Mississippi

Shortly after takeoff from Tupelo Regional Airport, while climbing, the twin engine airplane entered a right turn then lost height and crashed near the boundary fence, bursting into flames. Both occupants were killed.

On May 4, 2021, about 2305 central daylight time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 airplane, N322TA, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane collided with a private residence; one occupant was fatally injured, and two other occupants sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. According to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the flight departed Wichita Falls Municipal Airport (SPS), Wichita Falls, Texas, about 2057 and was en route to the Bobby L Chain Municipal Airport (HBG), Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The pilot had filed and activated an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot requested and received clearance to fly the RNAV 13 approach to HBG. The airplane flew to the initial approach fix, performed the procedure turn, and flew a portion of the final approach course. The last ADS-B point was recorded at 2300 about 1.6 miles northwest from the accident site, at an altitude of 1,475 ft mean sea level (msl). An Alert Notification (ALNOT) was issued by air traffic control when the pilot did not provide a cancellation radio call as required after the instrument approach to a non-towered airport. At 2320, law enforcement received a 911 call reporting the accident. There were no radio distress calls recorded from the pilot. The airplane impacted the front section of an occupied residence about 2.2 miles from the approach end of runway 13. A post impact fire ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane and the residential structure. Cockpit instrumentation was mostly consumed by the post-impact fire. The flaps were found at 20° down, and landing gear was extended at the time of impact. According to FAA records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. Documents provided by his MU-2 training facility revealed the pilot completed a flight review in the accident airplane on November 13, 2020, and completed Advisory Circular 91-89 approved MU-2 recurrent training on November 14, 2020. The pilot had purchased the airplane in February 2012. An associate of the pilot reported that the pilot owned a MU-2F model before he acquired the B model. On June 24, 2020, the pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate. On the medical certificate application, the pilot reported having accrued 7,834 total hours. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crashresistant recorder device.

Two instrument-rated commercial pilots and one passenger were conducting a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions when they began discussing an electrical malfunction; they then reported the electrical problem to air traffic control. The airplane subsequently made a descending right turn and impacted wooded terrain at a high speed. Most components of the airplane were highly fragmented, impact damaged, and unidentifiable. Based on the limited discussion of the electrical problem on the cockpit voice recorder and the damage to the airplane, it was not possible to determine the specific nature of the electrical malfunction the airplane may have experienced. While it was not possible to determine which systems were impacted by the electrical malfunction, it is possible the flight instruments were affected. The airplane's descending, turning, flight path before impact is consistent with a system malfunction that either directly or indirectly (through a diversion of attention) led to the pilot's loss of awareness of the airplane's performance in instrument meteorological conditions and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.

The aircraft departed MCAS Cherry Point-Cunningham Field in the early afternoon on a personnel transfer mission to El Centro NAS, California. En route, while cruising at an altitude of 20,000 feet, the n°4 blade on the engine n°2 detached, struck the left side of the fuselage, penetrated the cabin, then the right side of the fuselage and eventually impacted the right stabilizer that detached. The aircraft suffered a catastrophic structural failure, causing the cockpit to separate and detach. The airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a soybean field located 11 km southwest of Itta Bena. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 16 occupants were killed.
Crew:
Maj Caine M. Goyette, pilot,
Cpt Sean E . Elliott, copilot,
S/Sgt Joshua Snowden, flight engineer,
Sgt Owen J . Lennon, flight engineer.
G/Sgt Mark A. Hopkins, gunnery
G/Sgt Brendan C . Johnson, gunnery
Sgt Julian M. Kevianne, crewmaster,
L/Cpl Daniel I. Baldassare, crewmaster.
Passengers:
Cpl Collin J. Schaaff
S/Sgt William J. Kundrat,
S/Sgt Robert H. Cox,
S/Sgt Talon R. Leach,
Sgt Chad E . Jenson,
Sgt Joseph J . Murray,
Sgt Dietrich A. Schmiernan,
PO Ryan Lohrey.

On the day of the accident, a line service technician had disconnected the airplane from a battery charger. After disconnecting the battery, he left the right access door open which provided access to the fuel control unit, fuses, fuel line, oil line, and battery charging port as he always did. He then towed the airplane from the hangar it was stored in, and parked it in front of the airport's terminal building. The three passengers arrived first, and then about 30 minutes later the pilot arrived. He uploaded his navigational charts and did a preflight check "which was normal." The engine start, taxi, and engine run up, were also normal. The wing flaps were set to 10°. After liftoff he "retracted the landing gear" and continued to climb. Shortly thereafter the right cowl door opened partially, and started "flopping" up and down 3 to 4 inches in each direction. He reduced the torque to try to prevent the right cowl door from coming completely open. However, when he turned on the left crosswind leg to return to the runway, the right cowl door opened completely, and the airplane would not maintain altitude even with full power, so he "put the nose back down." The airplane struck trees, and then pancaked, and slid sideways and came to rest, in the front yard of an abandoned house. The private pilot and one passenger received minor injuries. Two passengers received serious injuries, one of whom was found out of her seat, unconscious, on the floor of the airplane shortly after the accident, and died about 227 days later. During the investigation, it could not be determined, if she had properly used the restraint system, as it was found unlatched with the seatbelt portion of the assembly extended. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. It was discovered though, that the right access door had not been closed and latched by the pilot before takeoff, as examination of the right access door latches and clevis keepers found them to be functional, with no indication of overstress or deformation which would have been present if the access door had been forced open due to air loads in-flight, or during the impact sequence. Further examination also revealed that the battery charging port cover which was inside the compartment that the right access door allowed access to, had not been placed and secured over the battery charging port, indicating that the preflight inspection had not been properly completed. A checklist that was provided by a simulator training provider was found by the pilot's seat station. Examination of the checklist revealed that under the section titled: "EXTERIOR PREFLIGHT" only one item was listed which stated, "EXTERIOR PREFLIGHT…COMPLETE." It also stated on both sides of the checklist: "FOR SIMULATOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY." A copy of the airplane manufacturer's published pilot's operating handbook (POH) was found in a cabinet behind the pilot's seat where it was not accessible from the pilot's station. Review of the POH revealed that it contained detailed guidance regarding the preflight check of the airplane. Additionally, it was discovered that the landing gear was in the down and locked position which would have degraded the airplane's ability to accelerate and climb by producing excess drag, and indicated that the pilot had not retracted the landing gear as he thought he did, as the landing gear handle was still in the down position. Review of recorded data from the airplanes avionics system also indicated that the airplane had roughly followed the runway heading while climbing until it reached the end of the runway. The pilot had then entered a left turn and allowed the bank angle to increase to about 45°, and angle of attack to increase to about 8°, which caused the airspeed to decrease below the stalling speed (which would have been about 20% higher than normal due to the increased load factor from the steep turn) until the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall, indicating that the pilot allowed himself to become distracted by the open door, rather than maintaining control of the airplane. One of the seriously injured passenger passed away 227 days after the accident.

On June 25, 2014, about 0750 central daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company C90A, N800MK, was substantially damaged following a runway excursion during an attempted go-around at Houston, Mississippi (M44). The commercial-rated pilot, co-pilot, and two passengers were not injured, while one passenger received minor injuries. The airplane was
operated by BECS, LLC under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed for corporate flight that originated at Memphis, Tennessee (MEM). According to the pilot, who was seated in the left, cockpit seat, he was at the controls and was performing a visual approach to runway 21. Just prior to touchdown, while at 90 knots and with approach flaps extended, the right wing "rose severely and tried to put the airplane into a severe left bank." He recalled that the co-pilot called "wind shear" and "go around." As he applied power, the airplane rolled left again, so he retarded the throttles and allowed the airplane to settle into the grass on the left side of runway 21. The airplane struck a ditch, spun around, and came to rest in the grass, upright. A post-crash fire ensued in the left engine area. The pilot and passengers exited the airplane using the main entry door. The pilot reported no mechanical anomalies with the airplane prior to the accident. The co-pilot reported the following. As they turned onto final, he noticed that the wind "picked up" a little by the wind sock. The final approach was stable, and as the pilot began to flare, he noticed the vertical speed indicator "pegged out." The airplane encountered an unexpected wind shear just above the runway. He called out for a go around. The pilot was doing everything he could to maintain control of the airplane. It was a "jarring" effect when they hit the shear. It felt like the wind was trying to lift the tail and cartwheel them over. He felt that the pilot did a good job of keeping the airplane from flipping over. In his 30,000-plus hours flying airplanes, he has never experienced anything quite like what they experienced with this shear. He has instructed on the King Air and does not feel that the pilot could have done anything different to avoid the accident.

