Saint Louis-Lambert

On June 28, 2007, about 0815 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-500TP, N477MD, was destroyed on impact with terrain following an in-flight breakup near Wellsville, Missouri. The personal flight was operating under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological surface conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was on file and was activated. The pilot and two passengers sustained fatal injuries. The flight originated from the Spirit of St Louis Airport, near Chesterfield, Missouri, about 0750, and was destined for the Buffalo Municipal Airport, near Buffalo, Minnesota. About 0711, a person representing N477MD contacted Kankakee Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) to file an IFR flight plan and obtain an abbreviated weather update. During the abbreviated weather update, the AFSS briefer advised the pilot that there was heavy rain and thunderstorm activity in Missouri along the aircraft's planned route of flight. The pilot stated that he had onboard radar for weather avoidance. About 0750, N477MD departed SUS, contacted Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controller (ATC) on the St. Louis (Gateway) Departure frequency about 0752, and was initially cleared to climb to 4,000 feet. The Gateway controller advised of light to moderate precipitation three miles ahead of the aircraft. The pilot requested a northerly course deviation for weather avoidance, which was approved. About 0753, N477MD was cleared to climb to 10,000 feet. The controller then advised of additional areas of moderate and heavy precipitation ahead of the airplane, gave the pilot information on the location and extent of the weather areas, and suggested a track that would avoid it. The pilot responded that he saw the same areas on his onboard radar and concurred with the controller's assessment. Radar data showed that the airplane flew northwest bound, and then turned toward the west. About 0757, N477MD was instructed to resume the Ozark 3 departure procedure, and the pilot acknowledged. About 0758, the pilot was cleared again to proceed direct to Macon, Missouri (MCM) VHF omnidirectional range distance measuring equipment (VOR/DME), and two minutes later, was instructed to contact Kansas City Center (ZKC). The pilot contacted the ZKC R53 controller at 0800:47, and, after a discussion about the final requested altitude, was cleared to climb and maintain flight level 230. At 0801:42, a position relief briefing occurred and the R53 controller was replaced. The new R53 controller made no transmissions to N477MD, and was replaced by a third controller at 0806:27. The next transmission to N477MD occurred at 0812:26, when the R53 controller asked the pilot if he had been given a clearance to deviate. The flight's radar track showed that the airplane turned to the left. The pilot responded, "mike delta we've got problems uh..." The controller responded by asking the pilot if he was declaring an emergency, and made several other attempts to contact N477MD. The pilot did not respond to any of these calls, and radar contact was lost. None of the three ZKC controllers had given the pilot any weather information during the time he was controlled by ZKC. The plane crashed in an open field near Wellsville and was destroyed upon impact. All three occupants have been killed.

The small, twin-engine business jet was about 15 feet above the runway on takeoff, when a flock of birds from both sides of the runway flew up in front of the airplane. The number two engine "surged," and "loud reports" were heard before the copilot noted a complete loss of power on the number two engine instruments. The airplane climbed for about 10 seconds, before the copilot observed the gas producer (N1) gauge on the number one engine decay through 50 percent. The stall warning horn sounded, and the pilot adjusted the flight controls for landing. The airplane contacted the runway with the landing gear retracted, overran the runway, struck a fence, crossed a road, and came to rest in a cornfield about 1,000 feet beyond the initial point of ground contact. Post accident examination of both engines revealed evidence and damage consistent with multiple bird ingestion.

On October 19, 2004, about 1937 central daylight time, Corporate Airlines (doing business as American Connection) flight 5966, a BAE Systems BAE-J3201, N875JX, struck trees on final approach and crashed short of runway 36 at Kirksville Regional Airport (IRK), Kirksville, Missouri. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled passenger flight from Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, in St. Louis, Missouri, to IRK. The captain, first officer, and 11 of the 13 passengers were fatally injured, and 2 passengers received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post impact fire. Night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident, and the flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The twin engine turbofan powered airplane was ditched into a river after a complete loss of power from both engines. The airplane was on a second approach to land on runway 30R after having been instructed by air traffic control (ATC) to climb during the final approach segment of the first approach due to inadequate separation from another airplane. Subsequent to the first approach, the airplane was issued vectors for the second approach by ATC. Communications transcripts show that the flight crew asked ATC how far they would be vectored during the second approach, but the flight crew did not inform ATC of their low fuel state until the airplane was already on a "base turn...to join final." The airplane subsequently lost power from both engines. During interviews, both pilots stated that there were no problems with the airplane. The second-in-command (SIC) stated that the airplane "ran out of fuel" and that the fuel quantity indicators read 0 and 100 pounds when each respective engine stopped producing power. The SIC also stated that after being instructed to climb to 5,000 feet after their first approach, he questioned the pilot-in-command about landing at another airport located about 14 nautical miles west-southwest of the destination airport. The SIC said that the PIC elected to continue with the second approach to the original destination. Research indicated that the flight crew did not obtain a weather briefing prior to the accident flight. Additionally, the Terminal Aerodrome Forecast that was valid at the time the aircraft's flight plan was filed showed a forecast ceiling consisting of overcast clouds at 1,500 feet above ground level at the aircraft's arrival time at the destination. 14 CFR Part 91.169 requires that an alternate airport be listed in the flight plan when forecast ceilings are less than 2,000 feet. No alternate was listed in the flight plan for the accident flight. Additionally, 14 CFR Part 91.167 requires that aircraft operated in instrument meteorological conditions maintain fuel reserves that allow flight to the intended destination and then continued flight to the listed alternate, and an additional 45 minutes at normal cruise speed. In 1993, the FAA/industry advisory committee developed advisory material for fuel planning and management for 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 air carrier flight operations, but the material was never published.

Prior to takeoff from Lambert Field/St. Louis International Airport, St. Louis, Missouri, the pilot contacted the operations manager at M. Graham Clark Airport, Point Lookout, Missouri, and asked about the current weather conditions there. The operations manager told the pilot that the weather was "pretty poor." The airplane took off from St. Louis, at 1411 cst. At 1447:12 cst, the pilot checked in with Springfield Approach Control. The pilot was told to expect the ILS approach to runway 2 at the Springfield-Branson Regional Airport. At 1501:01 cst, the pilot requested to go to Point Lookout and shoot the GPS to runway 11. Springfield Approach instructed the pilot to descend to 3,000 feet msl and cleared him for the approach. At 1507:08 cst, Springfield radar showed the airplane crossing the initial waypoint at 3,000 feet msl, and turn to 116 degrees approach heading. At 1507:17 cst, the airplane descended to 2,500 feet msl. At 1508:51 cst, Springfield Approach cleared the pilot to change to advisory frequency. "Call me back with your cancellation or your miss." The pilot responded, "Okay we're, we're RAWBE inbound and we will call you on the miss or cancellation." The operations manager at M. Graham Clark Airport said that he heard the pilot on the airport's common frequency radio say, "Citation 525KL is RAWBE inbound on the GPS 11 approach." At 1509:01 cst, Springfield radar showed the airplane begin a descent out of 2,500 feet msl. The last radar contact was at 1509:48 cst. The airplane was five nautical miles from the airport on a 296 degree radial, at 2,100 feet msl. At 1530 cst, the operations manager heard Springfield approach trying to contact the airplane. The operations manager initiated a search for the airplane. At 1430 cst, the weather observation at the M. Graham Clark Airport was 300 feet overcast, rain and mist, 3/4 miles visibility, temperature 53 degrees F, winds variable at 3 knots, altimeter 29.92 inches HG. Approach minimum weather for the GPS RWY11 straight in approach to Point Lookout are a minimum ceiling of 600 feet and visibility of 1 mile for a category B aircraft. An examination of the airplane wreckage revealed no anomalies. The results of FAA toxicology testing of specimens from the pilot revealed concentrations of Doxepin in kidney and liver. The Physicians' Desk Reference states that "... drowsiness may occur with the use of this drug, patients should be warned of the possibility and cautioned against driving a car or operating dangerous machinery while taking the drug." The physician who prescribed the Doxepin to the pilot said that he was using it to treat the pilot's "irritable bowel" condition. According to his wife, the pilot had not slept well for several nights, up to the day of the accident, due to problems he was having with the FAA. A friend, who spoke with the pilot just before the accident flight, confirmed the pilot saying "I haven't slept for three days." The friend stated further that the pilot "wasn't himself that day."

The first officer failed to maintain the proper rate of descent (sink rate) resulting in a hard landing on touch down, and separation of the left main landing gear during landing rollout. The pilot-in-command stated he knew the first officer was not going to make a good landing. He did not take any corrective action other than informing the first officer initially to increase power. Examination of the left main landing gear assembly revealed a preexisting crack in the outer cylinder housing.

During the takeoff roll on runway 30R, the MD-82, N954U, collided with the Cessna 441, N441KM, which was positioned on the runway waiting for takeoff clearance. The pilot of the Cessna acted on an apparently preconceived idea that he would use his arrival runway, runway 30R, for departure. After receiving taxi clearance to back-taxi into position and hold on runway 31, the pilot taxied into a position at an intersection on runway 30R, which was the assigned departure runway for the MD-82. The ATIS current at the time the Cessna pilot was operating in the Lambert-St. Louis area listed runways 30R and 30L as the active runways for arrivals and departures; there was no mention of the occasional use of runway 31. Air traffic control personnel were not able to maintain visual contact with the Cessna after it taxied from the well lighted ramp area into the runway/taxiway environment of the northeast portion of the airport. An operational ASDE-3, particularly ASDE-3 enhanced with AMASS, could be used to supplement visual scan of the northeast portion of the airport.

Scheduled domestic part 121 flight could not get landing gear to extend on approach to Chicago-Midway Airport. After missed approach, crew tried unsuccessfully to extend gear manually using procedures in cockpit checklist and flight operations manual. Emergency gear-up landing was made at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport. Investigation revealed a disconnected gear selector actuating rod from the normal landing gear retract/extension actuating assembly. Crew damaged manual gear extension mechanism in manual extension attempts. FAA approved procedural checklist had omitted critical step in manual gear extension procedure.

The passenger said that the approach appeared normal until the pilot turned on the landing lights while in the overcast. Seconds after, the aircraft impacted trees, careening out of control, and snapping power lines; then striking a house roof before coming to rest on the ground. The airplane began to burn as it went through the power lines. The weather at the time was at or above IFR landing minimums. The flight had been in a holding pattern for forty five minutes prior to commencing the approach. All of the aircraft's systems and powerplants, as well as the FAA approach facilities, were determined to be in working order. The pilot was killed and all three passengers were seriously injured.