Crash of a Beechcraft 350ER Super King Air in Ji'an: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 1, 2021 at 1519 LT
Registration:
B-10GD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
FL-1014
YOM:
2015
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
While completing a cloud seeding mission in the region of Ji'an, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances into three houses located in the Ji'an area. All five occupants were killed and one people on the ground was slightly injured.

Crash of a Cessna 340 in Fargo: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 1, 2016 at 1629 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N123KK
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Fargo - Fargo
MSN:
340-0251
YOM:
1973
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
7898
Aircraft flight hours:
7012
Circumstances:
The airplane was equipped with an air sampling system used to collect air samples at various altitudes. The accident occurred when the pilot was returning to the airport after taking air samples at various altitudes over oil fields. As he was being vectored for an instrument approach, the airplane overshot the runway's extended centerline. The pilot then reported that he had a fire on board. The airplane lost altitude rapidly, and radar contact was lost. Examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane struck the ground at high velocity and a low impact angle. One piece of the airplane's shattered Plexiglas windshield exhibited soot streaking on its exterior surface. This soot streaking did not extend onto the piece's fracture surface, indicative of the smoke source being upstream of the windshield and the smoke exposure occurring before windshield breakup at impact. Both nose baggage compartment doors were found about 2 miles south of the main wreckage, which indicative that they came off at nearly the same time and most likely before the pilot's distress call. Although there was no soot deposits, thermal damage, or deformation to the doors consistent with a "high energy explosion," the separation of the luggage compartment doors could have occurred due to an overpressure caused by the ignition of a fuel air mixture within the nose portion of the airplane. The ignition of fuel air mixtures can create overpressure events when they occur in confinement. An overpressure in the nose baggage compartment may have stretched the airframe enough to allow the doors to push open without deforming the latches. If it was a lean fuel air mixture, it would likely leave no soot residue. Post-accident examination revealed no evidence that the air sampling system, which was strapped to the seat tracks behind the copilot's seat, was the cause of the fire. The combustion heater, which was mounted in the right front section of the nose baggage compartment, bore no evidence of fuel leakage, but a fuel fitting was found loose.
Probable cause:
The loose fuel fitting on the combustion heater that leaked a lean fuel-air mixture into the nose baggage compartment. The mixture was most likely ignited by the combustion heater, blowing off the nose baggage compartment doors and starting an in-flight fire.
Final Report:

Crash of a Harbin Yunsunji Y-12-II in Shenyang

Date & Time: May 16, 2013 at 1000 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-3801
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Shenyang - Shenyang
MSN:
0006
YOM:
1986
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Shenyang-Taoxian Airport, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed on a road short of runway, bursting into flames. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire. The crew was returning to his base in Shenyang following a cloud seeding mission over the Liaoning Province.

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B2-H4 Turbo Porter in Chanthaburi: 4 killed

Date & Time: Mar 29, 2006
Operator:
Registration:
1312
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chanthaburi - Chanthaburi
MSN:
754
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Chanthaburi Airport for a cloud-seeding mission with four passengers and a pilot on board. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the engine failed. The aircraft stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. A passenger was seriously injured while four other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Engine failure for unknown reasons.

