Quebec

Controlled flight into terrain following the pilot's decision to continue the flight at a relatively low speed and in a nose-up attitude, which reduced his field of vision.

Findings:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
- Sensation seeking, mental fatigue, and an altered risk perception very likely contributed to the fact that, immediately after completing the magnetometric survey work, the pilot flying descended to an altitude varying between 100 and 40 feet above ground level and maintained this altitude until the aircraft collided with the wires.
- It is highly likely that the pilots were unaware that there was a power transmission line in their path.
- The pilot flying did not detect the power transmission line in time to avoid it, and the aircraft collided with the wires, which were 70 feet above the ground.
- Despite the warning regarding low-altitude flying in the Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manua, and in the absence of minimum-altitude restrictions imposed by the company, the pilot chose to descend to a very low altitude on the return flight; as a result, this flight segment carried an unacceptable level of risk.

Findings as to risk:
- If pilots fly at low altitude, there is a risk that they will collide with wires, given that these are extremely difficult to see in flight.
- If lightweight flight data recording systems are not used to closely monitor flight operations, there is a risk that pilots will deviate from established procedures and limits, thereby reducing safety margins.
- If Transport Canada does not take concrete measures to facilitate the use of lightweight flight data recording systems and flight data monitoring, there is a risk that operators will be unable to proactively identify safety deficiencies before they cause an accident.
- If safety management systems are not required, assessed, and monitored by Transport Canada in order to ensure continual improvement, there is an increased risk that companies will be unable to effectively identify and mitigate the hazards involved in their operations.
- Not wearing a safety belt increases the risk of injury or death in an accident.
- The current emergency locator transmitter system design standards do not include a requirement for a crashworthy antenna system. As a result, there is a risk that potentially life-saving search‑and‑rescue services will be delayed if an emergency locator transmitter antenna is damaged during an occurrence.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot’s inability to effectively manage the aircraft’s energy condition led to an unstable approach.
2. The pilot “got behind” the aircraft by allowing events to control his actions, and cognitive biases led him to continue the unstable approach.
3. A loss of control occurred when the pilot rapidly added full power at low airspeed while at low altitude, which caused a power-induced upset and resulted in the aircraft rolling sharply to the right and descending rapidly.
4. It is likely that the pilot was not prepared for the resulting power-induced upset and, although he managed to level the wings, the aircraft was too low to recover before striking the ground.
5. The pilot’s high workload and reduced time available resulted in a task-saturated condition, which decreased his situational awareness and impaired his decision making.
6. It is unlikely that the pilot’s flight skills and procedures were sufficiently practised to ensure his proficiency as the pilot-in-command for single-pilot operation on the MU2B for the conditions experienced during the occurrence flight.

Findings as to risk:
1. If the weight of an aircraft exceeds the certified maximum take-off weight, there is a risk of aircraft performance being degraded, which may jeopardize the safety of the flight.
2. If pilots engage in non-essential communication during critical phases of flight, there is an increased risk that they will be distracted, which reduces the time available to complete cockpit activities and increases their workload.
3. If flight, cockpit, or image/video data recordings are not available to an investigation, the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety may be precluded.
4. If pilots do not recognize that changing circumstances require a new plan, then plan continuation bias may lead them to continue with their original plan even though it may not be safe to do so.
5. If pilots do not apply stable-approach criteria, there is a risk that they will continue an unstable approach to a landing, which can lead to an approach-and-landing accident.
6. If pilots are not prepared to conduct a go-around on every approach, they risk not responding appropriately to situations that require one.
7. If a flight plan does not contain search-and-rescue supplementary information, and if that information is not transmitted or readily available, there is a risk that first responders will not have the information they need to respond adequately.

Other findings:
1. Transport Canada does not monitor or track the number of days foreign-registered aircraft are in Canada during a given 12-month period.
2. Turbulence and icing were not considered factors in this occurrence.
3. Transport Canada considers that the discretionary installation of an angle-of-attack system on normal-category, type-certificated, Canadian-registered aircraft is a major modification that requires a supplemental type certificate approval.
4. Although the aircraft was not in compliance with Airworthiness Directive 2006-17-05 at the time of the occurrence, there was no indication that it was operating outside of the directive’s specifications.
5. Although not required by regulation, the installation and use of a lightweight flight recording system during the occurrence flight, as well as the successful retrieval of its data during the investigation, permitted a greater understanding of this accident.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot performed manoeuvres with a reduced safety margin at low altitudes. As a result, these flights involved a level of risk that was unnecessary to attain the objectives of sightseeing flights.
2. With no restrictions on manoeuvres and no minimum altitude prescribed by the company prior to flight, the pilot flew according to his own limits and made a steep turn at approximately 110 feet above ground level.
3. When the pilot made a steep left turn, aerodynamic stalling ensued, causing an incipient spin at an altitude insufficient to allow control of the aircraft to be regained prior to vertical collision with the terrain.
4. The absence of an angle-of-attack indicator system and an impending stall warning device deprived the pilot of the last line of defence against loss of control of the aircraft.

