Utah

The airplane departed Grand Junction Airport at 1037LT on a positioning flight to Tacoma, carrying a crew of two. About 10 minutes later, it entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a uninhabited area located near the Bitter Creek River, eastern Utah, near the border with Colorado. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and the wreckage was found about 17 km west northwest from the Mack-Mesa Airport located in Colorado. Both occupants were killed.

The airplane was removed from a heated hangar and refueled, at which time water droplets were visible on both wings. The airplane remained outside for about 40 minutes, with no deice or anti-ice treatment, until takeoff was initiated. Multiple witnesses near the accident site reported observing the airplane take off and enter a nose-high attitude, after which it immediately rolled left and impacted the terrain. Wreckage and impact signatures at the accident site were consistent with the left wing impacting the runway surface before the nose of the airplane impacted terrain just to the left of the runway. Witnesses characterized the precipitation at the time of the accident as snow and misty rain, varying in intensity between light and medium. The airplane was equipped with a Wing and Horizontal Stabilizer Anti-Icing System to prevent and remove any ice formation on the leading edges of the wing and the horizontal stabilizer; the system is activated by a “Wing Stab” switch. Based upon both witness statements and flight data from the Cockpit Voice Data Recorder (CVDR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR), the Wing Stab ice switch was turned on about 9 minutes after engine start, while the pilot was performing his checklist; however, it was turned off shortly thereafter. The recorded position of the Wing Stab system switch remained off through the remainder of the recorded data. The airplane pilot’s operating handbook (POH) stated that airplane surfaces contaminated by ice, frozen precipitation, or frost must be deiced before departure. The POH also stated that the airplane must be anti-iced when the risk of freezing precipitation exists or is actually taking place. While deicing removes ice, anti-icing protects against additional icing for a certain period of time. The POH further states that the entire wing should be inspected during the pre-takeoff contamination check, not just the leading edge of the wing or wingtips, and that “when inspecting the wing, during the pre-takeoff contamination check, look at the entire upper surface and not only at the leading edge or wing tip. Although the wing tips can be seen from the cockpit, almost the entire wing is visible from a cabin window. Therefore, it is strongly advised that the visual inspection be done by a crew member from the cabin. Additionally, the crew should ask for the assistance of trained and qualified personnel outside the airplane to assist in the pre-takeoff and check to make sure that the tail and fuselage, which are not visible from the cockpit or cabin, are free of any ice contamination.” Furthermore, the before-takeoff checklist included an ice accumulation check, and included guidance that, “aerodynamic surfaces must be confirmed free of all forms of frost, ice, snow and slush prior to entering the takeoff runway or initiating takeoff.” No evidence of the pilot requesting a passenger or vocalizing that he was checking the wings for ice accumulation was heard on the CVR audio. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the Wing Stab ice protection switch was found in the on position, recorded data indicated that, after the initial system check, the wing stab ice protection system remained off through the remainder of the recorded data. The panel the switch was mounted to had separated from the instrument panel and had an area of dirt/mud directly below the switch itself. The anti-ice system valves and controller were tested at the respective manufacturers and functioned normally. Accordingly, based on the evidence, the switch was likely moved to the on position during the accident sequence. It could not be determined why the Wing Stab ice protection switch was turned off. At the accident time, and in the 3 hours before the accident, light snow, mist, IFR ceilings, and a temperature of -1°C were reported at the departure airport. Witnesses reported that around the time of the accident light snowfall with freezing mist existed, which would have allowed for accumulation of ice to form on the upper surfaces of the wings, fuselage, and tail surfaces in the 40 minutes between when the airplane exited the hangar and when it took off. Given that the pilot did not obtain any deice or anti-ice services before departure, and the immediate roll to the left as the weight on wheels transitioned from ground to air, the airplane likely had some degree of ice contamination on the upper surfaces of the wings, fuselage, and tail that affected the flight characteristics of the airplane.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot smelled smoke. As he began to turn the airplane back to the airport, the engine lost total power. He conducted a forced landing in a field just short of the airport, during which the airplane struck a metal fence and pipe. All occupants egressed, and the pilot then noticed that a fire had erupted under the airplane's engine cowling. Postaccident examination revealed that the airplane sustained fire damage to the roof and forward end of the baggage compartment along with the engine accessory area between the firewall and aft air baffles. Further examination revealed that one of the engine exhaust crossover pipe assemblies was misaligned at the slip joint. An engine manufacturer service bulletin (SB) called for inspections of the exhaust system slip and flange joints to identify misaligned exhaust components. The last maintenance event occurred about 7 1/2 flight hours before the accident, during which the SB was performed and resulted in the replacement of crossover pipes. The mechanic who had performed the most recent maintenance did not follow the correct procedures for reinstallation of the crossover pipe, and the inspector who reviewed his work did not examine the installation as it progressed but instead inspected the pipes after they were installed and essentially hidden from view by their protective heat shield. As a result of the misaligned engine exhaust crossover pipe, hot exhaust gases escaped into the engine compartment and started a fire, which compromised critical engine fuel and oil lines, and resulted in the loss of engine power.

Owned by a construction company and registered under Vancon Holdings LLC (VanCon Inc.), the aircraft was parked at Spanish Fork-Springville Airport when it was stolen at night by a private pilot. After takeoff, hew flew southbound to Payson, reduced his altitude and voluntarily crashed the plane onto his house located in Payson. The airplane disintegrated on impact and was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The pilot was killed. His wife and daughter who were in the house at the time of the accident were uninjured despite the house was also destroyed by fire. Local Police declared that the pilot intentionally flew the airplane into his own home hours after being booked for domestic assault charges. An examination of the airplane found no anomalies with the flight controls that would have contributed to the accident. Toxicology testing revealed the presence of a medication used to treat depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, some eating disorders, and panic attacks; the pilot did not report the use of this medication to the Federal Aviation Administration. The pilot had a known history of depression, anxiety, and anger management issues. The circumstances of the accident were consistent with the pilot's intentional flight into his home.

The commercial pilot was departing on a routine positioning flight in dark night visual meteorological conditions. Footage from a security camera at the airport showed the airplane
take off normally and initiate a right turn, which was the established direction of traffic for the takeoff runway. The airplane continued the right turn, then entered an increasingly rapid descent and subsequently impacted terrain about 1 mile southwest from the airport. The wreckage distribution was consistent with a high-energy impact. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Autopsy and toxicology testing of the pilot did not reveal any evidence of impairment or incapacitation. Visual conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident; however, the setting Moon was obscured by cloud cover, and the airport was located in an area of remote, sparsely-populated high desert terrain. This would have resulted in few visual references to which the pilot could have oriented the airplane. Although the pilot had experience operating in this environment in night conditions and held an instrument rating, the circumstances of the accident are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. The investigation could not determine the initiating event which led to the pilot's mismatch between the airplane's perceived and actual attitude; however, he likely experienced a sensory illusion as a result of spatial disorientation, which led to a loss of control.

The airline transport pilot and passenger departed on a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions in the light business jet. About 1 minute after departure, air traffic control instructed the pilot to climb and maintain an altitude of 14,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About 3 minutes later, the pilot stated that the airplane's flight management system (FMS) had failed. Shortly thereafter, he requested a climb and stated that he was "trying to get to clear skies." Over the next several minutes, the controller provided the pilot with headings and altitudes to vector the airplane into visual meteorological conditions. During this time, and over the course of several transmissions, the pilot stated that he was "losing instruments," was hand-flying the airplane (likely indicating the autopilot was inoperative), and that he wanted to "get clear of the weather." Radar data indicated that, during the 10-minute flight, the airplane conducted a series of climbs and descents with large variations in airspeed. About 2 minutes before the loss of radar contact, the airplane entered a climbing right turn, reaching its highest altitude of about 21,000 ft, before it began a rapidly descending and tightening turn. Performance data revealed that, during this turn, the airplane entered a partially-inverted attitude, exceeded its design maneuvering speed, and reached a peak descent rate of about 36,000 ft per minute. Radar contact was lost at an altitude of about 16,000 ft msl, and the airplane subsequently experienced an inflight breakup. The wreckage was distributed over a debris path that measured about 3/4-mile long and about 1/3-mile wide. Postaccident examination and testing of various flight instruments did not indicate what may have precipitated the inflight anomalies that the pilot reported prior to the loss of control. Additionally, all airframe structural fractures were consistent with ductile overload, and no evidence of any preexisting condition was noted with the airframe or either engine. The airplane was equipped with three different sources of attitude information, all three of which were powered by separate sources. It is unlikely that all three sources would fail simultaneously. In the event the pilot experienced a dual failure of attitude instrumentation on both the pilot and copilot sides, airplane control could have been maintained by reference to the standby attitude indicator. Further, the pilot would have been afforded heading information from the airplane's standby compass. Although the pilot did not specifically state to the controller the nature of the difficulties he was experiencing nor, could the investigation identify what, if any, anomalies the pilot may have observed of the airplane's flight instruments, the pilot clearly perceived the situation as one requiring an urgent ascent to visual conditions. As a single pilot operating without the assistance of an additional crewmember in a high-workload, high-stress environment, the pilot would have been particularly susceptible to distraction and, ultimately, a loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation.

The commercial pilot and copilot reported that, after a normal start and taxi, the airplane was cleared for takeoff. The pilot reported that he began the takeoff roll and, once the airplane reached 100 knots, he rotated the airplane. He added that the airplane immediately experienced an uncommanded right yaw and that the right rudder pedal was "at the floor." Both pilots applied pressure to the left rudder pedal; however, the pedal barely moved. The pilot then tried to manipulate the rudder trim; however, the airplane continued to yaw right. He then manipulated the throttle controls and landed the airplane on the left side of the runway. The airplane remained difficult to control, and subsequently, the left landing gear collapsed, and the airplane slid to a stop on its left side. Postaccident examination of the cockpit revealed that the rudder trim was fully trimmed to the nose right position. Examination of the rudder and rudder trim assembly revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the unmanageable right yaw could not be determined.

Registered N865AS, the landed at Saint George Airport, Utah, at 2236LT after completing flight DL7772 from Salt Lake City. All occupants deplaned and the aircraft was parked on the ramp for the night. Shortly after midnight, a commercial pilot climbed over the barbed wire fence, open the door of the aircraft (which was not closed by key) and managed to start the engines. The aircraft rolled for several metres before then impacted the terminal building, went through the fence and came to rest in a parking lot. The pilot shot himself in the cockpit. Polices forces confirmed later that he wanted to stole the aircraft after his girlfriend was killed that day in Colorado Springs.

The airplane collided with mountainous terrain while conducting firefighting operations, 20 miles north of Modena, Utah. The airplane was operated by Neptune Aviation Services under contract with the US Forest Service as an exclusive public-use fixed-wing airtanker service contract conducted under the operational control of the Bureau of Land management (BLM). Both pilots were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed. The flight originated in Cedar City, Utah, at 1315. The crew of Tanker 11 consisted of the pilot, copilot, and crew chief. They were based out of Missoula, MT, and had been together as a crew for the previous 3 weeks. Normally, the crews stay together for the entire fire season. Tanker 11 crew had operated out of Reno for the 2 weeks prior to the accident. During fire drop operations the tanker is manned by the pilot and copilot, while the crew chief remains at the fire base as ground personnel. The day before the accident while en route from Reno to Cedar City they performed one retardant drop on the White Rock fire, then landed at Cedar City. The crew departed the Cedar City tanker base and arrived at their hotel in Cedar City around 2230. The following morning, the day of the accident, the crew met at 0815, and rode into the Cedar City tanker base together. Tanker 11 took off at 1214 on its first drop on the White Rock fire, and returned at 1254. The crew shut down the airplane, reloaded the airplane with retardant, and did not take on any fuel. Tanker 11 departed the tanker base at 1307 to conduct its second retardant drop of the day, which was to be in the same location as the first drop. Upon arriving in the Fire Traffic Area (FTA) Tanker 11 followed the lead airplane, a Beech Kingair 90, into the drop zone. The drop zone was located in a shallow valley that was 0.4 miles wide and 350 feet deep. The lead airplane flew a shallow right-hand turn on to final, then dropped to an altitude of 150 feet above the valley floor over the intended drop area. While making the right turn on to final behind the lead plane, Tanker 11's right wing tip collided with terrain that was about 700 feet left of the lead airplane's flight path, which resulted in a rapid right yaw, followed by impact with terrain; a fire ball subsequently erupted. Tanker 11 created a 1,088-foot-long debris field and post impact fire.

According to the airplane's operator, the airplane was part of a flight of four airplanes that were taking an organized tour group of revenue passengers on a sightseeing tour of southern Utah. While operating in a high density altitude environment, the pilot was flying into an airport that had a 1,000-foot cliff about 400 feet from the end of the runway he was landing on. Because of the presence of the cliff, the Airguide Publications Airport Manual stated that all landings should be made on the runway that was headed toward the cliff and that all takeoffs should be made on the runway that was headed away from the cliff. The manual also stated that a go-around during landing was not possible. During his approach, the pilot encountered a variable wind and downdrafts. During the landing flare, the airplane dropped onto the runway hard and bounced back into the air. The pilot then immediately initiated a go-around and began a turn away from the runway heading. While in the turn, he was most likely unable to maintain sufficient airspeed, and the airplane entered a stall/mush condition and descended into the ground. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.