Rockwell Grand Commander 680

The pilot departed the airport mid-morning to fly to his home airport, 63 miles to the northwest. Weather conditions at the departureb airport were visual flight rules (VFR), the weather at the destination airport was not reported, and the weather conditions en-route were marginal VFR. The global positioning system (GPS) track for the flight indicated that the airplane departed from the airport and headed west along a highway corridor flying approximately 1,000 feet above ground level (agl) through a mountain pass. For the majority of the flight, the airplane maintained altitudes between 900 feet and 1,200 feet agl. Twenty-nine minutes after takeoff, the airplane’s GPS track turned southwest away from an area of concentrated precipitation and directly towards an isolated mountain peak that rose approximately 1,000 feet above the surrounding terrain. The pilot contacted the local air traffic control facility, reported his position and requested traffic advisories through the local airspace to his destination airport. About 6 minutes later, the pilot stated that he was having difficulty maintaining VFR and asked for an instrument flight rules (IFR)clearance. At the same time, the GPS track showed that the airplane came within 50 feet of the mountainous terrain. No further transmissions from the pilot were received. The final GPS position was recorded 1 minute later, at 500 feet agl and approximately half a mile from the crash site. The terrain rapidly ascended in this area and intersected the airplane's flight path over the remaining 1/2 mile. An airport located about 4 miles from the accident site and in an area of flat terrain 1,000 feet below the isolated mountain top, recorded weather at the time of the accident as few clouds at 900 feet agl, overcast clouds at 1,500 feet agl, and a variable ceiling between 1,200 and 1,800 feet agl, in drizzle. Weather radar images at the time of the accident depicted precipitation at the elevation and location of the accident site, indicating probable mountain obscuration.

The aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances near Cuchilla La Marimonda. The wreckage was found nine days later, on February 12, in a mountainous area. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. A load of 600 kilos of cocaine was found among the debris.

The airplane descended into the ground during takeoff-initial climb on a local fire reconnaissance flight. Witnesses reported that airplane became airborne, but was not climbing, and it continued down the runway in a nose-up attitude in ground effect until impacting terrain about 600 feet southeast from the departure end of the runway. The ambient temperature was about 107 degrees Fahrenheit, and the density altitude was calculated at 5,878 feet mean sea level. On scene examination found the flaps in the 30-degree position, which also corresponded to the flap actuator position. The cockpit indicator for the flaps also showed a 30-degree extension. A subsequent bench test of the combined flap/gear selector valve was conducted. During the initial inspection, both the gear selector and the flap selector valves were bent, but otherwise operational. The "stop-pin" on the flap selector lever was missing. There was no leakage of fluid during this test. Examination of both engines revealed no abnormalities, which would prevent normal operations. The aircraft flight manual specifies that the flaps should be set at 1/4 down (10 degrees) for normal takeoff.

The twin-engine airplane was on the base leg to final turn, about 1-1 1/2 miles from the approach end of the runway when the left engine lost power. Instantly after, the right engine lost power and the pilot feathered both engines. The airplane then impacted a 70-foot high tree and collided with the ground about 1,000 feet short of the runway. The 700-hour pilot reported that he activated the electric fuel boost pumps and switched the fuel selectors from the auxiliary fuel tank positions to the main fuel tank positions, about 17 miles from the airport. He recalled that the fuel gauges indicated approximately 70 gallons of fuel in the main tank and about 10-15 gallons of fuel in the auxiliary tanks. The original installed fuel system was configured with a center tank and two outboard tanks. The center tank was composed of five, interconnected rubber cells, having a total capacity of 150 to 159 US gallons. Each outboard fuel tank was composed of two fuel cells with a combined capacity of 33.5 gallons. The total of the two outboard fuel tanks (four cells) was 67 gallons, providing a total usable capacity of 233 gallons. Each engine had its own fuel shutoff switch. Rotating a switch to the RIGHT OUTBOARD or LEFT OUTBOARD position allows fuel from the outboard tanks to flow to the respective engine and shuts off fuel from the center tank. Rotating a fuel shutoff switch to the CENTER position allows fuel to flow from the center tank to the respective engine, and shuts off flow from the respective outboard tank. Rotating the switch to the OFF position shuts off all fuel flow to the respective engine. There was no cross-feed configuration of the switches. Documentation was found in the historical records that indicated extended range fuel system modifications, however, the information was incomplete. After review of all available records and examination of the wreckage, it was determined that the fuel system configuration/capacity of the airplane at the time of the accident was: 156 gallons for the center tank system; 67 gallons for the outboard wing tanks; and a set of auxiliary tanks capable of holding 21 gallons (records of installation unknown). The total usable fuel capacity was estimated at 244 gallons. Cockpit fuel selector positions were: LEFT Fuel Shut Off Valve Selector-LEFT HAND OUTBOARD; LEFT Fuel Boost Pump-OFF; LEFT Engine Primer-OFF; LEFT Ignition Switch-RIGHT; RIGHT Fuel Shut Off Valve Selector-RIGHT HAND OUTBOARD; RIGHT Fuel Boost Pump-ON; RIGHT Engine Primer-OFF; RIGHT Ignition Switch-BOTH. Airframe fuel shutoff valves were found in the following positions (Each valve position corresponded to the cockpit selectors): Right Wing Auxiliary-OPEN; Right Wing Main-CLOSED; Left Wing Auxiliary-OPEN; Left Wing Main-CLOSED. A total of 37.5 gallons of usable fuel was drained from the uncompromised tanks (unknown amount had leaked at the accident site). Excerpts from the " Normal Procedures" section of the flight manual regarding fuel selector positions for take off and landing: "CAUTION; Burn center tank fuel first, when 100 gallons is shown on center tank gauge, switch to outboard tanks. Do not allow engine to be starved of fuel when outboard tanks run dry. Select center tanks at first indication of fuel pressure loss. Fuel boost pumps must be on when switching tanks." The "BEFORE LANDING CHECK" procedures in the aircraft flight manual state that the Fuel Selector Valves must be in the "CENTER TANK" position before the approach. The manufacturer stated that the simultaneous loss of power of both engines was likely a result of the outboard fuel tanks unporting. No mechanical anomalies were found during examination of the engines or airframe, and usable fuel was available in the center tank at the time of the accident.

While departing on a local area aircraft checkout flight the aircraft stayed low and the pilot advised the tower that he had a fuel problem. The aircraft had been fueled with aviation grade 100LL twice the day before in preparation for a trip. The pilot attempted to return to the airport, but collided with power lines 1.5 miles north. Examination of the engines revealed severe detonation had occurred. A fuel sample was obtained from the aircraft and tested negative for jet fuel contamination. The aircraft had been modified by installation of higher horsepower engines and turbochargers with manual wastegates. During postaccident examination of the aircraft systems the manual wastegates were found partially closed; a position that can provide additional manifold pressure. The engines are restricted to a maximum of 29.5 inHg.

The pilot of the Part 135 cargo flight was executing the 'full' ILS runway 27 approach at Helena Regional Airport in a non-radar environment. Although the approach calls for the pilot to maintain 7,000 feet until intercepting the glideslope, the aircraft impacted the terrain at 5,300 about 1.5 miles prior to reaching the point where the pilot should have crossed the Hauser NDB at an altitude of 6,741 feet. According to the approach plate, the aircraft should not have descended to an altitude below 5,400 feet until reaching the outer marker, which is located about five and one-half miles west of the impact site.

The pilot, sole on board, departed Southend on a ferry flight to Canada with an intermediate stop in Greenland. En route, he reported to ATC severe icing conditions. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the Atlantic Ocean about 167 km southeast of the Greenland coast. The pilot was killed.

After takeoff, the pilot transmitted to ATC controllers that he had lost power in an engine. He made a steep turn to the left back toward the airport, then a right turn toward the runway. The aircraft's nose dropped in the right turn, and the aircraft crashed nose first on a taxiway. Post crash examination of the aircraft structure and flight control systems revealed no preimpact failure or malfunction. The left propeller was found in the feathered position, and the right propeller was found in a high blade angle. The right propeller had damage consistent with the engine operating. Teardown examination of the engines and propellers showed no findings that would have resulted in engine or propeller malfunction or failure. At the time the aircraft was purchased by the pilot in March 1996, he had not flown for about 10 years. Since purchasing the aircraft, he had logged 2.5 hours of transition/checkout in the airplane and had flown it for a total of about 22 hours, mostly on 'sightseeing flights.'

The twin engine aircraft departed Bogotá-El Dorado Airport at 0638LT. While climbing, the crew reported technical problems with the right engine and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. While completing a left turn, the crew lost control of the airplane that crashed near Empresa Triturados del Tolima, about 5 km north of the airport, some 7 minutes after takeoff. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.

Approximately two minutes after takeoff, witnesses saw the airplane pull up sharply into a steep climb from underneath an 800-foot ceiling. The airplane went into an uncontrolled, nearly vertical dive and impacted into a river. The pilot did not hold multi-engine or instrument ratings. Individuals who knew the pilot, including an instructor who had flown with him, stated that they had doubted the pilot's competence but that the pilot had been confident of his own flying ability.