Nigeria

On final approach to Kaduna Airport in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. All 11 occupants were killed, among them General Ibrahim Attahiru, Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army. He was returning to Kaduna with a delegation of six other Army officers, among them three Brigadier General.
Crew:
F/Lt T. Asaniyi,
F/Lt A. Olufade,
Sgt Adesina,
Acm Oyedepo.
Passengers:
Lt General Ibrahim Attahiru,
Br/Gen M. Abdulkadir,
Br/Gen Olayinka,
Br/Gen Kuliya,
Maj Lawal Hayat,
Maj Hamza,
Sgt Umar.

After takeoff from Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport, while climbing, the crew informed ATC about an engine failure and was cleared for an immediate return. On final approach to runway 22, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all 7 occupants were killed, among them two pilots, four ATOS specialists (Airborne Tactical Observation System) and one technician.

On 25th January 2018 at 14:28 h, a Gulfstream 200 (G200) aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-BTF operated by Nestoil Plc, departed Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos (DNMM) as a charter flight to Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja (DNAA) on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan. Onboard were four passengers and three flight crew members. The Pilot in command (PIC) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the Co-pilot was the Pilot Flying (PF). The departure, cruise and approach to Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport were normal. At 14:45 h, 5N-BTF contacted Abuja radar and was subsequently cleared for Radar vectors ILS approach Runway 22. Abuja Airport Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) Papa for time 14:20 h was monitored as follows; “Main landing runway 22, wind 110/07 kt, Visibility 3,500 m in Haze, No Significant Clouds, Temperature/Dew point 33/- 01°C, QNH 1010 hPa, Trend No Significant Change, End of Information Papa”. At 15:17 h, 5N-BTF reported 4 NM on Instrument approach (ILS) and was requested to report 2 NM because there was a preceding aircraft (Gulfstream 5) on landing roll. Thereafter, 5N-BTF was cleared to land runway 22 with reported wind of 070°/07 kt. At 15:18 h, the aircraft touched down slightly left of the runway centre line. According to the PF, in the process of controlling the aircraft to the centre line, the aircraft skidded left and right and eventually went partly off the runway to the right where it came to a stop. In his report, the PM stated that on touchdown, he noticed the aircraft oscillating left and right as brakes were applied. The oscillation continued to increase and [the aircraft] eventually went off the runway to the right where the aircraft came to a stop, partially on the runway. During the post-crash inspection, the investigation determined that the skid marks on the runway indicated that the aircraft steered in an S-pattern continuously with increasing amplitude, down the runway. On the last right turn, the aircraft exited the right shoulderof the runway, the right main wheel went into the grass and on the final left turn, the right main landing gear strut detached from its main attachment point after which the aircraft finally came to a complete stop on a magnetic heading of 160°. The ATC immediately notified the Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS), Approach Radar Control, and other relevant agencies about the occurrence. All persons on board disembarked with no injuries. Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the occurrence. The serious incident occcurred in daylight.

Shortly after takeoff from the Kaduna Military Airfield, while climbing, the aircraft went out of control and crashed into a house located in the Ribadu Cantonment, bursting into flames. All seven occupants (two pilots, two engineers and three passengers) were killed.

On 11th June, 2015, at about 18:25 h, an HS-125-800XP aircraft with nationality and registration marks N497AG, operated by SWAT Technology Limited departed Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja (DNAA) for Port Harcourt International Airport (DNPO) as a charter flight on an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) flight plan. There were five persons on board inclusive of three flight crew and two passengers. The Captain was the Pilot Flying while the Co-pilot was the Pilot Monitoring. At 18:48 h, N497AG established contact with Lagos and Port Harcourt Air Traffic Control (ATC) units cruising at Flight Level (FL) 280. At 18:55 h, the aircraft was released by Lagos to continue with Port Harcourt. Port Harcourt cleared N497AG for descent to FL210. At 19:13 h, the crew reported field in sight at 6 nautical miles to touch down to the Tower Controller (TC). TC then cleared the aircraft to land with caution “runway surface wet”. The crew experienced light rain at about 1.3 nautical miles to touch down with runway lights ON for the ILS approach. At about 1,000 ft after the extension of landing gears, the PM remarked ‘Okay...I got a little rain on the windshield’ and the PF responded, ‘We don’t have wipers sir... (Laugh) Na wa o (Na wa o – local parlance, - pidgin, for expression of surprise). From the CVR, at Decision Height, the PM called out ‘minimums’ while the PF called back ‘landing’ as his intention. The PM reported that the runway edge lights were visible on the left side. On the right side, it was missing to a large extent and only appeared for about a quarter of the way from the runway 03 end. The PM observed that the aircraft was slightly to the left of the “centreline” and pointed out “right, right, more right.” The PM further stated that at 50 ft, the PF retarded power and turned to the left. At 40 ft, the PM cautioned the PF to ‘keep light in sight don’t go to the left’. At 20 ft, the PM again said, ‘keep on the right’. PF replied, ‘Are you sure that’s not the centre line?’. At 19:16 h, the aircraft touched down with left main wheel in the grass and the right main wheel on the runway but was steered back onto the runway. The PF stated, “...but just on touchdown the right-hand lights were out, and in a bid to line up with the lights we veered off the runway to the left”. The nose wheel landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft stopped on the runway. The engines were shut down and all persons on board disembarked without any injury. From the CVR recordings, the PF told the PM that he mistook the brightly illuminated left runway edge lights for the runway centreline and apologized for the error of judgement for which the PM responded ‘I told you’. The aircraft was towed out of the runway and parked at GAT Apron at 21:50 h. The accident occurred at night in light rain.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Jeddah, the crew completed the approach and landing procedures on runway 04 at Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport. During the landing roll, the aircraft overran the displaced threshold then veered to the right and veered off runway. While contacting a grassy area, the aircraft collided with several parked excavator equipment and trucks. The aircraft came to a halt and was severely damaged to both wings and engines. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew discussed some concerns about the aircraft prior to departure but at this time we are not prepared to elaborate on those concerns as there remains a lot of work to complete on the CVR analysis in order to determine the specific nature of the crew’s concerns. Associated 361 was cleared for take-off on runway one eight left at Lagos international airport. The wind was calm and weather is not considered a factor in this accident. Approximately 4 seconds after engine power was advanced to commence the take-off roll, the crew received an automated warning from the onboard computer voice which consisted of three chimes followed by “Take-off Flaps…Take-off Flaps”. This is a configuration warning that suggests that the flaps were not in the correct position for take-off and there is some evidence that the crew may have chosen not to use flaps for the take-off. The warning did not appear to come as any surprise to the crew and they continued normally with the take-off. This warning continues throughout the take-off roll. As we are in the process of verifying the accuracy of the flight data, we have not yet been able to confirm the actual flap setting however we expect to determine this in the fullness of time. It was determined from the CVR that the pilot flying was the Captain and the pilot monitoring and assisting was the First Officer. The ‘set power‘ call was made by the Captain and the ‘power is set’ call was confirmed by the First Officer as expected in normal operations. Approximately 3 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the First Officer noted that the aircraft was moving slowly. Approximately 7 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the internal Aircraft Voice warning system could be heard stating ‘Take off Flaps, Auto Feather’. Auto feather refers to the pitch of the propeller blades. In the feather position, the propeller does not produce any thrust. The FDR contains several engine related parameters which the AIB is studying. At this time, we can state that the Right engine appears to be producing considerably less thrust than the Left engine. The left engine appeared to be working normally. The aircraft automated voice continued to repeat ‘Take-off Flaps, Auto Feather’. The physical examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the engine fire handle was pulled/activated. The standard ‘eighty knots’ call was made by the First Officer. The first evidence that the crew indicated that there was a problem with the take-off roll was immediately following the ‘eighty knots’ call. The First Officer asked if the take- off should be aborted approximately 12 seconds after the ‘eighty knots’ callout. Our investigation team estimates the airspeed to be approximately 95 knots. Airspeed was one of the parameters that, while working in the cockpit, appeared not to be working on the Flight Data Recorder. We were able to estimate the speed based on the radar data that we synchronized to the FDR and CVR but it is very approximate because of this. In response to the First Officer’s question to abort, the Captain indicated that they should continue and they continued the take-off roll. The crew did not make a ‘V1’ call or a Vr’ call. V1 is the speed at which a decision to abort or continue a take-off is made. Vr is the speed at which it is planned to rotate the aircraft. Normally the non-flying pilot calls both the V1 and the Vr speeds. When Vr is called the flying pilot pulls back on the control column and the aircraft is rotated (pitched up) to climb away from the runway. During the rotation, the First Officer stated ‘gently’, which we believe reflects concern that the aircraft is not performing normally and therefore needs to be rotated very gently so as not to aerodynamically stall the aircraft. The First Officer indicated that the aircraft was not climbing and advised the Captain who was flying not to stall the aircraft. Higher climb angles can cause an aerodynamic stall. If the aircraft is not producing enough overall thrust, it is difficult or impossible to climb without the risk of an aerodynamic stall. Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft slowly veered off the runway heading to the right and was not climbing properly. This aircraft behavior appears to have resulted in the Air Traffic Controller asking Flight 361 if operation was normal. Flight 361 never responded. Less than 10 seconds after rotation of the aircraft to climb away from the runway, the stall warning sounded in the cockpit and continued to the end of the recording. The flight data shows characteristics consistent with an aerodynamic stall. 31 seconds after the stall warning was heard, the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down near 90° right bank.

On the 25th of October, 2012 at 17: 48 h, a Cessna Caravan 208B, 5N-BMJ, departed Jalingo for Yola on a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight plan with four Persons-On-Board (one crew and three passengers). At 18:00 h, the Airport Manager stationed at Jalingo by Taraba State Government, called Yola Control Tower (CT) by phone to advise that the aircraft had departed Jalingo for Yola. At 18:25 h the pilot reported field in sight. CT then advised him to “continue approach and report final, wind calm” and the pilot acknowledged “will continue approach, to report final”. At 18:27 h CT had the aircraft in sight and advised the pilot to report “final, wind calm”, the pilot acknowledged. At 18:30 h, CT lost visual contact with 5N-BMJ and tried to raise her on radio but there was no response. At 18:37 h, information was received from witnesses, regarding a possible plane crash at Yola-Numan road close to Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) depot. This information was subsequently passed to the fire watch room. Rescue team and other security personnel were mobilized to the location of the crash. However, before the arrival of the rescue team from the airport, the locals had rescued the occupants from the wreckage. The occupants were subsequently taken to Federal Medical Centre (FMC), Yola for medical treatment. The accident occurred at dusk. The aircraft was destroyed.

On 3rd June, 2012 at about 1545:00hrs, 5N-RAM, a Boeing MD-83, a domestic scheduled commercial flight, operated by Dana Airlines (Nig.) Limited as flight 0992 (DANACO 0992), crashed into a densely populated area of Iju-Ishaga, a suburb of Lagos, following engine number 1 loss of power seventeen minutes into the flight and engine number 2 loss of power while on final approach to Murtala Muhammed Airport Lagos, Nigeria. Visual Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. All 153 persons onboard the airplane, including the six crew were fatally injured. There were also six confirmed ground fatalities. The airplane was destroyed. There was post impact fire. The flight originated at Abuja (ABV) and the destination was Lagos (LOS). The airplane was on the fourth flight segment of the day, consisting of two round-trips between Lagos and Abuja. The accident occurred during the return leg of the second trip. DANACO 0992 was on final approach to runway 18R at LOS when the crew declared a Mayday call “Dual Engine Failure – negative response from the throttles.” According to records, the flight arrived ABV as Dana Air flight 0993 at about 1350:00hrs and routine turn-around activities were carried out. DANACO 0992 initiated engine start up at 1436:00hrs. Abuja Control Tower cleared the aircraft to taxi to the holding point of runway 04. En-route ATC clearance was passed on to DANACO 0992 on approaching holding point of runway 04. According to the ATC ground recorder transcript, the aircraft was cleared to line-up on runway 04 and wait, but the crew requested for some time before lining-up. DANACO 0992 was airborne at 1458:00hrs after reporting a fuel endurance of 3 hours 30 minutes. The aircraft made contact with Lagos Area Control Centre at 1518:00hrs and reported 1545:00hrs as the estimated time of arrival at LOS at cruising altitude of 26,000 ft. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) retained about 30 minutes 53 seconds of the flight and started recording at 1513:44hrs by which time the Captain and First Officer (F/O) were in a discussion of a non-normal condition regarding the correlation between the engine throttle setting and an engine power indication. However, they did not voice concerns then that the condition would affect the continuation of the flight. The flight crew continued to monitor the condition and became increasingly concerned as the flight transitioned through the initial descent from cruise altitude at 1522:00hrs and the subsequent approach phase. DANACO 0992 reported passing 18,100ft and 7,700ft, at 1530:00hrs and 1540:00hrs respectively. After receiving radar vectors in heading and altitude from the Controller, the aircraft was issued the final heading to intercept the final approach course for runway 18R. According to CVR transcript, at 1527:30hrs the F/O advised the Captain to use runway 18R for landing and the request was made at 1531:49hrs and subsequently approved by the Radar Controller. The crew accordingly changed the decision height to correspond with runway 18R. At 1531:12hrs, the crew confirmed that there was no throttle response on the left engine and subsequently the Captain took over control as Pilot Flying (PF) at 1531:27hrs. The flight was however continued towards Lagos with no declaration of any distress message. With the confirmation of throttle response on the right engine, the engine anti-ice, ignition and bleed-air were all switched off. At 1532:05hrs, the crew observed the loss of thrust in No.1 Engine of the aircraft. During the period between 1537:00hrs and 1541:00hrs, the flight crew engaged in prelanding tasks including deployment of the slats, and extension of the flaps and landing gears. At 1541:46hrs the First Officer inquired, "both engines coming up?" and the Captain replied “negative” at 1541:48hrs. The flight crew subsequently discussed and agreed to declare an emergency. At 1542:10hrs, DANACO 0992 radioed an emergency distress call indicating "dual engine failure . . . negative response from throttle." At 1542:35hrs, the flight crew lowered the flaps further and continued with the approach and discussed landing alternatively on runway 18L. At 1542:45hrs, the Captain reported the runway in sight and instructed the F/O to retract the flaps and four seconds later to retract the landing gears. At 1543:27hrs, the Captain informed the F/O, "we just lost everything, we lost an engine. I lost both engines". During the next 25 seconds until the end of the CVR recording, the flight crew attempted to recover engine power without reference to any Checklist. The airplane crashed into a densely populated residential area about 5.8 miles north of LOS. The airplane wreckage was approximately on the extended centreline of runway 18R, with the main wreckage concentrated at N 06o 40.310’ E 003o 18.837' coordinates, with elevation of 177ft. During the impact sequence, the airplane struck an uncompleted building, two trees and three other buildings. The wreckage was confined in a small area, with the separated tail section and engines located at the beginning of the debris trail. The airplane was mostly consumed by post crash fire. The tail section, both engines and portions of both wings representing only about 15% of the airplane, were recovered from the accident site for further examination.

5N-BMM departed Lagos at 1856 hrs for Port Harcourt on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and estimated Port Harcourt at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to maintain FL330. The aircraft’s first contact with Port Harcourt was at 1914 hrs. The pilot reported maintaining FL330 with six souls onboard, four hours fuel endurance and estimating POT VOR at 1940hrs. The aircraft was cleared to POT, to maintain FL330 with no delay expected for ILS Approach Runway 21, QNH 1011 and to report when released by Lagos. At 1921 hrs the pilot reported 100 NM to POT and requested for descent. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL150. At 1927 hrs the pilot requested for further descent and was cleared to 3,300 feet on QNH 1011 but the pilot acknowledged 3500 feet. At 1931 hrs the aircraft was re-cleared to FL090 initially due to departing traffic on Runway 03. At 1934 hrs 5N-BMM reported maintaining FL090 and was re-cleared to FL050. The aircraft was re-cleared to 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 at 1936 hrs and cleared for the straight-in ILS Approach Runway 21 and to report on the localizer. At 1947 hrs the pilot reported final for Runway 21 and was asked to contact Tower on 119.2 and the Tower asked 5N-BMM to report on glide slope Runway 21. At 1950 hrs the Tower asked 5N-BMM to confirm on the glide slope and the crew confirmed “Charlie, we have three miles to run”. The Tower cleared 5N-BMM to land with surface wind calm but to exercise caution since the Runway surface was wet and 5N-BMM responded “wind calm”. At 1952:26 hrs the auto voice callout "minimums minimums” alerted the crew. At 1952:40 hrs the pilot flying (PF) said "I am not on the centerline". At 1952:48 hrs he said "I can't see down". At 1952:55 hrs the pilot monitoring (PM) said to the pilot flying; " I am telling you to go down" and the pilot flying said " I will go down", five seconds later the aircraft crashed. The crew exited the aircraft without accomplishing the Emergency Evacuation Checklist and therefore left the right engine running for about 28 minutes after the crash. The Fire Service eventually used their water hose to shutdown the running engine. At 19:54 hrs the Tower called 5N-BMM to pass on the landing time as 19:53 hrs, but no response from 5N-BMM. There was no indication that the aircraft was taxing on the Runway because it was dark and no light was visible hence the need to alert the Fire personnel. The watch room was asked to give the Tower information, which they could not give since they do not have a two – way contact with the Fire trucks. The Tower could not raise the Fire truck since there was no two - way communication between them; however, the Fire truck was later cleared to proceed to the Runway as the Tower could not ascertain the position of the aircraft. The aircraft was actually turned 90° because of the big culvert that held the right wing and made the aircraft spin and turned 90o facing the runway, two meters from the active runway, the culvert was uprooted due to the aircraft impact forces. The wheel broke off because of the gully that runs parallel to the runway.