Landing (descent or approach)

The airplane was flying a VOR/DME-C approach that was on an oblique course about 40 degrees to the runway 30 centerline; the wind conditions produced an 8-knot tailwind for landing on runway 30. Despite the tailwind, the captain elected to land on the 6,600-foot-long runway instead of circling to land with a headwind. Moderate to heavy rain had been falling for the past hour, and the runway was wet. The crew said that the airplane was flown at the prescribed airspeed (Vref) for its weight with the wing flaps fully extended on final approach, and that they touched down just beyond the touchdown zone. The captain said that he extended the wings' spoilers immediately after touchdown. He tested the brakes and noted normal brake pedal pressure. However, during rollout, he noted a lack of deceleration and applied more brake pressure, with no discernible deceleration. The airplane's optional thrust reversers had been previously rendered non-operational by company maintenance personnel and were therefore not functional. The captain stated that he thought about performing a go-around but believed that insufficient runway remained to ensure a safe takeoff. While trying to stop, he did not activate the emergency brakes (which would have bypassed the anti-skid system) because he thought that there was insufficient time, and he was preoccupied with maintaining control of the airplane. He asked the first officer to apply braking with him, and together the crew continued applying brake pedal pressure; however, when the airplane was about 2,000 feet from the runway's end, it was still traveling about 100 knots. As the airplane rolled off the departure end on runway 30, which was wet, both pilots estimated that the airplane was still travelling between 85 and 90 knots. The airplane traveled 618 feet through a rain-soaked grassy runway safety area before encountering a drainage swale that collapsed the nose gear. As the airplane was traversing the soft, wet field, its wheels partially sank into the ground. While decelerating, soil impacted the landing gear wheels and struts where wiring to the antiskid brake system was located. The crew said that there were no indications on any cockpit annunciator light of a system failure or malfunction; however, after the airplane came to a stop they observed that the annunciator light associated with the antiskid system for the No. 2 wheel was illuminated (indicating a system failure). The other three annunciator lights (one for each wheel) were not illuminated. During the approach, the first officer had completed the landing data card by using a company-developed quick reference card. The quick reference card’s chart, which contained some data consistent with the landing charts in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), did not have correction factors for tailwind conditions, whereas the charts in the AFM do contain corrective factors for tailwind conditions. The landing data prepared by the first officer indicated that 3,240 feet was required to stop the airplane on a dry runway in zero wind conditions, with a wet correction factor increasing stopping distance to 4,538 feet. The Vref speed was listed as 127 knots for their landing weight of 11,000 pounds, and the first officer’s verbal and written statements noted that they crossed the runway threshold at 125 knots. During the investigation, Bombardier Lear calculated the wet stopping distances with an 8-knot tailwind as 5,110 feet. The touchdown zone for runway 30 is 1,000 feet from the approach end. The crew’s estimate of their touchdown location on the runway is about 1,200 feet from the approach end, yielding a remaining runway of 5,400 feet. On-duty controllers in the tower watched the landing and said that the airplane touched down in front of the tower at a taxiway intersection that is 1,881 feet from the approach end, which would leave about 4,520 feet of runway to stop the airplane. The controllers observed water spraying off the airplane’s main landing gear just after touchdown. Post accident testing indicated that the brake system, including the brake wear, was within limits, with no anomalies found. No evidence of tire failure was noted. The antiskid system was removed from the airplane for functional tests. The control box and the left and right control valves tested within specifications. The four wheel speed sensors met the electrical resistance specification. For units 1, 2 and 3, the output voltages exceeded the minimum specified voltages for each of the listed frequencies. Unit 4 was frozen and could not be rotated and thus could not be tested. Sensors 1 and 2 exceeded the specified 15% maximum to minimum voltage variation limit. Sensor 3 was within the limit and 4 could not be tested. Based on all the evidence, it is likely that the airplane touched down on the water-contaminated runway beyond the touchdown zone, at a point with about 600 feet less remaining runway than the performance charts indicated that the airplane required for the wet conditions. Since a reverted rubber hydroplaning condition typically follows an encounter with dynamic hydroplaning, the reverted rubber signatures on the No. 2 tire indicate that the airplane encountered dynamic hydroplaning shortly after touchdown, and the left main gear wheel speed sensor anomalies allowed the left tires to progress to reverted rubber hydroplaning. This, along with postaccident testing, indicates that the anti-skid system was not performing optimally and, in concert with the hydroplaning conditions, significantly contributed to the lack of deceleration during the braking attempts.

Following an uneventful flight, the twine engine aircraft approached Andahuaylas Airport and landed normally on runway 03. After touchdown, while decelerating to a speed of about 40 knots, the aircraft started to deviate to the left. The crew counteracted but the aircraft continued to the left, veered off runway, rolled through a grassy and eventually came down a four meters high embankment before coming to rest. While all 19 occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew started the approach to Zaligei Airport runway 03 in good weather conditions. The aircraft landed hard 200 metres past the runway threshold, causing both propeller blades to struck the ground on a distance of 33 metres. The aircraft bounced and landed a second time 263 metres further then a third time after 15 metres. Upon impact, both engines were torn off and the aircraft rolled for about 400 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. Two passengers were killed while five others were injured. All 37 other occupants escaped unhurt. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

Following an uneventful flight from Lima, the crew continued the approached while the aircraft was unstabilized. Upon touchdown on runway 07, the aircraft landed relatively hard then bounced three times when the crew retracted the landing gear. The aircraft slid on its belly for about 600 metres before coming to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 2 November 2010, a Boeing Company B737-400 aircraft, registered PK-LIQ, was being operated by Lion Mentari Airlines on a passenger schedule flight with flight number JT 712. This flight was the first flight for the crew and was scheduled for departure at 09.30 LT (02.30 UTC). On board the flight was 175 person included 2 pilots and 4 flight attendants and 169 passengers consisted 2 infants and one engineer. The pilots stated that the aircraft had history problem on the difficulty of selection the thrust reversers and automatic of the speed brake deployment. This problem was repetitive since the past three months. The aircraft pushed back at 0950 LT (0250 UTC). During taxi out, the yaw damper light illuminated for two times. The pilot referred to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) which guided the pilot to turn off the yaw dumper switch then back to turn on. Considered to these problems, the pilot asked the engineer to come to cockpit and asked to witness the problem. The aircraft departed Soekarno Hatta International Airport, Jakarta at 1012 LT (0312 UTC) with destination of Supadio Airport, Pontianak. The Pilot in Command acted as pilot flying (PF) and the Second in Command acted as pilot monitoring (PM). The flight to Pontianak until commenced for descent was uneventful. Prior to descend, the PF performed approach crew briefing with additional briefing included review of the past experiences on the repetitive problems of thrust reversers which sometimes hard to operate and the speed brake failed to auto deploy. Considering these problems, the PF asked to the PM to check and to remind him to the auto deployment of the speed brake after the aircraft touch down. During descend, the pilot was instructed by Pontianak Approach controller to conduct Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach for runway 15 and was informed that the weather was slight rain. On the initial approach, the auto pilot engaged, flaps 5° and aircraft speed 180 knots. After the aircraft captured the localizer at 1300 feet, the PF asked to the PM to select the landing gear down, flaps 15° and the speed decreased to 160 knots. The PF aimed to set the flaps landing configuration when the glide slope captured. When the glide slope captured, the auto pilot did not automatically follow the glide path and the aircraft altitude maintained at 1300 feet, resulted in the aircraft slightly above the normal glide path. The PF realized the condition then disengaged the auto pilot and the auto throttle simultaneously, and fly manually to correct the glide path by pushing the aircraft pitch down. While trying to regain the correct the glide path, the PF commanded for flaps 40° and to complete the landing checklist. The flap lever has been selected to 40°, but the indicator indicated at 30°. Realized to the flaps indication, the PF asked the landing speed for flaps 30° configuration in case the flaps could not move further to 40°. When aircraft altitude was 600 feet and the pilots completing the landing checklist, the PM reselected the flap from 30° to 40° and was successful. The pilots realized that the aircraft touched down was beyond the touchdown zone and during the landing roll the PF tried to select the thrust reverser but the levers were hard to select and followed by the speed brake failed to automatic-deploy. The pilots did not feel the deceleration, and then the PF applied maximum manual braking and selected the speed brake handle manually. Afterward, the thrust reversers successfully operated and a loud sound was heard prior to the aircraft stop. The Supadio tower controller on duty noticed that the aircraft was about to overrun the runway and immediately pressed the crash bell. The aircraft stopped at approximately 70 meters from the runway or 10 meters from the end of stop-way. The PIC then commanded to the flight attendants to evacuate the passengers through the exits. No one injured in this accident.

At the day of the accident, the pilot, accompanied by his wife, planned to fly from Karlsruhe/Baden-Baden Airport to the Cottbus-Drewitz Special Airfield under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) with a Piper PA 46-350P. Prior to the flight he refueled 400 liters and submitted a flight plan. According to the radar recording of the responsible air traffic control center, the airplane started at 0923 hrs1 and flew the planned route at Flight Level (FL) 190 to Cottbus-Drewitz, following the flight plan. The airplane started to descend at approx. 1044 hrs. The Initial Approach Fix (IAF) Cottbus-Drewitz NDB (DRW) was overflown in an altitude of approx. 3,900 ft AMSL with a Ground Speed (GS) of approx. 170 kt, at approx. 1104 hrs, and the descent was continued for the approach NDB-RWY-25. After flying over the intermediate approach fix in approx. 2,800 ft AMSL with a GS of approx. 190 kt, the airplane flew a turn to the left in order to intercept the final approach. The radar recording ended at 1107:34 hrs. At that time the airplane was turning into the final approach in an altitude of 2,400 ft AMSL with a GS of approx. 200 kt. According to radar recordings of the German Federal Armed Forces, the airplane was captured several more times within the turn radius: at 1107:50 hrs in an altitude of 1,200 ft AMSL, at 1108:01 hrs in an altitude of 2,700 ft AMSL, and finally in 1,700 ft AMSL and 1,000 ft AMSL. The recording ended at 1108:21 hrs in an altitude of 600 ft AMSL. The airplane crashed into a field south of the Polish city of Gubin and caught fire. Both occupants lost their lives.

The pilot was landing at a private strip at Wentworth. The runway was oriented 110/290° and had several level changes along its length which required all landings to be made in the 110° direction and all takeoffs in the 290° direction. Touchdown was required to take place on a level portion before the ground rose relatively steeply and levelled out again. The final part of the runway sloped gently down towards the end, which was bordered by a dry stone wall. The surface, from police photographs taken soon after the accident, showed it to be closely mown grass and firm, despite the indications of recent rain. The wind at the time was 220°/10 kt and the pilot reported that the approach was made directly into the setting sun, making it difficult to monitor the airspeed indicator. Touchdown was achieved on the first level portion of the runway and the brakes were applied very soon afterwards; however the pilot stated that there was no discernible braking action, despite applying firmer pressure on the brake pedals. Seeing that the stone wall at the end of the runway was approaching, he steered the aircraft to the right and towards a hedge, however he was unable to prevent the left wing striking the walland causing severe damage outboard of the engine. The pilot was uninjured and evacuated the aircraft normally. The police photographs indicate that the mainwheels were skidding on the wet grass almost throughout the landing roll of about 630 metres. Whilst the pilot acknowledged that his airspeed might have been somewhat high, he did not feel at the time of touchdown that his ground speed was unusual and he attributes the lack of braking action to the slippery runway surface.

The aircraft was on an instrument flight rules flight from the Edmonton City Centre Airport to Kirby Lake, Alberta. At approximately 1114 Mountain Daylight Time, during the approach to Runway 08 at the Kirby Lake Airport, the aircraft struck the ground, 174 feet short of the threshold. The aircraft bounced and came to rest off the edge of the runway. There were 2 flight crew members and 8 passengers on board. The captain sustained fatal injuries. Four occupants, including the co-pilot, sustained serious injuries. The 5 remaining passengers received minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. A small, post-impact, electrical fire in the cockpit was extinguished by survivors and first responders. The emergency locator transmitter was activated on impact. All passengers were BP employees.

The single engine aircraft was engaged in a local skydiving mission in Santa Isabel, carrying nine skydivers and one pilot. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to a height of about 150 metres, the engine lost power. The pilot decided to return immediately. Upon landing, the aircraft collided with bushes and came to rest, bursting into flames. All 10 occupants escaped unhurt while the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

The aircraft departed Lusaka on a flight to Mukinge, carrying staff and various goods on behalf of the Zambian Presidency. After touchdown, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest against trees. All occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The crew was flying to Mukinge, preparing the next official visit of the President of the Republic of Zambia Rupiah Banda.