Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Shortly after takeoff from Nazca-María Reiche Neuman Airport, while in initial climb, the pilot lost control of the single engine airplane that crashed on a dirt road, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all seven occupants were killed. They were completing a local sightseeing flight.

Following an uneventful flight from RCAF Trenton on behalf of the RCAF, the twin engine aircraft apparently landed hard at Thunder Bay Airport. After touchdown on runway 25, it went out of control and veered off runway into a snow covered area. All three crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft suffered severe damages to wings and tail. The fuselage also broke in two.

The airplane was on a VFR charter flight from Kiunga Airport, Western Province to Tekin Airstrip, Sandaun Province, Papua New Guinea. During the landing roll aircraft sustained a left main landing gear assembly collapse and subsequent runway excursion. There were seven persons onboard: one pilot and six passengers. At 09:06, P2-BWC departed Kiunga Airport and arrived at Tekin circuit area at 09:40. The pilot established the aircraft on the final approach profile, he configured the aircraft for landing by fully extending the flaps and maintained an airspeed of about 80 knots (kts). The pilot also stated that he experienced a downdraft prior to touch down. The aircraft landed at 09:43 with an airspeed of 75 knots as recalled by the pilot. The aircraft touched down about 3m short of the airstrip edge boundary. The investigation determined that due to reduced damping effect of the oleo and/or the tyre of the left main landing gear, the landing gear attachment bolts sustained significant impact stress from the landing impact force and snapped, causing the gear assembly to collapse and separate from the aircraft. Subsequently, the left wing abruptly dropped, and the aircraft began veering to the left, towards the eastern edge of the airstrip. The aircraft continued veering to the left and subsequently the left wingtip struck the outer edge of the extended right-hand flap of P2-BWE, a wreckage of the same aircraft type owned and operated by NASL that was involved in a similar accident on 18 January 2022, causing P2-BWC to abruptly veer further left and skid across the airstrip boundary as the nose-wheel and right main wheel bogged into the ground. The pilot immediately shut down the engine and evacuated the passengers with the assistance of one of the Operator’s personnel who was also a passenger on board. There were no reported injuries and the aircraft sustained significant damage.

The airplane was conducting a single pilot VFR charter flight from Kiunga Airport, Western Province to Tekin Airstrip, Sandaun Province, Papua New Guinea when during the landing roll, the aircraft sustained a left Main Landing Gear (MLG) assembly collapse and subsequent runway excursion. There were eight persons onboard: one pilot and seven passengers. At 08:43, P2-BWE departed Kiunga Airport and arrived at Tekin Airstrip circuit at 09:18. The pilot then tracked towards the Northwest of the airstrip and made a left base turn for approach. The pilot stated that he established the aircraft on final approach with an airspeed of 120 kts. He subsequently configured the aircraft for landing; propeller pitch set to full fine, power set to maintain nominated approach speed, and full flap. The pilot indicated that he reduced airspeed while on approach and maintained an airspeed between 85 and 90 kts. As he flared the aircraft to land, the airspeed was between 75 to 80 kts. The touchdown speed, as he recalled, was 75 kts. The aircraft touched down two metres short of the designated landing threshold of runway18, which had an elevation of 15cm. Reviewing the flight records of the pilot, and from his interview, the AIC deduced that the pilot was not adequately familiar with Tekin Airstrip. The aircraft sustained substantial damaged. All the passengers and pilot evacuated the aircraft without injuries.

The aircraft departed the Opa Locka Executive Airport (KOPF), Opa Locka, Florida, USA at 7:52 AM EST (1252 UTC) with 2 persons on board enroute to the Chub Cay Int’l Airport. The aircraft was operated by Airway Air Charter INC (Venture Air Solutions INC), a Part 135 certificate holder under Title 14 US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Investigations revealed that the pilot in command arrived at the Opa Locka Airport at approximately 6:30 AM EST and conducted a pre-flight check of the aircraft, subsequently adding 66.5 gallons of 100LL avgas fuel to the main fuel tanks of the aircraft. No fuel was added to the auxiliary tanks. After completion of all pre-flight checks, and gaining clearance from Air Traffic Control, the aircraft departed at approximately 7:52 AM EST. Investigations revealed that the flight was uneventful, until descending into Chub Cay, at about 2,500 feet, when the left engine began to “sputter”. At this point the pilot executed the engine failure checklist, but shortly thereafter, the right engine began to “sputter” also. The pilot then contacted Miami air traffic center and advised of loss of power to both engines, which resulted in the aircraft crashing into waters. The United States Coast Guard along with the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) and Police Force (RBPF) were alerted. Joint aerial and marine assets were dispatched and additional assistance was provided by local mariners and pilots flying in the area to conduct search and rescue. Both occupants were located and rescued. They were later airlifted to the United States to receive further medical attention for minor injuries. Image from Google Earth of accident site and distance from Chub Cay Airport The location where the aircraft crashed was identified at coordinates 25° 24.884’ N and 077° 58.030’ W, approximately 4.48 NM west of the Chub Cay International Airport (MYBC), Berry Islands, Bahamas.

Shortly after departure, the engine lost total power and the pilot was forced to ditch in open water; the occupants egressed and were subsequently rescued by a recreational vessel. Examination of the engine revealed a fracture hole near the n°2 cylinder, which was likely the result of the n°2 cylinder connecting rod fracturing in fatigue as a result of high heat and high stress associated with failure of the n°2 bearing. The fatigue fracture displayed multiple origins consistent with relatively high cyclic stress, which likely occurred as excessive clearances developed between the bearing and the crankshaft journal. The n°2 connecting rod bearing may have failed due to a material defect in the bearing itself or due to a disruption in the oil lubrication supply to the bearing/journal interface. Either situation can cause similar damage patterns to develop, including excessive heating and subsequent bearing failure.

The aircraft departed La Isabela-Dr. Joaquín Balaguer Airport on a charter flight to Orlando, carrying six passengers and three crew members. Shortly after takeoff, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to divert to Santo Domingo-Las Américas Airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the aircraft went out of control and crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all nine occupants were killed, among them the Portorican music artist José Angel Hernández aka Flow La Movie. According to a preliminary report, the crew encountered technical problems with the spoilers and maintenance was performed to change the ground spoiler actuators. After maintenance, the crew completed a ground check and while all spoilers properly deployed on both wings, only the spoilers on the left wing retracted as the spoilers on the right wing remained deployed. The crew failed to notice this asymetry. Immediately after takeoff, the crew reported controllability problems and elected to return but finally decided to divert to Las Américas Airport. The aircraft eventually went out of control and crashed 16 minutes after takeoff.

The twin engine airplane departed Goiânia-Santa Genoveva Airport on a taxi flight to Caratinga, carrying three passengers and two pilots. On final approach to Caratinga-Ubaporanga Airport in VFR conditions, the airplane collided with a lightning rod located on the top of a high-voltage pylon. Upon impact, the left engine was torn off and the airplane stalled before crashing in a river bed located about 4,1 km short of runway 02. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and all five occupants were killed, among them the Brazilian singer Marília Mendonça aged 26.

The flight crew, which consisted of the pilot- and second-in-command (PIC and SIC), and a non-type-rated observer pilot, reported that during takeoff near 100 knots a violent shimmy developed at the nose landing gear (NLG). The PIC aborted the takeoff and during the abort procedure, the NLG separated. The airplane veered off the runway, and the right wing and right main landing gear struck approach lights, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The passengers and flight crew evacuated the airplane without incident through the main cabin door. Postaccident interviews revealed that following towing operations prior to the flight crew’s arrival, ground personnel were unable to get the plunger button and locking balls of the NLG’s removable pip pin to release normally. Following a brief troubleshooting effort by the ground crew, the pip pin’s plunger button remained stuck fully inward, and the locking balls remained retracted. The ground crew re-installed the pip pin through the steering collar with the upper torque link arm connected. However, with the locking balls in the retracted position, the pin was not secured in position as it should have been. Further, the ground personnel could not install the safety pin through the pip pin because the pin’s design prevented the safety pin from being inserted if the locking balls and plunger were not released. The ground personnel left the safety pin hanging from its lanyard on the right side of the NLG. The ground personnel subsequently informed their ramp supervisor of the anomaly. The supervisor reported that he informed the first arriving crewmember at the airplane (the observer pilot) that the nose pin needed to be checked. However, all three pilots reported that no ground crewmember told them about any issues with the NLG or pins. Examination of the runway environment revealed that the first item of debris located on the runway was the pip pin. Shortly after this location, tire swivel marks were located near the runway centerline, which were followed by large scrape and tire marks, leading to the separated NLG. The safety pin remained attached to the NLG via its lanyard and was undamaged. Postaccident examination and testing of the NLG and its pins revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The sticking of the pip pin plunger button that the ground crew reported experiencing could not be duplicated during postaccident testing. When installed on the NLG, the locking ball mechanism worked as intended, and the pip pin could not be removed by hand. Although the airplane’s preflight checklist called for a visual check of the NLG’s torque link to ensure that it was connected to the steering collar by the pip pin and that the safety pin was installed, it is likely that none of the pilots noticed that the pip pin did not have its safety pin installed during preflight. Subsequently, during the takeoff roll, without the locking balls extended, the pip pin likely moved outward and fell from its position holding the upper torque link arm. This allowed the upper torque link arm to move freely, which resulted in the violent shimmy and NLG separation. The location of the debris on the runway, tire marks, and postaccident examination and testing support this likely chain of events. Contributing to the PIC and SIC’s omission during preflight was the ground crew’s failure to directly inform the PIC or SIC that there was a problem with the NLG pip pin. The ground crew also failed to discard the malfunctioning pip pin per the airplane’s ground handling procedures and instead re-installed the pip pin. Although the observer pilot was reportedly informed of an issue with a nose gear pin, he was not qualified to act as a required flight crewmember for the airplane and was on his cell phone when he was reportedly informed of the issue by the ramp supervisor. These factors likely contributed to the miscommunication and the PIC’s and SIC’s subsequent lack of awareness of the NLG issue.

The accident flight was the pilot’s second passenger sightseeing flight of the day that overflew remote inland fjords, coastal waterways, and mountainous, tree-covered terrain in the Misty Fjords National Monument. Limited information was available about the airplane’s flight track due to radar limitations, and the flight tracking information from the airplane only provided data in 1-minute intervals. The data indicated that the airplane was on the return leg of the flight and in the final minutes of flight, the pilot was flying on the right side of a valley. The airplane impacted mountainous terrain at 1,750 ft mean sea level (msl), about 250 ft below the summit. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of pre accident failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Damage to the propeller indicated that it was rotating and under power at the time of the accident. The orientation and distribution of the wreckage indicated that the airplane impacted a tree in a left-wing-low attitude, likely as the pilot was attempting to maneuver away from terrain. Review of weather information for the day of the accident revealed a conditionally unstable environment below 6,000 ft msl, which led to rain organizing in bands of shower activity. Satellite imagery depicted that one of these bands was moving northeastward across the accident site at the accident time. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) weather cameras and local weather observations also indicated that lower visibility and mountain obscuration conditions were progressing northward across the accident area with time. Based on photographs recovered from passenger cell phones along with FAA weather camera imagery, the accident flight encountered mountain obscuration conditions, rain shower activity, and reduced visibilities and cloud ceilings, resulting in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) before the impact with terrain. The pilot reviewed weather conditions before the first flight of the day; however, there was no indication that he obtained updated weather conditions or additional weather information before departing on the accident flight. Based on interviews, the accident pilot landed following the first flight of the day in lowering visibility, ceiling, and precipitation, and departed on the accident flight in precipitation, based on passenger photos. Therefore, the pilot had knowledge of the weather conditions that he could have encountered along the route of flight before departure. The operator had adequate policies and procedures in place for pilots regarding inadvertent encounters with IMC; however, the pilot’s training records indicated that he was signed off for cue-based training that did not occur. Cue-based training is intended to help calibrate pilots’ weather assessment and foster an ability to accurately assess and respond appropriately to cues associated with deteriorating weather. Had the pilot completed the training, it might have helped improve his decision-making skills to either cancel the flight before departure or turn around earlier in the flight. The operator’s lack of safety management protocols resulted in the pilot not receiving the required cue-based training, allowed him to continue operating air tours with minimal remedial training following a previous accident, and allowed the accident airplane to operate without a valid FAA registration. The operator was signatory to a voluntary local air tour operator’s group letter of agreement that was developed to improve the overall safety of flight operations in the area of the Misty Fjords National Monument. Participation was voluntary and not regulated by the FAA, and the investigation noted multiple instances in which the LOA policies were ignored, including on the accident flight. For example, the accident flight did not follow the standard Misty Fjords route outlined in the LOA nor did it comply with the recommended altitudes for flights into and out of the Misty Fjords. FAA inspectors providing oversight for the area reported that, when they addressed operators about disregarding the LOA, the operators would respond that the LOA was voluntary and that they did not need to follow the guidance. The FAA’s reliance on voluntary compliance initiatives in the local air tour industry failed to produce compliance with safety initiatives or to reduce accidents in the Ketchikan region.