 to Palmerston North at flight level 210 (FL 210) and issued a transponder code of 5331. The engines were started and the aircraft taxied for take-off on runway 20. At 2032 AF 642 started its take-off on schedule and tracked initially south towards Burnham NDB before turning right for Cape Campbell NDB, climbing to FL210. The flight progressed normally until crossing Cook Strait. After crossing Cape Campbell NDB, the crew changed to the Wellington Control frequency and at 2108 advised Wellington Control that AF 642 was at FL210, and requested to fly directly to Paraparaumu NDB. The change in routing was common industry practice and offered a shorter distance and flight time with no safety penalty. The Wellington controller approved the request and AF 642 tracked directly to Paraparaumu NDB. At 2113 the Wellington controller cleared AF 642 to descend initially to FL130 (13 000 feet (ft)). The co-pilot acknowledged the clearance. At 2122 the Wellington controller cleared AF 642 for further descent to 11 000 ft, and at 2125 instructed the crew to change to the Ohakea Control frequency. At 2125:14, after crossing Paraparaumu NDB, the co-pilot reported to Ohakea Control that AF 642 was in descent to 11 000 ft. The Ohakea controller responded 'Air Freight 642 Ohakea good evening, descend to 7000 ft. Leave Foxton heading 010, vectors [to] final VOR/DME 076 circling for 25. Palmerston weather Alfa, [QNH] 987.' At 2125:34 the co-pilot replied ìRoger down to 7000 and leaving Foxton heading 010 for 07 approach circling 25 and listening for Alfa. Air Freight 642. At 2125:44 the Ohakea controller replied 'Affirm, the Ohakea QNH 987.' The crew did not respond to this transmission. A short time later the controller saw the radar signature for AF 642 turn left and disappear from the screen. At 2126:17 the Ohakea controller attempted to contact AF 642 but there was no response from the crew. The controller telephoned Police and a search for AF 642 was started. Within an hour of the aircraft disappearing from the radar, some debris, later identified as coming from AF 642, was found washed ashore along Paraparaumu Beach. Later in the evening an aerial search by a Royal New Zealand Air Force helicopter using night vision devices and a sea search by local Coastguard vessels located further debris offshore. After an extensive underwater search lasting nearly a week, aircraft wreckage identified as being from ZK-KFU was located in an area about 4 km offshore from Peka Peka Beach, or about 10 km north of Paraparaumu. Police divers recovered the bodies of the 2 pilots on 11 October and 15 October.

Crashed during bad weather. Andrew Wilde was flying and George Muir was a passenger. While enroute from Motu - Opotiki the gully became un-negotiable, so Andrew decided to return to Motu by flying a reciprocal course low level, depicted by arrows on his hand held marine GPS. During the return trip to Motahora up the Otara river valley, he found that the cloud base had lowered even further than when he entered the valley 6 minutes prior & he became fully reliant on that little GPS. The GPS became our enemy & lured Andrew into the cloud base, which ended our flight abruptly.
Testimony from George Muir, loader driver and passenger during this flight.

The aircraft took off from runway 24 right (24R) at Jandakot Airport, WA. One pilot and five passengers were on board the aircraft. The flight was being conducted in the aerial work category, under the instrument flight rules. Shortly after the aircraft became airborne, while still over the runway, the pilot recognized symptoms that he associated with a failure of the right engine and elected to continue the takeoff. The pilot retracted the landing gear, selected the wing flaps to the up position and feathered the propeller of the right engine. The pilot later reported that he was concerned about clearing a residential area and obstructions along the flight path ahead, including high-voltage powerlines crossing the aircraft’s flight path 2,400 m beyond the runway. The aircraft was approximately 450 m beyond the upwind threshold of runway 24R when the pilot initiated a series of left turns. Analysis of radar records indicated that during the turns, the airspeed of the aircraft reduced significantly below the airspeed required for optimum single-engine performance. The pilot transmitted to the aerodrome controller that he was returning for a landing and indicated an intention to land on runway 30. However, the airspeed decayed during the subsequent manoeuvring such that he was unable to safely complete the approach to that runway. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude and the aircraft descended into an area of scrub-type terrain, moderately populated with trees. During the impact sequence at about 1537, the outboard portion of the left wing collided with a tree trunk and was sheared off. A significant quantity of fuel was spilled from the wing’s fuel tank and ignited. An intense postimpact fire broke out in the vicinity of the wreckage and destroyed the aircraft. Four passengers and the pilot vacated the aircraft, but sustained serious burns in the process. One of those passengers died from those injuries 85 days after the accident. A fifth passenger did not survive the post-impact fire.