Country
code

New South Wales

Crash of a Lockheed EC-130Q Hercules near Peak View: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 23, 2020 at 1400 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N134CG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Richmond - Richmond
MSN:
4904
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
Tanker 134
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Richmond Airbase and was conducting fire control operations when contact was lost. Witnesses on the ground reported hearing a loud bang and saw a giant fireball around the time of the crash. ATSB said the fire retardant-laden aircraft, Tanker 134, was assisting with fire suppression efforts when the crash occurred near Peak View, northeast of Cooma. All three crew members were killed.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver off Cottage Point: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 31, 2017 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-NOO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
1535
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The single engine seaplane was returning to the Rose Bay seaplane base at Sydney when it crashed in unknown circumstances into the Jerusalem Bay, about 30 km north of its destination. The airplane struck the water surface and sank rapidly off Cottage Point. All six occupants were killed.

Crash of a Gippsland GA-8 Airvan in Orange

Date & Time: Jul 6, 2010 at 1745 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-YBH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Parkes - Orange
MSN:
GA8-08-131
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Pilot was performing a cargo flight from Parkes to Orange, New South Wales. On final approach, single engine aircraft was too low and hit the roof of a metal hangar located near the runway threshold. Aircraft stalled, hit the runway surface and lost its nose gear. It veered off runway and eventually collided with a metal hangar under construction. While the pilot was injured, the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the pilot.

Crash of a Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave in Bankstown: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jun 15, 2010 at 0805 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-PGW
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bankstown - Brisbane - Albury
MSN:
31-8414036
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2435
Captain / Total hours on type:
779.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6266
Circumstances:
Twin engine aircraft, with a pilot and a flight nurse on board, was being operated by Skymaster Air Services under the instrument flight rules (IFR) on a flight from Bankstown Airport, New South Wales (NSW) to Archerfield Airport, Queensland. The aircraft was being positioned to Archerfield for a medical patient transfer flight from Archerfield to Albury, NSW. The aircraft departed Bankstown at 0740 Eastern Standard Time. At 0752, the pilot reported to air traffic control (ATC) that he was turning the aircraft around as he was having ‘a few problems. At about 0806, the aircraft collided with a powerline support pole located on the eastern side of the intersection of Sackville Street and Canley Vale Road, Canley Vale, NSW. The pilot and flight nurse sustained fatal injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by impact damage and a post-impact fire.
Probable cause:
• While the aircraft was climbing to 9,000 ft the right engine sustained a power problem and the pilot subsequently shut down that engine.
• Following the shutdown of the right engine, the aircraft's descent profile was not optimized for one engine inoperative flight.
• The pilot conducted a descent towards Bankstown Airport that was consistent with a normal arrival profile without first verifying that the aircraft was capable of achieving adequate performance with one engine inoperative.
• Following the engine problem, the aircraft's flightpath and the pilot’s communication with air traffic control indicated that the pilot's situation awareness was less than optimal.
• The aircraft collided with a powerline support pole on the eastern side of the intersection of Sackville Street and Canley Vale Road, Canley Vale, about 6 km north-west of Bankstown Airport.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain in Bathurst: 4 killed

Date & Time: Nov 7, 2008 at 2024 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-OPC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Melbourne-Bathurst-Port Macquarie
MSN:
31-7952082
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
2061
Aircraft flight hours:
11000
Circumstances:

The twin engine aircraft crashed shortly after take off from Bathurst airport, outbound for Port Macquarie. The aircraft hit trees and crashed in an open field located 3 km from airport. All 4 occupants were killed. According ATSB, investigation was unable to establish why the aircraft collided with terrain; however, pilot spatial disorientation or pilot incapacitation could not be discounted.

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III off Sydney, Australia: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2008 at 2327 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-OZA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sydney-Brisbane
MSN:
AC-600
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
4873
Captain / Total hours on type:
175.00
Aircraft flight hours:
32339
Aircraft flight cycles:
46710
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff at night, the pilot followed a wrong track outbound for Brisbane. ATC requested the reasons of that route change and the pilot reported minor technical problem. The twin engine aircraft eventually crashed in sea 8 km off Bundeena. The pilot was killed in the accident.
Probable cause:
Contributing safety factors
• It was very likely that the aircraft’s alternating current electrical power system was not energised at any time during the flight.
• It was very likely that the aircraft became airborne without a functioning
primary attitude reference or autopilot that, combined with the added workload
of managing the "slight technical fault", led to pilot spatial disorientation and
subsequent loss of control.Other safety factors
• The pilot’s Metro III endorsement training was not conducted in accordance
with the operator’s approved training and checking manual , with the result that
the pilot’s competence and ultimately, safety of the operation could not be
assured. [Significant safety issue]
• The chief pilot was performing the duties and responsibilities of several key positions in the operator’s organisational structure, increasing the risk of
omissions in the operator’s training and checking requirements.
• The conduct of the flight single-pilot increased the risk of errors of omission,
such as not turning on or noticing the failure of aircraft items and systems, or
complying with directions.

Crash of a Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain in Condobolin: 4 killed

Date & Time: Dec 2, 2005 at 1350 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-PYN
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Brisbane-Swan Hill
MSN:
31-8252075
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
4600
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2900
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was making a private flight from Brisbane to Swan Hill with 2 pilots and 2 pax on board : Mr. Peter Menegazzo and his wife. While cruising at FL097, crew encountered bad weather and decided to modify the route. Few minutes later, the aircraft crashed in an open field located 20 km west of Condobolin, northwest part of Victoria State. The owner of the aircraft, Mr. Menegazzo, was chairman of one of Australia's biggest pastoral ventures - The Stambroke Pastoral Company, with more than 240,000 cattle.

Crash of a Beechcraft B200C Super King Air in Coffs Harbour

Date & Time: May 15, 2003 at 0833 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-AMR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sydney – Coffs Harbour
MSN:
BL-126
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
18638
Captain / Total hours on type:
460.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft impacted the sea or a reef about 6 km north-east of Coffs Harbour airport. The impact occurred immediately after the pilot initiated a go-around during an instrument approach to runway 21 in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) that included heavy rain and restricted visibility. Although the aircraft sustained structural damage and the left main gear detached, the aircraft remained airborne. During the initial go-around climb, the aircraft narrowly missed a breakwater and adjacent restaurant at the Coffs Harbour boat harbour. Shortly after, the pilot noticed that the primary attitude indicator had failed, requiring him to refer to the standby instrument to recover from an inadvertent turn. The pilot positioned the aircraft over the sea and held for about 30 minutes before returning to Coffs Harbour and landing the damaged aircraft on runway 21. There were no injuries or any other damage to property and/or the environment because of the accident. The aircraft was on a routine aeromedical flight from Sydney to Coffs Harbour with the pilot, two flight nurses, and a stretcher patient on board. The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) in predominantly instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). During the descent, the enroute air traffic controller advised the pilot to expect the runway 21 Global Positioning System (GPS) non-precision approach (NPA). The pilot reported that he reviewed the approach diagram and planned a 3-degree descent profile. He noted the appropriate altitudes, including the correct minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 580 ft, on a reference card. A copy of the approach diagram used by the pilot is at Appendix A. The aerodrome controller advised the pilot of the possibility of a holding pattern due to a preceding IFR aircraft being sequenced for an instrument approach to runway 21. The controller subsequently advised that holding would not be required if the initial approach fix (SCHNC)2 was reached not before 0825. At about 0818, the aerodrome controller advised the pilot of the preceding aircraft that the weather conditions in the area of the final approach were a visibility of 5000 m and an approximate cloud base of 1,000 ft. At 0825 the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of the King Air to track the aircraft from the initial approach fix to the intermediate fix (SCHNI) and to descend to not below 3,500 ft. The published minimum crossing altitude was 3,600 ft. About one minute later the pilot reported that he was leaving 5,500 ft and was established inbound on the approach. At 0828 the pilot reported approaching the intermediate fix and 3,500 ft. The controller advised that further descent was not available until the preceding aircraft was visible from the tower. At 0829 the controller, having sighted the preceding aircraft, cleared the pilot of the King Air to continue descent to 2,500 ft. The pilot advised the controller that he was 2.2 NM from the final approach fix (SCHNF). At that point an aircraft on a 3-degree approach slope to the threshold would be at about 2,500 ft. The controller then cleared the pilot for the runway 21 GPS approach, effectively a clearance to descend as required. The pilot subsequently explained that he was high on his planned 3-degree descent profile because separation with the preceding aircraft resulted in a late descent clearance. He had hand flown the approach, and although he recalled setting the altitude alerter to the 3,500 ft and 2,500 ft clearance limits, he could not recall setting the 580 ft MDA. He stated that he had not intended to descend below the MDA until he was visual, and that he had started to scan outside the cockpit at about 800 ft altitude in expectation of becoming visual. The pilot recalled levelling the aircraft, but a short time later experienced a 'sinking feeling'. That prompted him to go-around by advancing the propeller and engine power levers, and establishing the aircraft in a nose-up attitude. The passenger in the right front seat reported experiencing a similar 'falling sensation' and observed the pilot's altimeter moving rapidly 'down through 200 ft' before it stopped at about 50 ft. She saw what looked like a beach and exclaimed 'land' about the same time as the pilot applied power. The pilot felt a 'thump' just after he had initiated the go-around. The passenger recalled feeling a 'jolt' as the aircraft began to climb. Witnesses on the northern breakwater of the Coffs Harbour boat harbour observed an aircraft appear out of the heavy rain and mist from the north-east. They reported that it seemed to strike the breakwater wall and then passed over an adjacent restaurant at a very low altitude before it was lost from sight. Wheels from the left landing gear were seen to ricochet into the air and one of the two wheels was seen to fall into the water. The other wheel was found lodged among the rocks of the breakwater.During the go-around the pilot unsuccessfully attempted to raise the landing gear, so he reselected the landing gear selector to the 'down' position. He was unable to retract the wing flaps. It was then that he experienced a strong g-force and realised that he was in a turn. He saw that the primary attitude indicator had 'toppled' and referred to the standby attitude indicator, which showed that the aircraft was in a 70-degree right bank. He rapidly regained control of the aircraft and turned it onto an easterly heading, away from land. The inverter fail light illuminated but the pilot did not recall any associated master warning annunciator. He then selected the number-2 inverter to restore power to the primary attitude indicator, and it commenced to operate normally. The pilot observed that the left main landing gear had separated from the aircraft. He continued to manoeuvre over water while awaiting an improvement in weather conditions that would permit a visual approach. About 4 minutes after the King Air commenced the go-around, the aerodrome controller received a telephone call advising that a person at the Coffs Harbour boat harbour had witnessed an aircraft flying low over the harbour, and that the aircraft had '…hit something and the wheel came off'. The controller contacted the pilot, who confirmed that the aircraft was damaged. The controller declared a distress phase and activated the emergency response services to position for the aircraft's landing. Witnesses reported that the landing was smooth. As the aircraft came to rest on the runway, foam was applied around the aircraft to minimise the likelihood of fire. The occupants exited the aircraft through the main cabin door.
Probable cause:
This occurrence is a CFIT accident resulting from inadvertent descent below the MDA on the final segment of a non-precision approach, fortunately without the catastrophic consequences normally associated with such events. The investigation was unable to conclusively determine why the aircraft descended below the MDA while in IMC, or why the descent continued until CFIT could no longer be avoided. However, the investigation identified a number of factors that influenced, or had the potential to influence, the development of the occurrence.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Cootamundra

Date & Time: Jun 25, 2001 at 1021 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-OZG
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sydney – Griffith
MSN:
110-241
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6850
Captain / Total hours on type:
253.00
Circumstances:
The Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante, VH-OZG, departed from Sydney Kingsford Smith international airport at 0855 on 25 June 2001, on a single-pilot instrument flight rules (IFR) charter flight to Griffith. The nine occupants on board the aircraft included the pilot and eight passengers. At about 0945, while maintaining an altitude of 10,000 ft, the master caution light illuminated. At the same time, the multiple alarm panel ‘GENERATOR 2’ (right generator) warning light also illuminated, indicating that the generator was no longer supplying power to the main electrical bus bar. After resetting the generator and monitoring its output, the pilot was satisfied that it was operating normally. A short time later, the master warning light illuminated again. A number of circuit breakers tripped, accompanied by multiple master alarm panel warnings. The red ‘FIRE’ warning light on the right engine fire extinguisher ‘T’ handle also illuminated, accompanied by the aural fire alarm warning. The pilot reported that after silencing the aural fire alarm, he carried out the engine fire emergency checklist actions. However, he was unable to select the fuel cut-off position with the right fuel condition lever, despite overriding the locking mechanism using his left thumb while attempting to operate the lever with his right hand. He also reported that the propeller lever did not remain in the feathered detent, but moved forward, as if spring-loaded, to an intermediate position. After unsuccessfully attempting to select fuel cut-off with the right fuel condition lever, or feather the right propeller with the propeller lever, the pilot pulled the right ‘T’ handle to discharge the fire bottle. The amber discharge light illuminated and a short time later the fire alarm sounded again. Passengers reported seeing lights illuminated on the multiple alarm panel and heard the sound of a continuous fire alarm in the cockpit. At 0956, the pilot notified air traffic services (ATS) that there was a ‘problem’ with the aircraft, but did not specify the nature of that problem. Almost immediately the pilot transmitted a PAN radio call and advised ATS that there was a fire on board the aircraft. The nearest aerodromes for an emergency landing were not available due to fog, and the pilot decided to divert to Young, which was about 35 NM to the south east of the aircraft’s position at that time. The pilot advised ATS that the fire was extinguished, and that he was diverting the aircraft to Young. Two minutes later, the pilot repeated his advice to ATS stating that a fire in the right engine had been extinguished, and requested emergency services for the aircraft’s arrival at Young. The pilot informed one of the passengers that there was an engine fire warning, and that they would be landing at Young. The passengers subsequently reported seeing flames in the right engine nacelle and white smoke streaming from under the wing. Smoke had also started to enter the cabin in the vicinity of the wing root. The pilot subsequently reported that he had selected the master switch on the air conditioning control panel to the ‘vent’ position, and that he had opened the left direct vision window in an attempt to eliminate smoke from the cabin. When that did not appear to have any effect he closed the direct vision window. The pilot of another aircraft reported to ATS that Young was clear, but there were fog patches to the north. On arrival at Young, however, the pilot of the Bandeirante was unable to land the aircraft because of fog, and advised ATS that he was proceeding to Cootamundra, 27 NM to the south southwest of Young. The crew of an overflying airliner informed ATS that Cootamundra was clear of fog. ATS confirmed that advice by telephoning an aircraft operator at Cootamundra aerodrome. At 1017 thick smoke entered the cabin and the pilot transmitted a MAYDAY. He reported that the aircraft was 9 NM from Cootamundra, and ATS informed him that the aerodrome was clear of fog. The pilot advised that he was flying in visual conditions and that there was a serious fire on board. No further radio transmissions were heard from the aircraft. At 1021, approximately 25 minutes after first reporting a fire, the pilot made an approach to land on runway 16 at Cootamundra. He reported that when he selected the landing gear down on late final there was no indication that the gear had extended. The pilot reported that he did not have sufficient time to extend the gear manually using the emergency procedure because he was anxious to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible. Unaware that the right main landing gear had extended the pilot advised the passengers to prepare for a ‘belly’ landing. He lowered full flap, selected the propeller levers to the feathered position and the condition levers to fuel cut-off. The aircraft landed with only the right main landing gear extended. The right main wheel touched down about 260 m beyond the runway threshold, about one metre from the right edge of the runway. During the landing roll the aircraft settled on the nose and the left engine nacelle and skidded for approximately 450 m before veering left off the bitumen. The soft grass surface swung the aircraft sharply left, and it came to a stop on the grass flight strip east of the runway, almost on a reciprocal heading. The pilot and passengers were uninjured, and vacated the aircraft through the cabin door and left overwing emergency exit. Personnel from a maintenance organisation at the aerodrome extinguished the fire in the right engine nacelle using portable fire extinguishers.
Probable cause:
Significant factors:
1. Vibration from the worn armature shaft of the right starter generator resulted in a fractured fuel return line.
2. The armature shaft of the right engine starter generator failed in-flight.
3. Sparks or frictional heat generated by the failed starter generator ignited the combustible fuel/air mixture in the right engine accessory compartment.
4. Items on the engine fire emergency checklist were not completed, and the fire was not suppressed.