Crash of a Cessna 550 Citation II in Fort Yukon

Date & Time: Sep 30, 2005 at 1210 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N77ND
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fairbanks - Fairbanks
MSN:
550-0005
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3712
Captain / Total hours on type:
948.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5696
Copilot / Total hours on type:
141
Aircraft flight hours:
4262
Circumstances:
The flight crew, an airline transport certificated captain, and a commercial certificated co-pilot, were flying a restricted category, icing research equipped airplane in instrument meteorological icing conditions under Title 14, CFR Part 91. The purpose of the flight was to locate icing conditions for a prototype helicopter's in-flight icing tests. While in cruise flight, the airplane encountered icing conditions, and had accumulated about 1" of ice on the leading edges of the wings. The captain reported that he activated the wing deicing pneumatic boots, and the ice was shed from both wings. About 4 minutes after activating the deice boots, both engines simultaneously lost all power. The crew attempted several engine restarts, but were unsuccessful, and made a forced landing on frozen, snow-covered terrain. During the landing, the airplane struck several small, burned trees, and sustained substantial damage. The airplane's ice control system is comprised of two separate systems, one an anti-ice, the other, a deice. The majority of the wings' surfaces are deiced by pneumatic, inflating boots. The inboard section of the wings, directly in front of the engine air inlets, and the engine air inlets themselves, utilize a heated, anti-ice surface to preclude any ice accretion and potential for ice ingestion into the engines. The anti-ice system is not automatic, and must be activated by the flight crew prior to entering icing conditions. A researcher in the aft cabin photographed the airplane's wings before and after the activation of the deice boots. The photographs taken prior to the deice boot activation depicted about 1" of ice on the wings, as well as on the anti-ice (heated) inboard portion of the wings. The photographs taken after the deice boot activation revealed that the ice had been removed from the booted portion of the wings, but ice remained on the inboard, anti-ice segment. An engineer from the airplane's manufacturer said that if the anti-ice system was activated after ice had accumulated on the wings, it would take 2-4 minutes for the anti-ice portion of the wings and engine inlets to heat sufficiently to shed the ice. A postaccident inspection of the anti-ice components found no anomalies, and there was no record of any recent problems with the anti-ice system. The flight crew reported that the anti-ice activation switch is on the captain's side, and they could not recall if or when the anti-ice system was activated. They stated that they did not discuss its use, or use a checklist that addressed the use of the anti-ice system. A section of the airplane's flight manual states: "Failure to switch on the [anti-ice] system before ice accumulation has begun may result in engine damage due to ice ingestion." An inspection by an NTSB power plant engineer disclosed catastrophic engine damage consistent with ice ingestion.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper use of anti-icing equipment during cruise flight, which resulted in ice ingestion into both engines (foreign object damage), the complete loss of engine power in both engines, and an emergency descent and landing on tree covered terrain. Factors associated with the accident were the icing conditions, inadequate crew resource management, and failure to use a checklist.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 340 in Mendoza: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 7, 2005 at 0634 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N5790M
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
340-0044
YOM:
1972
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
On February 7, 2005, about 0634, Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 340, N5790M, registered to and operated by Ward County Irrigation District N°1, impacted with terrain in a mountainous area in Mendoza, Argentina. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and the flight plan information is unknown. The pilot and copilot received fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The flight originated from Aerodrome San Rafael (SAMR), Argentina, earlier that day, at an unspecified time. The initial notification from Argentina's Junta de Investigaciones de Accidentes de Aviacion Civil ( JIAAC) stated the airplane was on a cloud-seeding mission to prevent thunderstorms from developing in that agricultural area.

Crash of a Cessna T207A Skywagon near Henderson: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 8, 2004 at 1031 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N1783U
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Henderson - Henderson
MSN:
207-0383
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1209
Captain / Total hours on type:
117.00
Aircraft flight hours:
12616
Circumstances:
The airplane impacted mountainous terrain in an extreme nose-down attitude following a departure from controlled flight. The purpose of the flight was to check the weather conditions for passenger tour flights that day. The pilot reported about 20 minutes prior to the accident that the ceiling was 6,500 feet mean sea level (msl). Radar data showed that following this weather report, the airplane's radar track continued eastbound and upon its return westbound, at an altitude of about 6,000 feet msl, the airplane entered a series of altitude fluctuations approximately 1 mile west of a ridge that was the location of the accident, descending at 4,000 feet per minute while turning northbound, and then climbing at 3,900 feet per minute while traveling eastbound, prior to disappearing from the radar. The airplane impacted on the eastern side of the ridge. There were no monitored distress calls from the aircraft and no known witnesses to the accident. Prior to the accident, there were reports of vibrations during flight on this aircraft, although many went unreported to maintenance personnel. The day (and flight) prior to the accident, a pilot experienced a vibration during flight with passengers and it was not reported to maintenance personnel because it was logged improperly in the operator's maintenance tracking system. No corrective actions were taken. During the post accident examinations, no portions of the right elevator and trim tab were identified in the wreckage, or at the accident site. The bracket attachment to the right elevator was found loose within the wreckage and was torsionally twisted counterclockwise (aft). Ground and aerial searches for the missing parts based on a trajectory study were unsuccessful. This aircraft was equipped with a foam cored elevator trim tab that was installed during aircraft manufacture. A service difficulty report (SDR) query showed that 47 reports had been issued on elevator trim tab corrosion and many included reports of vibrations during flight. On January 20, 2005, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-05-27, which addressed potential problems with foam-filled elevator trim tabs in the accident make/model airplane, and Cessna 206 and 210 series airplanes. The SAIB indicated that the foam-filled elevator trim tabs, manufactured until 1985, were reported to have corrosion between the tab and the foam. The SAIB further said, in part, "When the skin of the trim tab becomes thin enough due to the corrosion, the actuator can pull the fasteners through the skin and disconnect. When this occurs, the tab can flutter." Some reports indicated prior instances of "vibrations in the tail section and portions of the elevator tearing away with the trim tab." Prior to the issuance of the SAIB, Cessna Aircraft Company issued a Service Bulletin (SB) SEB85-7 on April 5, 1985, that addressed elevator and trim tab inspection due to corrosion from moisture trapped in the foam cored trim tabs. Based on a review of the airplane's logbooks, the SB was not complied with, nor was the operator required to do so based on the FAA approved maintenance specifications.
Probable cause:
A loss of control due to the in-flight separation of the right elevator and elevator trim tab control surfaces. The precipitating reason for the elevator separation could not be resolved as related to the tab foam core issue with the available evidence.
Final Report:

