Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter in Iliniza

Date & Time: Sep 2, 1980
Operator:
Registration:
FAE453
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
MSN:
453
YOM:
1975
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances on Mt Illiniza near the 24 Mayo Airstrip. All seven occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The airplane had a dual registration FAE453 and HC-BAV.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 near Santiago de Chile: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 12, 1980
Operator:
Registration:
943
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
396
YOM:
1974
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
En route, the crew encountered technical problems and elected to make an emergency landing. The aircraft crash landed in a field located 40 km east of Santiago-Los Cerrillos Airport. A passenger was killed while 16 other occupants were injured, some of them seriously.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 near Oroque: 4 killed

Date & Time: Dec 19, 1979
Registration:
HK-1710-W
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Barranquilla - Cúcuta
MSN:
252
YOM:
1969
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The crew departed Barranquilla-Ernesto Cortissoz Airport under VFR mode. En route, weather conditions worsened and while cruising at 11,500 feet, the airplane struck the slope of a mountain located near Oroque. The wreckage was found three days later and all four occupants were killed, among them two Mexican employees of the Anson Drilling Company, a Colombian Group specialized in Oil and Petroleum business.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 near Nome: 4 killed

Date & Time: Dec 3, 1979
Operator:
Registration:
N8061V
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Nome - Shishmaref
MSN:
294
YOM:
1970
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3453
Captain / Total hours on type:
731.00
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Nome on a VFR flight to Shishmaref, about 122 miles to the north. Few minutes after takeoff, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with snow falls, limited visibility (night) and icing conditions. The airplane struck the slope of a mountain located to the north of Nome. As the airplane failed to arrive at destination, SAR operations were initiated but eventually suspended few days later as no trace of the aircraft nor the four occupants was found. The wreckage was localized on February 10, 1980. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all four occupants have been found dead.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain during normal cruise after the crew continued VFR flight into adverse weather conditions. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Snow covered terrain,
- High obstructions,
- Low ceiling,
- Snow,
- Visibility half a mile or less,
- Fog,
- Special VFR flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Tau

Date & Time: Nov 5, 1979 at 1703 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N23BC
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pago Pago - Tau
MSN:
431
YOM:
1974
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6979
Captain / Total hours on type:
1073.00
Circumstances:
On final approach to Tau Airport, the copilot failed to call out low airspeed. Following an improper level off, the airplane bounced on landing then veered off runway and collided with trees. All 18 occupants were rescued, among them one passenger was seriously injured.
Probable cause:
Hard landing and subsequent collision with trees due to improper level off. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Improper recovery from bounced landing,
- The copilot failed to follow approved procedures,
- The copilot did not call out low airspeed on final.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Big Trout Lake: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 1, 1979
Operator:
Registration:
C-GTJA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pickle Lake - Big Trout Lake
MSN:
630
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
UH607
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
On final approach to Big Trout Lake Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. On final, the twin engine airplane struck an NDB tower and crashed. Both pilots and a passenger were killed while nine other occupants were injured. At the time of the accident, the visibility was below minimums.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 200 in Sechelt: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 30, 1979 at 1300 LT
Registration:
C-FWAF
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vancouver – Sechelt – Powell River
MSN:
122
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
106
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
14
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Aircraft flight hours:
13815
Circumstances:
Flight 106 was a schedule service from Vancouver to Powell River with an intermediate stop at Sechelt. The flight to Sechelt was uneventful. While approaching Porpoise Bay at Sechelt, at an altitude of 200 feet, the twin engine airplane rolled to the right in an angle of 90° then nosed down and crashed on the east shore of the bay, about 50 meters from the water. The captain and a passenger were killed while 14 other occupants were injured, four of them seriously.
Probable cause:
The right-hand aileron bellcrank-to-aileron rod had separated from the bellcrank end fitting due to an extensive stress corrosion crack. This allowed the right-hand aileron to move up, causing asymmetric lift and irretrievable loss of control. The specified visual inspection of the rods was inadequate to detect stress corrosion cracking. Previous similar failures of flap rods on the DHC-6 had led to airworthiness action by the manufacturer and the DOT but these measures were not applied to the aileron rods which are of similar construction.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Frobisher Bay: 9 killed

Date & Time: Aug 29, 1979 at 2300 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GROW
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Brevoort Island - Frobisher Bay
MSN:
415
YOM:
1974
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Aircraft flight hours:
5286
Circumstances:
The airplane was being used for a series of flights between Frobisher (YFB) and Brevoort Island, a distance of 119 nm. These flights were conducted under visual flight rules (VFR) with a Flight Notification filed at Frobisher. Two return flights were accomplished without incident and the aircraft was flown back to Brevoort for another round trip. On the final flight the aircraft, with the same two pilots and with seven passengers, left Brevoort at 21:57 hours local time enroute to Frobisher. The pilots contacted Frobisher Flight Service Station (FSS) at 22:31 reporting at 6000 feet altitude estimating Frobisher in 15 minutes. Upon receiving the latest weather indicating conditions below VFR limits, they requested clearance for "Special VFR". This clearance was granted. Another weather report was transmitted by the Frobisher FSS giving the 22:44 observation in which the ceiling had lowered to 400 ft with the visibility at 8 miles and the wind from 190 deg M at 22 knots. The pilot stated they would make a front course ILS approach to runway 36 with a landing on 18. At 22:58 they were issued a clearance for an ILS approach. They subsequently reported outbound at procedure turn altitude and at that time confirmed their planned approach for runway 36 with circling for 18. This was the last radio transmission from C-GROW. The Twin Otter was seen flying north along the runway. It then struck high ground about 1200 feet east of the runway and about 100 feet above runway level. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The exact cause of the accident could not be determined with certainty. However, it is quite possible that there was low cloud over the terrain east of the runway; when the aircraft had nearly completed its turn, it entered low cloud and the crew lost visual contact; the crew continued the right turn probably expecting to become visual again because they knew that good visibility existed over the runway; they did not regain contact with the ground and runway environment however and impacted the higher ground to the east of the runway.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Hyannis: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 17, 1979 at 2248 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N383EX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York-LaGuardia – New Bedford – Hyannis
MSN:
245
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
NE248
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
25101
Captain / Total hours on type:
951.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4362
Copilot / Total hours on type:
102
Aircraft flight hours:
17058
Circumstances:
Before loading the aircraft for takeoff from LaGuardia, the flight crew checked the enroute weather for the return flight to Hyannis and learned that a landing at the en route stop at New Bedford might not be possible. When they were advised of the weather situation, the passengers destined for New Bedford decided to remain in LaGuardia. At 2132, flight 248 departed LaGuardia for Hyannis on the last leg of the day. There were eight passengers and two flight crew members aboard. According to the first officer's and a passenger's testimony at the public hearing during the investigation of the accident, flight 248 was normal until the approach for landing at Hyannis. At 2234:08, flight 248 contacted Otis Approach Control and reported level at 5,000 feet. At 2239:05, the flight was given the current Hyannis weather which included an indefinite ceiling of 200 feet, sky obscured, visibility 3/4 mile in fog, wind 210° at 10 knots. It also included a visibility of 1 1/8 in light drizzle on runway 24. At 2244:36, flight 248 was 4 nmi north-northeast of the outer marker when Otis Approach Control gave the flight a vector of 210° to intercept the localizer at 1,700 feet for an ILS approach to runway 24 at the Barnstable Airport. At 2245:34, flight 248 was instructed to contact the Barnstable Airport tower. About 2247, the flight complied with this request and reported crossing the outer marker. The flight was cleared to land, however, no further transmissions were heard form the aircraft. The Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Boston Center) was able to track flight 248 to within 2.8 nmi of the intended touchdown point on runway 24. Boston Center's computer printout showed the flight's position at 2246:51 about 0.35 nmi northeast of the ILS outer marker at 1,700 feet. It also showed the flight about 0.15 nmi southwest of the outer marker at 1,500 feet at 2247:03. The last radar position shown for the flight was about 1.1 nmi southwest of the outer marker at 2247:27 at 1,100 feet. The first officer stated that the captain was flying the aircraft during the approach to Hyannis. He said that he made the following callouts: localizer alive, outer marker, 500 feet above, 200 feet above, 100 feet above, minimums, and 100 feet below. He said that the captain did not acknowledge any of these calls. The first officer said that when he called 'minimums', the aircraft was one dot below the ILS glidepath. The first officer said that it appeared that the aircraft was in a continual descent without any excessive sink rates or descent angles from 5,000 feet until impact, with the airspeed near 130 knots for the entire approach. He stated that, as he called '100 feet below', he looked outside the cockpit because he believed that the captain had the approach lights in sight. The first officer said that he did not see the ground before the aircraft crashed about 2248 into a heavily wooded area located 1.5 nmi from the approach end of runway 24, on the runway centerline extended. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness. The captain was killed while all other occupants were injured, some of them seriously.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flightcrew to recognize and react in a timely manner to the gross deviation from acceptable approach parameters, resulting in a continuation of the descent well below decision height during a precision approach without visual contact with the runway environment. Although the Board was unable to determine conclusively the reason for the failure to recognize and react to the gross deviation, it is believed that the degraded physiological condition of the captain seriously impaired his performance. Also, the lack of adequate crew coordination practices and procedures contributed to the first officer's failure to detect and react to the situation in a timely manner.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter in Rockland: 17 killed

Date & Time: May 30, 1979 at 2055 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N68DE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Boston - Rockland
MSN:
229
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
DE46
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Captain / Total flying hours:
5050
Captain / Total hours on type:
603.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2580
Copilot / Total hours on type:
46
Aircraft flight hours:
21050
Circumstances:
About 2055LT, Downeast Airlines flight 46 crashed into a heavily wooded area about 1,2 mile south-southwest of the Knox County Regional Airport in Rockland, Maine. The crash occurred during a non-precision instrument approach to runway 03 in instrument meteorological conditions. Of the 16 passengers and 2 crew members aboard, only one passenger survived the accident. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flightcrew to arrest the aircraft's descent at the minimum descent altitude for the non-precision approach, without the runway environment in sight, for unknown reasons. Although the Safety Board was unable to determine conclusively the reason(s) for the flightcrew's deviation from standard instrument approach procedures, it is believed that inordinate management pressures, the first officer's marginal instrument proficiency, the captain's inadequate supervision of the flight, inadequate crew training and procedures, and the captaints chronic fatigue were all factors in the accident.
Final Report: