Brussels

Shortly after takeoff from runway 15, while climbing to a height of about 800 feet, the twin engine entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a grassy area located past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

The four engine airplane departed Brussels-Zavantem Airport runway 02 at 0929LT on a charter flight to Tenerife-Sur Reina Sofia with 110 passengers and a crew of seven on board. While climbing to an altitude of 7,000 feet, the engine n°3 exploded and caught fire. The crew declared an emergency and was cleared to return for a landing on runway 25L. After the fire was contained and while completing a last turn on final, the airplane was approaching too fast and overshot so the pilot decided to land on runway 25R. After touchdown, reversers on engine n°1 and 4 were activated and the crew initiated an emergency braking procedure. Nevertheless, the captain considered the remaining distance as insufficient and decided to steer the aircraft to the left of the runway where it came to rest. All 117 occupants were quickly rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was completing a charter flight from Brussels to Tenerife, carrying 189 passengers and a crew of nine on behalf of Sebelair. On approach to Tenerife-Norte-Los Rodeos Airport, the crew informed ATC about technical problems as he was unable to lower the nose gear. The landing was completed on runway 12/30 with the nose gear retracted and the airplane slid for a distance of 1,200 meters before coming to rest in flames. All 198 occupants were evacuated, four passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Following a normal takeoff roll on runway 28R, the aircraft rotated 42 seconds after brakes were released and lifted off 2 seconds later at 145 knots IAS. At 63 seconds the autopilot was engaged 355 feet above the runway at 170 knots IAS; the IAS speed lock was selected shortly thereafter. At 74 seconds the aircraft started a 20° banked turn to port towards the Epsom Non-Directional Beacon (NDB). At 83 seconds the captain reported 'Climbing as cleared'. He was then instructed to change frequency and contact London Air Traffic Control Centre. At 93 seconds the noise-abatement procedure was initiated. On the assumption that the captain was the handling pilot, this would involve the second officer selecting the flaps fully up and operating the thrust levers to reduce power to the pre-calculated figure. At 100 seconds the captain called 'Passing 1500' and at 103 seconds the aircraft was cleared to climb to Flight Level 60. This message was acknowledged by the captain at 108 seconds with the terse call 'up to 60'. This was the last message received from the flight. At second 114 when the airspeed was 162 knots and the altitude 1,772 feet, the droop lever was selected up putting the aircraft into the area of the stall as the droop started to move. At second 116 the stick-pusher stall recovery device operated, causing the autopilot automatically to disengage and the nose of the aircraft to pitch down and the stick-push to cease as the incidence decreased. Since the elevator trim would stay at its position on autopilot disengagement which at that speed with the droop up would be - the incidence then increased causing a second stick-push at second 124 and a third at second 127. At second 128 the stall recovery system was manually inhibited by pulling the lever. The aircraft then pitched up rapidly, losing speed and height, entering very soon afterwards the true aerodynamic stall and then a deep stall from which at that height no recovery was possible. Impact was at second 150 in a field next to the A30 motorway. The aircraft was totally destroyed and none of the 118 occupants survived the crash.

Without clearance, the copilot released the brakes and began to taxi when the right propeller struck a ground power unit. The airplane was immediately stopped. There were no casualties but the airplane was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

Flight SN712 was a non-scheduled international cargo flight from Brussels direct to Lagos on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria with 34 994 kg of cargo on board. No passengers were being carried. A flight plan was filed for a flight of 6 hours 9 minutes and the total endurance of the aircraft was stated as 8 hours 20 minutes. The designated alternate was Kano. The aircraft took off from Brussels at 2152 hours GMT on 12 July 1968 and routine radio reports were received during the en route phase of the flight. At 0325 hours R/T contact was made with Lagos approach control. The R/T transmissions with the aircraft have been identified as being almost certainly the voice of the co-pilot indicating that he was doing the R/T rhile the pilot-in-command was flying the aircraft. The aircraft gave an ETA at Lagos of 0355 hours and reported that it was at flight Level (FL) 330. A request was then made for the latest Lagos weather and the reply included the following information: wind: 210°/3 kt; visibility: 16 km; cloud: 5/8 stratocumulus 270 m, 7/8 altostratus 2 400 m, temporary thunderstorms, 118 cumulonimbus 2 000 ft; QNH: 1012 mb; temperature 24°. At 0327 hours the aircraft reported an ETA overhead Ibadan NDB of 0344 hours in response to a request for this information from Lagos. One minute later it reported that the Ibadan NDB did not appear to be operating. At 0336 the aircraft requested descent clearance. It was cleared to Lagos at FL60 and commenced the descent from FL330 at that time. Three minutes later the aircraft reported passing Ibadan and descending through FL275 but since it had reported earlier that the Ibadan NDB seemed not to be radiating it is not known how the position was determined. In reply Lagos approach stated that there was no delay in the approach and that the runway in use was 19. At 0341 hours, when the aircraft was about 50 miles north of. Lagos, it was recleared to 2 200 ft on a QNH of 1012 mb - and told to report field in sight. The flight recorder readout shows that shortly after this interchange the descent was interrupted while the speed decreased to a figure corresponding to the recommended maximum for landing gear extension and this speed was not exceeded for the remainder of the flight. Close study of the flight recording shows subsequent irregularity indicating that the automatic pilot was most probably disengaged at this stage of the flight. Subsequent to the speed reduction the rate of descent was re-established to approximately 2 000 ft/min and at 0350 hours the aircraft passed one mile to the east of Lagos airport whilst on a southerly heading at an altitude of 15 000 ft. The aircraft was heard flying over the airport at this time. The flight recorder indicates that a procedure turn was made to the south of the airport in the vicinity of the city of Lagos and at its conclusion there was a second interruption in the descent following which the airspeed remained below the maximum for 25° of flap. At 0354 hours the aircraft passed over the airport northbound at an altitude of 9 000 ft maintaining the average rate of descent of 2 000 ft/min for a further 2 1/2 minutes. At 0356 hours a procedure turn was commenced at an altitude of about 5 000 ft during which the rate of descent was reduced to 1 500 ft/min. The track of the aircraft between its passage over the airport northbound and the commencement of the final procedure turn is almost coincident with the outbound track of the published VOR approach procedure. At 0357 hours Lagos approach control was informed by the aircraft that it was in the procedure turn and requested to give the wind conditions. In reply control stated that the wind was calm and this was acknowledged. Shortly afterwards approach control instructed the aircraft to report runway in sight and this was also acknowledged. On completion of the procedure turn at an altitude of 1 400 ft (a height above the airport of 1268 ft) the airspeed was reduced from 190 kt to a little less than 160 kt and the rate of descent was reduced to 900 ft/min. The heading was stabilized on 197° M and at 0359 hours the aircraft asked for the runway lights to be put on maximum brightness. Approach control replied that the runway lights were on low intensity non-variable. A transmitter switch was then heard but there was no subsequent message from the aircraft before it crashed about 8 1/2 miles north of the airport approximately on the extended centre line of the runway. All the occupants were killed and the aircraft caught fire immediately and was burnt out. All seven occupants were killed.

The aircraft had taken off from Brussels at 0010 hours GMT on 18 February 1966 on a cargo flight to Milan-Malpensa, Italy, to transport 214 calves. The flight was routine until the aircraft arrived over the Saronno VOR/NDB at 0148 hours. It was then cleared by Milan ACC to fly directly to the Malpensa radio beacon with a 6 000 ft "clearance limit" and to contact Malpensa APP directly. The aircraft was duly transferred to this latter unit at 0150 hours. At 0153 hours the aircraft was over NDB Malpensa at 6 000 feet and was cleared by Malpensa APP to carry out a STANDARD/ILS (SIA) approach procedure to runway 35R. The aircraft was also provided with complete meteorological data for Malpensa Airport; runway visibility was given as 250 m. The aircraft left the 6 000 ft level at 0153:20 hours outbound on track 1550 as specified in AIP/ITALY MAP/050/1. At 0157:33 hours the pilot reported on approach inbound (352°) at 4 000 feet. At 0159:49 hours the Malpensa airport PAR controller provided the pilot with the current parameters: distance 7 NM/on track/ on the glide path. At 0200:44 hours the pilot reported 2 000 ft at the outer marker. It was cleared by Malpensa APP to land on runway 35R and instructed to report runway in sight. The ground/air/ground communications log indicates that the approach procedure was being carried out correctly and at 0202:50 hours the radar controller informed the pilot that he was over the approach end of the runway. This was the last contact between the aircraft and the control services. The aircraft had actually carried out a night-time final approach phase procedure in extremely critical visibility conditions because of fog, and in such conditions it had crossed the threshold of runway 35R deviating about 8° to the right in relation to the runway centre line; it then continued alongside the runway for about 2 400 m and struck the top of a group of trees beyond which it crashed to the ground approximately 3 000 m from the runway threshold and 435 m from its centre line. The aircraft caught fire following fuel spillage after impact with the ground. All the occupants were killed and the cargo was destroyed.

The aircraft departed Brussels-Melsbroek Airport in the morning on a flight to Gütersloh Airbase, Germany. Approaching Augustdorf, the captain decided to reduce his altitude to 2,500 feet to make a reconnaissance of the military training camp of Senne located 7 km south of Augustdorf. At this time, British troops were engaged in local exercices consisting of mortar shell fire. While flying too low, the aircraft was struck by several mortar shell and caught fire. Nine passengers were able to bail out and were later recovered uninjured. Out of control, the airplane went into a dive and crashed in flames, killing all 38 remaining occupants. It was reported few days after this tragic event that the aircraft should never being in this area at this time as it has been previously delimited by the British Troops for scheduled exercices. For unknown reason, the crew failed to follow the minimum safe altitude that was fixed at 10,000 feet over the area that day.

Following an uneventful transatlantic flight from New York, the crew started the approach to runway 20 at Brussels-Zaventem Airport. On short final, while at an altitude of 900 feet, the crew raised the landing gear, increased engine power and made a go around. The plane made three 360° turns to the left and climbed to 1,500 feet. During these turns the bank angle increased more and more until the aircraft was in a near vertical bank. The wings then leveled, followed by an abrupt pitch up. The 707 lost speed, started to spiral rapidly towards the ground nose down, crashed and caught fire. All 72 occupants were killed as well as one farmer working in the field. Among the passengers were 17 members of the US National Hockey Team who were flying to Prague to take part to the World Championship.

The aircraft departed the Brussels-Haren Airport for Rome at 1717LT on an IFR flight plan. According to radio communications between the aircraft and the area controls at Zurich, Milan and Rome the flight appears to have been normal. The aircraft was in touch with Rome area control at 1929LT and the last message from it was received at 1953LT. At about 1950LT the aircraft after overflying the village of Leonessa and continued on a heading of 163° until it hit the slope of the Mt Costone dell'Acquasanta at an altitude of 1,700 meters after breaking off the tops of trees in a wood in line with the point of impact, near the end of its course. The wreckage was found one week later only and all 29 occupants have been killed, among them the Italian actress Marcella Mariani.