Virginia

While on approach at night, in VMC, the left engine lost power due to fuel starvation. The propeller was not feathered, the l/g was left down, and the aircraft drifted left of crs, struck trees, and then the ground. One gallon of fuel was drained from the right wing, engine and fuel line. No fuel was found in the left wing, engine and fuel line. The copilot said the fuel quantity system was erratic with the left side more erratic, and the right side reading about 10 gallons more than the left side. Testing found the right side indicated about 45 gallons more than was present while the left side was inoperative. There was no requirement for periodic recalibration of the fuel quantity system. The owner/pilot had operated the aircraft on 32 flights, over 23 hours, and refueled 23 times using partial fills, since he had full tanks. The pilot was checked out 17 months prior and the instructor said the pilot was fine, however, he was cautioned him to enroll in recurrent training. There was no record he did. The pilot had received an FAA checkride 19 months prior to the accident, which he passed.

The airplane departed Winchester Regional Airport under VFR mode and was completing a routine point-to-point flight to Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport (PHF), Virginia after conducting a flight inspection of the ILS at Winchester Regional Airport. After takeoff, while flying at an altitude of 2,000 feet, the crew requested permission to climb but this was denied by ATC due to traffic. Awaiting an IFR clearance, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Knob located about 30 miles southwest from Winchester Airport. All three occupants were killed.

The instrument rated pilot was en route to his granddaughter's graduation exercises scheduled for the following day. He had received two preflight weather briefings from flight service and he was advised that marginal VFR conditions existed en route, and instrument meteorological conditions at his destination, and that VFRflight was not recommended. A witness who was below the mountain said he heard a low flying aircraft overhead. He stated that he caught a glimpse of the airplane and said it was 'well below the crest of the mountain' heading south. The weather as reported by the witness was about 200 overcast and visibility below 1 mile in fog. He also mentioned that the clouds had obscured the mountain. Shortly thereafter, he heard what was later determined to be the collision. Search personnel located the burning wreckage on top of Mitchells mountain 50 miles north of Charlottesville. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot returned to the airport at dusk and made a visual approach to runway 23. He reported that as the aircraft was descending thru 350 feet msl on final approach, it was aligned with the runway, the airspeed was 105 knots and the flaps were extended 25°. However, the aircraft hit trees and crashed about 1/8 mile short of the runway. No mechanical malfunction was reported. The airport elevation was 20 feet. Both occupants were slightly injured.

The pilot unsuccessfully tried twice to land on runway 03. He did a visual approach and then an ILS approach. The pilot and witnesses reported foggy conditions at the airport. The pilot flew the ILS approach as a third attempt to land when the crash occurred. Radar data showed the aircraft descended to 1,100 feet msl on the approach, about 1/2 mile from the runway. The published decision height was 1,118 feet. The radar data indicated the aircraft passed east of the runway threshold at an altitude of 1,000 feet msl. The next and last radar data shows the aircraft about 2,300 feet beyond and 400 feet east of the runway. The investigation revealed the aircraft struck trees east of the runway and then crashed in a cornfield. An examination did not disclose evidence of a malfunction. The landing gear was retracted and the flaps were extended 10°. All five occupants were killed.

Witnesses reported the aircraft took off and climbed to about 300 feet while in a wide left turn. According to witnesses, the wings were rocking and erratic engine sounds were noted. The aircraft was turning downwind when it abruptly pitched down, rolled left until inverted, descended and crash. Examination of the aircraft revealed no evidence of malfunction, although the left prop had less rotational damage than the right prop. Examination of aircraft records revealed the aircraft was inactive for about 9 years until it was returned to service less than a year before the accident. The aircraft accumulated about 17 hours since it was returned to service. The pilot stated to a witness before the accident that he had not done single engine operation in the aircraft. The aircraft was overloaded more than 200 lbs. All five occupants were killed.

This was the first flight after a maintenance inspection. The flaps were left full down after a post-inspection by company mechanics, before the flight. Witnesses stated the flaps were down when the aircraft taxied to takeoff on runway 19L. Witnesses stated the aircraft climbed steeply after it lifted off with a pitch attitude up to 60°. According to witnesses, the aircraft climbed to 200 to 500 feet agl, before it stalled and descended nose down in a left turn. The aircraft crashed about 300 ft left of and 2000 ft down the rwy. Examination of the aircraft revealed the flaps were full down. The scroll type checklist was positioned at the beginning of the takeoff check. The flight manual recommends a 10 degree flap setting for takeoff and prohibits flap full down takeoff. Review of previous DHC-6 accidents involving flap full down resulted in a steep takeoff climb and excessive pitch attitude followed by a stall. The position of the control lock suggests it may have been in the locked position during the takeoff. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft had descended through a cloud layer enroute for the scheduled landing at IAD and according to the crew had picked up some trace rime ice on its wing surfaces. Although pitot and sas (stall avoidance system) heat were used the captain elected not to use engine inlet anti-ice. Just inside the outer marker the left engine lost power followed shortly by the right engine. The captain was able to set the aircraft down in an open field where the gear collapsed during the landing roll. The engines were successfully run-up at the Garrett facility. The flight manual contains a warning and a note stating that engine heat and continuous ignition must be used after leaving icing conditions until the pilot is confident that any significant residual ice will not be ingested into the engines. Ice was found lying beneath the right wing which matched the curvature of the leading edge of the wing. A round conical shaped piece of ice was found along the wreckage path which matched the nose of the propeller spinner.

The pilot began taking off from a downward sloping, 2,300 feet runway in light winds. The reported temperature was 92°; the density altitude was about 2,500 feet. The pilot reported the aircraft accelerated normally to V1 speed; however, it hit the tops of trees about 350 to 500 feet beyond the runway, then struck the ground after traveling about another 1,000 feet. Performance charts showed the aircraft would have needed a takeoff distance of 2,200 feet to clear a 50 feet obstacle in calm wind. The pilot reported the wind was from 010° at 3 to 5 knots. A witness reported a 3 to 5 knot tailwind. No preimpact part failure or malfunction was found.

The aircraft, which was stolen from the airport, collided with the ground in a steep angle approximately one mile south of the airport. Instrument meteorological conditions existed with local visibility less than one mile as reported by persons near the accident site. The pilot was not instrument or multi engine rated. The pilot was denied a medical certificate about two weeks prior to the accident due to uncontrolled hypertension and diabetes. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.