Colorado

The accident occurred during a local instructional flight to satisfy the commercial pilot's annual insurance currency requirements in the accident airplane. The flight instructor reported that the pilot was demonstrating a simulated loss of engine power during initial climb and return for a downwind landing. During initial climb, upon reaching 1,200 ft above ground level (agl), the flight instructor reduced engine power to flight idle and feathered the propeller. In response, the pilot reduced airplane pitch and entered a left, 45-degree-bank turn back toward the airport. The flight instructor stated that, upon rolling wings level, the airplane appeared to be lower than he had expected as it glided toward the runway; however, he believed there was sufficient altitude remaining to safely land on the runway and told the pilot to continue without increasing the engine power. The flight instructor ultimately decided to abort the maneuver as the airplane crossed over the runway threshold at 40 ft agl. The flight instructor advanced the engine power lever to the full-forward position and increased airplane pitch to arrest the descent; however, he did not perceive an increase in engine thrust. Without an increase in engine thrust and with the increased pitch, the airplane's airspeed decreased rapidly, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall about 30 ft above the runway. The airplane impacted the runway before sliding into a grassy area. The flight instructor reported that he did not recall advancing the propeller control when he decided to abort the maneuver, and, as such, the perceived lack of engine thrust was likely because the propeller remained feathered after he increased engine power. Additionally, the flight instructor postulated that the airplane's landing gear had not been retracted after takeoff, which resulted in a reduced climb gradient, and, as such, the airplane entered the maneuver farther away from the airport than anticipated. Further, with the landing gear extended, the airplane experienced a reduction in glide performance during the simulated forced landing. The flight instructor reported that the accident could have been prevented if he had maintained a safe flying airspeed after he took control of the airplane. Additionally, he believed that his delayed decision to abort the maneuver resulted in an insufficient margin of safety.

The private pilot was inbound to the airport, attempting to conduct a straight-in approach to runway 33. Due to the prevailing wind, traffic flow at the time of the pilot's arrival was on runway 15. Another airplane was departing the airport in the opposite direction and crossed in close proximity to the accident airplane. The departing traffic altered his course to the right to avoid the accident airplane while the accident airplane stayed on his final approach course. The two aircraft were in radio communication on the airport common traffic advisory frequency and were exercising see-and-avoid rules as required. Witnesses reported that as the airplane continued down runway 33 for landing, they heard the power increase and observed the airplane make a left-hand turn to depart the runway in an attempted go-around. The airplane entered a left bank with a nose-high attitude, failed to gain altitude, and subsequently stalled and impacted terrain. It is likely the pilot did not maintain the necessary airspeed during the attempted go-around and exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack. The investigation did not reveal why the pilot chose to conduct the approach with opposing traffic or why he attempted a landing with a tailwind, but this likely increased the pilot's workload during a critical phase of flight.

About 3 months before the accident, the pilot received about 9 hours of flight instruction, including completion of an instrument proficiency check, in the airplane. The accident flight was a personal cross-country flight operated under instrument flight rules (IFR). Radar track data depicted the flight proceeding on a west-southwest course at 15,800 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the destination airport. The flight was cleared by the air traffic controller for a GPS approach, passed the initial approach fix, and, shortly afterward, began a descent as permitted by the approach procedure. The track data indicated that the flight became established on the initial approach segment and remained above the designated minimum altitude of 12,000 ft msl. Average descent rates based on the available altitude data ranged from 500 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,000 fpm during this portion of the flight. At the intermediate navigation fix, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a north-northwest course toward the airport. The track data indicated that the flight entered a right turn about 1 mile before reaching the intermediate fix. As the airplane entered the right turn, its average descent rate reached 4,000 fpm. The flight subsequently tracked northbound for nearly 1-1/2 miles. During this portion of the flight, the airplane initially descended at an average rate of 3,500 fpm then climbed at a rate of 1,800 fpm. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn. The final three radar data points were each located within 505 ft laterally of each other and near the approximate accident site location. The average descent rate between the final two data points (altitudes of 10,100 ft msl and 8,700 ft msl) was 7,000 fpm. About the time that the final data point was recorded, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane was in a spin and that he was attempting to recover. No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted the surface of a reservoir at an elevation of about 6,780 ft and came to rest in 60 ft of water. A detailed postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The available meteorological data suggested that the airplane encountered clouds (tops about 16,000 ft msl or higher and bases about 10,000 ft msl) and was likely operating in IFR conditions during the final 15 minutes of the flight; however, no determination could be made regarding whether the clouds that the airplane descended through were solid or layered. In addition, the data suggested the possibility of both light icing and light turbulence between 12,000 ft msl and 16,000 ft msl along the flight path. Although the pilot appeared to be managing the flight appropriately during the initial descent, it could not be determined why he was unable to navigate to the approach fixes and maintain control of the airplane as he turned toward the airport and continued the descent.

The pilot's friend reported that the pilot planned to fly his recently purchased twin-engine airplane over his friend's home to show it to him and another friend. The pilot's friends and several other witnesses reported observing the pilot performing low-level, high-speed aerobatic maneuvers before the airplane collided with trees and then terrain. A 1.75-liter bottle of whiskey was found in the airplane wreckage. A review of the pilot's Federal Aviation Administration medical records revealed that he had a history of alcohol dependence but had reportedly been sober for almost 4 years. Toxicological testing revealed that the pilot had a blood alcohol content of 0.252 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood, which was over six times the limit (0.040) Federal Aviation Regulations allowed for pilots operating an aircraft.

The airplane, with two flight crewmembers and a pilot-rated passenger on board, was on a cross-country flight. The departure and en route portions of the flight were uneventful. As the flight neared its destination, a high-altitude, terrain-limited airport, air traffic control (ATC) provided vectors to the localizer/distance measuring equipment (LOC/DME)-E approach to runway 15. About 1210, the local controller informed the flight crew that the wind was from 290º at 19 knots (kts) with gusts to 25 kts. About 1211, the flight crew reported that they were executing a missed approach and then requested vectors for a second approach. ATC vectored the airplane for a second LOC/DME-E approach to runway 15. About 1221, the local controller informed the flight crew that the wind was from 330° at 16 kts and the 1-minute average wind was from 320° at 14 kts gusting to 25 kts. The initial part of the airplane's second approach was as-expected for descent angle, flap setting, and spoilers. During the final minute of flight, the engines were advanced and retarded five times, and the airplane's airspeed varied between 135 kts and 150 kts. The final portion of the approach to the runway was not consistent with a stabilized approach. The airplane stayed nose down during its final descent and initial contact with the runway. The vertical acceleration and pitch parameters were consistent with the airplane pitch oscillating above the runway for a number of seconds before a hard runway contact, a gain in altitude, and a final impact into the runway at about 6 g. The weather at the time of the accident was near or in exceedance of the airplane's maximum tailwind and crosswind components for landing, as published in the airplane flight manual. Given the location of the airplane over the runway when the approach became unstabilized and terrain limitations of ASE, performance calculations were completed to determine if the airplane could successfully perform a go-around. Assuming the crew had control of the airplane, and that the engines were advanced to the appropriate climb setting, anti-ice was off, and tailwinds were less than a sustained 25 kts, the airplane had the capability to complete a go-around, clearing the local obstacles along that path.Both flight crewmembers had recently completed simulator training for a type rating in the CL600 airplane. The captain reported that he had a total of 12 to 14 hours of total flight time in the airplane type, including the time he trained in the simulator. The copilot would have had close to the same hours as the captain given that they attended flight training together. Neither flight crew member would have met the minimum flight time requirement of 25 hours to act as pilot-in-command under Part 135. The accident flight was conducted under Part 91, and therefore, the 25 hours requirement did not apply to this portion of their trip. Nevertheless, the additional flight time would have increased the crew's familiarity with the airplane and its limitation and likely improved their decision-making during the unstabilized approach. Further, the captain stated that he asked the passenger, an experienced CL-600-rated pilot. to accompany them on the trip to provide guidance during the approach to the destination airport. However, because the CL-600-rated pilot was in the jumpseat position and unable to reach the aircraft controls, he was unable to act as a qualified pilot-in-command.

The pilot reported that he performed the takeoff with the airplane at gross weight and with the flaps up and the engine set for maximum power, which he verified by reading the instruments. During the takeoff, the airplane accelerated and achieved liftoff about 65 to 70 mph and then climbed a couple hundred feet before the pilot began to lower the nose to accelerate to normal climb speed (90 to 100 mph). The airplane then stopped climbing and would not accelerate more than 80 mph. While the pilot attempted to maintain altitude, the airplane decelerated to 70 mph with the engine still at the full-power setting. With insufficient runway remaining to land, the pilot made a shallow right turn toward lower terrain and subsequently made a hard landing in a field. The pilot likely allowed the airplane to climb out of ground effect before establishing a proper pitch attitude and airspeed for the climb, which resulted in the airplane inadvertently entering a “region of reversed command” at a low altitude. In this state, the airplane may be incapable of climbing and would require either more engine power or further lowering of the airplane’s nose to increase airspeed. Because engine power was already at its maximum and the airplane was at a low altitude, the pilot was unable to take remedial action to fly out of the region of reversed command.

The pilot stated that, during the preflight inspection of the airplane, he checked the fuel gauge, and it indicated 65 gallons. Due to the design of the fuel system, it is not possible to visually check the fuel level to confirm that the fuel gauge indication is accurate. During takeoff and as he reduced power for enroute climb, the left engine began to surge and lose power. He immediately turned left back toward the airport and contacted the control tower to advise that he was making a single-engine, straight-in approach to land. When he lowered the landing gear, the right engine began to surge and lose power. Subsequently, the pilot declared an emergency, and, realizing he had insufficient engine power and altitude to return to the airport, he retracted the landing gear and made a no-flap, gear-up landing on a nearby golf course. Postaccident application of battery power to the airplane confirmed that the fuel gauge indicated 65 gallons; however, when the airplane's fuel system was drained, only about 1/2 gallon of fuel was recovered. Thus, the engines lost power due to fuel exhaustion.

While the first officer was flying the airplane on a visual approach to the airport located in a steep mountain valley, the tower controller informed him that the pilot of a Citation that had landed about 10 minutes earlier had reported low-level windshear with a 15-knot loss of airspeed on short final. The first officer used the spoilers while on the left base leg and then maneuvered the airplane in an "S-turn" on the final leg to correct for a too-steep approach. Just as the airplane was about to touch down with the airspeed decreasing, the captain made several calls for "power" and then called for a "go around." However, the first officer did not add power for a go-around, and the captain did not take control of the airplane. Both pilots reported that, when the airplane was about 30 ft above ground level (agl), they felt a sensation that the airplane had "stopped flying" with a simultaneous left roll, which is indicative of an aerodynamic stall, followed by an immediate impact with terrain. After striking obstructions that completely separated the right main landing gear and the right flap, the airplane came to rest upright in the dirt on the side of the runway about 4,000 ft from the initial impact point. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. All eight occupants evacuated through the main cabin door. There was a substantial fuel spill but no postimpact fire. Both pilots reported no mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane, and neither pilot reported an uncommanded loss of engine power. Data from the enhanced ground proximity warning system showed that seven warning events occurred in the last 3 minutes before the accident. The first warning was for "sink rate," and it occurred when the airplane was about 1,317 ft agl and in a 3,400-ft-per-minute descent. The last warning was for "bank angle," and it occurred about 10 seconds before touchdown as the airplane exceeded 42 degrees of bank when it was about 200 ft agl. The wind recorded at the airport at the time of the accident would have resulted in a 12-knot variable tailwind with gusts to 18 knots. The evidence is consistent with the first officer flying a non stabilized approach with a decreasing airspeed during low-level windshear conditions. The first officer did not properly compensate for the known low-level windshear conditions and allowed the airspeed to continue to decrease and the bank angle to increase until the airplane experienced an aerodynamic stall.

The pilot performed an instrument approach to the runway with an approaching winter storm. A review of on-board global positioning system (GPS) data indicated that the airplane flew through the approach course several times during the approach and was consistently below the glideslope path. The airplane continued below the published decision height altitude and drifted to the right of the runway’s extended centerline. The GPS recorded the pilot’s attempt to perform a missed approach, a rapid decrease in ground speed, and then the airplane descend to the ground, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Further, the airplane owner, who was also a passenger on the flight, stated that, after the pilot made the two “left turning circles” and had begun a third circle, he perceived that the airplane “just stalled.” An examination of the airframe and engine did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s anti-ice and propeller anti-ice switches were found in the “off” position. A review of weather information revealed that the airplane was operating in an area with the potential for moderate icing and snow. Based on the GPS data and weather information, it is likely that the airframe collected ice during the descent and approach, which affected the airplane’s performance and led to an aerodynamic stall during the climb.

While en route to the destination airport, the pilot was issued a clearance to descend. As the airplane descended to the assigned altitude, radar plots depicted the airplane entering a right turn, climbing rapidly, and then descending rapidly in a spiral-like pattern. The airplane wreckage was found the following day in mountainous terrain. Several tall trees surrounded the perimeter of the wreckage. Many of the trees showed scuff marks down the trunks consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain in a near-vertical descent. All airplane components were accounted for at the accident site. A postaccident examination of the airplane showed no preimpact failures of the airframe or the engine. A weather analysis revealed that the airplane was descending in the immediate vicinity of a stationary front. The weather conditions in the area were conducive to the production of moderate to severe turbulence, mountain wave activity with updraft/downdrafts in excess of 750 feet per minute, and moderate icing. The radar data confirmed that the airplane began its rapid descent shortly after entering cumuliform clouds. The radar information along with the wreckage at the accident site was consistent with the pilot losing control while trying to maneuver the airplane in an area of turbulent weather.