Findings as to risk:
1. If lightweight flight data recording systems are not used to closely monitor flight operations, there is a risk that pilots will deviate from established procedures and limits, thereby reducing safety margins.
2. If Transport Canada does not take concrete measures to facilitate the use of lightweight flight data recording systems and flight data monitoring, operators may not be able to proactively identify safety deficiencies before they cause an accident.
3. If pilots do not obtain at least the regulatory rest periods, there is a risk that flights will be conducted when pilots are fatigued.
4. Unless all flights made are recorded in the pilot’s logbook and monitored by the company, it is possible that the pilot will not receive the required rest periods, which increases the risk of flights being conducted when the pilot is fatigued.
5. If flights made are not recorded in the aircraft’s journey logbook, it is possible that inspection and maintenance schedules and component lifetimes will be exceeded, increasing the risk of failure.
6. Unless safety management systems are required, assessed, and monitored by Transport Canada in order to ensure continual improvement, there is an increased risk that companies will not be able to identify and effectively mitigate the hazards involved in their operations.
7. If pilots do not receive stall training that demonstrates the aircraft’s actual behaviour in a steep turn under power, there is a high risk of loss of control.

Other findings:
1. The replacement of the ventral fin with Seafins on C-FKRJ was in compliance with the requirements of Kenmore Air Harbor Inc.’s supplemental type certificate.
2. The control wheel was in the left-hand position (pilot side) at the moment of impact.
3. Angle-of-attack indicator systems have been recognized as contributing to flight safety by improving pilot awareness of the stall margin at all times, thereby allowing pilots to react in order to prevent loss of control of the aircraft.
4. Stall warning systems have been recognized as a means of improving flight safety by providing a clear, unambiguous warning of an impending stall.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
- The pilot relied exclusively on the gauge readings to determine the quantity of fuel on board, without cross-checking the fuel consumption since the last fueling to validate those gauge readings.
- The pilot misread the fuel gauges and assumed that the aircraft had enough fuel on board to meet the minimum fuel requirements of the Canadian Aviation Regulations for this visual flight rules flight, rather than adding more fuel to meet the greater reserves required by the company operations manual.
- The pilot did not monitor the fuel gauges while in flight and decided to extend the flight to carry out a practice instrument approach with insufficient fuel to complete the approach.
- The right engine stopped due to fuel exhaustion.
- The pilot did not carry out the approved engine failure procedure when the first engine stopped, and the propeller was not feathered, resulting in significant drag which reduced the aircraft's gliding range after the second engine stopped.
- The pilot continued flying toward Montréal/St-Hubert Airport (CYHU), Quebec, despite having advised air traffic control of the intention to divert to the St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil Airport (CSB3), Quebec, and without communicating the emergency. The priority given to communications resulted in the aircraft moving farther away from the intended diversion airport.
- The left engine stopped due to fuel exhaustion 36 seconds after the right engine stopped, when the aircraft was 7.4 nautical miles from Runway 24R at Montréal/St-Hubert Airport (CYHU), Quebec, and 2400 feet above sea level.
- The pilot's decision to lower the landing gear while the aircraft was still at 1600 feet above sea level further increased the drag, reducing the aircraft's gliding range. As a result, the aircraft was not able to reach the runway at St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil Airport (CSB3), Quebec.
- The operations manager was unable to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position related to monitoring and supervision of flight operations. As a result, the safety of more than half of the flights was compromised.
Findings as to risk:
- If the total fuel quantity required for a flight is not calculated and clearly displayed on the operational flight plan, there is an increased risk that aircraft will depart without the fuel reserves required by the Canadian Aviation Regulations.
- If flights are planned and carried out without the fuel reserves required by the Canadian Aviation Regulations, there is an increased risk of fuel exhaustion resulting from unanticipated situations that extend the duration of the flight.
- If pilots elect to extend flight without first determining whether sufficient fuel reserves are available to do so, there is an increased risk of fuel exhaustion.
- If pilots do not regularly check the quantity of fuel on board, there is an increased risk of fuel exhaustion.
- If pilots do not rule out a fuel leak before opening the crossfeed valve, they risk losing all of the remaining fuel on board.
- If a pilot does not maintain control of an aircraft until landing, the force of an impact following an aerodynamic stall is likely to be far greater, increasing the risk of injury or death during a forced landing.
- If a pilot does not declare an emergency to air traffic control in a timely manner, the pilot may be deprived of assistance and resources that could help deal with the emergency, increasing the risk of an accident.
- If pilots do not receive training in dealing with complex emergencies that require prioritizing tasks, there is a risk that they will not react effectively to emergencies, increasing the risk of an accident.
- If companies do not establish a process to monitor the performance of their pilots during training and testing, there is a risk that those companies will inadvertently assign pilots to carry out flights for which they are not proficient.
- If a flight is planned and authorized solely by the pilot, with no cross-check for compliance with existing regulations, there is a risk that deviations will continue undetected, reducing the safety of the flight.
- If pilots operate without regular supervision to ensure compliance with regulations and company procedures, coupled with effective training, there is a risk of procedural adaptations that result in reduced safety margins.
- If companies assign inexperienced personnel to key flight operations management positions, there is a risk that deviations in performance or from regulations will not be detected, reducing the safety of flight operations.
- If the pilot proficiency check requirements for a chief pilot are not more stringent than those for other pilots, there is a risk that the chief pilot will be unable to perform the duties required to ensure the safety of company training and operations.
- If the approval process for appointment of operations management personnel by companies is reduced to a compliance checklist based on the minimum standards in the Commercial Air Service Standards and on pilot proficiency checks that may be repeated an unlimited number of times, there is a risk that candidates who are unfit to perform the duties and responsibilities of their positions will be appointed.
- If Transport Canada does not take into consideration the combined knowledge and experience of a new operator's management team, there is a risk that the operator will lack the skills necessary to ensure the safety of flight operations.
- If process inspections carried out by Transport Canada do not examine factors related to a recent occurrence, there is a risk that those hazardous conditions will go undetected and will persist.
If process inspections carried by TC on newly certificated operators do not closely examine the outcomes of company processes, there is a risk that hazardous conditions will not be identified and will persist.
- If the inability of appointed individuals to perform their duties and responsibilities does not constitute grounds for suspending or revoking the ministerial approval of such appointments, there is a risk that operations management personnel who are not competent will remain in their positions, increasing the risk to flight safety.
Other findings:
- The chief pilot did not meet the requirements of the Canadian Aviation Regulations at the time of appointment.
- There was no indication that the aircraft's fuel gauges were not functioning properly at the time of the occurrence flight, and it is unlikely that a deviation of the fuel gauge indicator was a factor in the pilot's decision to take off.
- C-GJSU had approximately 260 pounds of fuel on board when it took off from Montréal/St-Hubert Airport (CYHU), Quebec, and did not experience a fuel leak during the occurrence flight.

Findings As To Causes and Contributing Factors:
The bird strike occurred on take-off at an altitude of less than 50 feet. Gulls were ingested in the left engine, which then lost power.
After the loss of engine power, the flight crew had difficulty controlling the aircraft. The aircraft touched the ground, forcing the pilot flying to abort the take-off when the runway remaining was insufficient to stop the aircraft, resulting in the runway overrun.
Findings As To Risks:
Although a cannon was in place, it was not working on the day of the accident, which increased the risk of a bird strike.
The presence of a goose and duck farm outside the airport perimeter but near a runway increases the risk of attracting gulls.
Operators subject to Canadian Aviation Regulations Subpart 703 are not prohibited from having an aircraft take off from a runway that is shorter than the accelerate-stop distance of that aircraft as determined from the performance diagrams. Consequently, travellers carried by these operators are exposed to the risks associated with a runway overrun when a take-off is aborted.
The absence of a CVR makes it harder to ascertain material facts. Consequently, investigations can take more time, resulting in delays which compromise public safety.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The aircraft was overloaded and its centre of gravity was beyond the aft limit. The aircraft pitched up and stalled at an altitude that did not allow the pilot to execute the stall recovery manoeuvre.
2. The baggage was not secured. Shifting of the baggage caused the triple seat to pivot forward, propelling the 3 rear-seat passengers against the pilot and front-seat passenger during impact.
3. Although the design of the triple seat met aviation standards, it separated from the floor at the time of impact, principally due to the fact that the heavy cargo shifted.
4. The action taken by TC did not have the desired outcomes to ensure regulatory compliance; consequently, unsafe practices persisted.
Finding as to Risk:
1. Operating an aircraft outside the limits and conditions under which a permit is issued can increase the risk of an accident

Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot took off in weather conditions that were below the minimum for visual flight rules, and continued the flight in those conditions.
2. After a late decision to carry out a precautionary alighting, the pilot wound up in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Consequently, the visual references were reduced to the point of leading the aircraft to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
3. The passenger at the rear of the aircraft was not seated on a seat compliant with aeronautical standards. The passenger was ejected from the plane at the moment of impact, which diminished his chances of survival.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The lack of training on pilot decision-making (PDM) for air taxi operators exposes pilots and passengers to increased risk when flying in adverse weather conditions.
2. In view of the absence of an ELT signal and the operator’s delay in calling, search efforts were initiated more than 3 ½ hours after the accident. That additional time lag can influence the seriousness of injuries and the survival of the occupants.