Crash of a Piper PA-31T Cheyenne II in Deerfield: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 1, 1999 at 1402 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N602RM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Jonesboro – Weyers Cave
MSN:
31-7920081
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1857
Captain / Total hours on type:
24.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4852
Circumstances:
The pilot was descending the airplane from 23,000 feet for an instrument approach. All communications were normal until after he acknowledged an instruction to contact approach control, when radio contact was lost. Radar contact ceased at 11,300 feet due to radar signal reception difficulties. Contact was lost almost directly over the eventual impact site, which was on the eastern side of a small valley. Witnesses on the western side of the valley had seen the airplane flying near them, at treetop level, eastbound, and clear of clouds. About the same time, on the eastern side of the valley where the airplane would impact trees, then terrain, there was heavy rain. The commercial pilot had about 1,850 total flight hours, and had completed a 'Wings III' flight proficiency program and an instrument proficiency program about two months earlier. The airplane had been on a continuous maintenance program. At the accident site, all of the airplane's control surfaces were found, and the engines and propellers displayed signatures consistent with being under power at impact. There were insufficient remains to conduct an autopsy or toxicological testing. Previously, the pilot's father, two uncles, and a male cousin had suffered fatal heart attacks.
Probable cause:
Loss of control of the airplane due to pilot incapacitation following a heart attack.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 340A in Chesapeake: 2 killed

Date & Time: Mar 16, 1999 at 0950 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N13DT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chesapeake – Bunnell
MSN:
340A-0063
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4500
Captain / Total hours on type:
10.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3575
Circumstances:
After takeoff, the airplane returned to the departure airport for an emergency landing. The aircraft was observed in the vicinity of the runway threshold, about 500 feet above the ground, with it's left propeller feathered, when it entered a left bank which increased to about 90 degrees. The airplane then entered a spin, descended, and impacted the ground. Examination of wreckage revealed the camshaft of the left engine had failed as a result of a fatigue crack. No other abnormalities were observed of airframe or engine. The left engine had accumulated about 1,200 hours since overhaul. The pilot purchased the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident. At that time, he reported 700 hours of flight experience in multi-engine airplanes, of which, 10 hours were in the make and model of the accident airplane.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during a single engine emergency landing, after experiencing a failure of the left engine. A factor in this accident was the failure of the left engine's camshaft due to a fatigue crack.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 45 in Wallops Flight Facility

Date & Time: Oct 27, 1998 at 1456 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N454LJ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wallops Flight Facility - Wallops Flight Facility
MSN:
45-004
YOM:
1998
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13073
Captain / Total hours on type:
767.00
Aircraft flight hours:
339
Circumstances:
The Learjet was participating in water ingestion tests, which required multiple landing rolls through a diked pool on the runway. On one of the landing rolls, the airplane's left main landing gear and nose landing gear tracked through the pool, while the right main landing gear tracked outside the pool. The airplane veered to the left, departed the left side of the runway, and struck a pickup truck parked adjacent to the runway. The airplane came to rest inverted and on fire. Formal hazard identification and risk management procedures were not employed and no alignment cues were in place on the runway to facilitate pool entry alignment. Further, the accident truck, other vehicles, heavy equipment, and personnel were placed hundreds of feet inside the FAA recommended runway-safe and object-free areas during the test.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilot to obtain/maintain alignment with the water pool, which resulted in the loss of control. Factors in the accident were the inadequate preflight planning of the flight test facility and the airplane manufacturer which resulted in hazards in the test area and the subsequent collision of the airplane with a vehicle.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-61P Aerostar (Ted Smith 601P) in Waterford: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 27, 1997 at 2052 LT
Registration:
N885JC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Allentown – Leesburg
MSN:
61-0826-8163434
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1600
Captain / Total hours on type:
525.00
Circumstances:
During arrival at night, the flight was being controlled by a developmental controller (DC), who was being supervised by an instructor (IC). The pilot (plt) was instructed to descend & cross the STILL Intersection (Int) at 3,000 ft. STILL Int was aligned with the localizer (loc) approach (apch) course, 10.1 mi from the apch end of runway 17 (rwy 17); the final apch fix (FAF) was 3.9 mi from the rwy. About 5 mi before reaching STILL Int, while on course & level at 3,000 ft, the plt was cleared for a Loc Rwy 17 Apch. Radar data showed the aircraft (acft) continued to STILL Int, then it turned onto the loc course toward the FAF. Shortly after departing STILL Int, while inbound on the loc course, the acft began a descent. Before the acft reached the FAF, the DC issued a frequency change to go to UNICOM. During this transmission, the IC noticed a low altitude alert on the radar display, then issued a verbal low altitude alert, saying, 'check altitude, you should be at 1,500 ft (should have said '1,800 ft' as that was the minimum crossing altitude at the FAF), altitude's indicating 1,200, low altitude alert.' There was no response from the plt. This occurred about 2 mi before the FAF. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the apch was 720 ft. The acft struck tree tops at 750 ft, about 1/2 mi before the FAF. The IC's remark 'you should be at 1,500 ft' was based on an expired apch plate with a lower FAF minimum crossing altitude; the current minimum crossing altitude at the FAF was 1,800 ft. Apch control management had not made the current plate available to the controllers. Investigation could not determine whether a current apch plate would have prompted an earlier warning by the controllers.
Probable cause:
Failure of the pilot to follow the published instrument (IFR) approach procedure, by failing to maintain the minimum altitude for that segment of the approach.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-61P Aerostar (Ted Smith 601P) in Chesapeake: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jan 2, 1997 at 1937 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N3CD
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chesapeake – Atlanta
MSN:
61-0353-108
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
2100
Aircraft flight hours:
1949
Circumstances:
The airplane departed the airport and crashed shortly thereafter. Before departure, the airplane was fueled with 120 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. According to the refueler, the airplane had full fuel tanks. The refueler also indicated the pilot had stated he wanted to be airborne prior to the arrival of bad weather. After the accident, the engines and propellers were disassembled and examined. No engine or propeller discrepancies were noted, except (post impact) heat damage.
Probable cause:
Failure of the pilot to maintain proper altitude/clearance above the ground after takeoff. A related factor was the pilot's self-induced pressure to depart before the arrival of bad weather.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-63F near Narrows: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 22, 1996 at 1810 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N827AX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Greensboro - Greensboro
MSN:
45901
YOM:
1967
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
8087
Captain / Total hours on type:
869.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8426
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1509
Aircraft flight hours:
62800
Aircraft flight cycles:
24234
Circumstances:
The airplane impacted mountainous terrain while on a post-modification functional evaluation flight (FEF). The pilot flying (PF) had applied inappropriate control column back pressure during the clean stall maneuver recovery attempt in an inadequate performance of the stall recovery procedure established in ABX's (Airborne Express) operations manual. The pilot not flying (PNF), in the right seat, was serving as the pilot-in-command and was conducting instruction in FEF procedures. The PNF failed to recognize, address and correct the PF's inappropriate control inputs. An inoperative stall warning system failed to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt. The flightcrew's exposure to a low fidelity reproduction of the DC-8's stall characteristics in the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator was a factor in the PF holding aft (stall-inducing) control column inputs when the airplane began to pitch down and roll. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised FEF flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991. The informality of the ABX FEF training program permitted the inappropriate pairing of two pilots for an FEF, neither of whom had handled the flight controls during an actual stall in the DC-8.
Probable cause:
The inappropriate control inputs applied by the flying pilot during a stall recovery attempt, the failure of the non flying pilot-in-command to recognize, address, and correct these inappropriate control inputs, and the failure of ABX to establish a formal functional evaluation flight program that included adequate program guidelines, requirements and pilot training for performance of these flights. Contributing to the causes of the accident were the inoperative stick shaker stall warning system and the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator's inadequate fidelity in reproducing the airplane's stall characteristics.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 65-A90 King Air in Orange

Date & Time: Nov 16, 1996 at 1500 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N814SW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Orange - Orange
MSN:
LJ-186
YOM:
1967
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1170
Captain / Total hours on type:
40.00
Circumstances:
The pilot was taking off with 10 jumpers onboard. At the rotation speed of 100 knots, he used elevator trim to rotate the airplane, but it did not lift off the runway. He continued moving the trim wheel violently to pitch the nose up, and attempted to pull back on the yoke, but the airplane collided with rising terrain off the end of the runway. A witness did not see any of the flight controls move during the pilot preflight inspection, and during the takeoff roll, he did not observe a nose up rotation of the airplane. The pilot reported that he removed a single pin control lock from the yoke during preflight. The Beech control lock consisted of two pins, two chains, and a U-shaped engine control lock. The pilot walked away from the wreckage after the accident. No control locks were found in the wreckage. However, the control column shaft exhibited distress signatures on the periphery of the hole where the control lock is installed. No other evidence was found of any other form of mechanical jamming, interference, or discontinuity with the flight controls. Investigators were unable to identify any potential source of interference, other than a control lock, that could have simultaneously jammed both pitch and roll control. According to the airplane's manufacturer, about 3 to 6 degree of trim would have been normal for the airplane's takeoff conditions.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate preflight inspection and his failure to complete the pre-takeoff checklist which resulted in a takeoff roll with the control lock in place.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 65 Queen Air in West Point: 12 killed

Date & Time: Sep 10, 1995 at 1840 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N945PA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
West Point - West Point
MSN:
LC-217
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Captain / Total flying hours:
2980
Captain / Total hours on type:
462.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1530
Circumstances:
The airplane was loaded with 10 sport parachutists and one pilot. Later, investigators calculated that the maximum gross weight was exceeded by 149.6 pounds, and the center of gravity was 2.87 inches aft of the aft limit. The cabin door had been removed for parachuting operations; however, an altered Flight Manual Supplement had been used as authority for the door removal. The airplane was not on the FAA-approved eligible list for such removal. The airplane needed to be refueled before flight, but the quantity of fuel in the airport's underground storage tank was below the electric cutoff level. Fuel was pumped manually from the storage tank into plastic jugs, which were used to refuel the airplane. Before takeoff, samples of fuel were reported to have been drained from the airplane's fuel tanks (sumps). According to witnesses, they heard an engine misfiring during takeoff. They observed the airplane level off during the initial climb and start a shallow right turn. The bank angle gradually increased from shallow to steep as the nose dropped and the airplane descended. Other witnesses observed the airplane in a steep dive just before it crashed in the rear of a residence. One person in the residence was killed. A postaccident fire destroyed the accessory sections of both engines. Examination of the airplane disclosed evidence that the right engine had been shut down and the right propeller had been feathered; however, no preimpact mechanical failure was found. A sample of excess fuel was obtained from the tank that was used to refuel the airplane, but no observable quantity of water or contamination was found.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate preflight/preparation, his failure to ensure proper weight and balance of the airplane, and his failure to obtain/maintain minimum control speed, which resulted in a loss of aircraft control after loss of power in one engine. A factor relating to the accident was: loss of power in the right engine for undetermined reason(s).
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave in Cedar Bluff: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 14, 1995 at 2154 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N922DC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Nashville - Lancaster
MSN:
31-8414028
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
6650
Aircraft flight hours:
2423
Circumstances:
ATC data indicated the airplane was in cruise flight at about 17,000 feet MSL, when the pilot deviated from the intended flight path to avoid thunderstorms. At 2150 EDT, the pilot requested clearance to climb to 19,000 MSL. At 2152, he requested a right turn out of weather and advised ATC that he was 'getting icing.' Between 2153 and 2154, the pilot's transmissions were garbled, then at 2154:38, he stated '...trying to get out of this mess.' Radar and radio contact with the airplane were lost. An in-flight breakup of the airplane occurred, and wreckage was found scattered over a 3 mile area. Postaccident examination revealed the outboard portion of the right wing had failed and separated in an upward and aft direction. Scrape marks were found on the right side of the fuselage, and there was damage to the right horizontal stabilizer and rudder. Also, there was evidence that both engines had separated in flight; they were found about 1 mile from the main wreckage. No preexisting mechanical malfunction or fatigue of the airplane was found. The pilot had received a complete weather briefing, and was advised of severe weather along the intended route of flight.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper planning/decision, and his allowing the airplane to exceed its maximum design/stress limitation. Factors relating to the accident were: the adverse weather conditions, and the pilot's continued flight into adverse weather.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 25D in Washington DC: 12 killed

Date & Time: Jun 18, 1994 at 0625 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XA-BBA
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mexico City – New Orleans – Washington DC
MSN:
25-223
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Captain / Total flying hours:
1706
Captain / Total hours on type:
1314.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
852
Copilot / Total hours on type:
426
Aircraft flight hours:
6118
Aircraft flight cycles:
5663
Circumstances:
The airplane crashed 0.8 nm south of the threshold of the runway during an ILS approach in instrument meteorological conditions. The captain was not authorized to attempt the approach and was relatively inexperienced for an approach under the weather conditions. The captain failed to adhere to acceptable standards of airmanship during two unstabilized approaches. After the unsuccessful ils approach to runway 01R, the captain should have held for improvements in the weather, requested the runway 19L ILS, or proceeded to his alternate. An operating gpws aboard the airplane would have provided continuous warning to the crew for the last 64 seconds of flight and might have prevented the accident. All 10 passengers were Mexican citizens flying to Washington DC to assist a game of the World Football Championship.
Probable cause:
Poor decision making, poor airmanship, and relative inexperience of the captain in initiating and continuing an unstabilized instrument approach that led to a descent below the authorized altitude without visual contact with the runway environment. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the lack of a GPWS on the airplane.
Final Report: