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Shortly after takeoff from Maturín-José Tadeo Monagas Airport, while in initial climb, the engine apparently failed. The aircraft lost height, collided with trees and came to rest against a concrete wall. The pilot was seriously injured.

Before taking off, the pilot canceled an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan that she had filed and requested a visual flight rules (VFR) on-top clearance, which the controller issued via the Monterey Five departure procedure. The departure procedure included a left turn after takeoff. The pilot took off and climbed to about 818 ft then entered a right turn. The air traffic controller noticed that the airplane was in a right-hand turn rather than a left-hand turn and issued a heading correction to continue a right-hand turn to 030o , which the pilot acknowledged. The airplane continued the climbing turn for another 925 ft then entered a descent. The controller issued two low altitude alerts with no response from the pilot. No further radio communication with the pilot was received. The airplane continued the descent until it contacted trees, terrain, and a residence about 1 mile from the departure airport. Review of weather information indicated prevailing instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) in the area due to a low ceiling, with ceilings near 800 ft above ground level and tops near 2,000 ft msl. Examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s climbing right turn occurred shortly after the airplane entered IMC while the pilot was acknowledging a frequency change, contacting the next controller, and acknowledging the heading instruction. Track data show that as the right-hand turn continued, the airplane began descending, which was not consistent with its clearance. Review of the pilot’s logbook showed that the pilot had not met the instrument currency requirements and was likely not proficient at controlling the airplane on instruments. The pilot’s lack of recent experience operating in IMC combined with a momentary diversion of attention to manage the radio may have contributed to the development of spatial disorientation, resulting in a loss of airplane control.

The pilot, who was the owner of the airplane, and the pilot-rated passenger, whose maintenance facility had recently completed work on the airplane, departed on the second of two local flights on the day of the accident as requested by the pilot, since he had not flown the airplane recently. Flight track and engine monitor data indicated that, about 15 minutes after takeoff, fuel flow and engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT) values were consistent with a total loss of left engine power at an altitude about 2,500 ft. Engine power was fully restored about 4 minutes later. Between the time of the power loss and subsequent restoration, the airplane directly overflew an airport and was in the vicinity of a larger airport. It is likely that the left engine was intentionally shut down to practice one engine inoperative (OEI) procedures. Had the loss of power been unanticipated, the pilot would likely have initiated a landing at one of these airports in accordance with the airplane’s published emergency procedure, which was to land as soon as possible if engine power could not be restored; however, data indicated that engine power was restored, and the flight continued back to the departure airport. About 7.5 minutes later, about 6 nautical miles from the departure airport, engine data indicated a total loss of right engine power, followed almost immediately by a total loss of left engine power, at an altitude about 3,500 ft. A battery voltage perturbation consistent with starter engagement was recorded about 1 minute later, followed by a slight increase in left engine fuel flow; however, the data did not indicate that left engine power was fully restored during the remainder of the flight. The airplane continued in the direction of the departure airport as it descended and ultimately impacted a tree and terrain and came to rest upright. A witness saw the airplane flying toward her with the landing gear extended and stated that it appeared as though neither of the two propellers was turning. A doorbell security camera near the accident site captured the airplane as it passed overhead at low altitude. Sound spectrum analysis of the footage indicated that one engine was likely operating about 1,600 rpm while the other was operating at less than 1,000 rpm. The right propeller was found feathered at the accident site. An examination and test run of the right engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left propeller blades exhibited bending, twisting, and chordwise polishing consistent with the engine producing some power at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine and engine-driven fuel pump did not reveal any anomalies. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilots were conducting practice OEI procedures and intentionally shut down the right engine. The loss of left engine power immediately after was likely the result of the pilot’s failure to properly identify and verify the “failed” engine before securing it, which resulted in an inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. Although partial left engine power was restored before the accident (as indicated by fuel flow values, damage to the left propeller, and sound spectrum analysis of security camera video), the left engine power available was inadequate to maintain altitude for reasons that could not be determined, and it is likely that the pilot was performing a forced landing when the accident occurred. It is also likely that the pilot’s decision to conduct intentional OEI flight at low altitude resulted in reduced time and altitude available for troubleshooting and restoration of engine power following the inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. The 67-year-old pilot was a Canadian national and had never applied for a Federal Aviation Administration medical certificate. According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the pilot was issued a category 1 license with knowledge of a previous condition and knowledge of currently taking Xarelto (rivaroxabam). No acute or historical cardiovascular event was found on autopsy. Toxicology testing detected the sedating antihistamine cetirizine just below therapeutic levels in the pilot’s blood. A very low concentration of the narcotic pain medication codeine was detected in the pilot’s blood and urine; codeine’s metabolite morphine was also detected in his urine. The mood stabilizing medication lamotrigine was detected but not quantified in the pilot’s blood and urine. Thus, the pilot was taking some impairing medications and likely had a psychiatric condition that could impact decision-making and performance; however, given the circumstances of the accident, including the presence of the pilot-rated passenger to operate the airplane, the effects from the pilot’s use of cetirizine, codeine, and lamotrigine were not likely factors in this accident.