Crash of a Grumman US-2C Tracker in Reno: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 17, 2000 at 1035 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7046U
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Reno - Reno
MSN:
27
YOM:
1957
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
8170
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3700
Circumstances:
During the takeoff climb, the airplane turned sharply right, went into a steep bank and collided with terrain. The airplane began a right turn immediately after departure and appeared to be going slow. A witness was able to distinguish the individual propeller blades on the right engine, while the left engine propeller blades were indistinguishable. The airplane stopped turning and flew for an estimated 1/4-mile at an altitude of 100 feet. The airplane then continued the right turn at a steep bank angle before disappearing from sight. Then the witness observed a plume of smoke. White and gray matter, along with two ferrous slivers, contaminated the chip detector on the right engine. The airplane had a rudder assist system installed. The rudder assist provided additional directional control in the event of a loss of power on either engine. The NATOPS manual specified that the rudder assist switch should be in the ON position for takeoff, landing, and in the event of single-engine operation. The rudder boost switch was in the off position, and the rudder boost actuator in the empennage was in the retracted (off) position. The owner had experienced a problem with the flight controls the previous year and did not fly with the rudder assist ON. The accident flight had the lowest acceleration rate, and attained the lowest maximum speed, compared to GPS data from the seven previous flights. It was traveling nearly 20 knots slower, about 100 knots, than the bulk of the other flights when it attempted to lift off. The airplane was between the 2,000- and 3,000-foot runway markers (less than halfway down the runway) when it lifted off and began the right turn. Due to the extensive disintegration of the airplane in the impact sequence, the seating positions for the three occupants could not be determined. One of the occupants was the aircraft owner, who held a private certificate with a single-engine land rating, was known to have previously flown the airplane on contract flights from both the left and right seats. A second pilot was the normal copilot for all previous contract flights; his certificates had been revoked by the FAA. The third occupant held an airline transport pilot certificate and had never flown in the airplane before. Prior to the accident flight, the owner had told an associate that the third occupant was going to fly the airplane on the accident flight.
Probable cause:
The flying pilot's failure to maintain directional control following a loss of engine power. Also causal was the failure of the flight crew to follow the published checklist and use the rudder assist system, and the decision not to abort the takeoff.
Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-16K near Zavitinsk: 6 killed

Date & Time: Aug 24, 1981 at 1521 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-07514
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Zavitinsk - Zavitinsk
MSN:
6203106
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
Two Tupolev TU-16K of the Soviet Air Force departed Zavitinsk Air Base on a weather reconnaissance mission. Registered CCCP-07034 and CCCP-07514, both military airplanes were carrying a crew of six. While cruising at an altitude of 5,220 meters in good weather conditions, the TU-16 registered CCCP-07514 collided with an Aeroflot Antonov AN-24. Registered CCCP-46653, the AN-24 was completing flight SU811 from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk to Blagoveshchensk with an intermediate stop in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, carrying 27 passengers and five crew members. It departed Komsomolsk-on-Amur Airport at 1456LT for the second leg of the trip and was cleared to climb to 5'200 meters. Both aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an uninhabited area located about 70 km east of Zavitinsk. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All six crew members of the TU-16 were killed as well as 31 occupants on board the AN-24. Three days after the accident, a man aged 20 who was seating in the AN-24 was found slightly injured in the taiga.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the collision was the consequence of a poor organization and management of flights in the area of the Zavitinsk and the non-compliance of the published procedures. The collision was made possible by a lack of interaction, coordination and communication between the civilian and military air controllers.

Crash of a Boeing C-135F Stratotanker off Hao Island: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jun 30, 1972 at 0510 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
38473/F-UKCD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Hao - Hao
MSN:
18682/C004
YOM:
1964
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The four engine airplane departed Hao Island Airport runway 12 at 0500LT for a weather reports mission of seven hours and 40 minutes. During initial climb, both right engines n°3 & 4 lost power simultaneously. The pilot-in-command was able to complete a low pass over the airport before the airplane went out of control and crashed into the sea few hundred meters offshore. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed.
Crew:
Cdt Dugué, pilot,
Lt Frugier, copilot,
Cpt Parage, navigator,
Adj Hecq, refueling operator.
Passengers:
- Adj Langlais, weather specialist,
1st Mst Saucillon, weather specialist.
Probable cause:
It is believed that the loss of power on both right engines was the consequence of a bleed valve failure. Nevertheless, investigations revealed several engine problems on other aircraft operated in the area, probably due to an excessive exposure to a salty environment.