Region

Crash of a Comp Air CA-8 in Jämijärvi: 8 killed

Date & Time: Apr 20, 2014 at 1540 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OH-XDZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jämijärvi - Jämijärvi
MSN:
01
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
1029
Captain / Total hours on type:
43.00
Aircraft flight hours:
809
Aircraft flight cycles:
3015
Circumstances:
The Tampere Skydiving Club (TamLK) organized the skydiving event “Easter Boogie” at Jämijärvi aerodrome, in the Satakunta region, on Sunday 20 Apr 2014. The event started on Maundy Thursday, 17 Apr 2014 and was planned to end on Easter Monday, 21 Apr 2014. The aircraft reserved for the event were Finland’s Sport Aviators’ Comp Air 8 airplane (CA8, OH-XDZ), which was intended to be used to take skydivers up to 4 000 m, and the Tampere Skydiving Club’s own Cessna U206F (OH-CMT), to be used for jumps from lower altitudes. On Sunday morning the cloud base hampered skydiving operations, which is why the activity started with student jumps from the Cessna. The pilot of the accident flight flew two flights on the Cessna. Once the weather improved he began to fly on the OH-XDZ. He flew two flights on it before he took a lunch break. Another pilot flew four flights on the airplane, following which it was topped up with 240 l of fuel. After refuelling the pilots changed duties again and the pilot of the accident flight flew yet another skydiving flight, landing at 15:25. Ten skydivers boarded the airplane for the accident flight. Takeoff occurred at 15:28 from northern runway 27 of Jämijärvi aerodrome. The airplane climbed to 4 230 m AGL by making a wide, left turn. The pilot steered the aircraft to the jump run, which was over the southern runway. Some of the skydivers sitting at the rear rose to their knees, and two of them cracked the jump door open so as to check the jump run. The skydivers then gave instructions to the pilot as regards correcting the jump run. The pilot adjusted the heading following which he reduced engine power to idle, reducing airspeed to approximately 70-75 kt. Nonetheless, the skydivers noted that they had overshot the jump line and requested that the pilot take them to a new run. The skydivers closed the door. The pilot increased engine power and, according to his account, simultaneously began to turn to the left at a 20-30 degree bank angle. He did not order the skydivers to return to their seats as he was homing in on the new jump run. At the end of the turn the occupants of the aircraft felt a downward acceleration which the skydivers experienced as a force pushing them towards the cabin ceiling. Approximately three seconds later the situation returned to normal. According to the pilot the airspeed was approximately 100 kt when they encountered the vertical acceleration. A moment later the pilot noticed that the airplane was in a descent and that the airspeed had suddenly risen to over 180 kt IAS. According to the pilot the airspeed peaked at 185 kt. He attempted to end the descent by pulling on the control stick. The aircraft levelled out or went into a shallow climb. He reduced engine power to idle to decrease the airspeed. The pilot said that the pitch control stick forces were relatively high. The aircraft returned to level flight, or to a gentle climb. The longitudinal control force suddenly decreased and the airplane suddenly flipped forward past the vertical axis. One of the surviving skydivers said that he heard a crushing sound roughly at the same time; how-ever, he was unsure of the precise point in time of the sound. The aircraft became uncontrollable and began to rotate around its vertical axis, akin to an inverted spin. According to eyewitness videos the aircraft was turning to the left. The videos show that the right wing was buckled against the fuselage and that a vapour trail of fuel was streaming from the damaged wing. While the aircraft was spinning its left wing, which was intact, was pointing upwards and the airplane was falling with its right side forward. Shouts of “open the jump door, bail out immediately” were heard inside the airplane. The pilot concluded that the aircraft was so badly damaged that it was no longer possible to recover from the dive. He unbuckled his seat belts and opened the pilot’s door on his left at approximately 2 000 m. The pilot jumped out at approximately 1 800 m and opened his emergency parachute. Even though twists had developed in the parachute’s lines, the pilot managed to untangle them. The skydiver sitting at the rear of the seat positioned next to the pilot (skydiver 3) noted that it would be impossible for him to make it to the jump door. Therefore, he chose the pilot’s door as a point of exit. It was extremely difficult to get to the door because the airplane was spinning. The skydiver sitting at the front of the seat positioned next to the pilot (skydiver 2) followed skydiver 3 on his way to the cockpit door and pushed skydiver 3 out of the door. Following egress, skydiver 3 immediately hit his head on airplane structures. The blow momentarily blurred his field of vision but he remained conscious. The Automatic Activation Device (AAD) opened the reserve parachute almost immediately after egress, at approximately 250 m. While skydiver 2 was still behind skydiver 3 he grabbed the control stick, intending to reduce the g-forces caused by the spinning and make it easier to bail out of the airplane. He soon realized that the airplane did not respond to stick movements and exited through the pilot’s door immediately behind skydiver 3. The skydiver who had occupied the furthest forward position (skydiver 1) assisted skydiver 2 in exiting through the door. The AAD of skydiver 2 opened his reserve parachute at approximately 200 m. After skydiver 2 had bailed out neither skydiver 1, situated closest to the pilot’s door, nor the remaining seven skydivers in the rear of the cabin managed to bail out. The airplane collided with the ground at 15:40 and caught fire immediately. The pilot landed approximately 300 m downwind from the wreckage. Skydiver 3 landed on a dirt road, some 60 m from the wreckage and skydiver 2 in the woods, approximately 40 m from the wreckage.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that the stress resistance of the right wing’s wing strut was exceeded as a result of the force which was generated by a negative g-force. The force which resulted in the buckling of the wing strut was the direct result of a negative (nose-down) change in pitching moment, in conjunction with an engine power reduction intended to decrease the high airspeed. The buckling was followed by the right wing folding against the fuselage and the jump door. The aircraft entered into a flight condition resembling an inverted spin, which was unrecoverable. It was impossible to exit through the jump door.
The contributing factors were the following:
1. There was a fatigue crack on the wing strut. Because of the damage to the aircraft it was not possible to investigate the mechanism of the fatigue crack formation. It is possible that, in addition to the stress caused to the aircraft by short flights and high takeoff weights, the temperature changes caused by the exhaust gas stream as well as vibration contributed to the fatigue cracking.
2. The nature of skydiving operations generated many takeoffs and landings in relation to flight hours. A significant part of the operations was flown close to the maximum takeoff weight. These factors increased the structural stress.
3. The pilot’s limited flight experience on a powerful turboprop aircraft, his inadequate training as regards aircraft loading and its effects on the centre of gravity and airplane behavior, the high weight of the aircraft and the aft position of the CG in the beginning of a new jump line and, possibly, the pilot’s incorrect observation of the actual visual horizon contributed to the onset of the occurrence. During the turn to a new jump run the aircraft began to descend and very rapidly accelerated close to its maximum permissible airspeed. The pilot did not immediately realize this.
4. The structural modifications on the wing increased the loads on the aircraft and the wing struts. Their effects had not been established beforehand. The kit manufacturer was aware of the modifications. No changes to the Permit to build were applied for in writing regarding the modifications. Neither the build supervisor nor the aircraft inspectors were aware of the origin or the effects of the modifications.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Super Cargomaster in Helsinki

Date & Time: Jan 31, 2005 at 1700 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-KYH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Helsinki-Örebro
MSN:
208B-0817
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
Helsinki – Örebro
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3886
Captain / Total hours on type:
3657.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6126
Circumstances:
The aircraft landed at Helsinki–Vantaa airport at around 02:47 on Monday, 31.1.2005. After landing, the pilot taxied to apron number four in the southeastern corner of the aerodrome and unloaded the cargo from Sweden. After having done that he left the airport and went to a suite the company reserves for the crew to rest before the return leg to Sweden, which was planned for the following afternoon. The pilot has worked for the company for approximately five years. As per standard policy, the company operates the aircraft with a two person crew. On the day in question the co-pilot had taken ill and the pilot had flown alone. The return leg to Sweden was also planned as a one-person crew flight. The following morning the aircraft was refuelled with 420 l of Jet A-1, in accordance with the pilot’s instructions. All in all ca. 725 kg of fuel was reserved for the return leg. According to his account, the pilot checked in for duty at the airport at around 14:30. After arriving, the pilot began to brush the accumulated snow and frozen snow melt off the upper surfaces of the aircraft. He said that there was a great deal of snow and ice on the aircraft. The cargo that was to go to Sweden did not arrive in time for him to fly it to Skavsta, his primary destination. Therefore, he phoned in a change to the flight plan, choosing Örebro instead as his destination. Örebro was a better choice regarding follow-on transport of the freight. The pilot had outdated meteorological information for the return leg and the operational flight plan form was inadequately filed in. The flight plan was inadvertently filed for another tail number. Information which should be included such as date, crew, prevailing upper winds, estimates to different waypoints, fuel calculations and pilot signatures were omitted from the flight plan. The pilot had not left a copy of the operational flight plan for the ground crew. No weight and balance calculation for the flight was to be found in the cockpit. It had been left in the ground handling service’s briefing room but had been correctly calculated. The pilot did not have access to the latest aeronautical information for the return leg. Printouts of aeronautical information for the inbound leg were found in the cockpit of the wreckage. At 16:52:45 the pilot acknowledged on Helsinki Control Tower (TWR) frequency 118.600 MHz that he was taxiing to takeoff position RWY 22L at intersection Y. At 16:54:40 TWR gave him takeoff clearance from that intersection and gave him the wind direction. The pilot later said that he executed a normal takeoff, using 10 degrees of flaps. The aircraft lifted off at the normal speed of 80-90 KT. At 16:56:05 the pilot called TWR on 118.600 MHz saying “TOWER” just once. As per the pilot’s account everything went well until he reached the height of 800-1000 ft (250-300 m) at which point he retracted the trailing edge flaps. Immediately after flap retraction, the pilot lost control of the aircraft, which began turning to the right. The pilot attempted to fly the aircraft to the end section of runway 22R for an emergency landing. Shortly before crashing to the right side of the extension of runway 22L the pilot managed to get the wings level. He lost consciousness in the crash.
Probable cause:
The chain of events can be regarded as having begun when the aeroplane stood overnight on the tarmac, exposed to the weather. Snowfall accumulated on the upper surfaces of the fuselage, wings and stabilizers during the night forming a thick coat of ice and snow as it partly melted during the day and refroze when the ambient temperature dropped towards the evening. The pilot noticed the impurities when he performed a walkaround check. However, he did not order a de-icing. Instead, he tried to remove the ice with a brush. It is only possible to remove dry and loose snow by brushing. In this case the frozen water that had trickled down remained stuck to surfaces. The pilot executed a takeoff with an aircraft whose aerodynamic properties were fundamentally degraded due to impurities. During the initial climb, immediately after flap retraction, airflow separated from the surface of the wing and the pilot did not manage to regain control of the aircraft. The pilot did not recognize the stall for what is was and did not act in the required manner to recover or, then again, it could be that he had not received sufficient training for these kinds of situations. Several factors are considered to have affected the pilot’s actions. He was either ignorant or negligent as to the effect of impurities on the aeroplane’s aerodynamic properties. Furthermore, the pressure of keeping to the schedule during the early preflight briefing activities may have affected his decision, even though a change in the flight plan eliminated the actual rush. It is the impression of the investigation commission that these factors were the principal ones that contributed to the omission of proper deicing. A probable contributing factor, albeit one difficult to verify, could have been the financial aspect. The company may have considered buying deicing services from an external service provider as an additional expense. Investigations showed that the operator in question had ordered aeroplane de-icing at Helsinki–Vantaa airport only once during the previous and ongoing winter season. The company regularly flew to this airport. Processes were in place for pre-flight briefing as well as for freight forwarding. However, the flight schedules with reference to the opening times of the company’s primary destination airport did not allow for long delays in ground operations. This may have partly put pressure on the pilot to complete the other pre-flight activities as soon as possible. As for the flap setting, the pilot’s takeoff technique was not proper for the existing circumstances. Moreover, when the aeroplane stalled, the pilot did not execute any effective corrective action to regain control of the aircraft. These would have been, among other things: having reset the flaps to the position prior to the stall as well as having taken advantage of the engine power reserve. As per his account, the pilot did not utilize all available engine power. Instead, he stuck to the maximum value prescribed for normal operations as specified in the aircraft operations manual. The fact that the said flight was flown, contrary to normal operations with only a one person crew, can be considered a contributing factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Oulu: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 20, 1994 at 1627 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N911SG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bremerhaven – Oulu – Murmansk
MSN:
P-510
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2024
Captain / Total hours on type:
11.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3310
Circumstances:
The aircraft registered N911SG arrived in Oulu on a private flight from Bremerhaven, Germany (EDWB) on 20 December 1994, with the intention to continue the flight to Murmansk, Russia (ULMM). Landing time at Oulu airport was 15.03. The aircraft had one passenger in addition to the pilot-in-command and a representative of the operator company, who had been marked as a crew member. After the landing the pilot-in-command contacted air traffic control by radio and told that the aircraft needed refuelling, without mentioning the fuel type required. The ATC officer transmitted the information by telephone to the fuel company, saying that the aircraft would take JET. According to the delivery receipt, the aircraft was refuelled with 664 litres of jet fuel, JET A-1, whereas the proper fuel type for the aircraft would have been AVGAS 100LL. The aircraft was refuelled on a stand situated in front of the terminal building. The fuel was delivered by a tanker car used only for JET A-1 refuelling and equipped with labels clearly indicating the fuel type. The representative of the aircraft operator/possessor company, who had been registered as a crew member in the aircraft log book, was present during refuelling, and the tanks were filled up according to his instructions on the quantity of fuel needed. He also accepted the fuel sample presented to him and signed the delivery receipt. He paid for the fuel in cash. The fuel tanks had not been marked with the minimum fuel grade of aviation gasoline used, as provided for in the airworthiness requirements. The filling orifices were equipped with restrictors in order to prevent jet fuel nozzles from going in and thus to prevent incorrect refuelling. The tanker car replenishment nozzle had been manufactured with an expansion, which had been shaped and dimensioned to fulfil the requirements set for jet fuel nozzles in different standards. The expansion is intended to prevent jet fuel nozzles from fitting into the orifices of aviation gasoline tanks. However, after the expansion the nozzle tip had been shaped as a Camlock coupling, which was smaller in dimension than the expansion and thus fitted into the reduced filling orifices, making it possible to fill the aviation gasoline tanks with jet fuel. During refuelling, the pilot-in-command visited meteo and paid for the landing. The aircraft had an IFR flight plan drawn up by the pilot-in-command for the continued flight from Oulu to Murmansk. According to the plan, flight time was one hour and 35 minutes, alternate aerodrome Ivalo (EFIV) and endurance 5 hours. The aircraft left for this planned flight from Oulu, runway 30, at 16.19. It had been cleared to Murmansk and to climb after take-off to FL 160 with a right turn. According to the ATC officer who had monitored the take-off, the gradient of climb was rather low. Four minutes after take-off the ATC officer gave the departure time to the aircraft and asked the crew to change over to Rovaniemi Area Control Centre radio frequency. The crew acknowledged the frequency. Without contacting Rovaniemi ACC the crew called again at Oulu ATC frequency at 4 min 47 sec after take-off, stating that they wanted to return to the airport because they were having some problems. The ATC officer cleared the aircraft to call on final 12. Approximately 10 seconds after this transmission the ATC officer asked whether any emergency equipment was needed, and the answer was negative. At 16.25.25, when the ATC officer asked if the crew had the field in sight, the crew confirmed this and reported that their DME distance was 6 nm. At 16.26.11 the crew called mayday, stating that both engines were stopping. At 16.26.38 the mayday call was repeated and emergency landing reported. Rovaniemi ACC monitored the aircraft by radar, and the last reliable radar contact was established at 16.26.30. On the basis of recorded radar data, the crash site was estimated to be approximately 1 NM from Laanila NDB, in the direction of 60°. Rescue units found the aircraft in a forest at 17.06. It had struck into trees, turned upside down and been destroyed. The aircraft door was shut and the occupants were still inside. The passenger on the back seat had been thrown away from his seat and was found dead at the accident site. The pilot-in-command was on the left front seat, seriously injured and unconscious, with his seat belt fastened (he died from his injuries 10 days later on December 30). The right crew seat occupant was injured but conscious, and his seat belt was fastened as well. It came out during the investigation that he was actually a passenger.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by incorrect refuelling. This was made possible by a series of human errors, which together with the fact that the technical defences failed, permitted the aircraft to be refuelled with Jet A-1 instead of Avgas 100LL. The incorrect fuel caused knocking, which resulted in engine damage and eventual stopping of both engines.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo C off Oulu

Date & Time: Aug 20, 1992
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OH-PRA
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
31-7612080
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a maritime patrol flight on behalf of the Finnish Border Guards (Rajavartiolaitos). While descending to Oulu Airport, both engines stopped simultaneously. The crew reduced his altitude and ditched the aircraft in the Liminga Bay, few km from the airport. Both pilots were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion.

Crash of a Short SC.7 Skyvan 3 Variant 200 off Mariehamn: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 1, 1989
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OH-SBB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Helsinki - Mariehamn
MSN:
1838
YOM:
1967
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a cargo flight from Helsinki-Malmi Airport to Mariehamn on behalf of DHL. On approach at an altitude of 2,000 feet, both engines failed. The crew lost control of the airplane that crashed in the sea few km offshore. The aircraft sank and both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- Poor flight preparation on part of the crew,
- The crew failed to follow the pre-takeoff checklist,
- The crew failed to pay attention to fuel gauges.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226T Merlin III in Helsinki: 7 killed

Date & Time: Feb 24, 1989 at 2350 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N26RT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Southend - Helsinki
MSN:
T-216
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
12991
Aircraft flight hours:
4401
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was completing a night charter flight from Southend to Helsinki, carrying seven passengers and one pilot. On final approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport runway 22, the pilot elected to reduce the speed when the aircraft lost altitude, descended below the MDA, struck the ground and came to rest inverted in a snow covered field located about one km short of runway threshold. A passenger was seriously injured while seven other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It is believed that the pilot probably encountered difficulties in controlling the altitude and an excessive speed during the final approach procedure. As a result, he retarded engine power by pulling both speed levers backwards. Investigations revealed that the flight idle gate allowing the speed levers to be stopped before being positioned at idle was worn, which allowed the pilot to position both levers to idle position while still on approach. This caused the aircraft to lose speed and altitude and to descend below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) until it struck the ground.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- The pilot did not have sufficient experience on this type of aircraft,
- The pilot's training on such operation was insufficient,
- The accident occurred in demanding instrument flight conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Seinäjoki-Ilmajoki: 6 killed

Date & Time: Nov 14, 1988 at 0714 LT
Operator:
Registration:
OH-EBA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Helsinki – Seinäjoki-Ilmajoki
MSN:
110-226
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
WW701
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
13766
Captain / Total hours on type:
306.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1012
Copilot / Total hours on type:
188
Aircraft flight hours:
8542
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, the crew started a night approach to Seinäjoki-Ilmajoki Airport. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck trees, stalled and crashed in a wooded area located 800 meters short of runway 32. Both pilots and four passengers were killed while six other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed. There was no fire. At the time of the accident, the RVR for runway 32 was 1,200 meters with a vertical visibility of 300 feet.
Probable cause:
The immediate cause of the accident was the decision to continue the NDB approach in difficult visibility circumstances. The airplane descended below minimum altitude without the required visual contact with approach lights or the runway. Contributory factors were the airline's poor safety culture due to pressures of performance, highlighted by the pilot because of his personality structure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation I in Helsinki

Date & Time: Nov 19, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OH-CAR
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
500-0144
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While on a night approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The captain reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in an open field located few km from the airport. The aircraft belly landed in a snow covered field and came to rest, broken in two. All six occupants evacuated the cabin and took refuge in a nearby house before being rescued.
Probable cause:
Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the crew failed to refuel the aircraft prior to takeoff as they thought the fuel quantity remaining was sufficient for the short flight to Vantaa Airport.

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Joensuu: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 28, 1986
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OH-CDU
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Helsinki - Joensuu
MSN:
402B-0034
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful cargo flight from Helsinki, the pilote initiate the descent to Joensuu Airport. The visibility was poor due to snow falls and on final, the pilot lost control of the aircraft that crashed 7 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the loss of control occurred after the pilot suffered a spatial disorientation while completing an approach in poor visibility. The following findings were reported:
- Limited visibility due to snow falls,
- There was no automatic pilot system,
- A beacon by Joensuu Airport was unserviceable at the time of the accident.

Crash of a Cessna 404 Titan II in Ylivieska

Date & Time: Aug 31, 1986
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OH-CIG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seinäjoki - Ylivieska
MSN:
404-0242
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful cargo flight from Seinäjoki, the pilot initiated the approach by night and foggy conditions. On final, the twin engine aircraft struck power cables and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The pilot was seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.