5. The operator’s CASA approved emergency checklist did not contain smoke evacuation procedures.
6. The pilot did not attempt to extend the landing gear using the emergency gear extension when he did not to get a positive indication that the gear was down and locked.
7. The aircraft landed on the right main landing gear and slid to a stop on the right main gear, left engine nacelle and nose.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B in Wagga Wagga: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 20, 1998 at 1739 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-IXH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Corowa – Albury – Wagga Wagga
MSN:
186
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1014
Captain / Total hours on type:
217.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft operator had been contracted to provide a regular service transporting bank documents, medical pathology samples and items of general freight between Wagga Wagga, Albury and Corowa. On the day of the accident a passenger was accompanying the pilot for the day's flying. The pilot commenced the flight from Corowa to Albury under the Visual Flight Rules, flying approximately 500 ft above ground level. At Albury he obtained the latest aerodrome weather report for Wagga Wagga, which indicated that there was scattered cloud at 300 ft above ground level, broken cloud at 600 ft above ground level, visibility restricted to 2,000 m in light rain and a sea-level barometric pressure (QNH) of 1008 hPa. At 1715 Eastern Standard Time (EST) the aircraft departed Albury for Wagga Wagga under the Instrument Flight Rules. The pilot contacted the Melbourne en-route controller at 1728 and reported that he was maintaining 5,000 ft. Although the aircraft was operating outside controlled airspace, the en-route controller did have a radar surveillance capability and was providing the pilot with a flight information service. However, no return was recorded from the aircraft's transponder and at 1732 the pilot reported that he was transferring to the Wagga Wagga Mandatory Broadcast Zone frequency. This was the pilot's last contact with the controller. Although air traffic services do not monitor or record the Wagga Wagga Mandatory Broadcast Zone frequency, transmissions made on this frequency are recorded by AVDATA for the purpose of calculating aircraft landing charges. This information was reviewed following the accident. The pilot broadcast his position inbound to the aerodrome on the mandatory broadcast zone frequency and indicated that he was conducting a Global Positioning System (GPS) arrival. He established communication with the pilot of another inbound aircraft and at 9 NM from the aerodrome, broadcast his position as he descended through 2,900 ft. Approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds later, the pilot advised that he was passing 2,000 ft but immediately corrected this to state that he was maintaining 2,000 ft. He also stated that it was "getting pretty gloomy" and that according to the latest weather report he should be visual at the procedure's minimum descent altitude. The aircraft would have been approximately 6 NM from the aerodrome at this time. This was the last transmission heard from the pilot. The resident of a house to the south of Gregadoo Hill sighted the aircraft a short time before the accident. He was standing outside his house and stated that the aircraft was visible as it passed directly overhead at what appeared to be an unusually low height. The aircraft then disappeared into cloud that was obscuring Gregadoo Hill, approximately 350 m from where he was standing. Moments later he heard the sound of an impact followed almost immediately by a red flash of light. The noise from the engines appeared to be normal up until the sound of the impact. The aircraft had collided with steeply rising terrain on the southern face of Gregadoo Hill, approximately 40 ft below the crest. The hill is 4 NM from the aerodrome and is marked on instrument approach charts as a spot height elevation of 1,281 ft. The estimated time of the accident was 1739. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries.
Probable cause:
The pilot had received an accurate appreciation of the weather conditions in the vicinity of Wagga Wagga prior to departing Albury. At that stage it would have been apparent that low cloud and poor visibility were likely to affect the aircraft's arrival. Under such conditions it would not have been possible to land from the GPS arrival procedure. As the reported cloud base and visibility were both below the minimum criteria, it is difficult to rationalise the pilot's transmission that, according to the latest weather report, he would be visual at the minimum descent altitude. This statement suggests that the pilot had already made the decision to continue his descent below the minimum altitude for the procedure and to attempt to establish visual reference for landing. Based on the report of broken low cloud in the vicinity of the aerodrome, the pilot would have needed to descend to 1,324 ft above mean sea level to establish the aircraft clear of cloud. This is within 50 ft of the last altitude recorded on the GPS receiver. Due to the difference between the actual and forecast QNH, the left altimeter would over-read by approximately 150 ft. At the time of the occurrence an otherwise correctly functioning instrument would have indicated an altitude of approximately 1,400 ft. The pilot had probably set the right altimeter to the local QNH prior to departing Albury. As this setting also corresponded to the actual QNH at Wagga Wagga, that instrument would have provided the more accurate indication of the aircraft's operating altitude. However, because of its location on the co-pilot's instrument panel, it is unlikely that the pilot would have included that altimeter in his basic instrument scan. It was not possible to assess the extent to which illicit drugs may have influenced the pilot's performance during the flight and affected his ability to safely operate the aircraft.
The following factors were identified:
- The pilot was operating the aircraft in instrument meteorological conditions below the approved minimum descent altitude.
- Low cloud was covering Gregadoo Hill at the time of the accident.
Final Report: