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Crash of a Socata TBM-700 near Urbana: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 20, 2021 at 1440 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N700DT
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Port Clinton – Cincinnati
MSN:
134
YOM:
1998
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
On August 20, 2021, about 1440 eastern daylight time, a Socata TBM 700A airplane, N700DT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Urbana, Ohio. The pilot sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Preliminary air traffic control information revealed the airplane was en route from the Erie Ottawa Airport (PCW), Port Clinton, Ohio, to the Cincinnati Municipal Airport (LUK), Cincinnati, Ohio. The airplane departed runway 9 at PCW and climbed to flight level 200 before beginning to descend. The airplane was southbound, descending to 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), and established communications with the assigned terminal radar approach control controller. The controller cleared the pilot to descent to 10,000 ft msl and proceed direct to LUK. While descending through 12,100 ft msl, the airplane entered a left turn. The controller observed the left turn and asked the pilot if everything was alright; there was no response from the pilot. Radar contact was subsequently lost with the airplane. The controller’s further attempts to establish communications were unsuccessful. A witness, located about 2 miles south of the accident location, stated that he observed the airplane at a high altitude in a nose-dive descent toward the terrain. He reported the airplane was not turning or spinning; it was headed straight down. The witness observed no signs of distress, such as smoke, fire, or parts coming off the airplane, and he stated the airplane’s engine was at full throttle. The witness lost sight of the airplane as it descended behind some trees. The accident site was located 1.3 miles northwest of the last radar contact. The accident site showed the airplane impacted trees, two powerlines, and the terrain in a left-wing low attitude. The initial ground scar, located in a residential yard, contained separated components of the left wing. The airplane crossed a highway, struck trees and a ditch, and then continued into mature potato and soybean fields. The airplane wreckage was scattered at a distance of about 2,050 ft along a measured magnetic heading of 275°. According to acquaintances of the pilot, the pilot purchased the airplane about 9 days before the accident. Following the purchase, the pilot and a flight instructor completed several hours of ground school and 15.5 hours of dual instruction in the airplane.

Crash of a Convair CV-440F in Toledo: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 11, 2019 at 0238 LT
Registration:
N24DR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Millington-Memphis - Toledo
MSN:
393
YOM:
1957
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
On September 11, 2019, at 0239 eastern daylight time, a Convair 440 airplane, N24DR, impacted trees and terrain while on final approach to runway 25 at the Toledo Express Airport (TOL). The accident site was located about 1/2-mile from the runway arrival threshold in Monclova, Ohio. Both pilots were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire. The airplane was registered to a private individual and operated by Ferreteria E Implementos San Francisco under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 125 as a non-scheduled cargo flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and the flight was being operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from the Millington-Memphis Airport (NQA), Millington, Tennessee, at 2314 central daylight time and was destined for TOL. According to the operator, the flight crew initially departed Laredo International Airport (LRD) about 1838 central time the evening before the accident and arrived at NQA about 2210 central time. The airplane was refueled before departing on the accident flight. Preliminary air traffic control position data depicted the airplane proceeding direct to TOL after departure from NQA at a cruise altitude of 7,000 ft mean sea level. About 39 miles southwest of TOL, the airplane entered a cruise descent in preparation for approach and landing. The flight crew was subsequently cleared to land at 0235 when the airplane was about 5 miles southeast of TOL. The pilot acknowledged the landing clearance; however, no further communications were received. The airplane ultimately became established on final approach for runway 25 before radar contact was lost. No problems or anomalies were reported during the flight. The airplane struck trees beginning about 0.12-mile east of the accident site; about 0.65-mile northeast of the runway arrival threshold. The initial strikes were about 55 ft above ground level. Multiple tree breaks were observed along the flight path through the wooded area east of the accident site. A ground impact scar was located west of the wooded area and led to the accident site. The impact path was oriented on a westerly heading. The airplane came to rest in a parking lot about 0.50-mile from the threshold and near the extended centerline of the runway.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Delaware: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 17, 2019 at 1745 LT
Registration:
N424TW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dayton - Delaware
MSN:
421B-0816
YOM:
1974
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3000
Captain / Total hours on type:
48.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8339
Circumstances:
The pilot departed on a short cross-country flight in the twin-engine airplane. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) were present at the time. While en route at an altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level, the pilot reported that the airplane was "picking up icing" and that he needed to "pick up speed." The controller then cleared the pilot to descend, then to climb, in order to exit the icing conditions; shortly thereafter, the controller issued a low altitude alert. The pilot indicated that he was climbing; radar and radio contact with the airplane were lost shortly thereafter. The airplane impacted a field about 7 miles short of the destination airport. Examination of the airplane was limited due to the fragmentation of the wreckage; however, no pre-impact anomalies were noted during the airframe and engine examinations. Extensive damage to the pitot static and deicing systems precluded functional testing of the two systems. A review of data recorded from onboard avionics units indicated that, about the time the pilot reported to the controller that the airplane was accumulating ice, the airplane's indicated airspeed had begun to diverge from its ground speed as calculated by position data. However, several minutes later, the indicated airspeed was zero while the ground speed remained fairly constant. It is likely that this airspeed indication was the result of icing of the airplane's pitot probe. During the final 2 minutes of flight, the airplane was in a left turn and the pilot received several "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP PULL UP" annunciations as the airplane conducted a series of climbs and descents during which its ground speed (and likely, airspeed) reached and/or exceeded the airplane's maneuvering and maximum structural cruising speeds. It is likely that the pilot became distracted by the erroneous airspeed indication due to icing of the pitot probe and subsequently lost control while maneuvering.
Probable cause:
A loss of airspeed indication due to icing of the airplane's pitot probe, and the pilot's loss of control while maneuvering.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Madeira: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 12, 2019 at 1516 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N400JM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Cincinnati - Cincinnati
MSN:
31-8152002
YOM:
1981
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6421
Captain / Total hours on type:
1364.00
Aircraft flight hours:
19094
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot was conducting an aerial observation (surveying) flight in a piston engineequipped multiengine airplane. Several hours into the flight, the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that the airplane had a fuel problem and that he needed to return to the departure airport. When the airplane was 8 miles from the airport, and after passing several other airports, the pilot informed ATC that he was unsure if the airplane could reach the airport. The final minutes of radar data depicted the airplane in a descent and tracking toward a golf fairway as the airplane's groundspeed decreased to a speed near the single engine minimum control airspeed. According to witnesses, they heard an engine sputter before making two loud "back-fire" sounds. One witness reported that, after the engine sputtered, the airplane "was on its left side flying crooked." Additional witnesses reported that the airplane turned to the left before it "nose-dived" into a neighborhood, impacting a tree and private residence before coming to rest in the backyard of the residence. A witness approached the wreckage immediately after the accident and observed a small flame rising from the area of the left engine. Video recorded on the witness' mobile phone several minutes later showed the airplane engulfed in flames. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of either engine. The fuel systems feeding both engines were damaged by impact forces but the examined components generally displayed that only trace amounts of fuel remained; with the exception of the left engine nacelle fuel tank. Given the extent of the fire damage to this area of the wreckage, and the witness report that the post impact fire originated in this area, it is likely that this tank contained fuel. By design, this fuel in this tank was not able to supply fuel directly to either engine, but instead relied on an electric pump to transfer fuel into the left main fuel tank. Fire damage precluded a detailed postaccident examination or functional testing of the left nacelle fuel transfer pump. Other pilots who flew similar airplanes for the operator, along with a review of maintenance records for those airplanes, revealed at least three instances of these pumps failing in the months surrounding the accident. The other pilots also reported varying methods of utilizing fuel and monitoring fuel transfers of fuel from the nacelle fuel tanks, since there was no direct indication of the quantity of fuel available in the tank. These methods were not standardized between pilots within the company and relied on their monitoring the quantity of fuel in the main fuel tanks in order to ensure that the fuel transfer was occurring. Had the pilot not activated this pump, or had this pump failed during the flight, it would have rendered the fuel in the tank inaccessible. Given this information it is likely that the fuel supply available to the airplane's left engine was exhausted, and that the engine subsequently lost power due to fuel starvation. The accident pilot, along with another company pilot, identified fuel leaking from the airplane's left wing, about a week before the accident. Maintenance records showed no actions had been completed to the address the fuel leak. Due to damage sustained during the accident, the origin of the fuel leak could not be determined, nor could it be determined whether the fuel leak contributed to the fuel starvation and eventual inflight loss of power to the left engine. Because the left engine stopped producing power, the pilot would have needed to configure the airplane for single-engine flight; however, examination of the left engine's propeller found that it was not feathered. With the propeller in this state, the pilot's ability to maintain control the airplane would have been reduced, and it is likely that the pilot allowed the airplane's airspeed to decrease below the singleengine minimum controllable airspeed, which resulted in a loss of control and led to the airplane's roll to the left and rapid descent toward the terrain. Toxicology results revealed that the pilot had taken doxylamine, an over-the-counter antihistamine that can decrease alertness and impair performance of potentially hazardous tasks. Although the toxicology results indicated that the amount of doxylamine in the pilot's cavity blood was within the lower therapeutic range, review of ATC records revealed that the pilot was alert and that he was making necessary decisions and following instructions. Thus, the pilot's use of doxylamine was not likely a factor in the accident.
Probable cause:
Fuel starvation to the left engine and the resulting loss of engine power to that engine, and a loss of airplane control due to the pilot's failure to maintain the minimum controllable airspeed.
Final Report:

Crash of an AMI DC-3-65TP in Kidron: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 21, 2019 at 0912 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N467KS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kidron - Akron
MSN:
20175
YOM:
1944
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
15457
Captain / Total hours on type:
5612.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9969
Copilot / Total hours on type:
12
Aircraft flight hours:
37504
Circumstances:
The two pilots departed in a turbine powered DC-3C at maximum gross weight for a repositioning flight. The airplane was part of a test program for new, higher horsepower engine installation. Soon after liftoff and about 3 seconds after decision speed (V1), the left engine lost total power. The propeller began to auto-feather but stopped feathering about 3 seconds after the power loss. The airplane yawed and banked to the left, descended, and impacted terrain. Recorded engine data indicated the power loss was due to an engine flameout; however, examination of the engine did not determine a reason for the flameout or the auto-feather system interruption. While it is plausible that an air pocket developed in the fuel system during the refueling just before the flight, this scenario was not able to be tested or confirmed. It is possible that the auto-feather system interruption would have occurred if the left power lever was manually retarded during the auto-feather sequence. The power loss and auto-feather system interruption occurred during a critical, time-sensitive phase of flight since the airplane was at low altitude and below minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). The acutely transitional phase of flight would have challenged the pilots' ability to manually feather the propeller quickly and accurately. The time available for the crew to respond to the unexpected event was likely less than needed to recognize the problem and take this necessary action – even as an immediate action checklist/memory item.
Probable cause:
The loss of airplane control after an engine flameout and auto-feather system interruption during the takeoff climb, which resulted in an impact with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 525C CitationJet CJ4 off Cleveland: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 29, 2016 at 2257 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N614SB
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cleveland – Columbus
MSN:
525C-0072
YOM:
2012
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
1205
Captain / Total hours on type:
56.00
Aircraft flight hours:
861
Circumstances:
The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged.The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain an effective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain due to pilot spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was pilot fatigue, mode confusion related to the status of the autopilot, and negative learning transfer due to flight guidance panel and attitude indicator differences from the pilot's previous flight experience.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAe 125-700A in Akron: 9 killed

Date & Time: Nov 10, 2015 at 1453 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N237WR
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Dayton – Akron
MSN:
257072
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
EFT1526
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
6170
Captain / Total hours on type:
1020.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4382
Copilot / Total hours on type:
482
Aircraft flight hours:
14948
Aircraft flight cycles:
11075
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed controlled flight while on a non precision localizer approach to runway 25 at Akron Fulton International Airport (AKR) and impacted a four-unit apartment building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The airplane was registered to Rais Group International NC LLC and operated by Execuflight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport, Dayton, Ohio, about 1413 and was destined for AKR. Contrary to Execuflight’s informal practice of the captain acting as pilot flying on flights carrying revenue passengers, the first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. While en route, the flight crew began preparing for the approach into AKR. Although company standard operating procedures (SOPs) specified that the pilot flying was to brief the approach, the captain agreed to the first officer’s request that the captain brief the approach. The ensuing approach briefing was unstructured, inconsistent, and incomplete, and the approach checklist was not completed. As a result, the captain and first officer did not have a shared understanding of how the approach was to be conducted. As the airplane neared AKR, the approach controller instructed the flight to reduce speed because it was following a slower airplane on the approach. To reduce speed, the first officer began configuring the airplane for landing, lowering the landing gear and likely extending the flaps to 25° (the airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be). When the flight was about 4 nautical miles from the final approach fix (FAF), the approach controller cleared the flight for the localizer 25 approach and instructed the flight to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until established on the localizer. The airplane was already established on the localizer when the approach clearance was issued and could have descended to the FAF minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. However, the first officer did not initiate a descent, the captain failed to notice, and the airplane remained level at 3,000 ft msl. As the first officer continued to slow the airplane from about 150 to 125 knots, the captain made several comments about the decaying speed, which was well below the proper approach speed with 25° flaps of 144 knots. The first officer’s speed reduction placed the airplane in danger of an aerodynamic stall if the speed continued to decay, but the first officer apparently did not realize it. The first officer’s lack of awareness and his difficulty flying the airplane to standards should have prompted the captain to take control of the airplane or call for a missed approach, but he did not do so. Before the airplane reached the FAF, the first officer requested 45° flaps and reduced power, and the airplane began to descend. The first officer’s use of flaps 45° was contrary to Execuflight’s Hawker 700A non precision approach profile, which required the airplane to be flown at flaps 25° until after descending to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and landing was assured; however, the captain did not question the first officer’s decision to conduct the approach with flaps 45°. The airplane crossed the FAF at an altitude of about 2,700 ft msl, which was 400 ft higher than the published minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. Because the airplane was high on the approach, it was out of position to use a normal descent rate of 1,000 feet per minute (fpm) to the MDA. The airplane’s rate of descent quickly increased to 2,000 fpm, likely due to the first officer attempting to salvage the approach by increasing the rate of descent, exacerbated by the increased drag resulting from the improper flaps 45° configuration. The captain instructed the first officer not to descend so rapidly but did not attempt to take control of the airplane even though he was responsible for safety of the flight. As the airplane continued to descend on the approach, the captain did not make the required callouts regarding approaching and reaching the MDA, and the first officer did not arrest the descent at the MDA. When the airplane reached the MDA, which was about 500 ft above the touchdown zone elevation, the point at which Execuflight’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the airspeed was 11 knots below the minimum required airspeed of 124 knots, and the airplane was improperly configured with 45° flaps. The captain should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a missed approach, but he did not do so. About 14 seconds after the airplane descended below the MDA, the captain instructed the first officer to level off. As a result of the increased drag due to the improper flaps 45° configuration and the low airspeed, the airplane entered a stalled condition when the first officer attempted to arrest the descent. About 7 seconds after the captain’s instruction to level off, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the first sounds of impact.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the approach and multiple deviations from company standard operating procedures, which placed the airplane in an unsafe situation and led to an unstabilized approach, a descent below minimum descent altitude without visual contact with the runway environment, and an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident were Execuflight’s casual attitude toward compliance with standards; its inadequate hiring, training, and operational oversight of the flight crew; the company’s lack of a formal safety program; and the Federal Aviation Administration’s insufficient oversight of the company’s training program and flight operations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Socata TBM-850 in Salem

Date & Time: May 19, 2011 at 0843 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1UL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Valparaiso - Salem
MSN:
564
YOM:
2010
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
932
Captain / Total hours on type:
76.00
Aircraft flight hours:
187
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that he flew an instrument approach and was clear of clouds about 650 feet above ground level when he proceeded visually to the airport. About 1/2 mile from the runway, he thought the airplane was too high, but a few seconds later the airplane felt like it had an excessive rate of descent. His attempts to arrest the rate of descent were unsuccessful, and the left main landing gear struck the ground about 120 feet prior to the runway threshold. The recorded data downloaded from the airplane's non-volatile memory showed that the airplane's airspeed varied from about 71 - 81 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) during the 10 seconds prior to ground impact. The data also indicated that there was about a 3 - 5 knot tailwind during the final landing approach. The airplane's stall speed with the airplane in the landing configuration with landing flaps was 64 knots IAS at maximum gross weight. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or system failure of the airplane.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain a stabilized glide path which resulted in the airplane touching down short of the runway.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500 in Columbus

Date & Time: Dec 27, 2010 at 2246 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N888CA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jeffersonville – Columbus
MSN:
500B-1318-127
YOM:
1963
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5700
Captain / Total hours on type:
3525.00
Circumstances:
Prior to the flight, the pilot preflighted the airplane and recalled observing the fuel gauge indicating full; however, he did not visually check the fuel tanks. The airplane departed and the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. During the downwind leg of the circling approach, the engines began to surge and the pilot added full power and turned on the fuel boost pumps. While abeam the approach end of the runway on the downwind leg, the engines again started to surge and subsequently lost power. He executed a forced landing and the airplane impacted terrain short of the runway. A postaccident examination by Federal Aviation Administration inspectors revealed the fuselage was buckled in several areas, and the left wing was crushed and bent upward. The fuel tanks were intact and approximately one cup of fuel was drained from the single fuel sump. Fueling records indicated the airplane was fueled 3 days prior to the accident with 135 gallons of fuel or approximately 4 hours of operational time. Flight records indicated the airplane had flown approximately 4 hours since refueling when the engines lost power.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s improper fuel management which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Elyria: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 2010 at 1405 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N80HH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Gainesville - Elyria
MSN:
732
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
2010
Captain / Total hours on type:
1250.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
190
Aircraft flight hours:
6799
Circumstances:
On his first Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach, the pilot initially flew through the localizer course. The pilot then reestablished the airplane on the final approach course, but the airplane’s altitude at the decision height was about 500 feet too high. He executed a missed approach and received radar vectors for another approach. The airplane was flying inbound on the second ILS approach when a witness reported that he saw the airplane about 150 feet above the ground in about a 60-degree nose-low attitude with about an 80-degree right bank angle. The initial ground impact point was about 2,150 feet west of the runway threshold and about 720 feet north (left) of the extended centerline. The cloud tops were about 3,000 feet with light rime or mixed icing. The flap jack screws and flap indicator were found in the 5-degree flap position. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preimpact anomalies to the airframe, engines, or propellers. A radar study performed on the flight indicated that the calibrated airspeed was about 130 knots on the final approach, but subsequently decreased to about 95–100 knots during the 20-second period prior to loss of radar contact. According to the airplane’s flight manual, the wings-level power-off stall speed at the accident aircraft’s weight is about 91 knots. The ILS approach flight profile indicates that 20 degrees of flaps should be used at the glide slope intercept while maintaining 120 knots minimum airspeed. At least 20 degrees of flaps should be maintained until touchdown. The “No Flap” or “5 Degrees Flap Landing” flight profile indicates that the NO FLAP Vref airspeed is 115 knots calibrated airspeed minimum.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during the instrument approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.
Final Report: