Country

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver into Mistastin Lake: 7 killed

Date & Time: Jul 15, 2019
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FJKI
Schedule:
Crossroads Lake - Mistastin Lake
MSN:
992
YOM:
1956
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane was chartered by a provider based in Crossroads Lake (near Churchill Falls reservoir) to fly four fisherman and two guides to Mistastin Lake, Labrador. The aircraft was supposed to leave Crossroads Lake at 0700LT but the departure was postponed to 1000LT due to low ceiling. Several attempts to contact the pilot failed during the day and the SAR center based in Trenton was alerted. The wreckage was found few hours later at the bottom of the lake, about a nautical mile from the shore. Three people were found dead while four other occupants, including the pilot, were not found after five days of intensive search. A week later, authorities confirmed all seven occupants died.

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu near Makkovik: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 1, 2019 at 0800 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N757NY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Goose Bay - Narsarsuaq
MSN:
46-36657
YOM:
2015
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a ferry flight from Goose Bay to UK via Narsarsuaq and departed Goose Bay Airport at 0723LT. Bound to the northeast, the single engine airplane flew at an altitude varying between 600 and 700 metres and a speed of 200-240 km/h when it struck a mountain located about 74 km southeast of Makkovik, Newfoundland, about 37 minutes after takeoff. SAR operations were hampered due to blizzard and a ground search and rescue team consisting of nine people from Makkovik reached the two men by snowmobile on Wednesday evening. At the time, one was conscious while another was unconscious. They reached Makkovik around 2100LT, but couldn't get a helicopter out until early Thursday morning due to poor weather conditions. Both pilots were evacuated in the morning of May 2 but one of them died from his injuries later in the day.

Crash of a Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain in Cartwright: 2 killed

Date & Time: May 26, 2010 at 0930 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FZSD
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Goose Bay - Cartwright - Black Tickle - Goose Bay
MSN:
31-7405233
YOM:
1974
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
9000
Circumstances:
Aircraft departed on a round trip flight from Goose Bay to Cartwright and Black Tickle before returning to Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador. The pilot was to deliver freight to Cartwright as well as a passenger and some freight to Black Tickle. At approximately 0905, the pilot made a radio broadcast advising that the aircraft was 60 nautical miles west of Cartwright. No further radio broadcasts were received. The aircraft did not arrive at destination and, at 1010, was reported as missing. The search for the aircraft was hampered by poor weather. On 28 May 2010, at about 2200, the aircraft wreckage was located on a plateau in the Mealy Mountains. Both occupants of the aircraft were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. There was no emergency locator transmitter on board and, as such, no signal was received.
Probable cause:
The pilot conducted a visual flight rules (VFR) flight into deteriorating weather in a mountainous region.
The pilot lost visual reference with the ground and the aircraft struck the rising terrain in level, controlled flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman Islander in Port Hope Simpson: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 7, 2009 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FJJR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lourdes-de-Blanc-Sablon - Port Hope Simpson
MSN:
0424
YOM:
1975
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
13500
Captain / Total hours on type:
600.00
Circumstances:
The pilot was tasked with a medical evacuation flight to take a patient from Port Hope Simpson to St. Anthony, Newfoundland and Labrador. The aircraft departed the company’s base of operations at Forteau, Newfoundland and Labrador, at approximately 0620 Newfoundland and Labrador daylight time. At approximately 0650, he made radio contact with the airfield attendant at the Port Hope Simpson Airport, advising that he was four nautical miles from the airport for landing. The weather in Port Hope Simpson was reported to be foggy. There were no further transmissions from the aircraft. Although the aircraft could not be seen, it could be heard west of the field. An application of power was heard, followed shortly thereafter by the sound of an impact. Once the fog cleared about 30 minutes later, smoke was visible in the hills approximately four nautical miles to the west of the Port Hope Simpson Airport. A ground search team was dispatched from Port Hope Simpson and the wreckage was found at approximately 1100. The sole occupant of the aircraft was fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a severe post-crash fire. There was no emergency locator transmitter signal.
Probable cause:
The aircraft departed controlled flight, likely in an aerodynamic stall, and impacted terrain for undetermined reasons.
The lack of onboard recording devices prevented the investigation from determining the reasons why the aircraft departed controlled flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Crossroads Lake

Date & Time: Jul 14, 2008 at 0816 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FPQC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Crossroads Lake - Schefferville
MSN:
873
YOM:
1956
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7885
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Circumstances:
The Labrador Air Safari (1984) Inc. float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) aircraft (registration C-FPQC, serial number 873) departed Crossroads Lake, Newfoundland and Labrador, at approximately 0813 Atlantic daylight time with the pilot and six passengers on board. About three minutes after take-off as the aircraft continued in the climb-out, the engine failed abruptly. When the engine failed, the aircraft was about 350 feet above ground with a ground speed of about 85 miles per hour. The pilot initiated a left turn and, shortly after, the aircraft crashed in a bog. The pilot and four of the occupants were seriously injured; two occupants received minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged, but there was no post-impact fire. The impact forces activated the onboard emergency locator transmitter.
Probable cause:
The linkpin plugs had not been installed in the recently overhauled engine, causing inadequate lubrication to the linkpin bushings, increased heat, and eventually an abrupt engine failure.
Immediately following the engine failure, while the pilot manoeuvred the aircraft for a forced landing, the aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall at a height from which recovery was not possible.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III in Goose Bay

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2002 at 0456 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FITW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint John's - Goose Bay
MSN:
AC-638
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
PB905
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on a scheduled courier flight from St. John=s, Newfoundland and Labrador, to Goose Bay. The aircraft touched down at 0456 Atlantic standard time and, during the landing roll on the snow-covered runway, the aircraft started to veer to the right. The captain's attempt to regain directional control by the use of full-left rudder and reverse on the engines was unsuccessful. The aircraft continued to track to the right of the centreline, departed the runway, and struck a hard-packed snow bank. There were no injuries to the two crew members. The aircraft was substantially damaged.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Cause and Contributing Factors:
1. Aircraft directional control was lost, likely because of negative castering of the nosewheel when snow piled up in front of the nosewheel assembly.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The crew members were not aware of negative castering; the aircraft flight manual and emergency checklists do not address negative castering.
2. The emergency response to the occurrence was delayed by four minutes because of the lack of communication from the aircraft to the tower.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900C in Saint John's

Date & Time: Sep 14, 2001 at 2118 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GSKC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
UB-27
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
SLQ621
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On take off from runway 11 at St. John's, the crew felt the nose of the aircraft rise to a high-pitch attitude. The aircraft climbed to about 150 to 200 feet, and was about to enter cloud when the crew reduced power. The crew lowered the nose, and force-landed the aircraft on the runway. The main gear, wings, engines and fuselage sustained substantial structural damage. Weather conditions at the time of the crash were reported as: winds 090° at 25 knots gusting to 35 knots, horizontal visibility 1/2 statute mile in light rain and fog, vertical visibility 100 feet, temperature 15° Celsius, dew point 15° Celsius, altimeter 29.31 Hg., pressure dropping.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-3 Otter in Otter Creek

Date & Time: Sep 12, 2001 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FQOS
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
398
YOM:
1960
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Otter Creek near Goose Bay on a charter flight to a fishing lodge with three passengers and one pilot on board. The pilot reported he was in climb mode when the aircraft pitched forward and then nosed up before entering an uncontrollable nose-down descent, although it did not exhibit characteristics normally associated with an aerodynamic stall. It impacted the water hard, resulting in structural failure of the float supports and extensive damage to the fuselage. 'Lab Air 911', a Twin Otter medevac flight bound for Nain witnessed the incident and raised the alarm. All four occupants were rescued by boat while the aircraft sank in 55 feet of water.
Source: http://www.dhc-3archive.com/DHC-3_398.html

Crash of a Boeing 737-2E1F in Saint John's

Date & Time: Apr 4, 2001 at 0615 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GDCC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hamilton – Montréal – Halifax – Saint John’s
MSN:
20681
YOM:
1973
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
At 2320, Newfoundland daylight time, on 03 April 2001, the Royal Cargo flight, a Boeing 737-200, left Mirabel, Quebec, for a scheduled instrument flight rules cargo flight with two pilots on board. The flight was headed for Hamilton, Ontario; Mirabel; Halifax, Nova Scotia; St. John's, Newfoundland; and Mirabel. The flights from Mirabel to Halifax were uneventful. Before departure from Halifax, the pilot flying (PF) received the latest weather information for the flight to St. John's from the company dispatch; he did not ask for, or receive, the latest notices to airmen (NOTAMs). At 0545, the aircraft departed Halifax for St. John's. The PF was completing his line indoctrination training after having recently upgraded to captain. The training captain, who was the pilot not flying (PNF), occupied the right seat. After departure from Halifax, he contacted Halifax Flight Service Station (FSS) and received the latest weather report for St. John's, the 0530 aviation routine weather report (METAR). The weather was as follows: wind 050° magnetic (M) at 35, gusting to 40, knots; visibility 1 statute mile in light snow and blowing snow; ceiling 400 feet overcast; temperature -1°C; dew point -2°C; and altimeter 29.41 inches of mercury. The FSS passed runway surface condition (RSC) reports for both runways (11/29 and 16/34), including Canadian runway friction index (CRFI) readings of 0.25 for Runway 11/29 and 0.24 for Runway 16/34. The FSS specialist also provided the NOTAMs for St. John's, which included a NOTAM released more than five hours earlier advising of the unserviceability of the instrument landing system (ILS) for Runway 11. The flight crew had initially planned an ILS approach, landing on Runway 11 at St. John's. Because of the marginal weather, the loss of Runway 11/29, and his greater experience, the training captain decided to switch seats and assume the duties and full responsibilities as captain and PF. Returning to Halifax was not considered because the aircraft would be overweight for landing there. The option of diverting the flight to the alternate airport was also discussed by the crew; however, in the end, they felt that a safe landing was achievable in St. John's. At 0638:27, the PF contacted St. John's tower to ask if the approach to Runway 34 was still an option. The response indicated that Runway 34 was probably the only option because of the wind: 050°M (estimated) at 35, gusting to 40, knots. The ILS on Runway 11 was unserviceable, and the glidepath for Runway 29 was unserviceable. The only instrument approaches available were the localizer back course Runway 34 and the ILS Runway 16. Also, at about 0638, the Gander Area Control Centre (ACC) controller suggested to the crew that they obtain the 0630 automatic terminal information service (ATIS) for St. John's. The ATIS was reporting surface winds of 055°M at 20, gusting to 35, knots. The PNF attempted to obtain the ATIS information; however, because of a simultaneous radio transmission on the second VHF radio between the PF and St. John's tower, the ATIS information was not obtained. At 0641, the PNF contacted Gander ACC, which reported the winds at St. John's as 040°M at 13, gusting to 18, knots. The PNF pointed out the discrepancy in the two wind reports to the PF; however, there was no acknowledgement of the significance of the discrepancy. It was later determined that the discrepancy was an unserviceable anemometer at the St. John's airport due to ice accretion on the anemometer. The anemometer was providing a direct reading of the incorrect wind information to Gander ACC. Gander ACC was unaware of the unserviceability and unknowingly passed the incorrect wind information on to the flight crew. At 0644, Gander ACC transmitted a significant meteorological report (SIGMET), issued at 0412 and valid from 0415 to 0815, that included St. John's. The SIGMET forecast severe mechanical turbulence below 3000 feet due to surface wind gusts in excess of 50 knots. However, the crew may not have been listening to the SIGMET broadcast: while the ACC transmitted the SIGMET, the crew were discussing the application of an 18-knot quartering tailwind for the approach to Runway 16. This tailwind was well under the 50 knots described by the SIGMET. The crew did not acknowledge receipt of the SIGMET until prompted by the controller. Before the descent into St. John's, the crew discussed approach options. The approach to Runway 11 was discounted because of the unserviceability of the ILS, and Runway 34 was eliminated as an option because the weather was below its published approach minimums. The crew discussed the ILS approach to Runway 16. Although the PNF expressed concern about the tailwind, it was decided to attempt the approach because the wind reported by Gander ACC was within the aircraft's landing limits. In calculating the approach speed in preparation for the approach, there was confusion during the application of the tailwind and gust corrections to the landing reference speed (Vref ). The crew had correctly established a flap-30 Vref of 132 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and ultimately an approach speed of 142 KIAS. The approach speed calculations were derived using the incorrect wind information from Gander ACC; further, the crew added five knots for the gust increment to the nominal approach speed (Vref + 5 knots), that is, Vref + 10 knots. This incorrect calculation (adding the gust factor) was consistent with company practice at the time of the accident. During the descent, the crew also had difficulty completing the descent and approach checklists; there were several missteps and repeated attempts at completion of checks. Clearance for an ILS approach to Runway 16 was obtained from Gander ACC , and the crew was advised to contact St. John's tower. Just over two minutes before landing, the tower advised that the wind was 050°M (estimated) at 20, gusting to 35, knots and provided the following RSC report for Runway 16: Full length 170 feet wide, surface 30% very light dusting of snow and 70% compact snow and ice; remainder is 20% light snow, 80% compact snow and ice, windrow along the east side of the runway; friction index 0.20; and temperature -1°C at 0925. The aircraft crossed the final approach fix on the ILS glideslope at 150 KIAS. During the final approach, the airspeed steadily increased to 180 KIAS (ground speed 190 knots); the glidepath was maintained with a descent rate of 1000 feet per minute. From 1000 feet above sea level, no airspeed calls were made; altitude calls were made and responses were made. The Royal Boeing 737 operations manual states that the PNF shall call out significant deviations from programmed airspeed. In the descent, through 900 feet above sea level, the aircraft encountered turbulence resulting in uncommanded roll and pitch deviations and airspeed fluctuations of +/- 11 knots. At about 300 feet above decision height, the crew acquired visual references for landing. Approximately one minute before landing, St. John's tower transmitted the runway visual range, repeated the estimated surface wind (050°M [estimated] at 20, gusting to 35, knots), and issued a landing clearance to the aircraft; the PNF acknowledged this information. The aircraft touched down at 164 KIAS (27 KIAS above the desired touchdown speed of Vref), 2300 to 2500 feet beyond the threshold. Radar ground speed at touchdown was 180 knots. The wind at this point was determined to be about 050°M at 30 knots. Shortly after touchdown, the speed brakes and thrust reversers were deployed, and an engine pressure ratio (EPR) of 1.7 was reached 10 seconds after touchdown. Longitudinal deceleration was -0.37g within 1.3 seconds of touchdown, suggesting that a significant degree of effective wheel braking was achieved. With approximately 1100 feet of runway remaining, through a speed of 64 KIAS, reverse thrust increased to about 1.97 EPR on engine 1 and 2.15 EPR on engine 2. As the aircraft approached the end of the runway, the captain attempted to steer the aircraft to the right, toward the Delta taxiway intersection. Twenty-two seconds after touchdown, the aircraft exited the departure end of the runway into deep snow. The aircraft came to rest approximately 75 feet beyond and 53 feet to the right of the runway centreline on a heading of 235°M.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. A combination of excessive landing speed, extended touchdown point, and low runway friction coefficient resulted in the aircraft overrunning the runway.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Before departure from Halifax, the flight crew did not request nor did dispatch personnel inform the crew of the notice to airmen (NOTAM) advising of the instrument landing system's failure for Runway 11 at St. John's International Airport.
2. The St. John's dynamic wind information provided to the Gander Area Control Centre controller was inaccurate. The controller was not aware of this inaccuracy.
3. The crew applied tailwind corrections in accordance with company practices; however, these practices were not in accordance with those stated in the operations manual.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter in Davis Inlet: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 19, 1999 at 0945 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FWLQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Goose Bay - Davis Inlet
MSN:
724
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
PB960
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1600
Captain / Total hours on type:
2500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
70
Aircraft flight hours:
30490
Circumstances:
The flight was a pilot self-dispatched, non-scheduled cargo flight from Goose Bay to Davis Inlet, Newfoundland, and was operating as Speed Air 960 under a defence visual flight rules flight plan. Before the flight, the captain received weather information from the St. John's, Newfoundland, flight service station (FSS) via telephone and fax. The aircraft departed for Davis Inlet at 0815 Atlantic standard time (AST). The captain was the pilot flying (PF). During the first approach, the first officer (FO) had occasional visual glimpses of the snow on the surface. The captain descended the aircraft to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 1340 feet above sea level (asl). When the crew did not acquire the required visual references at the missed approach point, they executed a missed approach. On the second approach, the captain flew outbound from the beacon at 3000 feet asl until turning on the inbound track. It was decided that if visual contact of the surface was made at any time during the approach procedure, they would continue below the MDA in anticipation of the required visual references. The captain initiated a constant descent at approximately 1500 feet per minute with 10 degrees flap selected. The FO occasionally caught glimpses of the surface. At MDA, in whiteout conditions, the captain continued the descent. In the final stages of the descent, the FO acquired visual ground contact; 16 seconds before impact, the captain also acquired visual ground contact. At 8 seconds before impact, the crew selected maximum propeller revolutions per minute. The aircraft struck the ice in controlled flight two nautical miles (nm) from the airport (see Appendix B). During both approaches, the aircraft encountered airframe icing. The crew selected wing de-ice, which functioned normally by removing the ice.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The captain decided to descend below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) without the required visual references.
2. After descending below MDA, both pilots were preoccupied with acquiring and maintaining visual contact with the ground and did not adequately monitor the flight instruments; thus, the aircraft flew into the ice.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The flight crew did not follow company standard operating procedures.
2. Portions of the flight were conducted in areas where the minimum visual meteorological conditions required for visual flight rules flight were not present.
3. Although both pilots recently attended crew resource management (CRM) training, important CRM concepts were not applied during the flight.
4. The cargo was not adequately secured before departure, which increased the risk of injury to the crew.
5. The company manager and the pilot-in-command did not ensure that safe aircraft loading procedures were followed for the occurrence flight.
6. There were lapses in the company's management of the Goose Bay operation; these lapses were not detected by Transport Canada's safety oversight activities.
7. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system, nor was one required by regulation.
8. Records establish that the aircraft departed approximately 500 pounds overweight.
Other Findings:
1. The flight crew were certified, trained, and qualified to operate the flight in accordance with existing regulations and had recently attended CRM training.
2. During both instrument approaches, the aircraft was operating in instrument meteorological conditions and icing conditions.
3. There was no airframe failure or system malfunction prior to or during the flight. In particular, the airframe de-icing system was serviceable and in operation during both approaches.
4. It was determined that an ice-contaminated tailplane stall did not occur.
5. The fuel weight was not properly recorded in the journey logbook.
6. The wreckage pattern was consistent with a controlled, shallow descent.
7. The emergency locator transmitter was damaged due to impact forces during the accident, rendering it inoperable.
Final Report: