United States of America

The two pilots were conducting a business flight with six passengers when the accident occurred. During the night arrival the captain flew a visual approach with excessive airspeed
and the airplane crossed the runway threshold more than 50 knots above approach speed (Vref). The before-landing checklist was not completed, and the flaps were at an incorrect 20° position instead of 40°. The airplane touched down near the midfield point of the 6,022 ft non grooved runway, which was wet due to earlier precipitation. The captain initially applied intermittent braking, then applied continuous braking starting about 2,069 ft from the end of the runway. The captain did not deploy the thrust reversers. The airplane exited the runway above 100 knots ground speed, then continued into a ditch and airport perimeter fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the forward fuselage. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The operator’s flight manual directed that all approaches were to be flown using the stabilized approach concept. For a visual approach, this included establishing and maintaining the proper approach speed and correct landing configuration at least 500 ft above the airport elevation. Neither pilot recognized the requirement to execute a go-around due to the excessive approach speed or the long landing on a wet runway, which resulted in the runway excursion.

After takeoff, the pilot proceeded about 30 miles and climbed to an altitude of about 2,200 ft mean sea level (msl). About 8 minutes after takeoff, the airplane entered a descending left turn that continued until impact. A witness observed a twin-engine airplane at a low altitude and in a descent. After the airplane descended below the tree line, a fireball emerged followed by some smoke; however, the smoke was thin and dissipated quickly. A second witness observed the airplane at a low altitude and in a slow, descending turn. The flight path was steady and the wings “never dipped.” Shortly after the airplane descended out of sight, he observed an explosion. Both engines were on fire when he arrived at the accident site, and there was a fuel leak from the right engine toward the cockpit area. He used a fire extinguisher to keep the fire off the fuselage until first responders arrived. The airplane impacted a utility pole and terrain. Burned vegetation was present over portions of the accident site. The left wing was separated outboard of the engine and was located near the utility pole. A postaccident examination revealed that the left main fuel tank was partially consumed by the postimpact fire; therefore, the amount of fuel in the tank could not be determined. The left engine nacelle was discolored consistent with the postimpact fire. The left nacelle fuel tank appeared intact, and no fuel was visible in the left nacelle fuel tank. However, the amount of fuel in the left nacelle fuel tank at the time of impact could not be determined. The right main fuel tank appeared intact, and about 1 gallon of fuel was drained from the tank during recovery of the airplane. While the postimpact fire was consistent with fuel present onboard the airplane at the time of the accident, the lack of an extensive and sustained ground fire suggested that a limited amount of fuel was present. The left and right engine cockpit fuel selectors were both positioned to the “RIGHT MAIN” fuel tank. The left fuel selector valve, located in the engine nacelle, was in the “OFF” position at the time of the exam. The right fuel selector was in the “RIGHT” fuel tank position. A teardown examination of the left engine did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. A teardown examination of the right engine revealed damage consistent with oil starvation throughout the engine. A teardown examination of the left propeller assembly revealed indications that the blades were at or near the feather pitch stop position during the impact sequence. A teardown examination of the right propeller assembly revealed indications that the blades were on or near the low pitch stop position during the impact sequence. The fuel flow indicator displayed the total fuel remaining as 8.3 gallons when powered up on a test bench. However, the fuel quantity indications are dependent on the pilot properly configuring the device when the airplane is refueled. The fuel flow indicator does not directly provide fuel quantity information. According to the airplane flight manual, the total unusable fuel for the airplane, with one engine nacelle fuel tank installed, was 7.8 gallons. Engine performance data recovered from the onboard engine monitor revealed a reduction in right engine power to near idle power. About 1 minute later, the airplane entered a descending left turn which continued until impact. About 3 minutes after the reduction in right engine power, the left engine completely lost power. Immediately afterward, right engine power increased to near full (takeoff) power. However, about 30 seconds later the right engine completely lost power. The airplane impacted the pole and the terrain a few seconds later. The pilot likely detected an impending failure of the right engine and intentionally reduced power. However, shortly afterward, the left engine lost power due to fuel starvation. At that time, the pilot likely set the left engine to crossfeed from the right main fuel tank to restore power. Unsuccessful, the pilot then decided to feather the left propeller and attempted to use any available power from the right engine, but the right engine immediately lost power as well. Whether the right engine lost power at that moment due to fuel starvation or oil starvation could not be determined. The pilot was obese and had hypertension, high cholesterol, and an enlarged heart with left ventricular thickening. While these cardiovascular conditions placed him at an increased risk for a sudden incapacitating cardiac event, the autopsy did not show any acute or remote myocardial infarction, and the flight path suggests intentional actions until the crash. Thus, the pilot’s cardiovascular disease was not a factor in this accident. Toxicology testing detected the muscle relaxant cyclobenzaprine and its active metabolite norcyclobenzaprine in the pilot’s femoral blood at low therapeutic levels. The sedative-hypnotic medication zolpidem was detected at subtherapeutic levels. While these substances are associated with side effects such as drowsiness and dizziness, the operational findings of this accident do not suggest performance issues related to fatigue. Thus, it is unlikely that the effects from the pilot’s use of cyclobenzaprine and zolpidem were factors in this accident.

The pilot and three other crew members were performing flight testing for a new Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for the single-engine turboprop-powered airplane. After departure, the pilot performed several maneuvers from the test card, then configured the airplane with the flaps extended for an intentional accelerated stall in a 30° left bank with the engine torque set to 930 ft-lb. Analysis of ADS-B data combined with a simulation matching the recorded trajectory of the accident maneuver revealed that, after the stall, the airplane rapidly rolled to the left, reaching a roll angle of 120° while the pitch angle decreased to 60° nose down. The airspeed rapidly increased, exceeding both the maximum flaps-extended speed (Vfe) and the airplane’s maximum operating speed (Vmo). Recorded engine data indicated that, after the stall, the engine torque increased. ADS-B data was lost at an altitude about 7,000 ft above ground level; the final track data indicated an approximate 8,700 ft/min rate of descent. Witnesses observed the airplane break up in flight and subsequently spiral to the ground. The wreckage was found in a rural field distributed over a distance of about 1,800 ft. Analysis of the aerodynamic loads in an overspeed condition showed that the wing design stress limit loads would be exceeded at high speeds with full flaps. The simulation of the stall maneuver indicated that reducing engine power to idle after the nose dropped could have reduced the rate at which the airspeed and associated aerodynamic loads increased, and would have likely given the pilot more time to recover. The airplane was equipped with an Electronic Stability and Protection (ESP) system, which was designed to deter attitude and airspeed exceedances during hand-flying and maintain stable flight by applying an opposite force to the direction of predetermined travel. It was designed to provide a light force that can be overcome by the pilot. To deactivate the ESP, the pilot needed to navigate to a specific page in the primary function display (PFD). Although the accident pilot was an experienced test pilot and qualified to operate the airplane, his experience with the accident airplane’s avionics system could not be determined. Videos of his previous flights in the airplane suggested that he was unfamiliar with the ESP system, as he did not deactivate it before the flight nor discuss the forces it was applying during the flight. Onboard video recording from a test flight the day before the accident indicated that, while performing a turning stall at idle power and 30° of left bank with the wing flaps extended, the airplane rapidly entered a left roll to a maximum of 83° before the pilot recovered to a wingslevel attitude. After recovery, the pilot pitched the airplane’s nose down about 25° in order to “get some airspeed back,” during which the ESP activated the autopilot to effect recovery to a level attitude. The airplane continued to gain airspeed, exceeding the Vmo of 175 knots and reaching 183 knots indicated airspeed, before pilot arrested the airplane’s acceleration and disconnected the autopilot. These two exceedances illustrated shortcomings in the test execution. First, although the 83° roll exceeded the allowable roll limit during this maneuver, the crew failed to identify this exceedance even though they discussed what angle had been reached and had a data acquisition system on board, which they could have consulted to determine the maximum roll angle reached during the maneuver. Correctly identifying the roll exceedance would have resulted in a “failed” test. In accordance with risk mitigation procedures for the test plan, the test buildup should have been stopped after roll limits were exceeded in order to determine the reasons for the exceedance and to implement corrective actions before proceeding with higher-risk conditions in the test plan. Secondly, after exceeding Vmo, the crew did not remark upon the exceedance, and even though the exceedance met the requirements for an overspeed inspection as described in the airplane’s maintenance manual, there was no indication that this inspection was completed. The accident flight simulation indicated that, during the stall immediately preceding the accident, it is likely that the ESP activated as the airplane pitched in excess of 19° nose-up. This would have required the pilot to apply more aft force on the control column in order to induce the stall. After the stall, the ESP would have activated at 45° bank, then deactivated as the airplane quickly exceeded 75°. The extent to which the control forces from the ESP, or the potential distraction due to the system’s engagement and disengagement, may have contributed to the pilot’s failure to recover from the nose-low attitude following the stall could not be determined. FAA guidance warns of the risks associated with upset events during stall maneuvers and advises against performing accelerated stalls with flaps deployed due to the increased risk of exceeding the airplane’s limitations in this configuration. Following a nose-low departure from controlled flight, reducing the power to idle immediately is crucial to avoid exceeding airspeed limitations and overstressing the airplane. The circumstances of the accident flight are consistent with the pilot’s improper recovery from a nose-low attitude following an intentional aerodynamic stall. Whether the increase in torque following the stall was the result of intentional application of power by the pilot could not be determined; however, the pilot’s failure to reduce engine power to idle following the airplane’s departure from controlled flight was contrary to published guidance as well as test flight hazard mitigation procedures. It is likely that this resulted in the airplane’s rapid exceedance of its airspeed limitations, and subsequently, a structural failure and inflight breakup.

