Tennessee

The instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane under instrument flight rules (IFR). As the flight neared its destination, the controller issued clearance for a GPS approach, and, shortly thereafter, the pilot informed the controller that he needed to review the approach procedure before continuing the approach. The controller acknowledged, and, after the pilot reported that he was ready to proceed with the approach, the controller again issued clearance for the GPS approach. Radar data showed that, during the approach, the airplane tracked a course that was offset about 0.5 miles right of the final approach course until it was about 1 mile from the runway threshold. The airplane then turned left towards the threshold and descended to an altitude of about 145 ft above ground level over the runway threshold before the pilot performed a missed approach. It is likely that the pilot performed the missed approach because he was unable to align the airplane with the runway before it crossed the threshold. The controller provided radar vectors for the airplane to return to the approach course and cleared the airplane a third time for the GPS approach to the runway. Radar data showed that the airplane was established on the final approach course as it passed the initial approach fix; however, before it reached the final approach fix, its airspeed slowed to about 111 knots, and it began a left turn with a 25 degree bank angle. About 18 seconds later, while still in the turn, the airplane slowed to 108 knots and began descending rapidly. The airplane's rate of descent exceeded 10,000 feet per minute, and it impacted the ground about 9 miles from the destination airport. Examination of the accident site showed that the airplane was severely fragmented and fire damaged with debris scattered for about 450 feet. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures; however, damage to the left engine indicated that it was not producing power at the time of the accident. The severity of impact and fire damage to the airplane and engine precluded determination of the reason for the loss of left engine power. Weather conditions present at the time of the accident were conducive to super cooled liquid water droplets, and the airplane likely encountered moderate or greater icing conditions. Several pilot reports (PIREPs) for moderate, light, trace, and negative icing were reported to air traffic control but were not distributed publicly into the national airspace system, and there was no airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) issued for icing. However, the pilot received standard and abbreviated weather briefings for the flight, and his most recent weather briefing included three PIREPs for icing conditions in the area of the accident site. Given the weather information provided, the pilot should have known icing conditions were possible. Even so, the public distribution of additional PIREPs would have likely increased the weather situational awareness by the pilot, weather forecasters, and air traffic controllers. The airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems that included wing and empennage deice boots and engine inlet heaters. Due to impact damage to the cockpit, the positions of the switches for the ice protection systems at the time of the accident could not be determined. Although the airplane's airspeed of 108 knots when the steep descent began was above its published stall speed of 77 knots, both bank angle and ice accretion would have increased the stall speed. In addition, the published minimum control airspeed was 93 knots. It is likely that, after the airplane passed the initial approach fix, the left engine lost power, the airplane's airspeed began to decay, and the asymmetric thrust resulted in a left turn. As the airspeed continued to decay, it decreased below either stall speed or minimum control airspeed, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent.

The twin engine aircraft departed Miami on a flight to Dickson, Tennessee. By night, the pilot decided to land at Cornelia Fort Airpak which is closed to traffic at this time. In unclear circumstances, the aircraft belly landed in a grassy area along the left side of runway 22 and came to rest. The pilot escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was flying in instrument meteorological conditions at flight level 200 (about 20,000 feet), and a large area of thunderstorm activity was located to the northwest. About 20 miles from the thunderstorm activity, the airplane began to encounter moderate turbulence and severe icing conditions. The pilot deviated to the south; however, the turbulence increased, and the airplane entered an uncommanded left roll and dive. The autopilot disengaged, and the pilot's attitude indicator dropped. The pilot leveled the airplane at an altitude of 8,000 feet and landed without further incident. Subsequent examination revealed that one-third of the outboard left elevator separated in flight and that the empennage was substantially damaged. Meteorological and radar data revealed the airplane entered an area of rapidly intensifying convective activity, which developed along the airplane's flight path, and likely encountered convectively-induced turbulence with a high probability of significant icing. The effect of icing conditions on the initiation of the upset could not be determined; however, airframe structural icing adversely affects an airplane's performance and can result in a loss of control.

According to the pilot, after he took off for a nearby airport he raised the landing gear but did not raise the 20-degree flaps per the “after takeoff” checklist. Shortly thereafter, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,400 feet, and in "heavy rain," the pilot noticed that the right engine was losing power. He subsequently feathered the propeller as engine power reduced to 40 percent, but still did not raise the flaps. Weather, recorded shortly before the accident, included scattered clouds at 500 feet, and a broken cloud layer at 1,200 feet, and the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he would fly an ILS (instrument landing system) approach if he could maintain altitude. After maneuvering, and advising ATC that he could not maintain altitude, the pilot descended the airplane to a right base leg where, about 1/4 nautical mile from the runway, it was approximately 300 feet above the terrain. The pilot completed the landing, with the airplane touching down about 6,200 feet down the 8,000-foot runway, heading about 20 degrees to the left. The airplane veered off the left side of the runway and subsequently went through an airport fence. The left engine was running at “high speed” when fire fighters responded to the scene. The right engine propeller was observed in the feathered position at the scene, and after subsequent examinations, the right engine was successfully run in a test cell with no noticeable loss of power. There was no determination as to why the right engine lost power in flight, although rain ingestion is a possibility. Airplane performance calculations indicated that with the landing gear up, a proper single-engine power setting and airspeed, and flaps raised, the airplane should have been able to climb about 650 feet per minute. Even with flaps at 20 degrees, it should have been able to climb at 350 feet per minute. In either case, unless the airplane was not properly configured, there was no reason why it should not have been able to maintain the altitudes needed to position it for a stabilized approach.

Prior to departing, the pilot looked at the fuel quantity indicators, and believed that approximately 3 hours of fuel was available for the estimated 1 hour 20 minute flight. Upon reaching the cruise portion of the flight, the pilot realized that an insufficient quantity of fuel remained in order to complete the planned flight, and he elected to divert to a closer airport. While on final approach to the diversionary airport, both engines lost power, and the pilot made a forced landing to a parking lot. When asked about the performance and handling of the airplane during the flight, the pilot stated, "the airplane performed the way it was suppose to when it ran out of fuel."

The approach and landing were stabilized and within specified limits. Recorded data indicates that the loads experienced by the landing gear at touchdown were within the certification limits for an intact landing gear without any pre-existing cracks or flaws. The weather and runway conditions did not affect the landing. The application of braking by the accident crew, and the overall effect of the carbon brake modification did not initiate or contribute to the landing gear fracture. Post-accident modifications to the MD-10 carbon brake system were implemented due to investigative findings for the purposes of braking effectiveness and reliability. Post accident emergency response by the flight crew and ARFF was timely and correct. The left main landing gear (LMLG) outer cylinder on the accident airplane had been operated about 8 ½ years since its last overhaul where stray nickel plating likely was introduced in the air filler valve hole. Nickel plating is a permissible procedure for maintaining the tolerances of the inner diameter of the outer gear cylinder, however the plating is not allowed in the air filler valve bore hole. Literature and test research revealed that a nickel plating thickness of 0.008" results in a stress factor increase of 35%. At some point in the life of the LMLG, there was a load event that compressively yielded the material in the vicinity of the air filler valve hole causing a residual tension stress. During normal operations the stress levels in the air filler valve hole were likely within the design envelope, but the addition of the residual stress and the stress intensity factor due to the nickel increased these to a level high enough to initiate and grow a fatigue crack on each side of the air filler valve hole. The stresses at the air filler valve hole were examined via development of a Finite Element Model (FEM) which was validated with data gathered from an instrumented in-service FedEx MD-10 airplane. The in-service data and FEM showed that for all of the conditions, the stress in the air filler valve hole was much higher than anticipated in the design of the outer cylinder. Fatigue analysis of the in service findings and using the nickel plating factor resulted in a significantly reduced fatigue life of the gear cylinder compared with the certification limits. During the accident landing the spring back loads on the LMLG were sufficient to produce a stress level in the air filler valve hole that exceeded the residual strength of the material with the fatigue cracks present.

While in cruise flight at 16,000 feet, the pilot requested from ATC and was cleared to make a 360-degree turn to the left. Shortly after this, the pilot requested a 360-degree turn to the right. The pilot then requested radar vectors to the closest airport and was given this. ATC asked the pilot if he had an emergency and the pilot reported he had an asymmetric fuel condition. The pilot then asked for a lower altitude and was cleared by ATC to 4,000 feet. About a minute later the pilot transmitted "Mayday" six times and shortly after this radar and radio contact with the flight was lost. Recorded radar data showed that at 1803:13 the accident airplane was proceeding on a southerly heading at 16,100 feet mean sea level (MSL). At 1803:53 the airplane turned left to a southeasterly heading. At 1804:13 the airplane turned right returning to its original southerly heading. At 1805:14 the accident airplane turned to the right on a southwesterly heading, and maintained that heading until 1809:04 at which time the airplane turned due west and was at an altitude of 15,400 feet. The last radar contact was at 1810:06 at an altitude of 13,800 feet. The airplane wreckage was located due north from this last recorded radar contact. Witnesses observed the airplane descend in a near vertical attitude, collide with the ground, and then explode. Components from all areas of the aircraft structure and flight control surfaces were located at the crash site along with components from both engines and propellers. Impact and post crash fire damage precluded the examination of the airplanes fuel system and components.

The airline transport pilot (ATP) stated the airplane was between 200 to 300 feet on initial takeoff climb when the right engine lost power and the airplane yawed to the right. The pilot lowered the nose of the airplane to gain airspeed, pulled the right power lever rearward and nothing happened. The pilot did not feather the right propeller and started moving switches in the vicinity of the boost pump switches. The ATP passenger stated, he did not think the left engine was producing full power. He scanned the instruments with his eyes looking at the manifold pressure gauges. "One needle was at zero and the other was at 25-inches. The manifold pressure should have been 39-inches of manifold pressure. The ATP passenger observed trees to their front and thought the pilot was trying to make a forced landing in an open field to their left. The ATP passenger realized the airplane was going to collide with the trees. Just before the airplane collided with the trees, the pilot feathered the right engine. The ATP passenger observed the right propeller going into the feather position, and the propeller came to a complete stop. Examination of the right engine revealed no anomalies. Examination of the left engine revealed the starter adapter gear teeth had failed due to overload.

On December 18, 2003, about 1226 central standard time, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) flight 647, a Boeing MD-10-10F (MD-10), N364FE, crashed while landing at Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The right main landing gear collapsed after touchdown on runway 36R, and the airplane veered off the right side of the runway. After the gear collapsed, a fire developed on the right side of the airplane. Of the two flight crewmembers and five non revenue FedEx pilots on board the airplane, the first officer and one non revenue pilot received minor injuries during the evacuation. The post crash fire destroyed the airplaneís right wing and portions of the right side of the fuselage. Flight 647 departed from Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK), Oakland, California, about 0832 (0632 Pacific standard time) and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The pilot was on a circling approach for landing in instrument icing conditions. The landing gear were extended and the flaps were lowered to 15°. The alternate air induction system was not activated. The surviving passenger stated when the airplane came out of the clouds and the airplane started to buffet and shake. The pilot was heard to state on the UNICOM frequency by the fixed base operator and a lineman, "Emergency engine ice." The airplane was observed to make a 60-degree angle of bank and collided with trees and terrain. The Pilot's Operating Handbook states the airplane will stall at 129 miles per hour with the landing gear and flaps down at 15-degrees. The maximum landing weight for the Cessna 414 is 6,430 pounds. The total aircraft weight at the crash site was 6,568.52 pounds. Witnesses who knew the pilot stated the pilot had flown one other known flight in icing conditions before the accident flight.