On the day of the accident, a mechanic taxied the airplane onto the runway and performed a full power check of both engines, exercised both propellers, and checked each magneto drop with no discrepancies reported. Following the engine run, the mechanic taxied the airplane to the fuel ramp where the fuselage fuel tank was filled; after fueling, the fuselage tank had 41.5 gallons of usable fuel. The mechanic then taxied the airplane to the ramp where the engines were secured and the fuel selector switches were placed to the off position. The mechanic reported that, at that time, the left fuel tank had 4 to 5 gallons of fuel, while the right fuel tank had about 2 to 3 gallons of fuel; the unusable fuel amount for each wing tank is 3 gallons. The pilot taxied the airplane to the approach end of runway 18 and was heard to apply takeoff power. A pilot-rated witness noted that, at the point of rotation, the airplane pitched up fairly quickly to about 20 degrees and rolled left to about 10 to 15 degrees of bank. The airplane continued rolling left to an inverted position and impacted the ground in a 40 degree nose-low attitude. A postcrash fire consumed most of the cockpit, cabin, both wings, and aft fuselage, including the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and fuselage fuel tank. Postaccident inspection of the flight controls, which were extensively damaged by impact and fire, revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Although the flap actuators were noted to be asymmetrically extended and no witness marks were noted to confirm the flap position, a restrictor is located at each cylinder’s downline port by design to prevent a rapid asymmetric condition. Therefore, it is likely that the flap actuators changed positions following impact and loss of hydraulic system pressure and did not contribute to the left roll that preceded the accident. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the fuselage fuel sump revealed the left fuel selector was in the crossfeed position, while the right fuel selector was likely positioned to the on position. (The as-found positions of the fuel selector knobs were unreliable due to postaccident damage.) The starting engines checklist indicates that the pilot is to move both fuel selectors from the on position to the crossfeed position, and back to the on position while listening for valve actuation/movement. The before takeoff checklist indicates that the pilot is to verify that the selectors are in the on position. Although the left engine servo fuel injector did not meet flow tests during the postaccident investigation, this was attributed to postaccident heat damage. Calculations to determine engine rpm based on ground scars revealed that the left engine was operating just above idle, and the right engine was operating about 1,315 rpm, which is consistent with a left engine loss of power and the pilot reducing power on the right engine during the in-flight loss of control. Examination of both propellers determined that neither was feathered at impact. Although the as-found position of the left fuel selector knob could be considered unreliable because of impact damage during the accident sequence, given that right wing fuel tank had no usable fuel, it is unlikely that the experienced pilot would have moved the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position in response to the engine power loss. It is more likely that the pilot failed to return the left fuel selector to the on position during the starting engines checklist and also failed to verify its position during the before takeoff checklist; thus, the left engine was being fed only from the right fuel tank, which had very little fuel. There was likely enough fuel in the right tank and lines for the pilot to taxi and takeoff before the left engine failed, causing the airplane to turn to the left, from which the pilot did not recover.

The Mishap Student pilot (MSP) was flying an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 21 at Keesler AFB. They were in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) at night and the runway was wet. After some deviations on the approach, they arrived over the threshold on a normal glide slope and faster (about 114 kts) than the computed approach speed of 108 kts. The aircraft touched down approximately 1500 feet down the runway. The Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) actuated the speed brakes/spoilers switch and the student began to immediately apply brake pressure. After 4-5 seconds, the instructor recognized that the aircraft was not decelerating and declared that she was taking control of the aircraft. The instructor immediately applied maximum braking with no perceived deceleration. She then grabbed the glare shield in an attempt to gain additional leverage on the brakes and again felt no perceived deceleration. At this point, the aircraft was rapidly running out of available runway. The instructor selected the emergency brakes just prior to arriving at the departure end threshold and the brakes locked resulting in a hydroplane skid. The aircraft departed the prepared surface and came to a halt 190 feet later. As a result of the runway departure, the right main and nose gear collapsed, and the forward fuselage and both wings were heavily damaged.

The pilot received a weather briefing before departure and when near the destination airport, cleared for the NDB approach. The pilot reported the procedure turn inbound; published MDA is 1,300 feet msl. Witnesses on the airport reported heavy low fog and heard the pilot announce over the UNICOM frequency, 'Oh there is fog rolling into Starkville too?' One of the witnesses advised the pilot they could go to another airport due to the fog; the pilot responded he would execute the approach. The witnesses heard the engines operating at full power then heard the impact and saw a fireball. The airplane impacted the runway inverted, slid across the runway, and came to rest in grass off the runway. A post crash fire destroyed the airplane. Tree contact approximately 972 feet northwest of the runway impact location separated approximately 51 inches of the left wing. Examination of the engines, propellers, and flight controls revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The pilot had twice failed his airline transport pilot checkride. The designated examiner of the second failed flight test indicated the pilot was marginal in all flight operations. The NDB was checked after the accident; no discrepancies were noted.

During an IFR arrival, vectors were provided for an ILS runway 16L approach. While on assigned heading and altitude of 270 degrees and 3,000 feet, about 8 miles north of the final approach fix, the pilot was told to turn left to 185 degrees and maintain 2,200 feet until established on the localizer, then he was cleared for the approach. The pilot acknowledged the instructions. About 1 minute later, communication and radar contact with the airplane were lost. Eye witnesses near the accident site observed the airplane as it descended below the cloud layer. The airplane was described as being in a steep left bank with the nose down. Witnesses also stated that the engines were revving. Within seconds of the visual sighting, the airplane crashed. Examination of the airframe failed to disclose a mechanical problem. No fire or smoke was seen coming from the airplane before it crashed. The pilot did not report experiencing a problem with the airplane to the tower controller. Toxicology tests of the pilot indicated O.323 mcg/ml chlorpheniramine (a sedating antihistamine) in liver fluid and 0.073 mcg/ml chlorpheniramine in kidney fluid. Also, unspecified levels of dextromethorphan (a cough suppressant), pseudoephedrine (a decibgestabt), and phenylpropanolamine (a decongestant) were reported in kidney and liver fluids. All medications are available in over-the-counter cold remedies.