Country
code

Aberdeenshire

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Stonehaven

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2014 at 1447 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N66886
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wick – Le Touquet
MSN:
31-7405188
YOM:
1974
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3188
Captain / Total hours on type:
19.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on a ferry flight from Seattle in the USA to Thailand via Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Scotland and across Europe. However the flight crew abandoned the aircraft in Greenland late in December 2013 after experiencing low oil pressure indications on both engines. This may have been due to the use of an incorrect grade of oil for cold weather operations. The aircraft remained in Greenland until 28 February 2014, when a replacement ferry pilot was engaged. Although the engine oil was not changed prior to departing Greenland, the flight continued uneventfully to Wick, in Scotland. Following some maintenance activity on the right engine, the aircraft departed for Le Touquet in France. However, approximately 25 minutes after takeoff, the engines successively lost power and the pilot carried out a forced landing in a ploughed field. Examination of the engines revealed that one piston in each engine had suffered severe heat damage, consistent with combustion gases being forced past the piston and into the crankcase.
Probable cause:
The aircraft began experiencing engine problems, leading to the forced landing, approximately 25 minutes after departing Wick, in Scotland. However, it is possible that these problems may have originated prior to the aircraft arriving in the UK. The low oil pressures in both engines, reported by the crew on the flight leg to Greenland, may have been due to the wrong grade of oil, W100, being used in what would have been very low temperatures experienced in December in Canada and Greenland. Despite supplies of multigrade oil being sent to Greenland, the engine oil was not changed. This was due to the fact that the pilot noted normal engine indications combined with the lack of maintenance facilities. Thus the aircraft continued its journey with the same oil in the engines with which it left Seattle; this was confirmed by the subsequent analysis of the oil. No further oil pressure problems were observed, although it is likely the aircraft would have been operating in warmer temperatures at the end of February in comparison with those in December. The engine manufacturer suggested that engine damage could have occurred as a result of operating the engines at low temperatures with the wrong grade of oil. Whilst this may have been the case, it is surprising that any damage did not progress to the point where it became readily apparent during the subsequent flights, via Iceland, to Wick. In fact the pilot did report rough running of the right-hand engine, but the investigation revealed a problem only with the No 4 cylinder compression, which led to replacement of this cylinder. Since the compressions in all the cylinders were presumably assessed during the diagnosis, it must be concluded that any damage in the No 3 cylinder of the right engine was not, at that stage, significant. Ultimately, it was not possible to establish why pistons in both engines had suffered virtually identical types of damage, although it is likely to have been a ‘common mode’ failure, which could include wrong fuel, incorrect mixture settings (running too lean) and existing damage arising from the use of incorrect oil in cold temperatures. The oil analysis excluded the possibility of the aircraft having been mis-fuelled with Jet A-1 at Wick. No conclusion can be drawn regarding the possibility of one of the pilots having leaned the mixtures to an excessive degree, although this would require that either high cylinder head temperature indications were ignored, or that the temperature gauges (or sensors) on both engines were defective. The engines would have begun to fail when the combustion gases started to ‘blow by’ the pistons, causing progressive damage to the piston crowns, skirts and rings. This would have also caused pressurisation of the crankcases, which in turn would have tended to blow oil out of the crankcase breathers. In the case of the left engine, the pressurisation was such that the dipstick was blown out of its tube, resulting in more oil being lost overboard. This may have accounted for the more severe damage to the left engine, having lost more oil than the right. The detached No 1 cylinder base jet oil nozzle in the left engine may have contributed to a slight reduction in the oil pressure, but is otherwise considered to have played no part in the engine failure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III in Aberdeen

Date & Time: Dec 24, 2002 at 0745 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OY-BPH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Aberdeen - Aalborg
MSN:
AC-580B
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
NFA924
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4600
Captain / Total hours on type:
2800.00
Circumstances:
At approximately 0630 hrs on 24 December 2002, the pilots arrived by car at Aberdeen Airport. With no requirement for their aircraft to transport mail on this occasion, it was decided to fly directly to their home airport in Denmark. The aircraft had been refuelled the previous day and the total fuel on board of 2,200 lb was sufficient for the flight; with no cargo on board, take-off weight was calculated as 12,000 lb (maximum take-off weight: 16,000 lb). The commander carried out an external inspection on OY-BPH while the co-pilot, who was the designated handling pilot for the flight to Denmark, submitted a flight plan. The weather at 0720 hrs was reported as follows: Surface wind 150°M/ 12 kt; visibility 2,500 metres in mist; cloud scattered 100 feet agl, overcast at 200 feet agl; air temperature +9°C; QNH 994 hPa. The runway was reported as wet and Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) had been in force at Aberdeen since 0633 hrs. OY-BPH, callsign 'Birdie Nine Two Four', was parked on Taxiway Bravo and the crew called for, and were given, start clearance at 0736 hrs by 'Ground Movement Control' on frequency 121.7 MHz. Then, following their after-start checks, the crew were cleared to taxi to 'Whiskey Five' for Runway 16 at 0740 hrs. During taxi, the crew were passed and correctly acknowledged the following clearance: "LEAVE CONTROLLED AIRSPACE CLIMBING FLIGHT LEVEL ONE FIVE FIVE SQUAWK SIX TWO FOUR ZERO". Then, at 0742 hrs as the aircraft approached 'Whiskey Five', the crew were transferred to 'Aberdeen Tower' on frequency 118.1 MHz. On the 'Tower' frequency, they were given line-up clearance for Runway 16. At 0743 hrs, the controller transmitted: "BIRDIE NINE TWO FOUR WITH A LEFT TURN DIRECT KARLI CLEAR TAKE OFF ONE SIX SURFACE WIND ONE SIX ZERO ONE TWO KNOTS". The crew correctly acknowledged this clearance. The controller watched the initial movement of the aircraft along the runway before transferring her attention to another aircraft, which was lining up. Shortly after, at 0746 hrs, she transmitted: "OY-BPH REPORT TURNING LEFT" but received no reply. About this time, a telephone message was received in the 'Tower' from a witness in front of the Terminal Building to the effect that an aircraft appeared to have crashed just south of the airfield. This witness had heard a "change in pitch" from the aircraft but had seen no flames prior to it disappearing from his sight: ATC personnel immediately activated their emergency procedures. For the reduced power take-off roll, with the flaps at ¼, the power was set by the commander. The crew considered that the performance of the aircraft was normal, with no unusual instrument indications. The calculated V1 and VR speeds (co-incident at 100 kt) were achieved and called by the commander and, at VR, the co-pilot rotated the aircraft to a pitch attitude of about 12° to 15° nose-up. As the aircraft left the ground, the co-pilot detected the aircraft 'yawing' to the right; almost immediately, he was also aware of a distinct smell of smoke. He called to the commander that he had an engine failure, called for maximum power and tried to maintain control by corrective aileron and rudder inputs. The commander felt the aircraft roll about 15° to the right and realised that there was a problem with the right (No 2) engine. He reached for both power levers and moved them forward. There were no audio or visual warnings associated with the apparent problem. The commander looked at the EGT gauges with the power levers fully forward and noted that the No 2 engine indicated about 600°C EGT, whereas the left (No 1) engine indicated greater than 650°C EGT (the normal maximum) and that its fuel 'Bypass' light was on. He retarded the No 1 power lever until the 'Bypass' light extinguished and noted the resultant EGT at about 630°C. He did not recall any other abnormal indications on the engine instruments but, later in the investigation, the commander recalled hearing a sound "like a compressor stall from the right engine". About this time, the co-pilot heard the automatic "Bank Angle" voice activate. As the aircraft continued to turn to the right, the co-pilot called that he "couldn't control the aircraft". The commander reached for and pulled No 2 engine 'Stop and Feather Control' but, almost immediately, OY-BPH struck the ground initially with the right wing. The aircraft slid along the surface of a field, through a fence and onto a road, before coming to rest. As it did so, the co-pilot was aware that the aircraft had struck a car, which was now at rest outside the right forward side of the cockpit. The co-pilot saw that the whole of the right wing was on fire and called this to the commander before evacuating out of the left door of the aircraft. As the copilot left, the commander pulled No 1 engine 'Stop and Feather Control' and activated both engine fire extinguishers before leaving the aircraft. Outside OY-BPH, the co-pilot went to the car to check if anyone was still inside; as he did so, he saw someone running away. With the intense fire and the car apparently empty, both pilots moved well away from the aircraft. At 0748 hrs, the co-pilot used his mobile phone to advise ATC of the accident and to request assistance. The local emergency services had been alerted at 0745 hrs by a member of the public, who reported a road accident; by 0753 hrs, the local fire service was on the scene. By 0754 hrs, the first AFS vehicle was on the scene and three further AFS vehicles arrived one minute later. A fifth vehicle arrived at 0800 hrs. The fire was quickly extinguished and the Fire Officer confirmed that all the aircraft and vehicle occupants had been located and that there had been no serious injuries. Following runway and taxiway inspections, the airport was re-opened at 0954 hrs.
Probable cause:
Although the investigation was hampered by the lack of FDR data, which might have provided information on engine handling and behaviour, the available evidence from the crew and the initial examination of the aircraft at the accident site, pointed to a major loss of power in the right engine. As a result of the discovery of dead birds close to the point of lift-off on the runway, and a section of braided wire found near the start of the take-off roll, consideration was given as to whether the these had been factors in the accident. The braided wire was not identified as having originated from OY-BPH. There was conclusive evidence that the left engine, which had continued to run, had ingested parts of birds, but no such evidence was found with the right engine. Nevertheless, the crew were adamant that there was a power loss from the right engine and were not conscious of any power reduction from the left engine. The technical examination of the left engine and its propeller assembly revealed evidence of damage consistent with this unit delivering a high level of power at impact. The examination of the right engine and propeller revealed all damage to be consistent with a low, or no, power condition at impact, consistent with either a genuine loss of power or as a consequence of the commander pulling the 'Stop and Feather' control immediately before impact. However, an exhaustive examination of the right engine revealed no evidence of anything that could have caused a failure. Therefore, the items found on the runway were not considered to have been causal or contributory factors in the accident. The crew's recollection of the event included a low EGT indication, at 600°C. This suggested that either the engine might have flamed out, should they have only momentarily looked at the indication as the engine was cooling down, or that the engine was operating at reduced power for an undetermined reason. Flame out could have occurred due to a number of reasons, including, for example, water contamination of the fuel. However, analysis of the bulk supply samples proved negative and, moreover, there were no reports of contaminated fuel from other operators at Aberdeen Airport. Ingestion of ice or water could also have resulted in a flame-out, although this is considered unlikely due to the conditions not being conducive to the formation of engine icing, the lack of significant standing water on the runway, and the absence of heavy precipitation. However, it could not be completely discounted and, if flame-out had occurred, the non-incorporation of the FAA mandated auto-relight system would have reduced the possibility of an immediate relight. Approximately six months before the accident, the left engine had failed during a landing roll-out whilst the aircraft was being operated in Spain. This failure was never satisfactorily explained although, at one stage, the fuel cut-off valve came under suspicion. The valves were interchanged, according to the records, so that the unit that had been fitted to the left engine was installed on the right engine, at the time of the accident. Whilst a stray electrical signal causing the valve to close would certainly result in the engine flaming out, rumours that such events had occurred were not substantiated by the engine manufacturer. In summary, the left engine experienced a bird strike, but with no apparent power loss, and the extensive technical examination could not identify any reason for a loss of power on the right engine. Although an engine failure during takeoff after V1 is a serious emergency, the aircraft was at a relatively light weight and, even with an such a failure, the crew should have been able to fly OYBPH safely away. However, if other factors had been involved, the margins for safe flight would have become more critical. These other factors could have included incorrect operation of the NTS system and/or a failure of the feathering system on the right engine, a concurrent power loss from the left engine, or the crew not handling the emergency effectively. There is no doubt that the left engine had been producing power at impact, but a definite conclusion could not be made as to the blade pitch angles of the right propeller. From the evidence of the commander and the propeller examination by the manufacturer, it is probable that the right propeller was close to the feather position at ground impact. The functionality of the NTS and feathering system could not be determined but, as noted earlier, the pre-flight NTS check actually only ensured that oil pressure was available for this system, and did not check the operation of the whole system. With the evidence that only the left engine had ingested birds, there was a possibility that the left engine was not producing maximum power, although the crew considered it was operating normally. The commander could remember that he compared the engine EGT indications, once he had pushed both power levers forward, and recalled that the left EGT was indicating greater than 650°C with the 'Bypass' light on. He then retarded the left power lever until the 'Bypass' light went out, following which the EGT indicated about 630°C. This retardation of the power lever was not required, as the function of the 'Bypass' system is to reduce the fuel flow in order to keep the engine parameters within limits. This reported retardation could, however, have resulted in a lower engine power than was possible within the available limits, possibly with an associated reduction in EGT. While it remains a possibility that the left engine may have experienced a transient power reduction as a result of the bird ingestion, it is likely that the commander's action in retarding the left power lever resulted in a more significant reduction of power. To maintain straight flight, following an engine failure, it is vital to apply sufficient corrective rudder input to maintain the wings essentially level and minimise the drag due to sideslip. In the case of OYBPH, there was a constant turn to the right before ground impact. The commander's recollection was that left rudder had been applied by the co-pilot, but not to full deflection. The amount of rudder deflection required depends mainly on the airspeed and the difference in engine power but, with the wings not level, more deflection was obviously required, and was available. Greater use of rudder would have reduced the overall drag of the aircraft, with consequent improvement in the aircraft's performance. Furthermore, following an engine failure, the second segment climb requirement is to climb from 35 feet to 400 feet at V2 with the landing gear selected to up. The commander did not raise the gear because he did not observe a positive rate of climb. However, evidence from the FDR was that a maximum airspeed of 128 kt was achieved and, as this was some 19 kt higher than the V2 speed, it indicated that the aircraft had a capability to climb which was not being used. These last three factors may have combined to reduce the climb capability of the aircraft to zero and, in that situation, the decision to not raise the gear was correct. However, all these factors were influenced by inappropriate crew actions. Although both pilots had flown together before, the lack of adherence to JAR-OPS conversion requirements may have been partly responsible for their actions during the emergency.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A Trislander III-1 in Aberdeen

Date & Time: May 15, 1979
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BCYC
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1011
YOM:
1975
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon touchdown, the tree engine aircraft went out of control and came to halt. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.

Crash of a North American B-25 Mitchell in Auchenblae: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jul 21, 1948
Operator:
Registration:
A-21
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a maritime patrol flight over the North Sea. While flying over Scotland, the crew encountered poor visibility when the twin engine aircraft hit the slope of a mountain near Auchenblae. All six crew members were killed.

Crash of a Vickers 491 Viking C.1A in Aberdeen

Date & Time: Sep 2, 1947
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VL245
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
144
YOM:
1946
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, an engine failed. The captain decided to make an emergency landing and the aircraft crash landed in a field located 3 km from the airport. All 11 occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Engine failure.

Crash of an Airspeed AS.10 Oxford I in Stob ant’Sluichd: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jan 10, 1945 at 1120 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PH404
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Tain – Hornchurch
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
While cruising in poor weather conditions at a height of 3,600 feet, the twin engine aircraft hit the slope of Stob ant’Sluichd located some 20 km southeast of Aviemore, Scotland. SAR operations were suspended after few days as no trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found. The wreckage was eventually found by walkers on August 19, 1945, on the top of the mountain, some 10 feet below the summit. All five crew members were killed.
Crew (311th Squadron):
W/O Rudolf Jelen, pilot,
F/O Jan Vella, copilot,
S/L Karel Kvapil, pilot,
F/O Leo Linhart, pilot,
P/O Valter Kauders, wireless operator.

Crash of a Handley Page H.P.54 Harrow I in Auchenblae: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 23, 1943
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
K6947
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Region:
Crew on board:
19
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
En route, the crew encountered low visibility due to misty weather. The aircraft was too low and his the slope of a hill before coming to rest. A crew member (A. F. R. Rooks) was killed while 18 other occupants were slightly injured.

Crash of a De Havilland DH.89 Dragon Rapide in Rosehearty

Date & Time: Dec 13, 1942
Operator:
Registration:
W6455
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Aberdeen - Aberdeen
MSN:
6340
YOM:
1936
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While flying in the vicinity of the RAF Fraserburgh (on a training mission from Aberdeen-Dyce Airport), the crew encountered an engine failure. The pilot in command decided to attempt an emergency landing in a field located in Rosehearty. While all four occupants were unhurt, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Engine failure.

Crash of an Airspeed AS.10 Oxford I near Strachan: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 3, 1942
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N6438
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Dalcross - Dalcross
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a navigation exercise from the RAF Dalcross. En route, the twin engine aircraft entered a cloudy area and while at an altitude of 1,725 feet, hit a hill located south of Strachan. A crew member was killed while the second occupant was rescued.
Crew (2nd FIS):
P/O John Keddie, pilot, †
P/O White, navigator.

Crash of a Handley Page H.P.57 Halifax I off Aberdeen

Date & Time: Jan 30, 1942 at 1005 LT
Operator:
Registration:
L9581
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lossiemouth - Lossiemouth
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The airplane departed RAF Lossiemouth at 0217LT to attack the Tirpitz. While returning to base, it suffered a loss of power on the port inner engine and was ditched some 4 miles off Aberdeen. The crew had been in difficulty for several hours due to severe icing and w/t failure. All crew members were rescued.
Crew:
Sgt J. W. R. Harwood,
Sgt Patey,
Sgt Young,
Sgt Smardon,
Sgt Scott,
Sgt Petch,
Sgt Norbert David Roche, wireless operator.
Probable cause:
Emergency landing following loss of engine power.