The flight crew reported that while on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach with the autopilot system engaged in approach mode, they noticed that the airplane flight director indicated a climbing right turn but the airplane was still tracking the localizer and glideslope. The airplane’s ice protection was on, and no visible ice had accumulated. They reported that they disconnected the autopilot, and the airplane suddenly rolled to the right. They attempted to regain control by increasing engine power and applying counteractive control inputs, but the airplane impacted the ground in a near-wings-level attitude. Examination of the airplane’s primary flight control system and engines after the accident did not reveal any defects. The rudder trim was neutral, and the pitch trim was airplane nose up. Aileron trim could not be determined. Examination of the airplane’s autopilot components revealed deficiencies in the yaw damper system that rendered it inoperative; however, on the accident airplane the yaw damper system was an optional component and was not necessary for airplane operation. Testing of the remaining autopilot components revealed some deficiencies that could have degraded performance but would not have resulted in a complete failure of the automatic flight control system. A performance study based on ADS-B data showed that the airplane intercepted the localizer and glideslope for the ILS approach and was descending in a level attitude. While maintaining the ILS approach guidance, the airplane slowed below the 130 knots (kts) airspeed that the crew stated was the desired approach speed. The airspeed continued to slow to about 102 kts when the ADS-B data indicated that the airplane rolled slightly to the right, likely corresponding to the flight crew’s description of events after they disconnected the autopilot. The airplane continued to slow below 100 kts and the airplane was at a bank angle of 27° right wing down. Subsequently, the descent rate increased to over 4,000 ft/min and airspeed increased while ground speed remained between 80 and 90 kts. The airplane rolled sharply to the left. The sudden roll and loss of altitude after reaching a low airspeed was consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Based on the available evidence, the airplane entered an inadvertent aerodynamic stall due to exceedance of the critical angle of attack after the flight crew allowed the airspeed to decay during the instrument approach. Although an unknown anomaly in the flight director system could have resulted in the crew becoming fixated on an errant flight director indication at the expense of airspeed control, the postaccident component examination was not able to explain the errant flight director indication that the flight crew described.

The single engine airplane landed last October at Dade-Collier Airport, in the center of the Everglades National Park, following a flight from Sancti Spíritus, Cuba. The pilot defected Cuba and landed safely in the US. On November 14, the pilot and copilot were hired to relocate the radial engine-equipped biplane as a public flight from Dade-Collier Airport to Miami-Opa Locka. The pilot stated that, while enroute, the airplane began to smoke and the engine lost power. The pilot performed a forced landing to a levee; however, the airplane’s main landing gear were wider than the levee, and after touchdown, the airplane traveled off the left side,
nosed over, and came to rest inverted, resulting in substantial damage. Both crew members were highly experienced but none of them have any flight hours in the accident airplane make and model.

On November 12, 2022, about 1322 central standard time, a Boeing B-17G, N7227C, and a Bell P-63F, N6763, collided in flight during a performance at the Commemorative Air Force’s (CAF) Wings Over Dallas air show at Dallas Executive Airport (KRBD) in Dallas, Texas. The pilot, copilot, flight engineer, and two scanners on board the Boeing B-17G and the pilot of the Bell P-63F were fatally injured, and both airplanes were destroyed. No injuries to persons on the ground were reported. Both accident airplanes (and six other historic, former military airplanes that were airborne as part of the same performance) were operated by the CAF under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 and a certificate of waiver for the air show. The Boeing B-17G was in the first position of five historic bomber airplanes flying as solo aircraft in trail, and the Bell P-63F was in the last position of three historic fighter airplanes flying in formation. The takeoffs, repositioning turns, and passes of the eight airplanes in the accident performance were directed in real time via radio by the air boss, who had primary responsibility for the control of air show operations. Just before the accident, the bomber group and the fighter formation completed a pass in front of the crowd of spectators from show right to left (that is, right to left from the crowd’s perspective). The airplanes were setting up for the next pass when the accident occurred. This pass was intended to be from show left to right in front of the crowd, and the air boss issued directives for the fighter formation to pass off the left side of the bomber group airplanes and then cross in front of them. The position data showed that the flight path for the fighter lead and position 2 fighter airplanes passed the bomber airplanes off the bombers’ left side before crossing in front of the Boeing B-17G but that the Bell P-63F’s flight path converged with that of the Boeing B-17G. Video and photographic evidence captured by witnesses on the ground showed that the Bell P-63F was in a descending, left-banked turn when it struck the left side of the Boeing B-17G near the trailing edge of the left wing, then both airplanes broke apart in flight.

The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing about 2.5 hours before departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and weather data indicated the flight encountered low IFR (LIFR) conditions during the approach to the destination airport. These conditions included low ceilings, low visibility, localized areas of freezing precipitation, low-level turbulence and wind shear. The ADS-B data revealed that during the last minute of data, the airplane’s descent rate increased from 500 ft per minute to 3,000 ft per minute. In the last 30 seconds of the flight the airplane entered a 2,000 ft per minute climb followed by a descent that exceeded 5,000 ft per minute. The last data point was located about 1,000 ft from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s flight instruments and avionics were destroyed during the accident and were unable to be functionally tested. The rapid ascents and descents near the end of the flight track were consistent with a pilot who was experiencing spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and high-speed impact with terrain. The pilot purchased the airplane about 3 weeks before the accident and received about 15 hours of transition training in the airplane, including 1 hour of actual instrument conditions during high-altitude training. The pilot’s logbook indicated he had 5.2 hours of actual instrument flight time. At the time of the pilot’s weather briefing, the destination airport was reporting marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions with the terminal area forecast (TAF) in agreement, with MVFR conditions expected to prevail through the period of the accident flight. LIFR conditions were reported about 40 minutes before the airplane’s departure and continued to the time of the accident. Light freezing precipitation was reported intermittently before and after the accident, which was not included in the TAF. The destination airport’s automated surface observing system (ASOS) reported LIFR conditions with overcast ceilings at 300 ft above ground level (agl) and light freezing drizzle at the time of the accident. Low-level turbulence and wind shear were detected, which indicated a high probability of a moderate or greater turbulence layer between 3,600 and 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl) in the clouds. During the approach, the airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions with a high probability of encountering moderate and greater turbulence, with above freezing temperatures. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued conflicting weather information during the accident time period. The pilot’s weather briefing indicated predominately MVFR conditions reported and forecasted by the TAFs along the route of flight, while both the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC) AIRMET (G-AIRMET) and the Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) were depicting IFR conditions over the destination airport at the time of the briefing. The TAFs, GAIRMET, and Current Icing Product (CIP)/Forecast Icing Products (FIP) were not indicating any forecast for icing conditions or freezing precipitation surrounding the accident time. The pilot reviewed the TAF in his briefing, expecting MVFR conditions to prevail at his expected time of arrival. The TAF was amended twice between the period of his briefing and the time of the accident to indicate IFR to LIFR conditions with no mention of any potential freezing precipitation or low-level wind shear (LLWS) during the period. Given the pilot’s low actual instrument experience, minimal amount of flight experience in the accident airplane, and the instrument conditions encountered during the approach with a high probability of moderate or greater turbulence, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and lost control of the airplane.

The pilot flew a visual approach to his home airport but did a go-around due to ground fog. After receiving an instrument flight rules clearance, he flew an RNAV/GPS approach that he also discontinued due to ground fog. After executing a missed approach, the pilot flew another RNAV/GPS approach. The pilot reported that during this last approach he lost visual references and initiated a go-around, during which the airplane impacted trees about 800 ft to the right of the runway. The main wreckage came to rest upright and was consumed by a post-impact fire. The postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he observed the right engine was slower to accelerate than the left engine during the attempted go-around, and that he was distracted looking at the engine indications. He reported that he did not notice if the airplane yaw to the right and, before he could correct for the altitude loss, the airplane descended into and struck the trees.

The pilot reported that he was under the impression that his airplane’s inboard fuel tanks had been topped and he had 202 gallons on board prior to departure. He had a “standing order” with the airport’s fixed base operator to top the tanks; however, the fueling was not accomplished and he did not visually check the fuel level prior to departure. He entered 202 gallons in cockpit fuel computer and unknowingly commenced the flight with 61 gallons on board. Prior to reaching his destination, his fuel supply was exhausted, both engines lost all power, and he performed a forced landing in a cemetery about one mile from the airport. The pilot and his passenger had minor injuries. Inspectors with the Federal Aviation Administration examined the wreckage and determined that damage to the wings and fuselage was substantial. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

Shortly after departure to pick up a passenger at their destination airport about 75 nm away, the pilots climbed and turned onto a track of about 115° before leveling off about 11,000 ft mean sea level (msl), where the airplane remained for a majority of the flight. Pilot and controller communications during the flight were routine and there were no irregularities reported. As the airplane descended into the destination airport area, the airplane passed through areas of light to heavy icing where there was a 20 to 80% probability of encountering supercooled large droplets (SLD) during their initial descent and approach. While level at 4,000 ft msl, the flight remained in icing conditions, and then was cleared for the instrument approach to the runway. The flight emerged from the overcast layer as it crossed the final approach fix at 2,800 ft msl; the flight continued its descent and was cleared to land. The controller informed the flight that there was a vehicle on the runway but it would be cleared shortly, which was acknowledged; this was the final communication from the flight crew. Multiple eyewitnesses and security camera footage revealed that the airplane, while flying straight and level, suddenly began a steep, spinning, nearly vertical descent until it impacted a commercial business parking lot; the airplane subsequently collided with several unoccupied vehicles and caught fire. The airplane was certified for flight in known icing conditions and was equipped with pneumatic deice boots on each of the wings and tail surfaces. The pneumatic anti-icing system was consumed by the postimpact fire; the control switches were impact and thermally damaged and a reliable determination of their preimpact operation could not be made. Further examination of the airframe and engines revealed no indications of any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation or performance. During the approach it is likely that the airframe had been exposed to and had built-up ice on the control surfaces. It could not be determined if the pilots used the pneumatic anti-icing system, or if the system was inoperative, based on available evidence. Review of the weather conditions and the airplane’s calculated performance based on ADS-B data, given the speeds at which the airplane was flying, and the lack of any discernable deviations that might have been expected due to an extreme amount of ice accumulating on the airframe, it is also likely that the deice system, if operating at the time of the icing encounter, should have been able to sufficiently remove the ice from the surfaces. Although it is also uncertain when the pilots extended the landing gear and flaps, it is likely that the before-landing checklist would be conducted between the final approach fix and when the flight was on its 3-mile final approach to land. Given this information, the available evidence suggests that the sudden loss of control from a stable and established final approach was likely due to the accumulation of ice on the tailplane. It is likely that once the pilots changed the airplane’s configuration by extending the landing gear and flaps, the sudden aerodynamic shift resulted in the tailplane immediately entering an aerodynamic stall that maneuvered the airplane into an attitude from which there was no possibility to recover given the height above the ground. Postaccident toxicological testing detected the presence of delta-8 THC. Delta-8 THC has a potential to alter perception and cause impairment, but only the non-psychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-8-THC was present in the pilot’s liver and lung tissue. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s delta-8-THC use contributed to the accident.