Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Thompson

Date & Time: May 10, 2005 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FKEX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
York Landing – Thompson
MSN:
TC-332
YOM:
1980
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
erimeter Aviation flight 914, a Metro II with 17 people on board, was on approach at Thompson, MB. The first officer flew the aircraft during the approach, and encountered turbulence and fluctuating airspeed. The captain took control at 200 feet agl. The aircraft was high and left of centreline. The captain added power, continued the approach and landed hard on runway 23 near the intersection with runway 32. After the aircraft arrived at the apron, a fuel leak was noted. The aircraft was inspected and damage was found in the wheel wells, wing leading edge, engine mounts and a wing-fuselage attachment point. No injuries were reported. Reported winds at 1400Z were 010 at 15-20 kts; 1500Z winds were 350 at 9 kts.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Reus

Date & Time: Jan 31, 2004 at 1800 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EC-HCU
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Reus - Barcelona
MSN:
TC-390
YOM:
1981
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3500
Captain / Total hours on type:
2700.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
360
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a positioning flight from Reus to Barcelona for maintenance purposes. During take off roll on runway 07, at a speed of 80 knots, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft slid on its nose for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The nose gear folded because the lever was in the gear up position. The lever was in that position either due to the failure of the crew to carry out the checklists in full, in the event that the aircraft was delivered to them with the gear lever in the gear retracted position, or inadvertent action on the gear lever at some point between the last check by the crew and the moment of the accident.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Swearingen SA226AC Metro II in Denver

Date & Time: Dec 3, 2003 at 0555 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N60U
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Denver - Garden City
MSN:
TC-232
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13285
Aircraft flight hours:
25932
Circumstances:
The accident involved 2 Swearingen airplanes. The pilot of the first airplane reported that he had taxied north for departure. There were several company aircraft in front of him in line for departure so he came to a complete stop. The pilot of the second airplane reported that he was also taxiing north for departure. He had seen the lights from an aircraft holding short of runway 17R; however, he did not see the lights of the first airplane until it was too late. The pilot of the second airplane reported he applied full brakes and used reverse thrust but was unable to avoid hitting the first airplane. Both airplanes were substantially damaged.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilot of the taxiing aircraft to maintain clearance and adequate visual lookout for the stopped aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Grand Junction

Date & Time: Nov 18, 2003 at 0721 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N332BA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Rifle – Grand Junction
MSN:
TC-222E
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2419
Captain / Total hours on type:
140.00
Aircraft flight hours:
23972
Circumstances:
According to the pilot, he was told to enter left base and was cleared to land. The pilot stated that, when he reduced the airspeed to lower the landing gear, he "heard the gear come down," and he verified "three green in the [landing] gear indicator." He landed the airplane on its "main [landing gear] wheels first" and slowly let the nose of the airplane drop. Although both main landing gear assemblies remained down and locked, the nose landing gear collapsed, allowing the nose of the airplane and both propellers to strike the runway. The airplane slid approximately 3,000 feet, coming to a stop on the right edge of the runway. Several fractured propeller pieces impacted the left and right sides of the fuselage substantially damaging two fuselage station bulkheads. The fuselage bulkhead, forward of the nose landing gear well, was also substantially damaged due to contact with the runway. The pilot said that, during the approach, from base to final, he did not hear a landing gear warning horn. An air traffic control specialist, stated that he told the pilot to enter a left base and that he was cleared to land. The specialist stated that he observed the airplane roll out on a 2-mile final "with the gear down." As the airplane was rolling down the runway the "nose wheel collapsed." An FAA inspector examined the airplane and noted that, according to the Fairchild SA226 Maintenance Manual, the nose landing gear's up-lock mechanism was not properly lubricated, a "critical clearance" measurement between the nose landing gear's bell crank roller and positioning cam was found to be out of tolerance, and when the throttles were retarded, the landing gear warning horn activated, but it was "barely audible." According to the Fairchild SA226 Maintenance Manual, the landing gear should be lubed every 200 hours. The FAA inspector stated that the approved maintenance inspection sheet for the operator, did not show the requirement for the main landing gear or nose landing gear to be lubed every 200 hours.
Probable cause:
The operator's improper maintenance and servicing of the airplane's nose landing gear assembly, resulting in the collapse of the nose landing gear during the landing roll. Contributing factors include the nose section of the airplane's subsequent contact with the runway, the impact of several fractured propeller pieces into the fuselage, and the operator's inadequate maintenance and servicing procedures.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II on Point Lenana: 14 killed

Date & Time: Jul 19, 2003 at 1800 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
ZS-OYI
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Nairobi – Samburu
MSN:
TC-349
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
14
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Nairobi-Wilson Airport at 1558LT on a charter flight to Samburu, carrying 12 passengers (all US citizens) and two pilots. En route, the crew decided to make a tour over the Mt Kenya before continuing to Samburu. While cruising at an altitude of 16,500 feet in clouds, the aircraft struck the eastern slope of Mt Point Lenana (third highest peak of Mt Kenya). The wreckage was found 450 feet below the summit and all 14 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew failed to maintain horizontal and vertical situational awareness of the aircraft’s proximity to the surrounding terrain.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Unfamiliarity with the airspace and the route in particular and the existence of high ground on the planned flight route,
- Inadequate flight planning by the pilots and distraction of their attention when they were instructed to contact Nanyuki,
- Poor pilot briefing by the Wilson ATC briefing office,
- Poor communication between the air traffic control units,
- Failure of the radar controller to advise the pilot of termination of radar service,
- Lack of a radar system minimum safe altitude warning to the radar controller,
- Poor civil military coordination during transit through the military airspace.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AC Metro II in Denver

Date & Time: Apr 15, 2003 at 2041 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N229AM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gunnison - Denver
MSN:
TC-305
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
HKA1813
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4565
Captain / Total hours on type:
2179.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2517
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1400
Aircraft flight hours:
31643
Circumstances:
The flight was following a heavy jet on landing approach. The crew agreed to fly the approach at a slightly higher altitude than normal to avoid any possible wake turbulence. The first officer, who was flying the airplane, called for the landing gear to be lowered. When the captain placed the gear handle in the DOWN position, he noted red IN-TRANSIT lights. He recycled the landing gear, but got the same result. He consulted the emergency checklist and thought he had manually extended the landing gear because he "heard the normal 'clunk feel' and airspeed started to decay." In addition, when power was reduced to FLIGHT IDLE, the GEAR UNSAFE warning horn did not sound. The first officer agreed, noting 2,000 pounds of hydraulic pressure. The airplane landed wheels up. Propeller blade fragments penetrated the fuselage, breaching the pressure vessel. Postaccident examination revealed the nose gear had been partially extended but the main landing gear was retracted. The crew said the GEAR UNSAFE indication had been a recurring problem with the airplane. The problem had previously been attributed to a frozen squat switch in the wheel well.
Probable cause:
The failure of the landing gear system and the flight crew's failure to ascertain that the landing ear was down and locked. A contributing factor was the inadequate maintenance inspections performed by maintenance personnel.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Bahía Blanca

Date & Time: Nov 27, 2001 at 0538 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LV-WSD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Buenos Aires – Bahía Blanca
MSN:
TC-237E
YOM:
1977
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8200
Captain / Total hours on type:
929.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
40
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, the crew started a night approach to Bahía Blanca-Comandante Espora Airport. The approach and landing on runway 34R were considered as normal. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure and the aircraft rolled for a distance of 1,200 metres when it started to deviate to the right. It veered off runway, rolled for 150 metres then lost its nose gear and came to a halt. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The aircraft veered off runway after landing due to the possible combination of the following factors:
- A possible (but not confirmed) failure or malfunction of the left engine reverse thrust system,
- Crosswind close to the maximums specified in the flight manual,
- Lack of corrective actions on part of the crew who failed to identify a possible failure,
- Inappropriate use of the nosewheel steering system.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Shamattawa: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 11, 2001 at 2333 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GYPA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gods Lake Narrows – Shamattawa
MSN:
TC-250
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
PAG962
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
3100
Captain / Total hours on type:
1100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1200
Copilot / Total hours on type:
900
Circumstances:
Perimeter Airlines Flight PAG962, a Fairchild SA226TC (Metroliner), with two pilots and a flight nurse on board, departed Gods Lake Narrows, Manitoba, at approximately 2300 central daylight time, on a MEDEVAC flight to Shamattawa. Approaching Shamattawa, the crew began a descent to the 100 nautical mile minimum safe altitude of 2300 feet above sea level (asl) and, when clear of an overcast cloud layer at about 3000 feet asl, attempted a night, visual approach to Runway 01. The aircraft was too high and too fast on final approach and the crew elected to carry out a missed approach. Approximately 30 seconds after the power was increased, at 2333, the aircraft flew into trees slightly to the left of the runway centreline and about 2600 feet from the departure end of Runway 01. The aircraft was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) that indicated the crew were in control of the aircraft; they did not express any concern prior to impact. The aircraft broke apart along a wreckage trail of about 850 feet. Only the cabin aft of the cockpit retained some structural integrity. The captain and first officer were fatally injured on impact. The flight nurse was seriously injured but was able to exit the wreckage of the cabin. A post-crash fire was confined to the wings which had separated from the cabin and cockpit wreckage.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The aircraft was flown into terrain during an overshoot because the required climb angle was not set and maintained to ensure a positive rate of climb.
2. During the go-around, conditions were present for somatogravic illusion, which most likely led to the captain losing situational awareness.
3. The first officer did not monitor the aircraft instruments during a critical stage of flight; it is possible that he was affected by somatogravic illusion and/or distracted by the non-directional
beacon to the extent that he lost situational awareness.
Other Findings:
1. The absence of approach aids likely decreased the crew=s ability to fly an approach from which a landing could be executed safely.
2. The company standard operating procedures (SOPs) did not define how positive rate is to be determined.
Final Report: