Charlottesville

About one minute after takeoff, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that the airplane's control wheels were locked. The controller subsequently cleared the pilot to land on any runway. No further transmissions were received from the pilot and the airplane continued straight ahead. Witnesses observed the airplane in a slow, level descent, until it impacted wires and then the ground. During a postaccident examination of the airplane, flight control continuity was confirmed to all the flight controls. Due to the impact and post-crash fire damage, a cause for the flight control anomaly, as reported by the pilot, could not be determined; however, several unsecured cannon plugs and numerous unsecured heat damaged wire bundles were found lying across the control columns forward of the firewall. Examination of the airplane logbooks revealed the most recent maintenance to the flight controls was performed about four months prior to the accident. The airplane had flown 91 hours since then.

The twin-engine turboprop airplane touched down about 1,900 feet beyond the approach end of the 6,000-foot runway. During the rollout, the pilot reduced power by pulling the power levers aft, to the flight idle stop. He then depressed the latch levers, and pulled the power levers further aft, beyond the flight idle stop, through the beta range, into the reverse range. During the power reduction, the pilot noticed, and responded to a red beta light indication. Guidance from both the manufacturer and the operator prohibited the use of reverse thrust on the ground with a red beta light illuminated. The pilot pushed the power levers forward of the reverse range, and inadvertently continued through the beta range, where aerodynamic braking was optimum. The power levers continued beyond the flight idle gate into flight idle, a positive thrust setting. The airplane continued to the departure end of the runway in a skid, and departed the runway and taxiway in a skidding turn. The airplane dropped over a 60-foot embankment, and came to rest at the bottom. The computed landing distance for the airplane over a 50-foot obstacle was 3,900 feet, with braking and ground idle (beta) only; no reverse thrust applied. Ground-taxi testing after the accident revealed that the airplane could reach ground speeds upwards of 85 knots with the power levers at idle, and the condition levers in the flight position. Simulator testing, based on FDR data, consistently resulted in runway overruns. Examination of the airplane and component testing revealed no mechanical anomalies. Review of the beta light indicating system revealed that illumination of the red beta light on the ground was not an emergency situation, but only indicated a switch malfunction. In addition, a loss of the reverse capability would have had little effect on computed stopping distance, and none at all in the United States, where performance credit for reverse thrust was not permitted.

The instrument rated pilot was en route to his granddaughter's graduation exercises scheduled for the following day. He had received two preflight weather briefings from flight service and he was advised that marginal VFR conditions existed en route, and instrument meteorological conditions at his destination, and that VFRflight was not recommended. A witness who was below the mountain said he heard a low flying aircraft overhead. He stated that he caught a glimpse of the airplane and said it was 'well below the crest of the mountain' heading south. The weather as reported by the witness was about 200 overcast and visibility below 1 mile in fog. He also mentioned that the clouds had obscured the mountain. Shortly thereafter, he heard what was later determined to be the collision. Search personnel located the burning wreckage on top of Mitchells mountain 50 miles north of Charlottesville. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot began taking off from a downward sloping, 2,300 feet runway in light winds. The reported temperature was 92°; the density altitude was about 2,500 feet. The pilot reported the aircraft accelerated normally to V1 speed; however, it hit the tops of trees about 350 to 500 feet beyond the runway, then struck the ground after traveling about another 1,000 feet. Performance charts showed the aircraft would have needed a takeoff distance of 2,200 feet to clear a 50 feet obstacle in calm wind. The pilot reported the wind was from 010° at 3 to 5 knots. A witness reported a 3 to 5 knot tailwind. No preimpact part failure or malfunction was found.

On approach to Charlottesville Airport, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with fog, low ceiling and rain showers. Unable to locate the runway, he decided to initiate a go-around when he lost control of the airplane that nosed down and crashed few dozen yards short of runway. The pilot was slightly injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Eastern Air Lines, Flight EA 663 was a scheduled passenger flight originating at Boston, MA (BOS), and terminating at Atlanta, GA (ATL) with intermediate stops at New York (JFK), Richmond, VA (RIC), Charlotte, NC (CLT), and Greenville-Spartanburg, SC (GSP). The DC-7B took off from runway 31L at New York-JFK at 18:20 on an IFR clearance to the Richmond Airport. The crew flew a Dutch 7 Standard Instrument Departure. About 18:24 EAL 663 was further cleared to 8,000 feet and instructed to turn right to a heading of 150 degrees. The flight acknowledged this clearance and reported leaving 3,000 feet. Shortly thereafter the crew reported leaving 3,500 feet at which time the flight was instructed to turn left to a heading of 090 degrees. At 18:25, while climbing through 3700 feet Departure Control instructed the flight to "... turn right now, heading one seven zero to Victor one thirty nine, traffic 2 o'clock five miles northeast bound below you." The flight responded, "OK we have the traffic, turning one seven zero..." The other traffic was Pan American flight 212 arriving from San Juan. The Boeing 707 was being vectored to intercept the final approach course to runway 31R. At approximately 18:24 Approach Control had instructed the PA212 to turn right to a heading of 020 degrees and inquired if the flight had as yet, reached 3,000 feet. Approach Control then instructed the flight to report leaving each 500-foot level down to 3,000 feet and advised the flight of " ...Traffic at 11 O'clock, six miles southeast bound just climbing out of three (3,000 feet)." As the Eastern DC-7 was turning from 090 to 170 degrees, the airplane was in a 35-degree banked nearly level turn. With PA212 approx. 700 feet lower and four miles away at 3 o'clock, PA212 would not be visible to the captain of EA663 until he was nearly around the turn and on the rollout. Upon completion of the turn, they were on a nearly head-on, converging course with PA212. At that moment, PA212 started a left turn to the assigned heading of 360 degrees. The results of this turn would be to produce an illusion of an apparent collision track. Also, EA663 was turning away from the background lights of the Long Island shore into a black area, so there was no horizon available to assist in the determination of the relative altitude of the target airplane. Under these circumstances, it is likely that the Eastern pilot started a descent, initially as a precautionary measure, which would give him a longer time to observe the other aircraft, and provide him with a measure of vertical separation. Afraid of a collision, PA212 rolled rapidly to the right and also initiated a descent. The Eastern pilot also made a rapid roll to the right and/or a pull up. In this circumstance the DC-7 was placed in an unusual attitude, resulting in spatial disorientation of the crew. They were not able to recover from the vertical bank. The DC-7 struck the sea and disintegrated.

About 2040, October 30, 1959, Piedmont Airlines Flight 349 crashed on Bucks Elbow Mountain located about 13 miles west of the Charlottesville-Albemarle County, Virginia, Airport. The crew of 3 and 23 of 24 passengers were killed; the sole survivor was seriously injured. The aircraft, a DC-3, N55V, was demolished by impact. From the available evidence it is the determination of the Board that this accident occurred during an intended instrument approach. More specifically, it occurred during the inbound portion of the procedure turn which was being flown 6 to 11 miles west of the maneuvering area prescribed by the instrument approach procedure. The Board concludes that the lateral error resulted from a navigational omission which took place when the pilot did not turn left about 20 degrees in conformity to V-140 airway at the Casanova omni range station. Consequently, when the pilots believed the flight was over the Rochelle intersection it was in fact 13 files northwest of tract position. As a result of this position, when the pilot turned left and flew the heading normally flown from Rochelle intersection, the path of the aircraft over the ground was displaced 8 to 11 miles west of the prescribed track. The Board further concludes that the error was undetected because tracking and other instrument approach requirements were not followed precisely. From information regarding the personal background of Captain and expert medical analysis of this information, it is the Board's opinion that preoccupation resulting from mental stress may have been a contributing factor in the accident cause.