Crash of a Beechcraft A60 Duke in Abilene

Date & Time: Feb 24, 2013 at 1020 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N7466D
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fort Smith – Abilene
MSN:
P-139
YOM:
1970
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7500
Captain / Total hours on type:
800.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3725
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that he had added fuel at the previous fuel stop and that he was using a fuel totalizer to determine the quantity of fuel onboard. After climbing to a cruise altitude of 14,000 feet above ground level, he discovered that the fuel mixture control was frozen and that he was unable to lean the mixture to a lower fuel flow setting. The pilot reported that because of the increased fuel consumption, he briefly considered an en route stop for additional fuel but decided to continue. During descent, the airplane experienced a complete loss of power in both engines, and the pilot made an emergency off-field, gear-up landing about 7 miles from the destination. The airplane impacted terrain and thick scrub trees, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings, both engine mounts, and the fuselage. A postaccident examination found that only a trace of fuel remained. The pilot also reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or failure and that his inadequate fuel management was partly because he had become overconfident in his abilities after 50 years of flying.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s improper fuel management, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Sedona: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 26, 2012 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N880LY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sedona – Albuquerque
MSN:
P-524
YOM:
1980
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
663
Captain / Total hours on type:
94.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3924
Circumstances:
Several witnesses observed the airplane before and during its takeoff roll on the morning of the accident. One witness observed the airplane for the entire event and stated that the run-up of the engines sounded normal. During the takeoff roll, the acceleration of the airplane appeared a little slower but the engines continued to sound normal. Directional control was maintained, and at midfield, the airplane had still not rotated. As the airplane continued down the 5,132-foot-long runway, it did not appear to be accelerating, and, about 100 yards from the end of the runway, it appeared that it was not going to stop. The airplane maintained contact with the runway and turned slightly right before it overran the end of the runway. The airplane was subsequently destroyed by impact forces and a postaccident fire. The wreckage was located at the bottom of a deep gully off the end of the runway. Postaccident examination of the area at the end of the runway revealed two distinct tire tracks, both of which crossed the asphalt and dirt overrun of 175 feet. A review of the airplane's weight and balance and performance data revealed that it was within its maximum gross takeoff weight and center of gravity limits. At the time of the accident, the density altitude was calculated to be 7,100 feet; the airport's elevation is 4,830 feet. For the weight of the airplane and density altitude at the time of the accident, it should have lifted off 2,805 feet down the runway; the distance to accelerate to takeoff speed and then to safely abort the takeoff and stop the airplane was calculated to be 4,900 feet. It is unknown whether the pilot completed performance calculations accounting for the density altitude. All flight control components were accounted for at the accident site. Although three witnesses indicated that the engines did not sound right at some point during the runup or takeoff, examination of the engine and airframe revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Propeller signatures were consistent with rotational forces being applied at the time of impact. No conclusive evidence was found to explain why the airplane did not rotate or why the pilot did not abort the takeoff once reaching the point to safely stop the airplane.
