Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Following an uneventful flight from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, the crew started the descent to Palana Airport Runway 11 from the south. In marginal weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft descended too low, impacted trees and crashed in a wooded area located on Mt Pyatibratka. The wreckage was found at a height of 216 meters some 10 km south of the airport. Both pilots and 8 passengers were killed while four other passengers were seriously injured. Thea aircraft was destroyed by impact forces.

The crew was completing a local training mission at Lohegaon Airport. On final approach to runway 28, the aircraft impacted ground, teared off several runway lights and came to rest. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from Rome-Ciampino Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in a car demolition, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post impact fire as well as more than 30 cars. Both crew were killed.

The commercial pilot was distracted by the nose cargo door popping open during takeoff; the airplane stalled and collided with trees off the end of the runway. The pilot said there were no mechanical problems with the airplane or engines and that he was fixated on the cargo door and lost control of the airplane. He also said that due to stress, he was not mentally prepared to handle the emergency situation.

Following an uneventful flight from Islamabad, the crew started the descent to runway 36R in marginal weather conditions. Upon touchdown on a wet runway, the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft slid for about 1,700 feet before exiting the runway to the right and coming to rest 60 feet further on. All 46 occupants were unhurt while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair. Five minutes after the accident, the weather briefing was as follow: OPLA 311015Z 16009KT 3000 RA BKN040 OVC100 29/24 Q1003. But ten minutes prior to the crash, the weather briefing was as follow: OPLA 311000Z 33008KT 4000 -RA SCT040 BKN100 32/24 Q1002 TEMPO 31030KT 2000 TSRA FEW030CB. Thus, the conditions were considered as marginal with turbulences, wind to 30 knots and CB's at 3,000 feet. On 11SEP2012, the French BEA reported that the aircraft touched down just at the beginning of the paved surface (undershoot area) to the right of the extended runway 36R centerline, causing the right main gear to collapse. It was reported that the aircraft was unstable on short final and that the crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure while the aircraft was too low on the glide.

In the afternoon, the crew departed Annino AFB (Gorelovo) to complete a local training mission consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. After two circuits, the aircraft landed normally and the crew took off and started the rotation without informing ATC. After liftoff, at a height of about 10-15 metres, the aircraft rolled to the right to an angle of 70° then stalled and crashed in a kindergarten located one km from the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

This was a commercial non scheduled flight which was being operated for air transport for local flights. The operator is based in Mombasa and mostly executes passenger flights to the Masai Mara and other game parks and reserves within the Republic of Kenya. On 22nd Aug 2012, the aircraft was scheduled to carry out a flight to the Masai Mara, do several sectors to pick and drop passengers and return to Moi international Airport via Ukunda Airport. The call sign was 5Y-UVP. The last point of departure was Ngerende Airstrip in the Masai Mara at 0917 with intention of onward flight to Mara North airstrip in the Masai Mara. The flight had earlier left Amboseli Airstrip with two crew, and 17 passengers for Ngerende Airstrip. 6 passengers had disembarked at Ngerende and the remaining 11 passengers were continuing to other destinations. No additional passengers or cargo was picked up from Ngerende airstrip. No refueling was done at the airstrip. The airfield is an unmanned airfield, with crew executing unmanned airfield communication procedures to execute approach and landings and also during takeoff. There is however a ground time keeper and a fueling bay at the airfield. Due to terrain and prevailing winds at the time of the flight, Runway 28 was in use. The crew was using unmanned airfield procedures and after the drop-off of 6 passengers, the aircraft lined up runway 28 and proceeded with the take off run. Ground staff at the airstrip reported a normal takeoff run and rotation. During the initial climb, the ground staff still had the aircraft in sight and reported to have seen the aircraft veer sharply to the left and then disappear behind terrain. Shortly afterwards, a loud sound was heard followed by dust in the air. Emergency SAR was initiated with the airport and hotel staff rushing to the accident site. The location of the accident was about 310 meters from the threshold of Runway 10, offset 30° to the left of the extended center line Runway 28. GPS coordinates (figure 1.2) 01.084189° S, 35.1781127° E, Ngerende airstrip. The accident occurred at 0917 UTC on 22nd Aug 2012, during daytime.

On 6 August 2012 the Embraer EMB-505 Phenom 300 aircraft, registration CN-MBR, took off at 12:59 UTC from Geneva (LSGG) on a commercial flight to St. Gallen-Altenrhein (LSZR). After the initial call to the aerodrome control centre St. Gallen tower, the crew quickly decided, after an enquiry from the air traffic controller, on a direct approach on the runway 10 instrument landing system (ILS). Shortly thereafter, the landing gear and flaps were extended. The flaps jammed at approximately 10 degrees and the FLAP FAIL warning message was displayed. The crew carried out a go-around shortly before landing. The landing gear subsequently remained extended. The flaps remained jammed for the remainder of the flight. The crew decided immediately on a second ILS approach with jammed flaps, which according to the manufacturer's information required an increased approach speed. During the approach, the crew had difficulty in reducing the airspeed to this increased approach speed. At 13:40 UTC, the aircraft subsequently touched down on the wet runway at an indicated air speed of 136 kt, approximately 290 m after the runway threshold, and could not be brought to a standstill on the remaining length of runway. The aircraft then rolled over the end of runway 10, broke through the aerodrome perimeter fence and overrun the road named Rheinholzweg running perpendicular to the runway centreline, on which a public transport bus was travelling. The aircraft rolled very close behind the bus and came to a standstill in a maize field, approximately 30 m from the end of the runway. The female passenger and the two pilots were not injured in the accident. The aircraft was badly damaged. There was crop damage and damage to the aerodrome perimeter fence.

Based on the information available, at 20:40 the ONT (National Transplant Organization) informed the Santiago Airport (LEST) that they were going to make a “hospital flight”. The aircraft was refueled at the Santiago Airport with 1062 liters of fuel. According to communications, the crew of aircraft EC-IBA contacted the Santiago tower at 21:46 to request permission to start up and information on the weather and the runway in use at Asturias. At 21:54 they were cleared to take off. According to the airport operations office, the aircraft landed in Asturias (LEAS) at 22:27. The hospital flight service commenced at 22:15. The RFFS accompanied the ambulance to the aircraft at 22:30 and at 22:44 the aircraft took off en route to Porto. The aircraft was transferred from Madrid control to Santiago approach at 22:52 at flight level 200 and cleared straight to Porto (LPPR). Based on the information provided by Porto Airport, the aircraft landed at 23:40. While waiting for the medical team to return, the crew remained in the airport’s facilities. According to some of the personnel there, the crew made some comments regarding the bad weather. There was fog, especially on the arrival route. At 01:34 and again at 02:01 the crew was supplied with the flight plan information, information from the ARO-LPPR office and updated weather data. The aircraft was refueled at the Porto Airport with 1,000 l of fuel and took off at 02:34. At 02:44 the aircraft contacted approach control at Santiago to report its position. Four minutes later the crew contacted the Santiago tower directly to ask about the weather conditions at the field (see Appendix C). The aircraft landed once more in Asturias at 03:28. At 03:26 the RFFS was again activated to escort the ambulance to the aircraft. The service was deactivated at 04:00. The crew requested updated weather information from the tower, which provided the information from the 03:00 METAR. According to the flight plan filed, the estimated off-block time (EOBT) for departing from the Asturias Airport was 03:45, with an estimated flight time to Santiago of 40 minutes. The alternate destination airport was Vitoria (LEVT). The aircraft took off from Asturias at 03:38. At 03:56 the crew established contact with Santiago approach control, which provided the crew with the latest METAR from 03:30, which informed that the runway in use was 17, winds were calm, visibility was 4,000 m with mist, few clouds at 600 ft, temperature and dew point of 13° and QNH of 1,019. The aircraft was then cleared to conduct an ILS approach to runway 17 at the Santiago Airport. At 04:15 the crew contacted the tower controller, who reported calm winds and cleared them to land on runway 17. At 04:18 the COSPAS-SARSAT system detected the activation of an ELT. The system estimated the position for the beacon as being in the vicinity of the LEST airport. At 04:38 the tower controller informed airport operations of a call he had received from SAR that a beacon was active in the vicinity of the airport, and requested that a marshaller go to the airport where the airplane normally parked to see if it was there. At 04:44 the marshaller confirmed that the aircraft was not in its hangar and the emergency procedure was activated, with the various parties involved in the search for the airplane being notified. At 05:10 the control tower called the airport to initiate the preliminary phase (Phase I) before activating the LVP. At 05:15 the RFFS reported that the aircraft had been found in the vicinity of the VOR. At 05:30 the LVP was initiated (Phase II). At 07:51 the LVP was terminated. The last flight to arrive at the Santiago Airport before the accident had landed at 23:33, and the next flight to arrive following the accident landed at 05:25.

The twin engine aircraft departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha Airport at 0700LT on a flight to Juiz de Fora, carrying six passengers and two pilots. In contact with Juiz de Fora Radio, the crew learned that the weather conditions at the aerodrome were below the IFR minima due to mist, and decided to maintain the route towards the destination and perform a non-precision RNAV (GNSS) IFR approach for landing on runway 03. During the final approach, the aircraft collided first with obstacles and then with the ground, at a distance of 245 meters from the runway 03 threshold, and exploded on impact. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 8 occupants were killed, among them both President and Vice-President of the Vilmas Alimentos Group.