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Crash of an Antonovv AN-26B in Tallinn

Date & Time: Aug 25, 2010 at 1747 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SP-FDP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
EXN3788
MSN:
119 03
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
Tallinn - Helsinki
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5569
Captain / Total hours on type:
4432.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
738
Copilot / Total hours on type:
485
Aircraft flight hours:
21510
Circumstances:
On 25th August 2010 cargo aircraft An-26B, registration SP-FDP started from Tallinn-Lennart Meri-Ülemiste Airport to Helsinki. After uneventful flight preparations, the aircraft started its take-off roll on runway 08. Based on pilots statements and FDR/CVR recordings the aircraft entered runway 08 from taxiway B on the West end of the runway and lined up for takeoff. On 16:47:22 the aircraft started its takeoff roll. The calculated V1 was 182 and Vr was 201 km/h. 10 seconds later PF started rotation without Vr callout at 123 km/h. The aircraft pitch angle increased to 4.6˚ 2 seconds later. At 16:47:38 the navigator made V1 call-out at 160.5 km/h. 1 second later flight engineer called “Retracting” in Polish. The aircraft started to pitch down and 3 seconds later it contacted the runway and continued on its belly for 1,228 m before coming to its rest position 3 m right from the runway centerline. No persons were injured and no fire broke up. The occurrence was classified as an accident due to the substantial damage to the aircraft structures.
Probable cause:
The investigation determined the inadequate action of the flight engineer, consisting in early and uncommanded landing gear retraction, as a cause of the accident.
Contributing factors to the accident were:
1. Inadequate crew recourse management and insufficient experience in cooperation and coordination between crewmembers.
2. Start of aircraft rotation at low speed and with fast elevator movement to 17˚, which resulted in:
Lifting the aircraft sufficiently to close the WOW switch and allow the retraction of the landing gear at the speed not sufficient for the climb.
Providing misleading information to FE about the aerodynamic status of the aircraft.
3. Inadequate adjustment of the WOW switch, which allowed the gear retraction to be activated before the aircraft was airborne. The position of the landing gear selector on the central console is not considered as a contributing factor to the accident. However, investigation finds necessary to point it out as a safety concern, specifically in situations, where crewmembers are trained and/or used to operate the aircrafts with gear selector location according to the EASA Certification Standards CS-25. Positioning of the gear lever to the location which is compliant to EASA document CS-25, would create additional safety barrier to avoid similar occurrences, specifically in aircrafts where landing gear is operated by FE.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26B in Tallinn

Date & Time: Mar 18, 2010 at 1018 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SP-FDO
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Helsinki – Tallinn
MSN:
105 03
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
EXN3589
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4695
Captain / Total hours on type:
2295.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
990
Copilot / Total hours on type:
495
Aircraft flight hours:
25941
Circumstances:
Exin Co was operating An-26B for regular cargo flight between Tallinn and Helsinki. The crew performed last maintenance check in Tallinn on previous day and made uneventful flight to Helsinki on 17th March afternoon. Next morning the aircraft took off from Helsinki for regular flight EXN3589 to Tallinn at 09:46 local time. The takeoff weight was 23,954 kg, 46 kg below the MTOW. Four crewmembers, company mechanic and one cargo attendant were on board. During takeoff crew used RU 19-300 APU for additional thrust as prescribed in AFM. The RU 19-300 was shot down after takeoff. The flight was uneventful until 08:14:50, 9.5 nm from the runway 26. When power levers were retarded to flight idle crew noticed engine vibration and smelled a smoke in the cockpit. The engine chip detector indicator in the cockpit was lit. After short discussion about which engine should be shot down the flight engineer shot down the left engine and the captain tried to start the RU19A-300 (APU) to gain more thrust. During the approach the air traffic controller noticed the aircraft deviation from the approach path to the left and notified the crew. According to the FDR and CVR data the crew was unable to maintain a proper approach path both in lateral and vertical dimensions. The attempts to start RU19A-300 engine failed. Visual contact with the RWY was established 0.5 nm from the threshold. The aircraft crossed the airport boundary being not configured for landing and with IAS 295-300 km/h. The flaps were extended for 10˚ over the threshold; the landing gear was lowered after passing the RWY threshold and retracted again. The aircraft made a high speed low path over the runway on ca 10-15 feet altitude with the landing gear traveling down and up again. Flaps were extended over runway, and then retracted again seconds before impact. At the end of the RWY the full power on right engine was selected, aircraft climbed 15-20 feet and started turning left. Crew started retracting flaps and lowered landing gear. Aircraft crossed the highway at the end of the RWY on altitude ca 30 feet, then descended again, collided with the treetops at the lake shore and made crash-landing on the snow and ice-covered lake waterline. Due to the thick ice the aircraft remained on the ice and glided 151 m on the ice with heading 238˚ before coming to full stop. After the impact the flight engineer shoot down the RH engine and power and released all engine fire extinguishers. All persons onboard escaped immediately through the main door. No emergency was declares and despite suggestions from FO go-around was not commanded.
Probable cause:
Causes of the accident:
1. The failure of the left engine lubrication oil system, leading to the failure of the rear compressor bearing and inflight engine failure.
2. The failure of the crew to maintain the approach path and adhere to single engine landing procedures.
Factors contributing to the accident:
1. Improper and insufficient crew training, inter alia complete absence of simulator training.
2. The lack of effective coordination between crewmembers.
3. The failure of the crew to start RU19A-300 (APU).
4. Adverse weather conditions.
5. Inadequate company supervision by Polish CAA, consisting in not noticing the lack.
of flight crew training and companies generally pour safety culture.
6. Inadequate company maintenance practices, leaving preexisting breather duct failure unnoticed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Super Cargomaster in Helsinki

Date & Time: Jan 31, 2005 at 1700 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-KYH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Helsinki-Örebro
MSN:
208B-0817
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
Helsinki – Örebro
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3886
Captain / Total hours on type:
3657.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6126
Circumstances:
The aircraft landed at Helsinki–Vantaa airport at around 02:47 on Monday, 31.1.2005. After landing, the pilot taxied to apron number four in the southeastern corner of the aerodrome and unloaded the cargo from Sweden. After having done that he left the airport and went to a suite the company reserves for the crew to rest before the return leg to Sweden, which was planned for the following afternoon. The pilot has worked for the company for approximately five years. As per standard policy, the company operates the aircraft with a two person crew. On the day in question the co-pilot had taken ill and the pilot had flown alone. The return leg to Sweden was also planned as a one-person crew flight. The following morning the aircraft was refuelled with 420 l of Jet A-1, in accordance with the pilot’s instructions. All in all ca. 725 kg of fuel was reserved for the return leg. According to his account, the pilot checked in for duty at the airport at around 14:30. After arriving, the pilot began to brush the accumulated snow and frozen snow melt off the upper surfaces of the aircraft. He said that there was a great deal of snow and ice on the aircraft. The cargo that was to go to Sweden did not arrive in time for him to fly it to Skavsta, his primary destination. Therefore, he phoned in a change to the flight plan, choosing Örebro instead as his destination. Örebro was a better choice regarding follow-on transport of the freight. The pilot had outdated meteorological information for the return leg and the operational flight plan form was inadequately filed in. The flight plan was inadvertently filed for another tail number. Information which should be included such as date, crew, prevailing upper winds, estimates to different waypoints, fuel calculations and pilot signatures were omitted from the flight plan. The pilot had not left a copy of the operational flight plan for the ground crew. No weight and balance calculation for the flight was to be found in the cockpit. It had been left in the ground handling service’s briefing room but had been correctly calculated. The pilot did not have access to the latest aeronautical information for the return leg. Printouts of aeronautical information for the inbound leg were found in the cockpit of the wreckage. At 16:52:45 the pilot acknowledged on Helsinki Control Tower (TWR) frequency 118.600 MHz that he was taxiing to takeoff position RWY 22L at intersection Y. At 16:54:40 TWR gave him takeoff clearance from that intersection and gave him the wind direction. The pilot later said that he executed a normal takeoff, using 10 degrees of flaps. The aircraft lifted off at the normal speed of 80-90 KT. At 16:56:05 the pilot called TWR on 118.600 MHz saying “TOWER” just once. As per the pilot’s account everything went well until he reached the height of 800-1000 ft (250-300 m) at which point he retracted the trailing edge flaps. Immediately after flap retraction, the pilot lost control of the aircraft, which began turning to the right. The pilot attempted to fly the aircraft to the end section of runway 22R for an emergency landing. Shortly before crashing to the right side of the extension of runway 22L the pilot managed to get the wings level. He lost consciousness in the crash.
Probable cause:
The chain of events can be regarded as having begun when the aeroplane stood overnight on the tarmac, exposed to the weather. Snowfall accumulated on the upper surfaces of the fuselage, wings and stabilizers during the night forming a thick coat of ice and snow as it partly melted during the day and refroze when the ambient temperature dropped towards the evening. The pilot noticed the impurities when he performed a walkaround check. However, he did not order a de-icing. Instead, he tried to remove the ice with a brush. It is only possible to remove dry and loose snow by brushing. In this case the frozen water that had trickled down remained stuck to surfaces. The pilot executed a takeoff with an aircraft whose aerodynamic properties were fundamentally degraded due to impurities. During the initial climb, immediately after flap retraction, airflow separated from the surface of the wing and the pilot did not manage to regain control of the aircraft. The pilot did not recognize the stall for what is was and did not act in the required manner to recover or, then again, it could be that he had not received sufficient training for these kinds of situations. Several factors are considered to have affected the pilot’s actions. He was either ignorant or negligent as to the effect of impurities on the aeroplane’s aerodynamic properties. Furthermore, the pressure of keeping to the schedule during the early preflight briefing activities may have affected his decision, even though a change in the flight plan eliminated the actual rush. It is the impression of the investigation commission that these factors were the principal ones that contributed to the omission of proper deicing. A probable contributing factor, albeit one difficult to verify, could have been the financial aspect. The company may have considered buying deicing services from an external service provider as an additional expense. Investigations showed that the operator in question had ordered aeroplane de-icing at Helsinki–Vantaa airport only once during the previous and ongoing winter season. The company regularly flew to this airport. Processes were in place for pre-flight briefing as well as for freight forwarding. However, the flight schedules with reference to the opening times of the company’s primary destination airport did not allow for long delays in ground operations. This may have partly put pressure on the pilot to complete the other pre-flight activities as soon as possible. As for the flap setting, the pilot’s takeoff technique was not proper for the existing circumstances. Moreover, when the aeroplane stalled, the pilot did not execute any effective corrective action to regain control of the aircraft. These would have been, among other things: having reset the flaps to the position prior to the stall as well as having taken advantage of the engine power reserve. As per his account, the pilot did not utilize all available engine power. Instead, he stuck to the maximum value prescribed for normal operations as specified in the aircraft operations manual. The fact that the said flight was flown, contrary to normal operations with only a one person crew, can be considered a contributing factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-28PD in Tallinn: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 10, 2003 at 1942 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ES-NOY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tallinn - Helsinki
MSN:
1AJ006-04
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
ENI827
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
10856
Captain / Total hours on type:
510.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2827
Copilot / Total hours on type:
475
Aircraft flight hours:
1428
Aircraft flight cycles:
2141
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport on a mail flight to Helsinki, carrying three crew members (two pilots and one mechanic) and a load consisting of 514 kilos of mail. Four seconds after lift off from runway 08, while climbing to a height of 12 metres and at a speed of 170 km/h, the left engine suffered vibrations. The power lever for the left engine was brought back to idle then in a full forward position. Nevertheless, the aircraft lost height, nosed down and crashed in a wooded area located one km past the runway end. Both pilots were killed and the mechanic was seriously injured.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the right engine failed during initial climb following the rupture of a turbine ball bearing due to poor lubrication.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226T Merlin III in Helsinki: 7 killed

Date & Time: Feb 24, 1989 at 2350 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N26RT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Southend - Helsinki
MSN:
T-216
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
12991
Aircraft flight hours:
4401
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was completing a night charter flight from Southend to Helsinki, carrying seven passengers and one pilot. On final approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport runway 22, the pilot elected to reduce the speed when the aircraft lost altitude, descended below the MDA, struck the ground and came to rest inverted in a snow covered field located about one km short of runway threshold. A passenger was seriously injured while seven other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It is believed that the pilot probably encountered difficulties in controlling the altitude and an excessive speed during the final approach procedure. As a result, he retarded engine power by pulling both speed levers backwards. Investigations revealed that the flight idle gate allowing the speed levers to be stopped before being positioned at idle was worn, which allowed the pilot to position both levers to idle position while still on approach. This caused the aircraft to lose speed and altitude and to descend below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) until it struck the ground.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- The pilot did not have sufficient experience on this type of aircraft,
- The pilot's training on such operation was insufficient,
- The accident occurred in demanding instrument flight conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Seinäjoki-Ilmajoki: 6 killed

Date & Time: Nov 14, 1988 at 0714 LT
Operator:
Registration:
OH-EBA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Helsinki – Seinäjoki-Ilmajoki
MSN:
110-226
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
WW701
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
13766
Captain / Total hours on type:
306.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1012
Copilot / Total hours on type:
188
Aircraft flight hours:
8542
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, the crew started a night approach to Seinäjoki-Ilmajoki Airport. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck trees, stalled and crashed in a wooded area located 800 meters short of runway 32. Both pilots and four passengers were killed while six other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed. There was no fire. At the time of the accident, the RVR for runway 32 was 1,200 meters with a vertical visibility of 300 feet.
Probable cause:
The immediate cause of the accident was the decision to continue the NDB approach in difficult visibility circumstances. The airplane descended below minimum altitude without the required visual contact with approach lights or the runway. Contributory factors were the airline's poor safety culture due to pressures of performance, highlighted by the pilot because of his personality structure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation I in Helsinki

Date & Time: Nov 19, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OH-CAR
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
500-0144
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While on a night approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The captain reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in an open field located few km from the airport. The aircraft belly landed in a snow covered field and came to rest, broken in two. All six occupants evacuated the cabin and took refuge in a nearby house before being rescued.
Probable cause:
Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the crew failed to refuel the aircraft prior to takeoff as they thought the fuel quantity remaining was sufficient for the short flight to Vantaa Airport.

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Joensuu: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 28, 1986
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OH-CDU
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Helsinki - Joensuu
MSN:
402B-0034
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful cargo flight from Helsinki, the pilote initiate the descent to Joensuu Airport. The visibility was poor due to snow falls and on final, the pilot lost control of the aircraft that crashed 7 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the loss of control occurred after the pilot suffered a spatial disorientation while completing an approach in poor visibility. The following findings were reported:
- Limited visibility due to snow falls,
- There was no automatic pilot system,
- A beacon by Joensuu Airport was unserviceable at the time of the accident.

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-1-DK in Kuopio: 15 killed

Date & Time: Oct 3, 1978 at 2131 LT
Operator:
Registration:
DO-10
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kuopio - Helsinki
MSN:
12050
YOM:
1943
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Circumstances:
Shortly after a night takeoff from Kuopio Airport, while climbing, the right engine failed. The captain elected to return for an emergency landing and initiated a turn to the left when the airplane lost height and crashed in the Juurusvesi Lake, about one km from the airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 15 occupants were killed, among them politicians and businessmen who were flying back to Helsinki after attending a National Defence Course meeting organized by the Finnish Defence Forces.
Crew:
1st Lt Kari Halmetoja, pilot,
M/Sgt Seppo Raninen, copilot,
Sgtm Heikki Mannila, flight engineer.
Passengers:
Risto K. Alanko,
Kirsti Hollming,
Aaro Kenttä,
Pekka Lahdensuu,
Olavi Majlander,
Arto Merisaari,
Antti Pohjonen,
Kari Sinisalo,
Viljo Särkkä,
Olli Varho,
Col Aarno Hukari,
Lt Col Tapio Kokkonen.
Probable cause:
The failure of the right engine was the consequence of the failure of the 5th cylinder due to fatigue cracks that could not be detected during the last maintenance check.

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Helsinki: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 16, 1977
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OH-CFM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
402B-0215
YOM:
1972
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Vantaa Airport in Helsinki, the pilot reported engine problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. Shortly later, the airplane lost height and crashed in flames near the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
An engine failed shortly after takeoff for unknown reasons while the second engine partially lost power.