Probable cause:
The airplane's failure to rotate and the pilot's failure to reject the takeoff, which resulted in a runway overrun for reasons that could not be undetermined because postaccident examination of the airplane and engines did not reveal any malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Edwards: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 15, 2010 at 1602 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N571M
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Pueblo - Eagle
MSN:
P-534
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1300
Aircraft flight hours:
2456
Circumstances:
The air traffic controller had cleared the flight for the instrument approach and the pilot acknowledged the clearance. Radar data depicted the airplane turning toward the final approach course and then continuing the turn 180 degrees before disappearing from radar at 11,200 feet. The wreckage was located at an elevation of 10,725 feet. Examination of the terrain and ground scars indicated the airplane impacted terrain in a nose down, right turn. Impact forces and a postimpact fire resulted in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the airplane, engines, and de-icing systems revealed no mechanical anomalies. Weather at the time of the accident was depicted as overcast skies, reduced visibility, with snow showers in the area. An icing probability chart depicted a probability of moderate rime and mixed icing. Both AIRMETs and SIGMENTs advised of moderate icing between the freezing level and flight level 220 and occasional severe rime and mixed icing below 16,000 feet. During his weather briefing, the pilot stated that he was aware of the adverse weather conditions.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain, while on an instrument approach in instrument meteorological conditions, for undetermined reasons.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 60 Duke in Edenton: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 7, 2010 at 1932 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N7022D
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Edenton - Edenton
MSN:
P-13
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1558
Captain / Total hours on type:
343.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
30000
Aircraft flight hours:
3562
Circumstances:
The pilot was receiving instruction and an instrument proficiency check (IPC) from a flight instructor. Following an hour of uneventful instruction, the IPC was initiated. During the first takeoff of the IPC, the pilot was at the flight controls, and the flight instructor controlled the throttles. Although the pilot normally set about 40 inches of manifold pressure for takeoff, the flight instructor set about 37 inches, which resulted in a longer than expected takeoff roll. Shortly after takeoff, at an altitude of less than 100 feet, with the landing gear extended, the flight instructor retarded the left throttle at 83 to 85 knots indicated airspeed; 85 knots was the minimum single engine control speed for the airplane. The pilot attempted to advance the throttles, but was unable since the flight instructor’s hand was already on the throttles. The airplane veered sharply to the left and rolled. The pilot was able to level the wings just prior to the airplane colliding with trees and terrain. The pilot reported that procedures for simulating or demonstrating an engine failure were never discussed. Although the flight instructor’s experience in the accident airplane make and model was not determined, he reported prior to the flight that he had not flown that type of airplane recently. The flight instructor was taking medication for type II diabetes. According to his wife, the flight instructor had not experienced seizures or a loss of consciousness as a result of his medical condition.
Probable cause:
The flight instructor’s initiation of a simulated single engine scenario at or below the airplane’s minimum single engine control speed, resulting in a loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor’s failure to set full engine power during the takeoff roll and the flight instructor’s lack of recent experience in the airplane make and model.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Huntsville: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 2010 at 1345 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N810JA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Huntsville – Nashville
MSN:
P-591
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1600
Aircraft flight hours:
3383
Circumstances:
The multiengine airplane was at an altitude of 6,000 feet when it experienced a catastrophic right engine failure, approximately 15 minutes after takeoff. The pilot elected to return to his departure airport, which was 30 miles away, instead of diverting to a suitable airport that was located about 10 miles away. The pilot reported that he was not able to maintain altitude and the airplane descended until it struck trees and impacted the ground, approximately 3 miles from the departure airport. The majority of the wreckage was consumed by fire. A 5 1/2 by 6-inch hole was observed in the top right portion of the crankcase. Examination of the right engine revealed that the No. 2 cylinder separated from the crankcase in flight. Two No. 2 cylinder studs were found to have fatigue fractures consistent with insufficient preload on their respective bolts. In addition, a fatigue fracture was observed on a portion of the right side of the crankcase, mostly perpendicular to the threaded bore of the cylinder stud. The rear top 3/8-inch and the front top 1/2-inch cylinder hold-down studs for the No. 2 cylinder exceeded the manufacturer's specified length from the case deck by .085 and .111 inches, respectively. The airplane had been operated for about 50 hours since its most recent annual inspection, which was performed about 8 months prior the accident. The right engine had been operated for about 1,425 hours since it was overhauled, and about 455 hours since the No. 2 cylinder was removed for the replacement of six cylinder studs. It was not clear why the pilot was unable to maintain altitude after the right engine failure; however, the airplane was easily capable of reaching an alternate airport had the pilot elected not to return to his departure airport.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to divert to the nearest suitable airport following a total loss of power in the right engine during cruise flight. Contributing to the accident was the total loss of power in the right engine due to separation of its No. 2 cylinder as a result of fatigue cracks.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft A60 Duke in Minidoka

Date & Time: Aug 13, 2009 at 1541 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N99BE
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pocatello – Boise
MSN:
P-132
YOM:
1970
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2000
Captain / Total hours on type:
800.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3120
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that he planned to fly a round trip cross-country flight. Prior to takeoff, he ascertained the quantity of fuel on board based upon the airplane's fuel totalizer gauge indication, which indicated 89 gallons. The flight to the destination was uneventful, and upon landing, 20 gallons of fuel was purchased. Thereafter, the pilot departed for the return flight back to his originating airport. According to the pilot, on takeoff the fuel tank gauges indicated the tanks were between 1/3 and 1/4 full. While cruising, the pilot contacted an air traffic control facility and notified them that he had lost power in one engine. About 5 minutes later, the pilot broadcasted that both engines were without power. Unable to reach the nearest airport, the pilot landed on soft, uneven terrain. During rollout, the airplane nosed over and was substantially damaged. The calculated post accident fuel burn-off for the round trip flight was about 106 gallons. During the post accident inspection, an FAA inspector reported finding an estimated 2 gallons of fuel in one tank. The other tank was dry. No fuel was observed in the main fuel lines to the engines, and no mechanical malfunctions were reported by the pilot.
Probable cause:
A loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion as a result of the pilot's inadequate fuel planning.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 60 Duke in Wilmington: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 4, 2007 at 0722 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N105PP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Wilmington – Allentown
MSN:
P-105
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1080
Circumstances:
According to a witness, prior to arriving in the run-up area the pilot lowered the airplane's flaps. After the right flap fully extended, the flap key on the drive shaft inside the 90-degree drive assembly adapter fractured, in overload, in the direction of flap extension. Before takeoff, the pilot raised the flaps; however, with the fractured key, the right flap would have remained fully extended. The pilot could have identified this condition prior to takeoff, either visually or by means of the flap indicator, which received its input from the right flap actuator. The pilot subsequently took off, and the airplane turned left, but it is unknown at what point the pilot would have noted a control problem. The pilot climbed the airplane to 250 to 300 feet and allowed the airspeed to bleed off to where the airplane stalled and subsequently spun into the ground. Airplane manufacturer calculations revealed that the pilot should have been able to maintain control of the airplane at airspeeds over 70 knots. According to the pilot's operating handbook, the best two-engine angle of climb airspeed was 99 knots and the best two-engine rate of climb airspeed was 120 knots.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during a split flap takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident were the failure of the right flap drive mechanism and the pilot's failure to verify that both flaps were retracted prior to takeoff.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 60 Duke in Silvânia: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 17, 2007 at 1340 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PT-OOH
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Montes Claros – Goiânia
MSN:
P-27
YOM:
1969
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1000
Captain / Total hours on type:
85.00
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Montes Claros Airport at 1200LT on a flight to Goiânia, carrying one passenger and one pilot. As he started the descent to Goiânia Airport, the pilot reported the failure of the left engine and requested the permission to proceed with a direct approach to runway 32 despite the runway 14 was in use. Few seconds later, the right engine failed as well. The pilote reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in an open field located near Silvânia, about 50 km east of Goiânia Airport. On impact, the fixing points of the seat belts broke away, causing both occupants to impact the instrument panel. The aircraft was severely damaged and both occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Failure of both engines in flight due to fuel exhaustion. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor judgment on the part of the pilot who considered that the quantity of fuel present in the tanks before departure was sufficient, which was not the case,
- Poor flight planning on part of the pilot who miscalculated the fuel consumption,
- The pilot failed to follow the procedures related to fuel policy.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Gainesville: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 16, 2006 at 1153 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N999DE
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Gainesville - Gainesville
MSN:
P-447
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
1500
Aircraft flight hours:
2901
Circumstances:
The airplane crashed into the terminal building following a loss of control on takeoff initial climb from runway 25. Witnesses reported that shortly after takeoff, the airplane banked sharply to the left, then it seemed to momentarily stabilize and commence a climb before beginning to roll to the left again. The airplane rolled to an inverted position, entered a dive, collided with the airport terminal building and exploded on impact. The entire airplane sustained severe fire and impact damage. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of any discrepancies that would preclude normal operation. All the propeller blades displayed signatures indicative of high rotational energy at the time of impact, indicating that both propellers were rotating, not feathered, and the engines were operating at high power at the time of impact. Components of the autopilot system, specifically the pitch servo assembly and a portion of the roll servo assembly, were identified in the wreckage. The portion of the roll servo assembly found remained attached to a piece of skin torn from the airframe and consisted of the mounting bracket for the roll servo with the capstan bolted to the bracket, clearly indicating that this component had been reinstalled and strongly suggesting that the pilot reinstalled/reactivated all of the removed autopilot components the day before the accident. Maintenance personnel started an annual inspection on the airplane the month prior to the accident and found an autopilot installed in the airplane without the proper paperwork. The pilot explained to them that he designed and built the autopilot and was in the process of getting the proper paperwork for the installation of the system in his airplane. During the inspection, a mechanic found the aileron cable rubbing on the autopilot's roll servo capstan so the mechanic removed the roll servo along with the capstan. Additionally, mechanics disabled the autopilot's pitch servo and removed the autopilot control head. They were in the process of completing the inspection when the pilot asked for the airplane stating that he needed it for a trip. The pilot also asked that the airplane be returned to him without the interior installed. Two days before the accident, the airplane was returned to the pilot with the annual inspection incomplete. The autopilot control head, roll servo and capstan were returned to the pilot in a cardboard box on this date. A friend of the pilot reported that the day before the accident, the pilot completed reinstalling the seats and "other things" in order to fly the airplane the next day. It is possible that improper installation or malfunction of the autopilot resulted in the loss of control; however, the extent of damage and fragmentation of the entire airplane wreckage precluded detailed examination of the flight control and autopilot systems and hence a conclusive determination of the reason for the loss of control.
Probable cause:
The loss of control for an undetermined reason.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Asheville: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 27, 2004 at 1050 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N611JC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Asheville – Greensboro
MSN:
P-496
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
13400
Aircraft flight hours:
2144
Circumstances:
At about the 3,000-foot marker on the 8,000-foot long runway witnesses saw the airplane at about 100 to 150-feet above the ground with the landing gear retracted when they heard a loud "bang". They said the airplane made no attempt to land on the remaining 5,000 feet of runway after the noise. The airplane continued climbing and seemed to gain a little altitude before passing the end of the runway. At that point the airplane began a right descending turn and was in a 60 to 80 degree right bank, nose low attitude when they lost sight of it. The airplane collided with the ground about 8/10 of a mile from the departure end of runway 34 in a residential area. Examination of the critical left engine found no pre-impact mechanical malfunction. Examination of the right engine found galling on all of the connecting rods. Dirt and particular contaminants were found embedded on all of the bearings, and spalling was observed on all of the cam followers. The oil suction screen was found clean, The oil filter was found contaminated with ferrous and non-ferrous small particles. The number 3 cylinder connecting rod yoke was broken on one side of the rod cap and separated into two pieces. Heavy secondary damage was noted with no signs of heat distress. Examination of the engine logbooks revealed that both engine's had been overhauled in 1986. In 1992, the airplane was registered in the Dominican Republic and the last maintenance entry indicated that the left and right engines underwent an inspection 754.3 hours since major overhaul. There were no other maintenance entries in the logbooks until the airplane was sold and moved to the United States in 2002. All three blades of the right propeller were found in the low pitch position, confirming that the pilot did not feather the right propeller as outlined in the pilot's operating handbook, under emergency procedures following a loss of engine power during takeoff.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to follow emergency procedures and to maintain airspeed following a loss of engine power during takeoff, which resulted in an inadvertent stall/spin and subsequent uncontrolled impact with terrain. Contributing to the cause was inadequate maintenance which resulted in oil contamination.
Final Report: