Delivery

The single engine airplane departed Buochs Airport on December 12 on a delivery flight to its new owner, Smart Cakrawala Aviation based in Indonesia. The crew made a stop in Maribor and Podgorica then continued to Heraklion. On December 15, shortly after takeoff from Heraklion-Nikos Kazantzakis Airport runway 09, en route to Hurghada, the airplane climbed to an altitude of 1,400 feet when the pilot reported problems and declared an emergency. After completing a right turn to return to the airport, the airplane lost height and speed then stalled and crashed into the sea off Karteros. The pilot aged 26 was slightly injured while the passenger, an Indonesian citizen aged 68, died shortly later. The airplane floated for a while then sank. Named 'Franz', the airplane was the last PC-6 built by the Swiss manufacturer.

On November 6, 2020, about 1600 Pacific standard time, a Pilatus PC-12, N400PW, was substantially damaged when it was ditched in the Pacific Ocean about 1000 miles east of Hilo, Hawaii. The two pilots sustained no injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 ferry flight. According to the pilot-in-command (PIC), who was also the ferry company owner, he and another pilot were ferrying a new airplane from California to Australia. The first transoceanic leg was planned for 10 hours from Santa Maria Airport (KSMX), Santa Maria, California to Hilo Airport (PHTO), Hilo, Hawaii. The manufacturer had an auxiliary ferry fuel line and check valve installed in the left wing before delivery. About 1 month before the trip, the pilot hired a ferry company to install an internal temporary ferry fuel system for the trip. The crew attempted the first transoceanic flight on November 2, but the ferry fuel system did not transfer properly, so the crew diverted to Merced Airport (KMCE), Merced, California. The system was modified with the addition of two 30 psi fuel transfer pumps that could overcome the ferry system check valve. The final system consisted of 2 aluminum tanks, 2 transfer pumps, transfer and tank valves, and associated fuel lines and fittings. The ferry fuel supply line was connected to the factory installed ferry fuel line fitting at the left wing bulkhead, which then fed directly to the main fuel line through a check valve and directly to the turbine engine. The installed system was ground and flight checked before the trip. According to Federal Aviation Administration automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) data, the airplane departed KSMX about 1000. The pilots each stated that the ferry fuel system worked as designed during the flight and they utilized the operating procedures that were supplied by the installer. About 5 hours after takeoff, approaching ETNIC intersection, the PIC climbed the airplane to flight level 280. At that time, the rear ferry fuel tank was almost empty, and the forward tank was about 1/2 full. The crew was concerned about introducing air into the engine as they emptied the rear ferry tank, so the PIC placed the ignition switch to ON. According to the copilot (CP), she went to the cabin to monitor the transparent fuel line from the transfer pumps to ensure positive fuel flow while she transferred the last of the available rear tank fuel to the main fuel line. When she determined that all of the usable fuel was transferred, and fuel still remained in the pressurized fuel line, she turned the transfer pumps to off and before she could access the transfer and tank valves, the engine surged and flamed out. The PIC stated that the crew alerting system (CAS) fuel low pressure light illuminated about 5 to 15 seconds after the transfer pumps were turned off, and then the engine lost power and the propeller auto feathered. The PIC immediately placed the fuel boost pumps from AUTO to ON. The CP went back to her crew seat and they commenced the pilot operating handbook’s emergency checklist procedures for emergency descent and then loss of engine power in flight. According to both crew members, they attempted an engine air start. The propeller unfeathered and the engine started; however, it did not reach flight idle and movement of the power control lever did not affect the engine. The crew secured the engine and attempted another air start. The engine did not restart and grinding sounds and a loud bang were heard. The propeller never unfeathered and multiple CAS warning lights illuminated, including the EPECS FAIL light (Engine and Propeller Electronic Control System). The crew performed the procedures for a restart with EPECS FAIL light and multiple other starts that were unsuccessful. There were no flames nor smoke from either exhaust pipe during the air start attempts. About 8,000 ft mean sea level, the crew committed to ditching in the ocean. About 1600, after preparing the survival gear, donning life vests, and making mayday calls on VHF 121.5, the PIC performed a full flaps gear up landing at an angle to the sea swells and into the wind. He estimated that the swells were 5 to 10 ft high with crests 20 feet apart. During the landing, the pilot held back elevator pressure for as long as possible and the airplane landed upright. The crew evacuated through the right over wing exit and boarded the 6 man covered life raft. A photograph of the airplane revealed that the bottom of the rudder was substantially damaged. The airplane remained afloat after landing. The crew utilized a satellite phone to communicate with Oakland Center. The USCG coordinated a rescue mission. About 4 hours later, a C-130 arrived on scene and coordinated with a nearby oil tanker, the M/V Ariel, for rescue of the crew. According to the pilots, during the night, many rescue attempts were made by the M/V Ariel; however, the ship was too fast for them to grab lines and the seas were too rough. After a night of high seas, the M/V Ariel attempted rescue again; however, they were unsuccessful. That afternoon, a container ship in the area, the M/V Horizon Reliance, successfully maneuvered slowly to the raft, then the ship’s crew shot rope cannons that propelled lines to the raft, and they were able to assist the survivors onboard. The pilots had been in the raft for about 22 hours. The airplane was a new 2020 production PC-12 47E with a newly designed Pratt and Whitney PT6E-67XP engine which featured an Engine and Propeller Electronic Control System. The airplane is presumed to be lost at sea. The investigation is ongoing.

On 03.07.2015 at 15:05, Kodiak-100 N642RM airplane, which had left Riga AP (Latvia), performed a landing at Pskov AD (RF). The airplane was performing a ferry flight from USA (where it was bought) to Krutitsy landing site, which is 80 km to the Southeast from Ryazan (RF). After the landing, flight crewmembers and passengers passed a border and customs control successfully. The aircraft was kept at Pskov AD from July 3 till July 6 under custody of AASS of Pskovavia (JSC). On 06.07.2015 at 08:00, the flight crew – PIC and FO – arrived to Pskov AD with a view to the ferry flight resumption. PIC was planning to fly the aircraft from Pskov AD to Krutitsy landing site on 06.07.2015. In violation of FAP MA CA and FAP-128 requirements, PIC and FO didn't pass a preflight medical check in spite of the fact that Pskovavia medical service was available at the aerodrome. Before the takeoff, two flight crewmembers were in the cockpit: PIC occupying a left seat, and FO occupying a right seat. Both were secured with safety belts. At 13:15:30, PIC performed a takeoff from Pskov AD with MH=190°. According to the flight crew explanatory reports, during the climbing with left turn, they had the engine troubles. Therefore, the flight crew put the airplane into gliding. They failed to re-start the engine in flight. Before the emergency landing, they cut the fuel off and de-energized the aircraft. The landing was performed at 13:18 to a marshy area with some bushes and individual trees around. The aircraft received significant damage during the landing. There was no fire: neither in flight nor on the ground. At 13:21:21, FO reported the forced landing to ATC controller, using the aircraft radio station. Pskov First-Aid Station suggested the help, but the flight crewmembers refused because they did not have any injuries.

The crew was performing a delivery flight from Stauning (Denmark) to Klaipėda with an intermediate stop in Kattleberg, Sweden. Recently acquired by the company for agricultural purposes, the single engine aircraft departed Kattleberg Airfield at 1312LT with an ETA in Klaipėda at 1720LT. En route, the crew informed ATC about their position at 1508LT. Less than half an hour later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in unknown circumstances in the Baltic Sea, some 111 km off Klaipėda. The crew of a Lithuanian Marine vessel located the wreckage three days later at a depth of 124 meters. A dead body was found on May 21. The second pilot was not found.

The aircraft was on a ferry flight from Seattle in the USA to Thailand via Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Scotland and across Europe. However the flight crew abandoned the aircraft in Greenland late in December 2013 after experiencing low oil pressure indications on both engines. This may have been due to the use of an incorrect grade of oil for cold weather operations. The aircraft remained in Greenland until 28 February 2014, when a replacement ferry pilot was engaged. Although the engine oil was not changed prior to departing Greenland, the flight continued uneventfully to Wick, in Scotland. Following some maintenance activity on the right engine, the aircraft departed for Le Touquet in France. However, approximately 25 minutes after takeoff, the engines successively lost power and the pilot carried out a forced landing in a ploughed field. Examination of the engines revealed that one piston in each engine had suffered severe heat damage, consistent with combustion gases being forced past the piston and into the crankcase.

On April 3, 2012, about 0920 atlantic standard time (ast), a Hawker Beechcraft C90GTx, N8116L, operated by Lider Taxi Aereo, was substantially damaged after ditching in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, 17 miles north of Aruba, following a dual loss of engine power during cruise. The flight departed Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and was destined for Hato International Airport (TNCC), Willemstad, Curacao. The airline transport pilot and the pilot rated passenger were uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan was filed for the delivery flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The Amsterdam arrived at the ditching location at 1120. The airplane was partially submerged. The crew of the Amsterdam attempted to prevent the airplane from sinking by placing a cable around it and hoisting it onboard. However during the attempted recovery, the fuselage broke in half and the airplane sank.

While delivering the single-engine, turbine-powered airplane to Brazil during a multiple leg trip, the pilot decided to fly direct from his departure airport in Puerto Rico to his destination airport in Grenada instead of following the island chain and staying within power-off gliding distance of the shore. During the cruise portion of the flight, a total loss of engine power occurred over open water in visual meteorological conditions at 27,000 feet, about 119 miles west of a suitable landing area. During the loss of power, the engine torque indication dropped from the cruise power setting to 0 foot-pounds (ft-lbs) of torque, the engine then began to vibrate, and smoke began emanating from the engine. The pilot ditched the airplane, it sank, and it was not recovered. The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were rescued by a French Navy helicopter. The pilot said that he had decided to take a direct route instead of staying closer to the island chain between the two airports because he had ferried 3 airplanes down to Brazil in the last year and that it was a judgment call and a calculated risk because the engine was reliable. At the airplane’s planned operating altitude of 27,000 feet, the airplane could have glided about 54 miles; if the route had been planned to take advantage of this glide distance, the pilot could have remained off shore island chain and taken a shorter, although not direct, route. Review of fueling documentation, the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and statements made by the pilot and pilot-rated passenger also revealed that on the accident flight, good operating practices were disregarded. For instance, during fueling, the airplane which was not equipped with fuel heaters, had been topped off with fuel, but no fuel icing additive had been added, even though the pilot was planning to operate the airplane at 27,000 feet. The airplane was also operated in excess of the manufacturer's published weight limitations, and no power setting or performance information was available for climb and cruise operations in excess of these limitations. Furthermore, according to the pilot, before the loss of engine power, the torque was about 937 ft-lbs. According to the pilot-rated passenger, before the failure, the torque gauge was indicating about 980 ft-lbs. Review of the maximum cruise performance chart in the POH and Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) revealed that both of the stated torque settings exceeded the maximum torque setting listed on the chart. Operating the engine beyond the recommended power settings specified in the POH/AFM for a prolonged period will result in accelerated deterioration due to hot section component distress and will affect engine reliability and durability.

The Aero Commander 500S had recently been purchased. The new owner of the aircraft retained the services of 2 experienced pilots to deliver the aircraft from Portland, Oregon, United States, to Bern, Switzerland. After having flown several positioning legs, the aircraft arrived at Rankin Inlet for refuelling. The aircraft was refuelled from two 45-gallon drums and was to continue on to Iqaluit, Nunavut. The pilot-in-command occupied the right seat and the pilot flying the aircraft occupied the left seat. The aircraft was at its maximum takeoff weight of 7000 pounds. Prior to take off, the crew conducted a run-up and all indications seemed normal. During the takeoff roll, the engines did not produce full power and the crew elected to reject the takeoff. After returning to the ramp, a second run-up was completed and once again all indications seemed normal. Shortly after second rotation, cylinder head temperatures increased and both Lycoming TIO-540-E1B5 engines began to lose power. The pilots attempted to return to the airport, but were unable to maintain altitude. The landing gear was extended and a forced landing was made on a flat section of land, approximately 1500 feet to the southwest of the runway 13 threshold. There were no injuries and the aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Shortly after takeoff from Bauru Airport, the twin engine aircraft encountered difficulties to maintain a positive rate of climb. It then descended until it impacted ground about 5 km from the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was supposed to deliver the aircraft at Sorocaba Airport.

The pilot was approaching his home airport under dark night conditions. He reported that he was five miles from the airport and adjusted the airport lighting several times. He made no further radio calls, though his normal practice was to report his position several times as he proceeded in the landing pattern. The airplane approached the airport from the southeast in a descent, continued past the airport, and adjusted its course slightly to the left. One witness reported observing the airplane enter a left turn, then pitch down, and descend at a steep angle. The airplane impacted terrain in a steep left bank and cart wheeled. An examination of the airframe, airplane systems, and engine revealed no pre-impact anomalies. Flight control continuity was confirmed. The pilot had flown eight hours and 30 minutes on the day of the accident, crossing two time zones, and had been awake for no less than 17 hours when the accident occurred. The accident occurred at a time of day after midnight in the pilot's departure time zone. Post-accident toxicology testing revealed doxylamine and amphetamine in the pilot's tissues. The pilot had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) almost five years prior to the accident and had taken prescription amphetamines for the disorder since that diagnosis. The FAA does not medically certify pilots who require medication for the control of ADHD. At the time of the accident, the pilot's blood level of amphetamines may have been falling, and he may have been increasingly fatigued and distracted. The use of doxylamine (an over-the-counter antihistamine, often used as a sleep aid) could suggest that the pilot was having difficulty sleeping.