The pilot was flying a non precision approach in instrument meteorological conditions at night. While flying the procedure turn for the approach, the airplane’s speed decayed toward the stall speed before the airplane accelerated back to the standard approach speed. During the descent from the final approach fix, the airplane’s descent stopped for about 30 seconds and then the airplane descended at a rate of about 1,300 ft per minute. The airplane decelerated and continued to descend until the airspeed was about 85 knots (about 7 knots above the calculated stall speed for flaps 20°) and the altitude was 500 ft mean sea level. The last recorded data point showed the airplane about 460 ft mean sea level and 750 ft from the accident site. The airplane impacted a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued and destroyed the airplane. Impact signatures were consistent with a low-energy impact. Examination of the airframe and engines did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. Signatures on the engines and propellers were consistent with both engines providing power at impact. A review of the pilot’s toxicological information found that the level of eszopiclone in his specimens was subtherapeutic and thus not likely a factor in the accident. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with an inadvertent aerodynamic stall from which the pilot was unable to recover.

The twin engine aircraft departed Ganzhou Airport at 1440LT on a cloud seeding mission over the Jiangxi Region. While flying in clouds, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent, entered a spin and eventually crashed in a residential area. All five occupants were killed and one people on the ground was slightly injured.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a cargo flight to Cobán. After takeoff from Guatemala City-La Aurora runway 02, while in initial climb, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed in trees located in a garden along the 4th Avenue, in the Zone 9 district, approximately 980 metres from the end of runway 02. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and the pilot was killed.

The pilot-in-command seated in the right seat was providing familiarization in the multiengine airplane to the left seat pilot during a flight to a nearby airport for fuel. Shortly after takeoff, one of the pilots reported an engine problem and advised that they were diverting to a nearby airport. A witness along the route of flight reported hearing the engines accelerating and decelerating and then popping sounds; several witnesses near the accident site reported hearing no engine sounds. The airplane impacted a building and terrain about 10 minutes after takeoff. Very minimal fuel leakage on the ground was noted and only 23 ounces of aviation fuel were collected from the airplane’s five fuel tanks. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted for either engine or propeller; the damage to both propellers was consistent with low-to-no power at impact. Since the pilot could not have visually verified the fuel level in the center fuel tank because of the low quantity of fuel prior to the flight, he would have had to rely on fuel consumption calculations since fueling based on flight time and the airplane’s fuel quantity indicating system. Although the fuel quantity indications at engine start and impact could not be determined postaccident from the available evidence, if the fuel quantity reading at the start of the flight was accurate based on the amount of fuel required for engine start, taxi, run-up, takeoff, and then only to fly the accident flight duration of 10 minutes, it would have been reading between 8 and 10 gallons. It is unlikely that the pilot, who was a chief pilot of a cargo operation and tasked with familiarizing company pilots in the airplane, would have knowingly initiated the flight with an insufficient fuel load for the intended flight or with the fuel gauge accurately registering the actual fuel load that was on-board. Examination of the tank unit, or fuel quantity transmitter, revealed that the resistance between pins A and B, which were the ends of the resistor element inside the housing, fell within specification. When monitoring the potentiometer pin C, there was no resistance, indicating an open circuit between the wiper and the resistor element. X-ray imaging revealed that the conductor of electrical wire was fractured between the end of the lugs at the wiper and for pin C. Bypassing the fractured conductor, the resistive readings followed the position of the float arm consistent with normal operation. Visual examination of the wire insulation revealed no evidence of shorting, burning or damage. Examination of the fractured electrical conductor by the NTSB Materials Laboratory revealed that many of the individual wires exhibited intergranular fracture surface features with fatigue striations in various directions on some individual grains. It is likely that the many fatigue fractured conductor strands of the electrical wire inside the accident tank unit or fuel transmitter resulted in the fuel gauge indicating that the tanks contained more fuel than the amount that was actually on board, which resulted in inadequate fuel for the intended flight and a subsequent total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. The inaccurate fuel indication would also be consistent with the pilot’s decision to decline additional fuel before departing on the accident flight. While the estimated fuel remaining since fueling (between 15 and 51 gallons) was substantially more than the actual amount on board at the start of the accident flight (between 8 and 10 gallons), the difference could have been caused by either not allowing the fuel to settle during fueling, and/or the operational use of the airplane. Ultimately, the fuel supply was likely completely exhausted during the flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of power to both engines. Given the circumstances of the accident, the effects from the right seat pilot’s use of cetirizine and the identified ethanol in the left seat pilot, which was likely from sources other than ingestion, did not contribute to this accident.

On 22 May 2020 at 13:05 hrs PST, the Pakistan International Airlines aircraft Airbus A320-214, registration number AP-BLD, took off from Lahore (Allama Iqbal International Airport – AIIAP) Pakistan to perform a regular commercial passenger flight (PK8303) to Karachi (Jinnah International Airport – JIAP) Pakistan, with 8 crew members (01 Captain, 01 First Officer, and 06 flight attendants) and 91 passengers on board. At 14:35 hrs the aircraft performed an ILS approach for runway 25L and touched down without landing gears, resting on the engines. Both engines scrubbed the runway at high speed. Flight crew initiated a go-around and informed “Karachi Approach” that they intend to make a second approach. About four minutes later, during downwind leg, at an altitude of around 2000 ft, flight crew declared an emergency and stated that both engines had failed. The aircraft started losing altitude. It crashed in a populated area, short of runway 25L by about 1340 meters. An immediate subsequent post impact fire initiated. Out of 99 souls on-board, 97 were fatally injured and 02 passengers survived. On ground 04 persons were injured however 01 out of these reportedly expired later at a hospital.

Below, the preliminary report published by the Pakistan AAIB.

The pilot was conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in instrument meteorological conditions at the conclusion of a cross-country flight. The airplane had been cleared to land, but the tower controller canceled the landing clearance because the airplane appeared not to be established on the localizer as it approached the locator outer marker. The approach controller asked the pilot if he was having an issue with the airplane’s navigation indicator, and the pilot replied, “yup.” Rather than accept the controller’s suggestion to use approach surveillance radar (ASR) approach instead of the ILS approach, the pilot chose to fly the ILS approach again. The pilot was vectored again for the ILS approach, and the controller issued an approach clearance after he confirmed that the pilot was receiving localizer indications on the airplane’s navigation equipment. The airplane joined the localizer and proceeded toward the runway while descending. The pilot was instructed to contact the tower controller; shortly afterward, the airplane entered a left descending turn away from the localizer centerline. At that time, the airplane was about 3 nautical miles from the locator outer marker. The pilot then told the tower controller, “we’ve got a prob.” The tower controller told the pilot to climb and maintain 3,000 ft msl and to turn left to a heading of 180°. The pilot did not respond. During the final 5 seconds of recorded track data, the airplane’s descent rate increased rapidly from 1,500 to about 5,450 ft per minute. The airplane impacted terrain about 1 nm left of the localizer centerline in a left-wing-down and slightly nose down attitude at a groundspeed of about 90 knots. A postimpact fire ensued. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument flight experience could not be determined with the available evidence for this investigation. Most of the fuselage, cockpit, and instrument panel was destroyed during the postimpact fire, but examination of the remaining wreckage revealed no anomalies. Acoustic analysis of audio sampled from doorbell security videos was consistent with the airplane's propellers rotating at a speed of 2,500 rpm before a sudden reduction in propeller speed to about 1,200 rpm about 2 seconds before impact. The airplane’s flightpath was consistent with the airplane’s avionics receiving a valid localizer signal during both instrument approaches. However, about 5 months before the accident, the pilot told the airplane’s current maintainer that the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) displayed erroneous heading indications. The maintainer reported that a replacement HSI was purchased and shipped directly to the pilot to be installed in the airplane; however, the available evidence for the investigation did not show whether the malfunctioning HSI was replaced before the flight. The HSI installed in the airplane at the time of the accident sustained significant thermal and fire damage, which prevented testing. During both ILS approaches, the pilot was cleared to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until the airplane was established on the localizer. During the second ILS approach, the airplane descended immediately, even though the airplane was below the lower limit of the glideslope. Although a descent to the glideslope intercept altitude (2,100 ft msl) would have been acceptable after joining the localizer, such a descent was not consistent with how the pilot flew the previous ILS approach, during which he maintained the assigned altitude of 3,000 ft msl until the airplane intercepted the glideslope. If the HSI provided erroneous heading information during the flight, it could have increased the pilot’s workload during the instrument approach and contributed to a breakdown in his instrument scan and his ability to recognize the airplane’s deviation left of course and descent below the glideslope; however, it is unknown if the pilot had replaced the HSI.

The personal flight departed from Lafayette Regional Airport/Paul Fournet Field (LFT), Lafayette, Louisiana, and entered the clouds when the airplane was at an altitude of about 200 ft above ground level. Before takeoff, the controller issued an instrument flight rules clearance to the pilot, instructing him to turn right onto a heading of 240° and climb to and maintain an altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level (msl) after takeoff. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data for the accident flight started at 0920:05, and aircraft performance calculations showed that the airplane was climbing through an altitude of 150 ft msl at that time. The calculations also showed that the airplane then turned slightly to the right toward the assigned heading of 240° and climbed at a rate that varied between 1,000 and 2,400 ft per minute and an airspeed that increased from about 151 to 165 knots. At 0920:13, the airplane started rolling back toward wings level and, 7 seconds later, rolled through wings level and toward the left. At that time, the airplane was tracking 232° at an altitude of 474 ft and an airspeed of 165 knots. The airplane’s airspeed remained at 165 knots for about 10 seconds before it started increasing again, and the airplane continued to roll steadily to the left at an average roll rate of about 2° per second. The aircraft performance calculations further showed that, at 0920:40, the airplane reached a peak altitude of 925 ft msl. At that time, the airplane was tracking 200°, its bank angle was about 35° to the left, and its airspeed was about 169 knots. The airplane then started to descend while the left roll continued. At 0920:55, the airplane reached a peak airspeed of about 197 knots, which then started decreasing. At 0920:57, the airplane descended through 320 ft at a rate of descent of about 2,500 ft per minute and reached a bank angle of 75° to the left. At 0920:58, the controller issued a low altitude alert, stating that the pilot should “check [the airplane’s] altitude immediately” because the airplane appeared to be at an altitude of 300 ft msl. The pilot did not respond, and no mayday or emergency transmission was received from the airplane. The last ADS-B data point was recorded at 0920:59; aircraft performance calculations showed that, at that time, the airplane was descending through an altitude of 230 ft msl at a flightpath angle of about -7°, an airspeed of 176 knots, and a rate of descent of about 2,300 ft per minute. (The flightpath angle is in the vertical plane—that is, relative to the ground. The ground track, as discussed previously, is in the horizontal plane—that is, relative to north.) The airplane struck trees and power lines before striking the ground, traveled across a parking lot, and struck a car. The car rolled several times and came to rest inverted at the edge of the parking lot, and a postcrash fire ensued. The airplane continued to travel, shedding parts before coming to rest at the far end of an adjacent field. At the accident site, the surviving passenger told a local police officer that “the plane went straight up and then straight down.”