Landing (descent or approach)

After landing on runway 16 at Rogachevo AFB (Anderma-2), the aircraft encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its left main gear and came to rest 8 metres further. All 39 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Londrina-Governador José Richa airport in poor weather conditions, aircraft encountered windshear. It hit a small hill and eventually crashed in a field short of runway. All seven occupants injured and aircraft destroyed by fire.

Daghestan Airlines (Avialinii Dagestana) flight DAG372 departed Moscow-Vnukovo Airport at 1408LT bound for Makhatchkala, Daghestan. Fourteen minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 9,000 metres some 80 kilometers south of Moscow, the crew informed ATC about the failure of the engines n°1 and 3 and was cleared to return to Moscow-Domodedovo Airport. On final, the aircraft descended below the clouds at a height of 500 feet but was not properly aligned with the runway centerline. It landed hard to the right of runway 32R, went out of control, impacted an earth mound and bushed before coming to rest, broken in two. Two passengers were killed while 78 other occupants were injured.

The flight from Nampula was uneventful until the approach to Maputo. Due to bad weather conditions at destination, the crew was vectored to a holding pattern. After two circuits, the captain decided to start the descent despite ATC informed him about very poor conditions. At this time, the visibility was reduced due to the night, heavy rain falls, thunderstorm activity with turbulences and lightnings. On final approach to runway 23, the aircraft was too low and impacted ground short of runway in a slight nose-up attitude. Upon impact, the aircraft broke in two and came to rest in a field. All 17 occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed.

The instrument-rated pilot was executing a night instrument approach when the airplane impacted the water. The published approach minimums for the area navigation/global positioning system approach were 460-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility. Recorded air traffic control voice and radar data indicated that prior to the approach the pilot had turned to an approximately 180-degree heading and appeared to be heading in the direction of another airport. The controller reassigned the pilot a heading in order to intercept the final approach. The airplane was located in the water approximately 5,000 feet from the runway threshold. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left main landing gear was in the retracted position and the right main and nose landing gear were in the extended position. Examination of the left main landing gear actuator revealed no mechanical anomalies. The pilot had likely just commanded the landing gear to the down position and the landing gear was in transit. It is further possible that, as the gear was in transit, the airplane impacted the water in a left-wing and nose-down attitude and the left gear was forced to a gear-up position.

The flight crew reported for duty at Liverpool Airport at 0845 hrs. Their original task was to fly to Belfast City Airport, collect a transplant organ, and take it to Cambridge Airport. However, on their arrival at Belfast the transfer was no longer required, so they were given a new task to fly to Belfast Aldergrove Airport and collect an organ to carry to Birmingham Airport. The aircraft departed Belfast Aldergrove at 1450 hrs with the co-pilot as pilot flying. The flight was uneventful and the aircraft was given a radar vector to intercept the ILS for a straight-in approach to Runway 15 at Birmingham. The Runway 15 ILS course is 149°M. The autopilot was engaged and the aircraft was flying on a track of 135°M, 13 nm from the touchdown zone and at a groundspeed of 254 kt, when it crossed the localiser centreline. The aircraft then turned right onto a corrective track but once again passed through the localiser course. Further corrections were made and the aircraft passed through the localiser once more before becoming established at 5 nm. The co-pilot later reported that, because the autopilot was not capturing the localiser, he had disconnected it and flown the approach manually. When the aircraft was at 10 nm, the radar controller broadcast a message advising of the presence of a fog bank on final approach and giving RVRs of 1,400 m at touchdown and in excess of 1,500 m at both the mid-point and stop end. The airfield was sighted by the commander during the approach but not by the co-pilot. A handover to the tower frequency was made at around 8 nm. When the aircraft was at 6 nm, landing clearance was given and acknowledged. The tower controller then advised the aircraft that there was a fog bank over the airfield boundary, together with the information that the touchdown RVR was 1,400 m. The commander responded, saying: “WE’VE GOT ONE END OF THE RUNWAY”. The aircraft was correctly on the localiser and the glideslope at 4 nm. The Decision Altitude (DA) of 503 feet amsl (200 feet aal) for the approach was written on a bug card mounted centrally above the glare shield. Both pilots recollected that the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) calls of “500 above” and “100 above” DA were made by the commander. However, neither pilot could recall a call of ‘decision’ or ‘go-around’ being made. At between 1.1 nm and 0.9 nm, and 400 feet to 300 feet aal, the aircraft turned slightly to the right, onto a track of 152°M. This track was maintained until the aircraft struck the glideslope antenna to the right of the runway some 30 seconds later (see Figure 3, page 11). The aircraft came to rest in an upright position on the grass with a fire on the left side. The co-pilot evacuated through the main cabin door, which is located on the left side of the fuselage, and suffered flash burns as he passed through the fire. The commander was trapped in the cockpit for a time.

Upon landing on runway 07 at Le Bourget Airport, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All 9 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair and withdrawn from use in LBG.

After landing at Sanaa Airport, the four engine aircraft veered off runway and came to rest, bursting into flames. All occupants escaped uninjured. The fire was quickly extinguished but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was flying a VOR/DME-C approach that was on an oblique course about 40 degrees to the runway 30 centerline; the wind conditions produced an 8-knot tailwind for landing on runway 30. Despite the tailwind, the captain elected to land on the 6,600-foot-long runway instead of circling to land with a headwind. Moderate to heavy rain had been falling for the past hour, and the runway was wet. The crew said that the airplane was flown at the prescribed airspeed (Vref) for its weight with the wing flaps fully extended on final approach, and that they touched down just beyond the touchdown zone. The captain said that he extended the wings' spoilers immediately after touchdown. He tested the brakes and noted normal brake pedal pressure. However, during rollout, he noted a lack of deceleration and applied more brake pressure, with no discernible deceleration. The airplane's optional thrust reversers had been previously rendered non-operational by company maintenance personnel and were therefore not functional. The captain stated that he thought about performing a go-around but believed that insufficient runway remained to ensure a safe takeoff. While trying to stop, he did not activate the emergency brakes (which would have bypassed the anti-skid system) because he thought that there was insufficient time, and he was preoccupied with maintaining control of the airplane. He asked the first officer to apply braking with him, and together the crew continued applying brake pedal pressure; however, when the airplane was about 2,000 feet from the runway's end, it was still traveling about 100 knots. As the airplane rolled off the departure end on runway 30, which was wet, both pilots estimated that the airplane was still travelling between 85 and 90 knots. The airplane traveled 618 feet through a rain-soaked grassy runway safety area before encountering a drainage swale that collapsed the nose gear. As the airplane was traversing the soft, wet field, its wheels partially sank into the ground. While decelerating, soil impacted the landing gear wheels and struts where wiring to the antiskid brake system was located. The crew said that there were no indications on any cockpit annunciator light of a system failure or malfunction; however, after the airplane came to a stop they observed that the annunciator light associated with the antiskid system for the No. 2 wheel was illuminated (indicating a system failure). The other three annunciator lights (one for each wheel) were not illuminated. During the approach, the first officer had completed the landing data card by using a company-developed quick reference card. The quick reference card’s chart, which contained some data consistent with the landing charts in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), did not have correction factors for tailwind conditions, whereas the charts in the AFM do contain corrective factors for tailwind conditions. The landing data prepared by the first officer indicated that 3,240 feet was required to stop the airplane on a dry runway in zero wind conditions, with a wet correction factor increasing stopping distance to 4,538 feet. The Vref speed was listed as 127 knots for their landing weight of 11,000 pounds, and the first officer’s verbal and written statements noted that they crossed the runway threshold at 125 knots. During the investigation, Bombardier Lear calculated the wet stopping distances with an 8-knot tailwind as 5,110 feet. The touchdown zone for runway 30 is 1,000 feet from the approach end. The crew’s estimate of their touchdown location on the runway is about 1,200 feet from the approach end, yielding a remaining runway of 5,400 feet. On-duty controllers in the tower watched the landing and said that the airplane touched down in front of the tower at a taxiway intersection that is 1,881 feet from the approach end, which would leave about 4,520 feet of runway to stop the airplane. The controllers observed water spraying off the airplane’s main landing gear just after touchdown. Post accident testing indicated that the brake system, including the brake wear, was within limits, with no anomalies found. No evidence of tire failure was noted. The antiskid system was removed from the airplane for functional tests. The control box and the left and right control valves tested within specifications. The four wheel speed sensors met the electrical resistance specification. For units 1, 2 and 3, the output voltages exceeded the minimum specified voltages for each of the listed frequencies. Unit 4 was frozen and could not be rotated and thus could not be tested. Sensors 1 and 2 exceeded the specified 15% maximum to minimum voltage variation limit. Sensor 3 was within the limit and 4 could not be tested. Based on all the evidence, it is likely that the airplane touched down on the water-contaminated runway beyond the touchdown zone, at a point with about 600 feet less remaining runway than the performance charts indicated that the airplane required for the wet conditions. Since a reverted rubber hydroplaning condition typically follows an encounter with dynamic hydroplaning, the reverted rubber signatures on the No. 2 tire indicate that the airplane encountered dynamic hydroplaning shortly after touchdown, and the left main gear wheel speed sensor anomalies allowed the left tires to progress to reverted rubber hydroplaning. This, along with postaccident testing, indicates that the anti-skid system was not performing optimally and, in concert with the hydroplaning conditions, significantly contributed to the lack of deceleration during the braking attempts.

Following an uneventful flight, the twine engine aircraft approached Andahuaylas Airport and landed normally on runway 03. After touchdown, while decelerating to a speed of about 40 knots, the aircraft started to deviate to the left. The crew counteracted but the aircraft continued to the left, veered off runway, rolled through a grassy and eventually came down a four meters high embankment before coming to rest. While all 19 occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.